Chapter 13 Chapter 12 Northeast European Battlefield

Compared with the western front, the combat plan on the eastern front was more flexible, but it was also drawn up more roughly.In formulating these plans, geography was easy to ascertain, but one factor was more difficult to ascertain, and that was the ability of the Russians to concentrate their forces. The territory of Russian Poland is like a big tongue protruding from the Russian mainland. It is surrounded on three sides by the territories of Germany and Austria: East Prussia on the north, and the Baltic Sea outside; Galicia in Austria on the south, behind it The Carpathian Mountains, covering all access to the Hungarian plain; to the west, the German province of Silesia.

The German frontier provinces are full of strategically important railway networks, and Poland, like the Russian mainland, has a very underdeveloped road system. Therefore, the Germans have a major advantage, they can quickly concentrate their forces to meet the attack. Russian attack.However, if the Germans themselves attacked first, this advantage would gradually disappear the farther they penetrated into Poland and Russia.Therefore, based on historical experience, it can be seen that the most favorable strategy for Germany is to lure the Russian army out of its original position and gradually approach Germany. The assault overwhelmed them.This is a Punic War-style strategy, which is much more beneficial than launching an attack first.However, this strategy also has a disadvantage, that is, it allows the Russian army enough time to gradually concentrate its forces and fully launch their cumbersome and rusty war machine.

However, on this issue, the German and Austrian military command headquarters have differences of opinion.Although both sides agreed that the current task is to stop the advance of the Russian army within six weeks, so that the German army can defeat France first, and then the German army will turn around and join the Austrian army to jointly deal with the Russian army. with a decisive blow.But the so-called difference of opinion is nothing more than a question of the method of action.The Germans insisted on achieving decisive results in France first, and therefore only wanted to retain a minimum number of troops in the East.However, some political reasons prevented the German High Command from withdrawing troops from East Prussia, forcing them to garrison the Vistula River area instead.The Austrians, under the influence of their chief of staff, Conrad, hoped to launch an immediate offensive in order to break down the Russian war machine.Because this idea may be beneficial to Germany, it can prevent the German army from being interfered by the Russian army when it conducts a decisive battle in France, so Moltke also agreed to the Austrian's suggestion.The plan proposed by Conrad was to first attack Poland with two legions from the northeast, and then deploy two legions to the east of them, so as to cover the attack of the two legions from the right.

It is the same in the enemy camp.One side of the allies exerted a significant influence on the strategy of the other side.Regardless of military reasons or political reasons, the Russian military command hopes to focus on dealing with Austria first.Because during this period, Austria was in a helpless position and could easily be knocked down.If there is only one Germany left, you can wait for the whole country to complete the general mobilization before dealing with it calmly.However, the French take a completely different view.They hoped to reduce the pressure of the German army on themselves first, so they urged the Russian army to attack Austria and Germany at the same time.As a result, the Russians had to agree that in addition to attacking Austria, they also launched an attack on Germany at the same time.However, they were not prepared in advance for this additional attack in terms of strength and organization.On the southwest front, the Russian army has four legions, divided into two groups, each governing two legions, and it is expected to adopt a centripetal method to attack the Austrian army in Galicia at the same time.On the northwest front, the Russian army has two corps, which are expected to attack the German army in East Prussia.The Russians are known to be slow and crudely organized, so a cautious strategy seemed bound to follow.However, this time they broke their inherent tradition and hastily adopted the line of direct attack on both fronts.

After the outbreak of the war, Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, once commanded the Russian army to quickly invade East Prussia in order to reduce the pressure of the German army on his French allies.On August 17, a corps under the command of Rencave crossed the eastern border of East Prussia.Then, on August 19 and 20, they encountered the German Eighth Army led by Prittwitz and repelled the main force of the opponent in the Compilon area.On August 21, Prittwitz learned that Samsolov's corps had also penetrated into East Prussia from the south, advancing to his rear.At that time, on the southern border of East Prussia, the German army had three divisions defending, while the attacking Russian army had as many as ten divisions.Prittwitz ordered a retreat in panic, preparing to retreat behind the Vistula River.Therefore, Moltke immediately removed him from his post and appointed the retired General Hindenburg to replace him, with Ludendorff as his chief of staff.

Colonel Hoffmann, the staff officer of the German Eighth Army, had drawn up a plan.Ludendorff based on this plan and only partially revised it.He concentrated nearly six divisions against Samsolov's left flank.This force is slightly smaller than the Russian army in terms of number, and it would have been difficult to have a decisive influence.But Ludendorff had already found out that Rencave was still near Compilon, so he decided to take a risk, except for a few cavalry to cover, and the rest of the German army was drawn out and cast on Samsolov's right flank. above.The lack of communication between the two corps commanders of the Russian army and the relatively easy interception and translation of the Russian radio orders by the Germans gave the Germans great convenience in executing this bold maneuver.Taking a centripetal direction, they carried out two simultaneous assaults, which destroyed the two flanks of the Russian army, encircled its central force, and practically wiped out Samsolov's entire corps.If it is said that the favorable conditions for victory this time were not created by Ludendorff himself, but were produced by the situation at the time, then the short-lived Battle of Tellenburg can be regarded as an example of the indirect route of fighting along the interior.

After Ludendorff received two corps transferred from the Western Front, he immediately used them to attack Rencave, which was slowly advancing, and drove him out of East Prussia.Rencave was passive and inactive, first because of the great losses suffered at Compilon, and later because of the lack of accurate information about the enemy.As a result, the Russian army lost about 250,000 troops in these battles, and what is more serious, lost a large amount of weapons and equipment.However, due to the invasion of East Prussia by the Russian army, the Germans were forced to withdraw two armies from the western front, which at least helped the French army get a chance to recover on the Marne River.

The effects of the Battle of Tellenburg (140 km south of Koenigsberg) soon faded as the situation on the Galician front became increasingly complex and began to turn against the German-Austrian forces.The first and fourth Austrian armies made considerable progress in their offensive in Poland at first. However, the second and third armies covering the right flank of the Austrian basic group, due to their relatively weak strength, were unable to defend against the Russian third and eighth armies. The corps, under heavy blows, suffered heavy losses from 26 to 30 August, and was forced to retreat behind Lvov.In this way, the initial victory of the Austrian 1st and 4th Army Corps was finally lost, because the attack of the Russian left wing posed a threat from the rear to the Austrian left wing, which was developing an offensive.Austrian Conrad tried to turn part of his left flank to attack the Russian flank, but the assault was unsuccessful.Later, as the Russian right-wing forces continued to attack, the Austrian army panicked and began to rout.By September 11th Conrad had to order a general retreat, which by the end of September was almost as far as Krakow.

Due to the serious situation on the Austrian side, the German army had to provide assistance.As a result, most of the German army in East Prussia was reorganized into the new Ninth Army, and was ordered to drive to the southwest corner of Poland, and from there to attack Warsaw together with the Austrian army.However, Russia had already completed its mobilization work at this time, and after the Russian army was reorganized, it immediately began a series of counter-offensives.They not only repelled the onslaught of the German-Austrian coalition forces, but also turned to the offensive themselves, and then concentrated a large number of troops into Silesia.

Grand Duke Nicholas formed a huge phalanx with seven legions.Among them, the front three legions formed an assault group, and the left and right wings were covered by two legions each.In addition, there is a Tenth Army, which has also invaded the eastern corner of East Prussia and is fighting a weak German army there.In order to cope with this dangerous situation, the German army handed over the command of the entire Eastern Front to Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffmann.They drew up a new counteroffensive plan based on a parallel railway network within the German borders.Under the oppression of the superior Russian army, the German Ninth Army gradually retreated, systematically destroying the underdeveloped communication lines in Poland.When the Ninth Army retreated to the border of Silesia, it immediately began to turn north, entered the Poznan | Torun area, and then, on November 11, advanced southeast again, reaching the west bank of the Vistula River, directly It pointed to the junction of the two corps of the Russian army covering the right flank.Later, the German army wedged into the enemy split the two Russian armies, forcing the Russian First Army to retreat to Warsaw, and its Second Army was almost surrounded in the Lodz area.At that time, if the Fifth Army in the formation of the Russian Assault Group did not turn around to rescue, then the German army might win another Tylenburg-style victory.As a result of the Russian Fifth Army's return to the division for rescue, a German army encircling it fell into a trap set by the Russian army.However, they finally protruded from the encirclement and joined the main force.It is true that the Germans did not achieve a decisive tactical victory this time, but the maneuver they performed is still a typical example.It is enough to show that even a small force, as long as it can use its mobility to make a sudden attack on the enemy's vital points, it may still paralyze the enemy whose force is far greater than its own superiority in the attack.After this incident, the Russian road rollers began to fail to operate, and they no longer posed a major threat to Germany.

In the following week, the German army brought in four more fresh troops from the Western Front.At that time, the Battle of Ypres on the Western Front had already been lost.Although this force came too late and was not large enough to give the Germans a decisive victory, Ludendorff still used them to push the Russians to the Bzura-Malavka line in front of Warsaw.After the Russian army retreated there, the battlefield on the Eastern Front was the same as the battlefield on the Western Front, forming a stalemate in which the two sides dug trenches.The defenses of the East, however, were not as fixed as those of the West, and the Russians, moreover, had exhausted their ammunition reserves to such an extent that their backward industry could no longer supply them adequately. The historical story on the Eastern battlefield in 1915 is the fierce dispute of opinion between Ludendorff and Falgenhain.Ludendorff believed that decisive results could only be achieved by adopting a strategy which, at least geographically speaking, was an indirect route.Falgenhahn believed that as long as the forces employed were limited, a strategy of the direct line could be adopted to reduce its own casualties while destroying the Russian attacking force.Falgenheim's position was higher, so his opinion finally prevailed, but his strategy achieved little. Ludendorff had seen that when the Russians launched their autumn offensive against Silesia and Cracow, their main body penetrated deep into the position of the Polish salient.On the southwest corner, the Russian army once broke through the snare, and even once stepped into the territory of Austria.Therefore, Ludendorff took advantage of this opportunity and launched a counterattack in Lodz, which temporarily paralyzed the main force of the Russian army.However, the strength of the Russian army was quickly restored; and the broken net of the German army was quickly repaired and reinforced.From January to April the main body of the Russian army marched tenaciously but fruitlessly towards the Carpathians, and fought many battles, only to trap a large number of Russian troops still more tightly in the net. Ludendorff had hoped to take advantage of the situation formed at that time to carry out a far-reaching roundabout maneuver, bypass the northern flank of the Russian army along the Baltic coast, advance to their rear, and cut off the few lines of communication leading directly to the Polish salient. Wire.But his plan was rejected by Falgenheim.Falgenhahn believed that the plan was too rash, and there were not enough reserves to carry it out.A plan devised by Falgenheim himself, however, consumed an even greater number of troops.He had wanted to launch a storming attack on the western front to break through the trench defenses, but with little success he dropped that plan for the time being, because he had to draw some troops from the reserves to reinforce the Austrian ally.At the same time, he invested a large number of troops on the Eastern Front, but the purpose of this operation was very limited. He only hoped to temporarily defeat the Russian army so that he could resume his offensive on the Western battlefield without any scruples. The battle plan on the Eastern battlefield was proposed by Conrad and approved by Falgenhan.This plan stipulated that the German army should break through the Russian army's position between the Carpathian Mountains and the Vistula River, specifically, in the area of ​​the Dunayets River.On May 2, the Germans began their offensive.It was a very successful surprise attack and a quick victory.The Russian army was routed across the board, and by May 14 it had retreated 130 kilometers along the Carpathian Mountains to the line of the San River. Here we can see a striking illustration of the difference between a truly indirect line and what is commonly called suddenness.This attack by the German army achieved a sudden goal in terms of time, space and force.However, the Russian army just retreated backwards, as if snowballing.Although they suffered heavy losses, the further they retreated, the closer they were to their reserves, supply bases, and railway lines.In this way, the Germans pressed the snowball tighter and tighter, allowing the Russian army to compensate for the losses, and turned from fragments into whole pieces.This direct line of action by the Germans, although under great pressure, made the Russians extremely nervous and faced great danger, but it could not destroy them. Only then did Falgenheim begin to realize that he was deeply embedded in Galicia.In this attack, he could not find an area where he could stop and gain a firm foothold.He originally wanted to stabilize the situation on the Eastern Front and quickly transfer troops back to the Western Front, but the result was just the opposite, and he had to transfer troops from France to the Eastern Front.Then he made an almost direct decision.He changed the direction of his attack from the east to the northeast, and at the same time ordered Ludendorff to cooperate with the operation and ordered him to carry out an assault to the southeast.Ludendorff, who was in East Prussia at the time, grew impatient with the wait and expressed his opposition to the plan.Ludendorff proved that this centripetal attack was essentially a frontal attack. The German troops on both flanks could only force the Russians to retreat, and it was impossible to obtain other results.This time, Ludendorff still proposed his plan to maneuver towards Wilno, but was rejected by Falgenhain again. The outcome of the attack proved that Ludendorff was right.Falgenheim's pincers squeezed it together, but they only pushed back the Russian army a little bit, and got nothing else.By the end of September, the Russian defense zone formed a long straight line from Riga on the Baltic coast in the north to Cherrowitz on the Romanian border in the south.From then on, although the Russians could no longer directly threaten Germany, they still made the Germans constantly nervous, tied down a large number of their troops, and at the same time strongly affected Austria. When Falgenhain finally halted this large-scale operation, it was late and still reluctant, but he reluctantly agreed to Ludendorff's plan to try it out with only his own force with limited reserves. Make a roundabout maneuver towards Wilno.So Ludendorff led a small force and took offensive actions independently.He first cut off the railway between Wilno (now Vilnius) and Dvinsk, then continued on, almost reaching the Minsk railway line.This is a major line of communication for the Russian army.Although the Russians repelled the assault, they used all their reserves.These results suggest that Ludendorff's maneuver has great potential.Had this maneuver been implemented earlier and with a larger force, the Germans would have gained much more while the main force of the Russian army was still trapped in Poland. The two powers in Central Europe (Germany and Austria) finally stopped their offensives on the Eastern Front, while they were still tenaciously defending on the Western Front, but then they used the autumn time to carry out a campaign in Serbia.From the standpoint of the entire war, this was an indirect battle, although its purpose was limited, but it was decisive for Serbia itself.The course of this battle shows that, under favorable geographical and political conditions, the method of adopting the remote and indirect route is effective.At that time, the basis for formulating the plan was that Bulgaria had already stood on the side of the two powers in Central Europe and directly participated in the war.When the Bulgarian army began to invade Serbia from the west, the Serbian army was still able to block the direct attack of the German and Austrian allied forces, because the Serbian army could resist tenaciously by virtue of the danger of the mountains.Serbian resistance faltered, however, after the Bulgarian left flank advanced through southern Serbia to the Serbian rear and cut off communication between the Serbian army and British and French reinforcements from Salonika.As a result, Serbia quickly announced its surrender.The remnants of the Serbian army began to retreat in an all-round way. In the deep winter, they passed through Albania and reached the Adriatic coast.This method of concentrating all efforts to quickly destroy the enemy's weaker partners relieved Austria from worries about the future and eliminated the threat from the south. At the same time, it also enabled Germany to obtain a free line of communication in Central Europe and was able to control the situation in the entire Central Europe. On the Russian front in 1916 and 1917 there were no battles worth commenting on.The battles that took place at that time, from the perspective of Germany and Austria, were actually on the defensive, while from the perspective of the Russian army, almost all of them were direct attacks.The campaign of the Russian army proved that the strategy of relying solely on numerical superiority and direct attack was not only fruitless, but also counterproductive, and even hit its own morale.In 1917 there was a revolution in Russia which brought about a total collapse of Russian military power.But in fact, the weapons and equipment of the Russian army at this time are better than ever before.Yet the mass and worthless casualties and attrition had begun to demoralize even the most patient and self-sacrificing armies in Europe.After the Spring Offensive of 1917, there were also numerous mutinies among the French troops on the Western Front, most of which were caused by tired soldiers unwilling to continue bleeding and ordering them to return. Happened during the trenches. Brusilov's offensive from Lutsk in June 1916 was the only Russian campaign in which the route was to some extent indirect.It is also an accidental phenomenon that this campaign has the characteristics of an indirect route, because the attack at that time did not have any far-reaching intentions. Attack.Due to the lack of proper preparation in advance and lack of concentration of forces, this attack, which was launched almost by accident, produced a great suddenness, which caused the passive and slack defense line of the Austrian army to be destroyed. That is two hundred thousand. Surprise attacks that produce such good strategic effects are relatively rare.Because Brusilov broke through the Austrian defense, the Austrian army was forced to stop its offensive against Italy; Falgenhain had to transfer troops from the western front to the eastern front again, so he had to abandon the consumption in the Verdun area war.At the same time, Romania also announced its participation in the war, openly standing on the side of the coalition forces to oppose the two major powers in Central Europe.It was because of this campaign that Falgenhain was forced to resign.It was Hindenburg and Ludendorff who rose to replace Falgenhain, while Hoffmann remained on the Eastern Front.Falgenheim's downfall was formally due to Romania's entry into the war, but the real reason was the direct line strategy he adopted in 1915.This strategy, limited in scope and direction, provided the Russians with an opportunity to gather forces that enabled them to break the German strategic intentions in 1916. However, most of Brusilov's gains from the surprise attack were quickly lost.It forced the Russian High Command to throw all their forces in this direction, but it was too late.Moreover, according to the natural law of war, the offensive continues to develop under the condition that the enemy gradually strengthens its resistance, so that the Russian army continues to consume its reserves without any substantial results.Brusilov's final losses amounted to a million men, but this could still be managed, and only the psychological bankruptcy made the Russian High Command really unable to sustain itself, and in the end it inevitably collapsed. The obstinacy of the Russians in concentrating their forces in this direction gave Hindenburg and Ludendorff the opportunity to act on a new indirect line, as in the attack on Serbia in 1915.The conditions which had been established at that time were partly what made the action all the more indirect.The purpose of this operation was to occupy Romania.At the beginning of the war, Romania had twenty-three divisions that were not well equipped, while the enemy was confronted with only seven divisions.Romania was counting on Brusilov's offensive, the British offensive in the Somme area, and the Allied forces in the Salonika area to prevent the Germans from increasing the number of troops in the division.However, the direct nature of Allied operations in those areas made it impossible to prevent the Germans from mobilizing sufficient forces to destroy Romania. Sandwiched between Transylvania and Bulgaria, the territory of Romania is a land full of natural obstacles.Among them, there are such large obstacles as the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River, so its geographical location in the Balkans is very suitable for adopting an indirect route strategy.For example, the Dobroja lowland on the Black Sea is a back garden in Romania, which can be used as bait, and it is impossible not to use it when encountering experienced opponents like the Germans. Romania's desire and determination was to attack all the way west, breaking into Transylvania.This precisely enabled its enemy to adopt countermaneuver using indirect routes, and more indirectly than they had anticipated at the outset of the war. On August 27, 1916, Romanian troops began their offensive.They organized the main force into three columns, each with roughly four divisions, marched northwestward, crossed the pass in the Carpathian Mountains, and went out to the Hungarian Plain.To defend the Danube, they left behind three divisions.There are also three divisions used to guard the Dobroga area, but Russia has promised to send additional reinforcements there.However, the Romanian attack on Transylvania was too slow and cautious.The enemy only destroyed some bridges, and they found it much more difficult to advance.Originally, there were only five Austrian divisions with weak combat effectiveness serving as cover for the opponent on the border.For the Luo army, this was not a serious threat until the five German divisions and two Austrian divisions who were reinforced by the other side arrived.In order to carry out the second phase of the plan approved by Falgenhain before leaving office, the German general Maxson has led an army to attack the Dobroja lowlands. Its strength is four Bulgarian divisions, but part of the German army is attached. detachment and Austrian pontoon train. While the column of the Romanian Army was still slowly advancing westward, that is, towards Transylvania, Maxson had already launched a strong attack on the Turtukaya bridgehead on the Danube on September 5 and defeated it. captured the three Romanian divisions covering the position.Thereafter, with his flank secured by the Danube, he drove eastward, deep into the territory of Dobruja, and far from Bucharest, the most likely target.This was an assault of great spiritual value, and its strategic significance was that it naturally attracted the Romanian reserves from supporting the Romanian army attacking in Transylvania, and prevented its forces from Spreads out well and wears out quickly. The German army attacking Romania was originally under the unified command of Falgenhain.He first decided to launch a counter-offensive, but in acting, perhaps too hastily and too directly.Although he was quite ingenious in concentrating his forces, he successively defeated the two columns of the Roman army in the south and the center, and at the same time restrained the enemy's other forces with the smallest but just right amount of troops, but the Roman army was only defeated. Chased back, forced to retreat to the mountains.The Germans failed to cut off their retreat to the mountains.As a result of this loss, the entire German program was threatened.The Romans still controlled all the mountain defiles and were holding their ground, thwarting many attempts by the Germans to break through them.Falgenheim's first attempt to advance further failed; but before the winter snows came, he made a second attack and succeeded at last.He then made a leap west, attempting to break into Romania through the front gate.His attack thus became an operation of a direct line, and had to cross several great rivers.Fortunately for him, however, Maxson had already invaded Romanian territory when he advanced to the banks of the Olt and was stopped by the enemy.This allowed him to ride out the storm safely. Maxson drew back his main force from Dobroja, passed through Turtukaya, entered Sistovo, and crossed the Danube there on November 23.He gave up his advantageous position in the rear of Romania, and instead cooperated with Falgenhain's main force to attack Bucharest in a centripetal direction.From a strategic point of view, this is hardly an advantage.Maxson's attack, while allowing Falgenhain to cross the Oort, also enabled the Romanians to use their central position to counterattack.They launched a very thrilling counterattack on Maxson's flank, and Maxson was almost surrounded.However, this danger was avoided after all.The combined action of the two armies of Falgenhain and Maxson then forced the Romanian army to retreat, abandoning Bucharest, and from there retreating to the line from the Celet River to the Black Sea coast. The Germans certainly took most of Romania, and that includes its wheat and oil.However, they could neither isolate nor destroy the Romanian army.When the German offensive reached its final stage, the mental and physical condition of the Roman army improved even more due to the successful resistance.In the summer of the following year, the German army attempted to drive the Romanian army across the Prut River in order to occupy all of Romania's territory.But the Romanians put up a tenacious resistance, and the German plan was not completed.It was not until December 1917, when Bolshevik Russia signed an armistice with Germany, that Romania, completely isolated, had to agree to this and finally made peace with Germany.