Chapter 14 Chapter 13 Southeast European Battlefield (Mediterranean Battlefield) Italy Direction

In the autumn of 1917, Italy became the stage and object of German High Command operations.Here, too, the situation on the frontier gave the Germans the geographical and physical advantage of taking an indirect route, which their enemies did not have.At the same time, it never occurred to the Italians to use the psychologically indirect route. The province of Venice in Italy is a border province that just broke into a large piece of Austrian territory.It is bounded by the Austrian provinces of Tirol and Trantino|Alto|Adige (now part of Italy) in the north, and bordered by the Adriatic Sea in the south.On the coast is a small low-lying plain.The provincial boundary is in the area east of the Isonza River, followed by the Yuri Alps and the Carni Alps. It circles a large arc, first to the northwest, then to the southwest, and extends to Lake Garda.Since the north was so vast and mountainous, and without a military objective of any importance, the Italians considered an attack in this direction impossible.Just because the ability to attack in the north direction is limited, the Italians had to choose a direction further east, and attempted to attack Austria by means of a direct attack.The Austrians were thus able to launch surprise attacks from Tyrol against the Italian rear, often posing a serious threat to them.However, Italy had no other way out at that time, so it had to take such a route.

For two and a half years in succession, Italy has doggedly pursued this one and only course.It fought the battle of Isunza eleven times, all in vain.The Italians made no progress, almost stopped in their starting area, and the total casualties reached 1.1 million, while the Austrian losses totaled only 650,000.During this period, the Austrians launched only one offensive.That was in 1916. In order to defeat Italy, Konrad, the chief of staff of the Austrian army, reluctantly won the support of Falgenhain, and once carried out a surprise attack directly south from Trento.This is an attack directed at the rear of the Italian army.At that time, the Italian army was fighting hard in the Isonza River area.But Falgenhain did not believe in this plan, let alone Conrad's concept of a decisive strike, because he was only concerned with the danger faced by the German army, and he insisted on his ideal of Verdun's war of attrition.Falgenhain even refused Conrad's minimum request of nine divisions.Conrad originally wanted to borrow nine divisions to replace the Austrian troops fighting on the Eastern Front.Since he could not get assistance from the German army, Conrad made a decision in a fit of anger to carry out the plan on his own.He drew some of the best Austrian troops from the Eastern Front, and as a result weakened the defense there.In this way, on the one hand, Brusilov's Russian army could drive straight in in the future offensive, on the other hand, Conrad still couldn't gather enough troops to complete the plan to defeat the Italian army.

Even so, the Austrian attack was almost on the verge of success.Although the Austrian High Command did not deliberately choose an unobtrusive direction to attack, their offensive still had a hostile effect to a certain extent, because the Italian High Command absolutely did not trust Conrad. There will also be troops and weapons used to organize large-scale attacks.The scale of this attack is relatively large, but it has not reached a sufficiently strong level.During the first few days of the offensive, the rate of development was high.Although Conrad was able to quickly mobilize the reserve force from the Isonza River area, and also had time to evacuate the baggage and heavy artillery, this was after all a contest between the two armies, and he only won an equal chance of winning at that time.The offensive Austrian army almost broke into the plain area, but due to the lack of reserves, the subsequent offensive speed had to be slowed down.At the same time, Brusilov's Russian army had launched an offensive on the Eastern Front, and the offensive was completely stopped.

Seventeen months later, the situation in Austria was getting worse, and Ludendorff thought of a joint assault on Italy.The future of this assault is obviously not very optimistic.Ludendorff could draw only six divisions from his general reserve, and his allies were exhausted both morally and materially.Due to the shortage of troops and weapons, Ludendorff's plan could only specify a limited target, and had to take a direct line, that is, to carry out the assault directly to the northeast corner of the Isunda River area.There, the Italian defense line bent right in the direction of the Alps.This location was chosen as the target of the assault because the tactical resistance there was the weakest. As far as this front is concerned, it also adopted a new principle.

According to the original plan, at the beginning it was only to break through the enemy's defense line in the area of ​​Capolido (130 kilometers northwest of Venice), and then use the flank assault method to defeat the Italian army on the Isonza River.However, the tasks stipulated in the later plan were much larger, so that there was no corresponding force to complete them.As a result, Ludendorff at Capolido, like the British at Cambrai, made serious strategic errors this autumn.They overestimate their strength, or rather, they don't cut clothes according to the length of the cloth.Comparing Ludendorff and Falgenhain, it can be seen that each of them goes to an extreme.When Falgenhan made clothes, he always bought too little fabric and underestimated the use of materials, so he had to add cloth in the middle of making clothes. Although the clothes were made in the end, they were patchwork. patchwork clothes.

On October 24, 1917, a skillfully prepared and, again, covert attack began.Immediately a deep gap was cut between the two Italian armies, and a wedge was inserted.A week later, the tip of this wedge had reached the Talimento River (forty kilometers west of the Isonza River).Although the Italian army suffered heavy losses, they still withdrew the disrupted troops under the constant assaults of the opponent, thus turning the German army's continued offensive into a simple direct route action, which only forced the Italian army to retreat.In this way, the Italian army was forced to retreat 30 to 40 kilometers to the west and retreated to the banks of the Piave River.The Piave River was a solid water barrier behind which Italian troops could hide.At that time, Ludendorff wanted to transfer the reserve team to the Trento area in a roundabout way, but it was too late, because the railway network was very underdeveloped, and it was difficult for him to carry out such a maneuver.Therefore, the German army that entered the Trento area launched a fruitless offensive without waiting for reinforcements.Of course, such a belated attack has lost its characteristic of threatening the enemy from the rear, because the Italian line and its reserves have now retreated far, almost to the edge, and the line between the front and the rear It is also difficult to distinguish.

When the initial stage of the surprise attack passed, the German and Austrian offensive became a purely direct action, only forcing the Italian army to retreat gradually.The further they retreated, the closer they came to their reserves, their supply bases, their central areas, and the reinforcements of the Allied forces.In this way, it is natural to have the opposite effect on the outcome of the attack.However, in the early stages of the offensive, the German army was still victorious with such weak troops and weapons.That is to say, it can be proved that Falgenhain did not accept Conrad's suggestion at the beginning, which was really a big mistake.Had it turned to the offensive in early 1916, its prospects for victory would have been much better.

Balkan direction Before concentrating on discussing Ludendorff's 1918 campaign plan, one should first look at the situation outside the French front (that is, the Western Front) and the Russian front (that is, the Eastern Front) and see how his opponents were fighting here. What actions have been taken and what attempts have been made in the past three years. At that time, the French and British military leaders and their headquarters unanimously insisted on the direct line and believed in the power of this line. They not only hoped to break through the enemy's trench defense system, but also wanted to win a decisive victory.However, since October 1914, there have also been many who have been deeply skeptical about the effectiveness of the direct line.People who hold this view are not entirely politicians, but also military figures.This question is now more easily stated after a consideration of historical events.To this category there is Gallieni in France, and Guichener in England.On January 7, 1915, Gichener wrote to French, saying: Those fortifications built by the German army in France should be regarded as insurmountable obstacles, not only difficult to capture by force, but also impossible. Enclosed completely.Therefore, the best way to deal with these fortifications is to implement restraint and choose another place to fight.

In addition, Winston Churchill also once made the following remarks: To treat all countries in the enemy camp as a whole, under modern conditions, the concepts of distance and mobility have undergone great changes; A blow to the enemy on the battlefield is equivalent to a traditional attack on the enemy's strategic flank and will have the same meaning.At that time, many people also cited the example of Napoleon, explaining that forces should be concentrated on the Western Front, but the actual examples were just the opposite, proving that combat operations elsewhere were also necessary.In addition, everyone recognized the fact that combat operations in remote areas coincided with the traditional British strategy of naval landing operations.It would have prompted the British to give full play to the military prowess of their sea supremacy, but until then British sea power had been underestimated by some.In January 1915, Lord Gijchener proposed to send troops to land in Iskenderun Bay in order to cut off the main line of communication in the eastern part of Turkey.According to the opinions expressed by Hindenburg and Enfer Bashar after the war, if Britain took this action, it might completely paralyze Turkey; Nor can it be regarded as an effective indirect route.

Louis George once insisted on transferring the main force of the British army to the Balkans, where he believed that he could attack the enemy from the back door.However, the French and British commanders on the western battlefield firmly believed that the war in France would soon be won, so they strongly opposed any other strategy, emphasizing that it would face difficulties in transportation and supplies.In their view, that would also make it easier for Germany to mobilize forces to meet threats elsewhere.Of course, these opinions also have some correct elements and are not completely based on facts, but they exaggerate the difficulties too much.It is not appropriate to justify their opposition to the Balkan project proposed by Gallieni.According to Gallieni's suggestion, a sufficiently strong force should be sent to land in Thessaloniki, from there to capture Constantinople, and induce Greece and Bulgaria to stand on the side of the Allies.Once Constantinople is captured, it will continue to attack, cooperate with Romania to fight upstream along the Danube River, and push into the hinterland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.There are many similarities between Gallieni's plan and the actual combat situation in the final months of the war.Already in September 1918, German military figures saw that such an attack would be decisive.This is of course an accidental coincidence.So at the beginning of November, although the threat to Germany from the Balkan direction was not particularly serious, it became an important reason for Germany to speed up its surrender.

In January 1915, most of the French and British military chiefs were still unwilling to give up the idea of ​​first place on the Western Front, unwilling to accept any new ideas.However, the views of the opposition have not been silenced.At this time, a new situation emerged, and the so-called Near East project was born.This is exactly a new form of resurrection, only on a more limited scale. On January 2, 1915, Gichener received a letter from Grand Duke Nicholas of Russia.The letter requested the British army to implement a decoy assault to relieve the pressure of the Turkish army on the Russian army in the Caucasus.Guichener believed that he could not spare the troops to complete this task, so he advocated the use of the navy to make a demonstrative feint to the Dardanelles.The imaginative Churchill immediately saw the wide strategic possibilities of this feint and suggested military assistance to the Russians.This feint was carried out by force across the Strait without Army support.His naval advisers, while not necessarily supporters of the plan, were not opposed to it either.Admiral Carlton, the British commander in the Balkans, was then ordered to draw up a plan.This plan was carried out by a combined fleet, mainly composed of old British ships, with only a part of French ships.On March 18, 1915, after a period of preparatory fire, the combined force entered the bay.But the plan to cross the Dardanelles was abandoned mid-execution, as several ships were quickly sunk when a minefield was encountered at an unexpected location. If the coalition forces of the Allied Powers resume their offensive as soon as possible, there is no doubt that they may win the victory, because the ammunition on the Turkish side is quickly exhausted.Without the cover of shore artillery, minefields are not difficult to overcome.However, the new fleet commander, Admiral Robeck, refused to attack without the support of the army.As early as a month ago, the council of war had decided to launch a combined army and navy attack, and it was already starting to send an army under Lord Hamilton to fight.The government, however, has been slow to accept the new plan and to understand the magnitude of the force required to carry it out.Even when these forces were finally dispatched, they were found to be insufficient in number, and there was a delay of several weeks while they waited to be loaded at Alexandria, owing to the redistribution of transport ships to better suit tactical requirements. .To make matters worse, this policy of indecision completely ruined any chance of a surprise attack.In February, when the naval guns of the Allied forces made preliminary artillery preparations for the Turkish coastal fortifications in the Strait area, the Turkish army had only two divisions there; when the navy attacked for the second time, it had increased to four divisions. ; by the time Hamilton was ready for the landing, it had increased to six divisions.At this time, Hamilton's force was only four British divisions and one French division, and he was actually at a disadvantage.Moreover, the Turks had the advantage of a terrain which presented much greater difficulties to the assailant than to the defender.In view of the disadvantage of the number of troops and the limitation of the mission, that is, to help the fleet pass through the strait, Hamilton could not choose the coast of Europe or the coast of Asia, but only On the Gallipoli peninsula. On April 25, Hamilton's landing force landed at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula.There are two landing sites: one is Cape Herris, which is located on the side of the peninsula facing the Aegean Sea; the other is Cape Gebetipi (about 25 kilometers north of Cape Herris).At the same time, the French army also landed in the Kumenkeri sector on the Asian coast as a seductive maneuver to disperse the Turkish army.However, this landing operation of the British and French troops completely lost the factor of tactical surprise.The Turkish army had mobilized the reserves in time, so that the landing forces could not expand the two very small and very weak landing fields. In July, the British government decided to send five additional divisions to reinforce the seven divisions already on the Gallipoli peninsula.But when these forces arrived, the Turkish force there also increased to fifteen divisions.Hamilton decided to adopt a double-strike approach: on the one hand, he would use most of his troops to attack from Gebetipi; A new landing field in order to cut it from the middle of the peninsula and occupy the commanding heights capable of controlling the bay.This maneuver may appear more direct than a plan for an approach to a landfall in Blair or somewhere on the Asian coast, but it has one great advantage: an approach in this direction will surprise the enemy and prevent them from The reserve team was called in time.Thus, before the arrival of the Turkish reserve, during a full thirty-six hours, the Turkish army was there to hold back the British attack, with a total strength of only one and a half battalions.However, due to the lack of experience of the landing troops and the inertia of their commanders, the time and conditions won by this landing were lost in vain.Afterwards, the war situation became more and more rigid, people were disappointed, and those who originally opposed the plan expressed their opposition one after another, and the coalition forces soon withdrew from the peninsula. For this plan to cross the Dardanelles, Falgenhan has expressed his views.He said: If the strait between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea cannot be blocked for a long time, and the ships of the Allied Powers are allowed to pass freely, then Germany's hope of victory will be greatly reduced.For the great powers of Central Europe, it is to their advantage that Russia is in an isolated position.The Russians' escape from this isolation meant more than their victories on the battlefield.Otherwise, the power of this giant monster will eventually disintegrate on its own, sooner or later. This error does not lie in the concept itself, but in how to put the concept into practice.Had the British at first concentrated successively increasing forces for success, their plan, according to the testimony of opposing commanders, had a good chance of success.The British attack on the Dardanelles was a direct route as far as Turkey itself was concerned; For the countries of the Central European Union as a whole, it is even more of an indirect route.If we compare the situation on the western front, we can see that the prospect of the western front was very gloomy at that time. Although a large number of troops have been concentrated in a limited space, there is still no breakthrough in strategy ; but the situation in the Dardanelles appears to be much better, because this operation is just in line with the principle of adapting existing means to the goal.Unfortunately, when the plan was implemented, this principle happened to be completely broken again. Palestine and Mesopotamia direction Expeditions in the Middle East should not have been included in the scope of this chapter.Strategically speaking, these expeditionary areas were so remote from the main battlefield that their operations could not have had any decisive influence on the outcome of the war.It is also unreasonable to regard these expeditions as a means of strategically distributing the forces of the enemy, since in each operation the British army involved far more forces than its enemies. Politically, though, the expeditions played a role.The British used to compensate for the failure of their alliance partners on the European continent by seizing the enemy's overseas territories.When the situation on the main battlefield is unfavorable, or when the outcome of the war is uncertain, any victory on the secondary battlefield, including the gains from overseas operations, is a positive means for concluding a more favorable peace treaty.And, in the course of war, such victory is a good tonic. (After the First World War, many people opposed the return of the captured German colonies to the Germans. They feared that these colonies would become a dangerous bane. Many people forget that these colonies are for Britain. It is said to be of indirect value. In the event of war, quick victories in these areas are sufficient to weaken the pressure of the enemy's victory in Europe and to restore the prestige damaged by the enemy's victory. This countermeasure The psychological effect never loses its meaning, especially with regard to maritime powers. And when a continental state possesses overseas territories, when its territories are vulnerable to attack, it will not be able to not restraining its aggressive intentions. Italy is an example of this. After the start of the Second World War in 1939, it wavered for a long time, unable to make up its mind to enter the war until the victory of Germany seemed certain Undoubtedly, it finally decided to enter the war. The establishment of bases on the territory of other countries, although not guaranteeing the complete deterrence of aggression, is a constraining factor in curbing the desire for aggressive purposes.) The strategic intention of the expedition to Palestine is worth exploring.At the outset, the expedition had shortcomings, and stemmed from the routes taken, both direct and indirect.At first, the offensive developed in a direction that did not seem sudden to the enemy, advancing along the longest and most difficult line, approaching important Turkish objectives by detours.However, the first two operations in Gaza were defeated (one in April 1917 and one in April 1917).Gaza is the gateway from Egypt to Palestine, blocking access along the coast.In the fall, the British attacked with a larger force, but this time the line was less direct. The plan this time was drawn up by Chitward, and Allenbey immediately decided to adopt this plan after succeeding Muller as commander.The plan decided to take an indirect route based on geographical conditions.This is because it takes into account the condition of the water source and the fact that there is only a narrow strip between the desert and the coast.The Turkish fortifications started from the city of Gaza and extended about 30 kilometers inland; at the same time, in a place farther inland, that is, at a further 16 kilometers, there is a city of Beersheba, which protects the country from the east. this area.This time, the British army acted surreptitiously and cunningly, completely attracting the attention of the Turks to Gaza. Then, in the direction of the Turks' flank, they quickly made a roundabout maneuver and seized the city of Beersheba and its water source.After making a seductive maneuver against Gaza, the British planned to attack the flanks of the main Turkish position and at the same time send cavalry from the Beersheba area to encircle the Turkish army from the rear.However, due to the difficulty of the water source and the Turkish army's counterattack in the area north of Beersheba, the British army's plan to implement the maneuver failed again.Although the Turkish defense line was broken through, decisive results were not achieved.The British army's final plan to encircle the Turkish army failed, and they continued to retreat, and finally even gave up on Jerusalem. The wish for a decisive result was delayed for a year, that is, until September 1918, when it was finally realized.At that time, in the desert country, both in the east and the south, a strange campaign took place, which weakened the fighting ability of the Turkish army.These campaigns shed some light on strategy, especially on the indirect route.It was called the rebellion of the Arabs at the beginning, and it was launched under the command of Lawrence.Such campaigns, despite their guerrilla nature, are essentially based on indirect routes.Since the strategy of the Arabs had a very scientific basis in calculation, we cannot fail to note its influence on the general method of warfare.From the general characteristics, this is an extreme form of indirect route strategy, and in terms of its scope of application, it is also the most economically effective strategy.The mobility of the Arab troops is much higher than that of ordinary regular troops, but they are very sensitive to casualties and difficult to withstand.The Turkish army paid little attention to casualties. What they feared most was the loss of weapons and equipment, because at that time they felt that there was a lack of weapons and equipment.The Turkish army can carry out tenacious trench defense and is good at repelling the enemy attacking head-on, but it is difficult to deal with fluid operations and cannot withstand the rapid changes in the situation.The Turks wanted to control vast expanses of territory, but their strength was seriously insufficient to supplement the garrisons here and there.Moreover, their transportation lines are very underdeveloped and the lines are long. Lawrence's strategy is formulated according to these characteristics. Compared with the general strategy theory, its foundation is really different.Ordinary regular troops always strive to maintain contact with the enemy, but Arabs try to avoid the enemy as much as possible.Ordinary regular troops always strive to destroy the enemy in front of them, while the Arabs regard the destruction of the enemy's military supplies, especially the warehouses far away from the enemy, as their basic task.However, Lawrence's strategy goes beyond that and goes further.He does not cut off the enemy's supply line leading to the warehouse, and does not want to force the enemy to retreat, but tries to trap the enemy in place so that the enemy can obtain a small amount of supplies, so that the enemy stays in a certain place. The longer it is, the greater its strength will be weakened and morale will be lower.A direct assault on the enemy may force the enemy to concentrate its forces more tightly, better organize its supplies and strengthen its defenses.By this feeble needle the Arabs forced the Turks to disperse their forces more and more.In short, this strategy, for all its unorthodox features, is a strategy of advancing along the line of least resistance, a logical conclusion.Lawrence, the creator of this route, said: The Arab army never wanted to maintain or develop its superiority in a certain point; after they made an assault on a certain point, they left immediately in order to go to another point to conduct an assault.Therefore, the Arabs always use the smallest amount of troops to carry out assaults at the longest distance in the shortest time.They continue to fight until the enemy adjusts his forces to organize resistance.Therefore, the basic principle of this strategy is to destroy and force the enemy not to carry out assaults on determined targets. Compared with the strategy on the Western battlefield in 1918, this strategy is not much different in essence.In other words, the strategy adopted on the western battlefield in 1918 was even the continuation of this strategy. Is it possible to adopt the strategy of the Arabs in ordinary regular warfare?This depends on factors such as time, space and force.This strategy of the Arabs, indeed the most effective and active form of the blockade, was very slow in its effect on the war, and more so than that which was aimed at destabilizing the enemy. in this way.Therefore, if ideal conditions exist and a swift end to the war is required, it is generally better to adopt a strategy of destabilizing the enemy.However, in order to achieve victory without taking the indirect route, the direct route may appear to be slower, more costly, and more dangerous than Lawrence's strategy.The limited space for maneuvering and the excessive density of troops are also obstacles and sometimes decisive.In normal wars it is undoubtedly best to take the indirect line, which generally leads to trapping the enemy, and a good chance of catching him will assure a quicker victory.But in the opposite situation, or in the event of defeat, the original indirect method should be stopped, and the decisive result should be achieved by directly destroying the enemy's strength and will.All in all, all indirect methods are often better than direct methods, and the direct route should never be adopted unless absolutely necessary. The strategic intentions of the Arabs have not been able to be implemented to the end.This is because, in September 1918, when the Arabs were severely attacking the Turkish army on the Hejaz Railway, the main force of the Turkish army in Palestine had completely collapsed under a decisive assault by Allenby. Should the final military operation in Palestine be considered a battle, or a battle followed by a pursuit?It seems hard to be sure now.At the beginning of the operation the Arab forces were in contact with the enemy, but until the contact was broken the victory was so certain that the operation seemed to be a battle.However, this victory was mainly achieved by strategic means, and the role played by combat actions was insignificant in the battle. It is because of this that many people underestimate this result, especially those who believe deeply in Clausewitz's dogma, and therefore tend to think that blood is the price of victory.Although Allen Bay has an advantage in terms of numbers, it may be more than two: one, or even three: one, but the advantage of military strength does not necessarily guarantee victory.When the British army first attacked Palestine, its advantage was actually greater than this ratio, but the result was still inevitable.Moreover, there have been many offensive campaigns, both in the past and in this great war, in which one side, despite a similar superiority in numbers, ended in defeat. The underestimation of the morale of the Turkish army is a very serious problem.A careful analysis of the favorable conditions developed in September 1918 shows clearly that the campaign in Palestine was comparable in scale and skill with other typical campaigns in history.Although the tasks of the British Army were not complicated, their campaign conception was perfect and their plans well executed in terms of their general characteristics, so that it was almost a perfect form worthy of imitation. This plan to fight the Turks fully reflected Verizon's and Napoleon's ideas about strategy.According to Willison, strategy is the science of lines of communication.Napoleon also said: The secret of the whole art of war is to make yourself the master of the lines of communication.The purpose which the British set themselves there was to become the master of all communications in Turkey.Cutting off the enemy's communication lines is tantamount to destroying its material supply system; blocking the enemy's retreat route is destroying the morale of the troops; destroying the enemy's internal communication lines makes it impossible to transmit orders and reports, It is equivalent to damaging its sensory organs and breaking the connection between its brain and body.The last task was performed by the British Air Force.The British Air Force once completely suppressed the opponent's air force, thus eliminating an important reconnaissance tool of the enemy.Later, it bombed telegraph and telephone junctions in the Airi Afula area, thereby destroying the enemy's command tools.In the second phase of the campaign, the Arabs cut off the main railway line of the Turkish army in the Desa area, and the result was a temporary interruption of supplies from Turkey.This action brought severe mental pressure to the Turkish Army Command, forcing them to draw some troops from their limited reserves for support. At that time, the three so-called legions in Turkey only relied on the only railway line from Damascus for supplies.After reaching Deraa, the railway branched into two branches: one continued southward to Hejaz; the other turned westward and crossed the Jordan River to Afula.In Afula it divides into two branches: one leads to the sea, that is, to Haifa;The Fourth Army of the Turkish Army was stationed east of the Jordan River at that time, so its supply problem was solved by the railway leading to Hejaz.Therefore, once the British army occupied the crossing of the Jordan River near Airi Afula and Besan, the communication lines of the Seventh and Eighth Army Corps of the Turkish Army were cut off. Beyond the impassable trails in the Eastern No Man's Land, their retreat path was completely blocked.If they go on to occupy Deira, the British can cut off the communication lines of the three Turkish armies, and even include the safest retreat route of the Fourth Army. The distance between Deira and the British frontline position is too far, and it is impossible for the British army to capture this stronghold in a short time so that it can have an impact on the outcome of the battle.Fortunately, these strongholds fell into the hands of the Arabs.Out of nowhere, they burst out of the desert and cut off all three rail lines in one fell swoop.However, due to the tactical characteristics of the Arabs and the limitations of the local terrain conditions, it was impossible for them to establish a strategic barrier behind the Turkish army.Allenbe wanted to achieve decisive results quickly, so he had to find a place directly close to the enemy in order to set up a strategic obstacle.The Jordan River and the mountains west of it are just such places that can prevent the enemy from retreating.阿富拉的鐵路樞紐站和貝桑附近的約旦河大橋，距離前線都是一百公里，因此，都在其裝甲車和騎兵進行戰略性躍進的範圍之內，只要通往這些重要目標的道路沒有阻塞，那就可以使用裝甲車和騎兵進行突擊。完成這個任務的中心問題，是要尋找一條接近目標的線路，一方面要使土耳其人難於及時加以阻塞，另一方面又要使他們不能在事後加以切斷。 那麼這個問題是怎樣解決的呢？瀕海邊上是雪倫平原，它構成了一條走廊，通到了埃斯德納倫平原（即納赫｜艾里｜穆卡塔河谷地）和傑茲里爾谷地（即艾里｜古爾穀地）。艾里｜阿富拉和貝桑即位於傑茲里爾谷地當中。這條走廊只有一個門戶通到外面，但因它位置在土軍的深遠後方，所以並沒有派兵防守。這個門戶系由一條狹窄的山地地帶所構成，它恰好把瀕海的雪倫平原與內陸的埃斯德納倫平原隔截開了。然而，土軍卻在走廊的入口處構築了塹壕工事。 艾倫貝曾經進行了長時期的心理準備，用詭計代替炮彈，把土耳其人的注意力從海岸邊上吸引到了約且河的側翼。他所以能夠成功地引開土軍的注意力，是因為在這年的春天裡英軍曾在約旦河東岸發起過兩次進攻，但都遭到失敗。所以，他借此引誘著敵人的注意力。 九月間，當土耳其人仍然把注意力集中在東面的時候，艾倫貝卻把部隊隱蔽地調向了西方，並使沿海地區的兵力對比大為改變，從原先的二：一增長為五：一。九月十九日，經過十五分鐘猛烈的炮火準備以後，步兵開始發動進攻，突破了土軍兩道比較淺薄的防線，而後，採取了廣泛的包圍行動，深深地前進到了內地。騎兵則急速地通過了大開的門戶，以裝甲車為前導，迅速地穿過走廊地帶，到達了進入埃斯德納倫平原的入口處。這次作戰行動的成功，獲益於空軍的保障作用不小，因為正是空軍瓦解了敵軍司令部對於部隊的指揮活動。 第二天，英軍已在土耳其人的後方建立了一道戰略性屏障。這時，土軍還剩有一條退路，那就是越過約旦河退往東方。因為遇到了土軍後衛部隊的頑強抵抗，英軍步兵直接進攻的速度是很遲緩的，但由於英國空軍不斷地進行著轟炸攔截，土耳其軍無法利用自己唯一的一條退路。九月二十一日清晨，英國飛機發現一個大型縱隊正從納布盧斯（雅法東北五十公里）開出，沿著一條曲折而又狹窄的道路向約旦河方向撤退。這實際上是土耳其二個軍團留下的全部殘餘部隊。於是，英國空軍一連對它進行了四個小時的攻擊，把這個縱隊完全炸毀了，可以說，土耳其的第七和第八軍團，從此以後也就不存在了。 在約旦河以東地區，由於難以建立一條戰略性的屏障，土耳其的第四軍團並沒有遭到毀滅。不過，英軍的打擊雖然不夠猛烈，但卻是連續不斷的，因此該軍團也很快喪失了戰鬥力。在此以後，英軍進佔了大馬士革城，並繼續擴張著戰果，攻佔了阿勒頗。阿勒頗城距離大馬士革已有三百二十公里，而距離英軍在三十八天以前的出發陣地，則是五百三十公里。在這次進攻過程中，英軍捕獲俘虜七萬五千人，而自己的損失不到五千。 當時，保加利亞已經崩潰，米爾尼從薩洛尼卡的進攻正好接近了君士坦丁堡，前進到了土軍的後方，使土耳其受到了直接的威脅。這樣一來，當英軍於十月三十一日剛剛到達阿勒頗時，土耳其正巧也就宣佈投降了。 我們分析在巴勒斯坦奪得的這次決定性勝利，必須指出，在英軍還沒能於土軍後方建立戰略性屏障以前，也即是土軍在心理上還沒有受到強烈震撼以前，土軍是能夠阻擋英國步兵進攻的。而且，由於最初形成了塹壕戰的局面，步兵對於防禦的突破也就必不可少。但在正常的作戰條件恢復以後，爭取勝利的工具主要還是機動性部隊，而當時它們在全部兵力中所占的比重都是很小的。在巴勒斯坦的作戰，可以算是間接路線的一種特殊例證，但其技巧主要在於準備階段。至於它的執行，仍然是依賴於部隊的機動性。正是因為這種機動性，才使故人的穩定性受到了破壞，使其組織紀律發生渙散，這實際上又是進行突然襲擊的結果。 另外，還要扼要談談整個東南歐戰場上的薩洛尼卡作戰。協約國方面派遣聯軍在那裡登陸，最初的目的只是增援塞爾維亞。一九一五年秋天，由於遲誤了時機，實際上並沒有產生什麼效果。但是經過三年以後，薩洛尼卡卻變成了進攻的跳板，發生了極其重要的作用。在巴爾幹地區開闢一個立足點，保有一塊基地，雖然很長時期沒有在那裡採取積極的作戰行動，但仍然是很必要的。這一方面是因為政治上的原因，另一方面，也有作戰上的需要。當然，是否需要在那裡集中這麼多的部隊（最終多達五十萬人），則是頗有疑問的。德國人後來挖苦地說，他們在巴爾幹有一個最大的集中營，專門收容著協約國的部隊。