Chapter 15 Chapter Fourteen The Strategy for 1918

Any study of any nature on the operations of the last year of the First World War must be done in close connection with the naval warfare of the previous years.This war lasted for several years, and the naval blockade exerted more and more influence on the overall situation of the war.In fact, if someone were to ask a historian what date was decisive for the outcome of the First World War, he would probably choose August 2, 1914.At the time, Britain had not yet declared war.At 1:25 a.m. that day, British Admiralty Minister Winston Churchill issued a mobilization order to the Navy.The British navy did not win another Trafalgar-style victory in this war, but it contributed more to the Allied victory than any other factor.The naval fleet was the instrument of the blockade, but it was only after the war had died down that it became clear that the naval blockade played a prominent role in the war.If it is more accurate, it should be said that it is a decisive factor in the war.The effect of this closure is similar to that of the straitjackets used in American prisons on disobedient prisoners.This straitjacket gradually plays a punitive role.After the prisoner wears it, his activities will be restricted, and then he will feel difficulty in breathing; the longer he wears it, the weaker his resistance will be, and eventually he will not be able to bear it at all.

A position of isolation and helplessness inevitably leads to hopeless consequences.History tells us that it is not the loss of troops that determines the outcome of a war, but the loss of hope.No historian will underestimate the fact that the complete semi-starvation of the German people was the immediate cause of the general collapse of the German home front.Now, leaving aside the question of how much the revolution contributed to the military defeat, it is only clear that in any military situation the factor of the blockade must be kept in mind, because it is an elusive and all-encompassing factor .

What compelled Germany to launch its first submarine campaign in February 1915 should be seen as its potential threat, if not the immediate effect of the naval blockade.This is an irrefutable fact.Since the Germans had launched submarine warfare, Britain had a favorable pretext to lift the shackles of the London Declaration, to tighten its blockade even more, and to publicly declare that British warships would intercept and inspect all suspected shipments to Germany. ship.When the Germans torpedoed the Lucidania, the United States of America also had an important pretext to declare war.In addition, the occurrence of this incident also eased the friction between the United States and Britain due to the implementation of the blockade policy by the United Kingdom.

Two years later, Germany was in a very serious economic crisis because of the blockade.This forced the German military leaders to put aside all scruples and return to unrestricted submarine warfare.The British army and civilians must rely on sea transportation for supplies, and in terms of military strength, this is its Achilles heel.Submarine warfare has achieved great results in a relatively short period of time.Therefore, some people concluded that the indirect route in this grand strategic plan will bring serious consequences to the country.Of course, this conclusion does not apply to every country, but in the case of Great Britain it is almost entirely applicable.Take, for example, the loss of a ship.In February, the loss of British ships was 500,000 tons, which in April increased to 875,000 tons.Although Britain took countermeasures to gradually reduce the number of ship losses, at this time Britain's national memory was only enough to supply the people of the whole country for six weeks.

The German leaders were apprehensive about the danger of economic collapse and looked to a sound economic solution.It was this fear that led them to wage the submarine war.They were fully aware that doing so would likely bring the United States into the war, but they were still determined to take the risk.On April 6, 1917, this danger finally became a reality.Although it took the United States quite a long time to mobilize its military power, and this was also expected by the Germans, once the United States entered the war, it quickly produced an effect in stepping up the blockade of Germany from the sea.As a belligerent, the United States has firmly used economic means as a weapon.It has little regard for the rights of neutral countries, and its actions are much tougher than those adopted by Britain earlier.The blockade was not weakened despite the obstacles posed by some neutral countries.As a result, the United States turned the blockade against Germany into a trap.It drew the trap tighter and tighter, gradually weakening Germany.This is so because military power is entirely dependent on the economic base.Unfortunately, this truth is often overlooked.

With regard to the blockade, it can be regarded as an indirect line of action within the scope of grand strategy.For it, there is almost no effective way to resist it, and there is no need to worry about any dangerous consequences. Of course, the effect of the blockade will come later.But the longer the blockade is in place, the greater its effect.By the end of 1917, the countries of Central Europe felt the seriousness of this influence even more.It was the economic pressure that spurred and compelled the Germans to launch another massive offensive in 1918, and it was the failure of the offensive that led them to self-inflicted harm.Since the Germans are unwilling to seek peace in a timely manner, they have no choice, or take risks and launch an attack recklessly, or sit and wait to die, slowly exhausting their strength, but in the end they all inevitably lead to failure.

After the Battle of the Marne in 1914, the outcome of the war might have been quite different if the Germans had gone on the defensive on the Western Front immediately, or had gone on the defensive a little later and at the same time started to attack on the Eastern Front. .This is because, on the one hand, by doing so they will undoubtedly realize their dream of conquering Central Europe; The circle will always be tight.If this is the case, Germany can control the entire central European region, force Russia out of the war, and even make Russia economically subordinate to Germany.Britain, France and Italy could then hardly hope to recover from the Germans their two trump cards of forcing Germany to give up Belgium and northern France, and the Germans would undoubtedly want to keep them on the Eastern Front Everything you get.After Germany annexed the territory of other countries and expanded its area, its economic potential and resources would also increase accordingly. Therefore, it could have given up its desire to conquer the Western Allied Forces militarily.In fact, to abandon a goal that brings no benefit of any kind is exactly the action in the spirit of grand strategy, and to pursue such a goal stubbornly is the greatest folly.

By 1918, however, such an opportunity had long been lost.Germany has been greatly weakened economically, and the encirclement that blocks her is getting tighter. Even if she can continue to seize the resources of the occupied territories and bring back supplies from Romania and Ukraine, her economic situation is still in a state of depression. keeps getting worse. Under the above conditions, the Germans decided to launch a final offensive, and their purpose was still to achieve a military victory.They withdrew some troops from the German-Russian front, thus achieving a certain superiority in numbers.However, compared with the forces possessed by the coalition forces when they launched the offensive, their advantages are very limited. In March 1917, the French, British and Belgian coalition forces concentrated 178 divisions to deal with a German army. One hundred and twenty-nine divisions.In March 1918, although the Germans were attacking with 192 divisions, the Allied forces in front of them were 173 divisions.Among them, there are nine US divisions.The U.S. division is actually four and a half, because its establishment is twice as large as that of the European division, so it is converted into nine divisions proportionally.In the future, the German army will continue to draw back from the east, probably only a few divisions.However, the troops transferred to Europe by the U.S. military one after another began like a small stream, and then became a rapid torrent under the pressure of emergencies.The German army has 85 reserve divisions in its total strength, and all of them are well-known assault divisions; the coalition forces have only 62 divisions in reserve, and they are still under decentralized command.The Allied Forces originally had a plan to gather the strength of thirty divisions as a general reserve under the unified command of the Versailles Military Executive Committee.But the plan was later scuttled.British General Hague declared that he could not hand over his seventeen divisions to the Executive Committee.And when the critical moment came, the agreement between the commanders of the French and British armies on mutual support failed to be fulfilled.The imminent danger prompted the coalition to take new measures.Thanks to Hagrid's active support, Foch took on the responsibility of coordinating the operations of the coalition forces, and was later appointed commander-in-chief of the coalition forces.

Compared with any previous campaign, the German battle plan this time has two prominent features: one is to strive to achieve tactical surprise, and the other is to have a broader purpose.If there is any respect for the German High Command and its staff, it should be pointed out that they were well aware that superior numbers could not offset the disadvantages of complete exposure on the offensive.They also know that only by cleverly using various deceitful methods and trying to confuse the enemy can they truly achieve the goal of a surprise attack. Only by using surprise, the universal key, can they open the door to the defense of positions that have been stalemate for a long time .

In the planning of this offensive, the German army had put the main attention on short and intense artillery preparations.The artillery fire is prepared to use chemical shells, that is, gas bombs.At that time, Ludendorff did not see the great role of the tank, so he did not use it in the campaign.The infantry were trained in new infiltration tactics.The essence of this tactic is to enable the vanguard to find out and get familiar with the weak points in the enemy's defense, and try to penetrate them.At that time, the tasks of the reserve team were limited to developing victories, and there was no provision for it to restore the original situation in case of defeat.The divisions which were expected to attack approached the field by night marches; the bulk of the artillery was massed close to the front in concealment, and no trials or surprises were made.In addition, what appeared to be offensive artillery fire was carried out at several other locations across the front.On the one hand, this is to confuse the enemy and make them unclear about the main attack direction, and on the other hand, it can also encourage the troops in these areas to maintain combat readiness.

However, this is not the whole story.In view of the failure of many offensive campaigns launched by the allies, Ludendorff accepted the lessons learned and came to a conclusion: tactical tasks should be solved first, and then how to achieve purely strategic goals should be considered.Pursuing strategic goals is pointless if tactical victory is not guaranteed.Since it is impossible to take a strategic indirect route, Ludendorff's principle is undoubtedly correct.The Germans therefore adopted a new tactic according to this plan, and with it a new strategy.In this way strategy and tactics are linked and based on the same principle.This is a new principle, or more precisely, a principle of bringing forth the new through the old, that is, try to pursue a route of least resistance.In 1918, the conditions on the French front made it impossible for the Germans to act in directions where the enemy expected less.Ludendorff had no such intentions either.However, when the two hostile parties are in direct contact with each other under the condition of trench defense, if they can break through the enemy's defense line as soon as possible, and then quickly expand the results in the direction of least resistance, then the enemy's anticipation under normal conditions can also be achieved. What can be achieved by taking action in a direction that is not possible. The German army successfully broke through the coalition defense line and began to advance at a high speed to expand the results.But Ludendorff's plan failed after all.So where is the mistake?Whether at the time of the failure of this attack, or after the end of the war, all critics focused on one point: that Ludendorff had made a tactical error, thereby changing the direction of the assault, spreading his forces, so that Make tactical victories to the detriment of strategic intentions.Critics, it seems, argued that Ludendorff's principles were incorrect.However, if we carefully study the German archives and the orders and instructions issued by Ludendorff after the war, then we may have another view on this issue.Therefore, Ludendorff's real mistake seems to be that he only knew this new principle in theory, but failed to apply it in practice, or in other words, he himself has not fully understood everything about this new strategic theory. Consequences, don't want to act exactly on this theory.The actual situation shows that when the German army suffered tactical defeats in individual areas, he exhausted the reserves too much in order to restore the situation, and he hesitated for too long when the tactical victory needed to expand the results. Difficulties began to arise on the German side as early as when choosing the main assault direction.It was originally planned to choose the 100-kilometer front from Aras to Rafael, and the 17th, 2nd, and 18th legions would be responsible for the attack.But at the same time, two other options were proposed.The first case advocates attacking from both sides of the Verdun salient.However, this case was later rejected for three reasons: first, the terrain is unfavorable; second, even if a breakthrough can be achieved, there may not be any decisive results; The French army has already recharged its batteries, and I am afraid it will not be easy to break through.In the second case, the attack was carried out between Ypres and Lens.Although the case was supported by Ludendorff's military adviser Weizl, and by Prince Rupricht, who commanded from St. Quentin to the coast, Ludendorff abandoned it. The reason is that it is very likely to encounter an assault from the main force of the British army in this area, and there are some swamps that are difficult to pass. In the end, the area from Aras to Raphael was finally selected. The reason, apart from the more favorable terrain, was that the enemy's fortifications there were relatively weak, and there were relatively few defensive troops and reserves.Moreover, to the south of that lot was the junction of the French and British armies.Ludendorff had counted on first separating the French and British armies and then destroying the British.According to his estimation, the British army must have been greatly weakened after a long and bitter battle at Ypres.As far as the general situation is concerned, the strength of the coalition forces in this area has undoubtedly been weakened to a considerable extent, but in terms of specific facts, Ludendorff's estimation is very wrong.The northern part of this section, accounting for about one-third of the entire front, not only has strong fortifications, but also is closely defended by the British Third Army.The corps consisted of fourteen divisions, four of which served as reserves.At the same time, the bulk of the British general reserve was concentrated on this flank.As a result, they were able, and in time, to be supported by other British forces further north.The central part and the south side of this area used to be the main assault area of ​​the German army, and the Fifth Army of the British Army was responsible for the defensive task there.They are a total of five divisions, resisting the attack of the German Second Army.From here to the south, on the longer line of defense, seven British divisions are defending, one of which is the reserve.It is the Eighteenth Army of the German Army that is attacking on this front. Ludendorff ordered the XVII Army near Arras to carry out the first assault with nineteen divisions. Its offensive front was twenty-four kilometers, but this was only the strength of its left flank.Ludendorff did not intend to carry out a frontal attack on the British army that was assaulting in the direction of Cambrai, but only wanted to restrain it. Therefore, only two divisions of the German Second Army were used on the eight-kilometer front of this section.This army concentrated eighteen divisions to attack the left flank of the British Fifth Army.The British Fifth Army, with only five divisions, is occupying a twenty-four-kilometer defensive front.In the southernmost section, the German Eighteenth Army attacked from both sides of Saint-Quentin.Ludendorff gave the corps the task of attacking a front with a width of 43 kilometers with 24 divisions.Therefore, although Ludendorff put forward a new principle, he still dispersed his forces according to the distribution of the enemy's forces, and did not concentrate the main force to deal with the weakest part of the enemy's defense. The orientation laid down in Ludendorff's order shows this tendency even more clearly.He stipulated that the main assault be carried out in the area north of the Somme.After breaking through the enemy's defenses, the Seventeenth and II Corps were to turn northwest and push the British down to the coast.Their left flank would be covered by a river and the Eighteenth Corps.In this way, the Eighteenth Army would act as a flanking support for the Seventeenth and Second Armies, which were carrying out the main assault.However, the result of the matter was completely opposite.Where Ludendorff set his hopes low, he quickly achieved results, while where he set his hopes high, he failed to achieve anything. In the early hours of March 21, 1918, the Germans began their offensive.Under the cover of the morning mist, the attack took on the effect of a surprise attack.At that time, the British army's defensive troops in the south of the Som River were relatively weak.Although the attacking German army was relatively weak, the defense of the place was breached.In the Arras area, the German attack did not progress, thus adversely affecting the entire offensive north of the river.The occurrence of such a result was originally completely in line with the law.But Ludendorff thus violated the new principles himself.He did not hesitate to spend a few days in a row, desperately assaulting the strong fortifications in the Aras area.Ludendorff always took the direction of Arras, which was stubbornly held by the enemy, as his main direction of attack, and tried to resume the offensive there.He also tried to restrain the Eighteenth Army at that time, and although the army did not encounter serious obstacles from the enemy in its attack, he did not allow them to continue to drive south.Until March 26, when Ludendorff issued an order to the Eighteenth Army, they were still not allowed to cross the Avri River, and they were stipulated to attack at the same speed as the neighboring Second Army.At that time, the Second Army, because it was restrained by the Seventeenth Army near Arras, its advancing speed was also extremely slow.It can be seen from this that Ludendorff is actually using the method of direct assault from the front to attack the strongest part of the British defense zone in an attempt to defeat the British army.Because of this obstinate conception, he could not, of course, throw his reserves to the south bank of the Somme, and thus could not win.Later, although he wanted to correct this mistake, the time had passed and it was too late. Under the circumstances at that time, after bypassing the flank of the British army, if the troops could go straight to the rear of the Aras fortress, then the original plan to turn to the northwest would have the hope of success.On March 26, the German offensive in the area north of the Somme, that is, the left flank of the Seventeenth Army and the right flank of the Second Army, had been significantly weakened due to heavy losses.The left flank of the Second Army in the area south of the Som River reached the old battlefield of the Som River Battle, which had become a man-made desert. Therefore, the German army encountered great difficulties in both supply and transportation.Only the Eighteenth Army was able to move on without losing its original impact. Changes in the situation forced Ludendorff to draw up a new plan, but the old plan was still in effect.On March 28, he ordered the Seventeenth Army to launch a new direct attack on the heights near Arras with its right flank; at the same time, he ordered the Sixth Army to launch a surprise northward in the Vimy and La Basse areas.This time, taking into account the favorable situation already formed on the south bank of the Somme, he designated Amiens as the main target of the Second Army.Nevertheless, he prevented the Eighteenth Army from advancing further and forbidding them to turn around in the direction of Amiens' flank.As a result, the attack on the city of Amiens had to adopt the method of frontal assault under the unfavorable terrain. On March 28, the Germans resumed their attack on Arras.The attack, without any pretense, and meeting the strong and prepared defenses of the British general Byrne's 3rd Corps, was again defeated.Only at this time did Ludendorff abandon the original plan and transfer his main force and the remaining part of the reserve team to attack Amiens.At the same time, he ordered the Eighteenth Army to stay where it was for two days.In this way, the offense will naturally not achieve results.Therefore, when the offensive was launched again on March 30, the number of participating troops would be limited, and decisive results could not be achieved by relying on those troops alone.At that time, the French army had time to prepare. It not only transferred the reserve team, but also strengthened the fortifications, closing the gap opened by the German army's previous attack in their defense line.On the first day of this operation, the French artillery, closely following the infantry, officially participated in the large-scale operations and conducted concentrated fire.On April 4, the Germans tried again, attacking with fifteen divisions, but only four of them were fresh, and the result was naturally less effective. In view of the fact that further attacks would consume more troops, Ludendorff finally made a decision to temporarily suspend the assault on Amiens.At that time, it never occurred to him that he should throw his main force at the junction between the British and French armies.As early as March 24, Pétain had warned Hague that if the Germans continued to assault the French-defended sector, he would have to withdraw his reserves from this sector and use the To block the southwest direction, in order to defend Paris.Originally, as long as the German army put a little more pressure on the French defensive positions, they could immediately expand a small crack that had opened into a big gap. Based on the experience of this battle, two historical conclusions can be drawn: first, the joint is the most sensitive and the most favorable point of attack; Wedging is more difficult; on the contrary, it is easier when the two armies are spread out over a broad front; and it is easier to wed the enemy's defenses when the troops are separated from each other and fight independently of each other. . Since Ludendorff had sent most of his reserves to the south of Arras and trapped them there on a huge salient, when he later launched a new attack on the area north of this place, he even I don't have much confidence anymore.On March 25, he issued an order ordering the authorities to prepare for a small offensive in the districts of La Basse and Armantières, but only for the purpose of continuing to expand the breach.On the twenty-eighth, after the failure of the attack in Arras, he decided to expand the plan.According to this plan, the first assault was to be carried out on the area south of Armantières, and after twenty-four hours the attack was to be carried out from the north of the city. Due to the late order, the preparations were somewhat delayed.It was not until April 9 that the troops were just getting ready to attack, and by this time, apart from a few feints designed to distract the enemy, the entire attack was still planned.This time, again aided by the morning mist and weakened in the enemy's defenses, the initial raid was successful.Ludendorff seized this victory and developed it into a massive offensive south of Armantières.The offensive front was twenty-four kilometers wide. The first echelon of the German army consisted of nine divisions and the second echelon five divisions.At that time, the enemy consisted of one division of the Portuguese army and two divisions of the British army. Close to their rear, there were also reserves of two divisions.The next day, the German army began to attack again north of Armangel, with four divisions in the first echelon and two divisions in the second echelon. The front of the attack was 11 kilometers.Here, too, the Germans were aided by thick fog.However, as resistance intensified on the Allied side, Ludendorff had to bring fresh new forces of his own into battle, so that by the end of the first week of May he had more than forty divisions in action.In this way, Ludendorff was once again caught in a war of attrition and could not extricate himself. The retreat of the British army almost reached their base on the coast.However, when they reached a distance of 16 kilometers from the important railway junction of Hazebrouck, they finally gained a firm foothold and stopped the German army.On April 17, Ludendorff attempted to attack Ypres with a concentric attack.But for the British army, this has completely lost the meaning of the raid, because Haig took an indirect action, and had automatically withdrawn from the area as early as forty-eight hours ago. As a result, the German army's plan was completely defeated.After this defeat, Ludendorff made another decision to take a purely direct attack south of Yeper, but by this time the French had brought up their reserves.On April 25, the Germans assaulted the junction and broke through the defenses next to the high ground near Goldmery. However, Ludendorff was unable to take advantage of the successful expansion due to fear of being hit by a counterattack.Throughout the course of the campaign he had been so cautious in employing his reserves that no real victory could be expected.After the failure of the first attack, it can be seen that Ludendorff himself does not have much confidence in future victories.On April 29, he made an impromptu decision to stop further attacks.In doing so, he seemed to intend by his next move to draw away the French reserves for a final decisive assault on the English in the plains of Flandres. Earlier, Ludendorff had also issued an order to prepare for an offensive in the Chemins-de-Dame and Soissons areas.According to the original plan, the offensive would begin on April 17, but it was not until May 27 that the offensive was truly ready.The delay was due to the fact that Ludendorff had been busy in Flanders and had since exhausted the reserves.The reconnaissance detachment of the U.S. Army Headquarters in Europe made quite accurate reconnaissance of the location and approximate time of the German attack.But they waited until May 26, when their judgment had been confirmed by the prisoners' confessions, before reporting the information.The alarm was issued too late, and there was no time to take any other measures except to immediately order the troops to enter a combat state to improve combat effectiveness.Still, the early warning allowed the reserves to move ahead.On the morning of May 27, the German army launched an offensive. The first echelon consisted of fifteen divisions, and the second echelon consisted of seven divisions. The frontal width of the assault was 38 kilometers.The enemy who was defending at that time was five divisions of the French and British coalition forces, and another four divisions were used as reserves.Under the cover of fog and smoke, the German attacking troops quickly repelled the enemy's garrison on the Chemin-de-Dam road, and then crossed the Anne River.On May 30 they reached the Marne.Here again, Ludendorff had some victories, but he was not prepared for them and therefore did not have high hopes.When he brought up a large number of reserves, the coalition forces also transferred their own reserves to the battlefield, and they had greater adaptability, so the outcome of this battle could not have a decisive impact. Some analysis can be made of Ludendorff's initial victories this time.There seem to be three reasons why he was able to win: first, the attention and reserves of the coalition forces were initially dispersed to other areas; Thirdly, the commander of the French army in this area is really clumsy.The French commander insisted on concentrating his infantry in forward positions, thereby making his troops serve as cannon fodder for the Germans, and was dealt a fatal blow from the start.At the same time, his artillery, part of the reserves, and the command post were all too close to the front, so once the Germans broke through the defense, his entire defense system would quickly collapse.This made the German offensive tactically achieve a sudden purpose.This suddenness, which had been partially lost on the eve of the attack, was fully restored after the attack had begun.This is because the purpose of any surprise operation is to destabilize the enemy, or to completely panic the enemy, or to trap the enemy, regardless of the situation, the effect is the same. By this time, Ludendorff had occupied three prominent positions on the Allied line of defense: two large and one small.After that, he tried to level the front in the Compiègne area, but at this time it was impossible to achieve the sudden goal of the attack.On June 19, the Germans launched an assault along the Oise River in the southwest, but it was too late to cooperate with the attack in the Château-Zieri area in the southeast. Then there was an interstitial phase, which lasted a full month.Ludendorff had always dreamed of delivering a decisive blow to the British in Belgium, and the plan had long been drawn up.However, he thought that the British reserves were still too strong in Belgium, and he conceived a plan for a feint, in the hope of drawing the British reserves thither by making a strong assault in the south. .At that time, Ludendorff failed to eliminate the Compiègne salient on the Allied defense line, so he planned to level the front in the Rimes (now Reims) area.In this way, it is necessary to make the troops rest and prepare for the attack, so that the start of the attack is delayed.This delay turned out to be Ludendorff's fatal scourge, for it also gave the other side time in which the British and French armies could mobilize and recover, while the American troops traveled across the ocean to Europe. The tactical victories of Ludendorff's various assaults did not lead him to his goal.For, encouraged by such victories, he pushed his troops too far each time, and cost too much time and strength.Moreover, these raids were not well coordinated with each other and lacked interlinkages.Many of his assaults were carried out not on the line where the enemy's resistance was weakest, but on the line where the enemy's resistance was gradually strengthened.Therefore, the German offensive that followed the breakthrough of the defense, as a rule, became a purely direct advance from a strategic point of view.Although Ludendorff opened three gaps in the Allied line of defense, and each gap had a certain depth, none of the gaps was deep enough to reach the enemy's strategic rear, so none of them could cut off the enemy's important artery.This was his strategic failure, which turned the German front into a zigzag shape, and at the same time provided favorable conditions for the Allied forces to launch a counterattack on his flank. On July 15, 1918, Ludendorff launched a new offensive.For the coalition forces, this attack was expected.Therefore, the German attack east of Rimes was quickly repulsed by the French army, which had switched to mobile defense.The German army, which forcibly crossed the Marne River west of Rimes, actually only accelerated its own collapse.This is because Foch had already made preparations. On July 18, he launched a sudden counterattack to the west of the Marne salient.The campaign was directed by Petain.He used a new tool on the battlefield that Ludendorff did not have.Like the Cambrai operation, in the first echelon of the attacking force, a large number of light tanks were used.Originally, for a considerable period of time, the German army had firmly controlled the areas captured by the wedge defense of the Allied forces, and planned to retreat the troops one by one in an attempt to level the front.However, their reserves were finally forced to run out.This forced Ludendorff to relax his offensive in the Flanders region. At first he just wanted to delay it for a while, but later he had to give up.From then on, the war initiative on the western battlefield was officially transferred to the coalition forces. The characteristics of the coalition's counter-assault in the Marne area are worth studying.貝當曾向福煦提出建議，要求在博韋和埃佩爾內兩個地區分別集中預備隊兵力，組成兩個獨立的集團，其目的是要在德軍發動進攻後向其兩翼實施反突擊。第一個集團由馬金指揮，起初曾用來擊毀德軍在六月九日發動的進攻，隨後便轉移了陣地，專門去對付馬恩突出部西側的敵軍。後來，福煦又打算以該集團去進攻蘇瓦松的鐵路樞紐站。但是當它作著進攻的準備時，偵察部門獲得一個準確情報，探知德軍的下一次進攻必然從里姆地區發起。於是，福煦決定摧毀這次進攻，並預期在七月十二日對德軍實施突擊。而貝當卻認為，最好先讓德軍攻進來，這樣既可使法軍獲得休整，也便於對德軍的後方進行突擊。然而，事態的發展頗為奇怪。到了七月十二日，法軍並未能作好進攻準備，因為作戰部署的進行，實際上按貝當計畫的成分多些，按福煦計畫的成分反而少些，但是又不是全部。根據貝當的計畫，戰役的進程可以分為三個步驟：首先，只以少數兵力防守第一陣地，故意誘敵來攻，且戰且退，力求把敵軍阻止在第二陣地前面；其次，實行局部的反衝擊，把敵人的預備隊引來參加戰鬥，使其裝入法軍向里姆兩側實行衝擊所造成的新口袋中；最後，派出由馬金指揮的預備隊兵力，使其在東面沿著馬恩河突出部的底邊實施反攻。貝當指望在戰役實施過程中形成一個巨大的口袋，把安訥河南面的所有德軍全部包圍進去。 後來發生的事實和福煦採取的行動，使貝當的計畫發生了某些改動。因為德軍在里姆東面發起的進攻沒有成功，法軍便轉而採取了機動防禦。這是戰術性間接路線的一種形式。而在里姆西面，法軍的指揮官頑固地堅持著老辦法，進行了堅決的防禦，結果只是使德軍突破防線而已。隨後，德軍強渡了馬恩河。為了應付這個緊急的危機，貝當不得不把自己的大部分預備隊投入戰鬥。按他原來的打算，這些兵力要等到戰役的第二階段才予以動用。為了補充自己抽空了的預備隊，貝當決定從馬金的兵力中調撥一部分過來，因而使得馬金實施反突擊的時間不得不往後推遲。可是，福煦早就下了命令，規定反突擊必須在七月十八日開始。但當福煦得悉貝當所下的命令以後，馬上又把命令撤銷了。這樣一來，貝當計畫的第二階段便完全被破壞了。結果，德軍終於把預備隊調集起來，既阻住了馬金的反攻，也保障自己控制了鑽出口袋的出口。法軍的反突擊很快變成了直接的壓迫行動，只是單純地追趕著德軍。這有如法爾根漢一九一五年在波蘭作戰的情況，最後雖然把整個口袋壓扁了，但只不過是把口袋裡的敵人全部擠了出去。 從此以後，福煦的主要意圖就是把主動權緊緊地抓住，在自己尚未集中足夠數量的預備隊以前，決不使德軍有任何喘息的機會。他決心把一切橫向的鐵路掌握到手，並為此進行了一系列局部性的進攻戰役。八月八日，海格在亞眠地區組織了第一次進攻。由於採取了謹慎態度而又技巧地運用了欺詐手段，法國人在進攻以前竟使勞林森指揮的第四軍團暗中增兵一倍。聯軍這次進攻，在第一梯隊裡使用了四百五十輛坦克，因此，與以前進行的各次進攻戰役比較起來，具有最大的突然性。但是，法軍實施進攻的路線實在過於直接化了，致使這次進攻很快就被德軍阻住。儘管如此，法軍作戰行動在戰役初期顯示出來的那種突然性，仍然產生了強烈的震撼作用，曾使德軍最高統帥部在心理上喪失了平衡。魯登道夫意識到自己的部隊在精神方面已經瀕於破產以後，終於不得不公開宣稱：只有採取談判的方法才可能獲得和平。但他同時又說：我們的戰略目的，是要轉入戰略防禦，以此來逐漸消磨敵人繼續作戰的意志。 在此同時，聯軍方面也採取了新的戰略方法。第一個採取行動的就是福煦。他命令聯軍各部隊在整個戰線的各個地段接連不斷地實行進攻。使這種方法有所發展的是海格。他曾拒絕執行福煦關於要他屬下第四軍團繼續實施正面進攻的命令。第四軍團的進攻，是在英軍第三和第一軍團先後完成突擊以後才恢復的。這樣一來，專就海格與貝當所控制的戰線來說，聯軍的進攻就形成為一連串前後銜接的快速突擊了，而且正是打在各個不同的地段上。其中，每一次突擊都恰好是在它剛要喪失其最初衝擊力的時候停止，前一個突擊正像是為後一個突擊鋪路。因此，這些突擊是彼此緊密相連的。聯軍這種車輪戰法，使魯登道夫不能自由自在地調動預備隊，無法應付預料中的打擊。而且，魯登道夫的預備隊很快就消耗光了。聯軍方面的後備力量卻並不感到如何緊張。聯軍採取的這種方法，雖然實質上不能算是間接路線的方法，但不論就那個場合來看，都應該說是與間接路線很接近的。採取這種方法，雖然不一定是在敵人期待最小的方向上實施進攻，但卻可避免在敵人最可能預計到的方向上實施進攻；雖然不一定是沿著敵人抵抗力最弱的線路實施進攻，但卻可避免在敵人抵抗力愈來愈強的方向上實施進攻；因此，這種方法實際上可以算是一種消極形式的間接路線。 由於德軍在精神上日趨瓦解，兵力上損失慘重，採取上述方法，至少可使聯軍連續不斷地發起進攻，逐步削弱德軍的抵抗能力。在德軍頹勢日益明顯的情況下，海格不斷提高了信心。他擔保說，自己有力量突破興登堡防線。德軍那條防線，當時是由最有戰鬥力的預備隊進行防守的。這些情況也使福煦相信，有必要放棄上述方法。因此，他便決定在九月底同時發動全面進攻。 福煦的計劉是：由英軍和美軍分別組成聯軍的兩翼，從德軍楔入法國境內所形成的巨大突出部的兩側實施進攻，採取向心方向實行突擊，力求把楔入法境的大部分德軍隔絕開來。作出這個計畫的根據，是把阿登山當作一個幾乎無法通過的地區，把它當作一堵後牆，認為這個山區只有兩側有些狹窄的通道。順便說一句，關於阿登山的這種觀念，可以說是來自對該地區的片面理解。事實上，阿登山地區內有著良好的道路網，交通是發達的，其境內多半是丘陵，大山比較少。 按照潘興的建議，這個計畫本來還含有某種程度的間接路線意味。他的意思是，美軍應在布里昂地區發動進攻，發展局部的勝利，從而削平聖米赫爾附近那個突出部，迂迴到梅斯城，切斷德軍通往洛林的交通線，阻塞德軍從西面向萊茵河退卻的道路。可是，海格不贊成這個計畫。他認為這樣的進攻方向與聯軍其他的進攻方向不協調，不是向心的，而是離心的。福煦也同意海格的觀點，沒有考慮潘興的反對意見，並修改了他的計畫。這樣一來，美軍就只好把自己的力量掉轉到西面來，匆匆忙忙地在馬斯河與阿爾哥尼地區實行進攻準備，而時間總共不到一個星期。美軍在該地區的進攻，面臨著德軍不斷增強的抵抗，發展非常緩慢，不僅遭到了巨大損失，部隊紀律也幾乎瀕於渙散。因此，對於海格向興登堡防線實施的進攻，實在毫無幫助。 以後還有多次事實證明，即使擁有相當優勢的火力，而對著士氣已經低落的敵人，如果採取直接的正面進攻，雖然可以突破敵軍的防禦，但卻不能完全消滅敵軍。直到十一月十一日，即實行停戰的那一天，德軍在其後衛兵力的掩護下，仍然順利地從這個突出部撤退出去了。當時，他們逐步地把戰線縮短，拉直，聯軍跟在後面的進攻，實際上是鑽死胡同。其所以如此，不僅因為有德軍進行抵抗，而且因為在廢墟地帶內遇到了補給和維修方面的許多重大困難。在這種情況下，聯軍採取直接路線的進攻，只不過更快地促使德軍溜走了，而他們自己卻無法追上去。 值得慶倖的是，聯軍這些進攻戰役的最後階段，對於整個戰爭的結局並沒有多大的影響。德軍統帥部在精神上受到的打擊，還是來自八月八日聯軍在亞眠地區發動的突然進攻，其次則是薩洛尼卡那個遙遠戰場上聯軍所採取的間接路線行動。在薩洛尼卡戰場上，聯軍是在守兵最少的一個地段開始進攻的，很快就突破了防線。在那裡，由於山地地形的限制，敵方不能迅速地把預備隊調去支援，因而無法阻止進攻的發展。結果，保加利亞的軍隊被分割為兩部分。早已經厭戰的保加利亞人，終於被迫締結了停戰協定。聯軍勝利地完成這個任務，不僅剝奪了中歐大國的一個同盟者，而且為協約國軍隊打開了直達奧國後方的道路。 當聯軍在義大利境內再次發動進攻，而不穩定的奧軍防線遭到突破以後，德國所面臨的戰敗威脅就愈來愈嚴重了。此時，奧國人在精神上和物質上都早已走到了山窮水盡的地步，最後也只有投降。於是，奧國的領土和鐵路，也都變成了聯軍展開對德進攻的有利條件。九月間，德國將軍馮‧格爾維茨即向帝國首相提出警告：繼續進行戰爭將是德國的災難。 這個威脅，再加上封鎖所產生的高度精神效力，即大戰略方面一種間接路線形式所產生的效力，使整個德意志民族都感到大禍即將臨頭。饑餓和失望，有如兩把尖刀，威逼著德國政府只好投降。應當補充一點：保加利亞在巴爾幹的失敗，聯軍在法國恢復直接進攻的傳聞，加速了德國宣佈投降的進程。 由於上述種種因素的影響，德軍最高統帥部終於感到神經錯亂，無以自持。是的，這一過程曾延續了好幾天的時間。這時，德軍已經完全混亂了，在精神上徹底崩潰了。一九一八年九月二十九日，興登堡和魯登道夫匆忙作出決定，宣佈接受停戰。他們認為，巴爾幹戰線的崩潰破壞了他們所有的計畫，因為本來預計調往西線的部隊，現在需要改調到巴爾幹戰線上去。同時還說，如果聯軍在西線再次進攻，則整個形勢將會根本改變，即使這一次能把他們的進攻擋住，但以後仍然是嚴重的威脅。 最後，福煦終於決定發動全面的進攻。美軍在馬斯河｜阿爾哥尼地區的進攻，是在九月二十六日開始的，但到二十八日實際上就完全停止了。法英比三國聯軍在弗郎德勒地區的進攻，是九月二十八日開始的。雖然這次進攻給德軍造成了明顯的困難，但是並沒能構成真正的威脅。九月二十九日早晨，海格開始對興登堡防線發動主要突擊，傳出的第一批戰報，即使德軍發生了動搖。 在這緊急情況之下，馬克斯親王奉命出任首相。這是想利用他的溫和政見和國際威望，來達到進行和平談判的目的。為了求得一個體面的和平，而不表示出自己在認輸，他要求軍方允許他推遲開始談判的時間。他對興登堡說：應該使我有十天或八天，至少也得有四天的喘息時間，以便乘機向敵人提出和平的呼籲。但是興登堡卻回答說：軍事形勢已經極端嚴重，到了最大限度，不可以再延緩了。因此，堅決主張立即向聯軍方面發出和平談判的呼聲。 十月三日，德國政府向美國總統威爾遜提出了立即締結停戰協定的要求。這也就等於公開向全世界承認自己的失敗。而且，早在十月一日，德軍最高統帥部就已經自己破壞著國內的民心土氣。他們在各政黨領袖的一次集會上宣稱，已不可能繼續進行抵抗了。 長期被關在黑暗當中的人們，一旦看見光線，反而會感到眼睛瞎了似的。這樣，在德國境內，各種不滿的和不穩定的因素，現在就統統地暴露出來了。 然而，在幾天以後，德軍最高統帥部似乎又開始有了一點信心，甚至還產生了某些樂觀的情緒。他們看到，英軍楔入興登堡防線以後，並未能把整個防線突破。隨後，他們獲得報告，說是聯軍的進攻速度已經降低，特別是對於有利條件的利用不夠充分，已經無力擴張戰果。這時，魯登道夫雖仍堅持進行和平談判，但他的目的只是想給德軍贏得喘息時間，以便積聚力量來繼續進行抵抗，並保障德軍有組織地撤退到自己邊境內的防線上。到了十月十七日，魯登道夫甚至認為，用不著再休整等待也可以達到目的了。他所以這樣認為，並不完全因為業已形成的情況，而主要是憑著他的主觀判斷。事實上，現實情況從來也沒有像他自己在九月二十九日所描繪的那個樣子。然而，他所散佈的悲觀情緒已經在政界人物當中廣泛傳開，也在居民中間慢慢傳播，有如一顆石子投到水中，水波正在逐步擴大。國內防線的崩潰雖然開始得較晚，可是比起軍事防線來，它卻潰散得更快。 十月二十三日，威爾遜總統用一個通諜答覆了德國人的要求，實際上，就是要求德國無條件投降。就在這時，魯登道夫還在希望繼續進行戰爭。他指望在德國邊境進行有效的防禦，用以打擊聯軍的氣焰。但是，他已經無法控制正在劇變的情況，德國民族的抵抗意志業已崩潰，所以再也沒有人來傾聽他的意見了。十月二十六日，他被迫辭職。此後，德國首相由於過量地服用了安眠藥，曾有三十六小時不省人事，一直處在昏睡不醒的狀態中。十一月三日下午，當他回到辦公室開始辦公的時候，立即獲得報告，不僅土耳其投降了，奧地利也步了後塵。這樣，德國的後門已經完全敞開。第二天，德國國內暴發了革命，並且隨即蔓延到全國。因為德國皇帝還不想退位，和平談判也發生了延誤。這時，唯一的出路只有向革命勢力及其領袖們讓步。到了十一月九日，馬克斯親王便把政權交給了社會黨領袖亞伯特。一九一八年十一月十一日淩晨五時，德國和談代表團的全權代表，終於在和平條約上簽了字，上午十一時，戰爭最後結束了。 這次戰爭的結局，根據最後的判斷，應該算是九月二十九日決定的，因為正好是在這一天，德軍最高統帥部得出了結論，認為戰爭已經打輸了。魯登道夫及其助手們當時精神極度沮喪，以致他們的有害情緒很快就傳染給了全體國民。再也沒有什麼力量可以拯救德國了。指揮官們的神經可以復原，實際的軍事態勢可以改善，可是，士氣和民心卻一時難以振奮起來，這就在戰爭中決定了德國的命運。 在促使德國投降的各種因素當中，封鎖似乎要算是產生了決定性影響的一個。如果不是遭遇到封鎖，德軍在自己的國界之內，也許要進行很長時期的頑強抵抗，但這要有另一個必不可少的條件，即在國內避免發生革命。然而，即使德國人民團結一致地起來捍衛自己的國土，並且拼死阻住聯軍的進攻，但那也只不過是戰爭結束時間的延長，而德國的失敗則是必然的，因為聯軍方面掌握著制海權，這是英國人的傳統武器，他們是必將用來進行封鎖的。 當然，最有決定意義的因素畢竟還是軍事行動。正是軍事行動的勝利加快了德國的投降，沒有使戰爭拖延到一九一九年。這個結論並不等於說，在締結停戰協定的時候，德國的軍事實力已經毀滅了，它的軍隊已經完全崩潰了。也不能說，這是德國向聯軍方面實行的錯誤讓步。認真分析一下最後一百天的戰爭情況，可以更加肯定一個古老的真理：戰爭的真正目的應該是壓垮敵人的抵抗意志，瓦解其統治者的心靈，而並不是一定要消滅其軍隊；戰爭的勝或負，主要取決於雙方的民心士氣，對於敵人的直接打擊，只有一種間接的影響。真正使魯登道夫的神經感到震驚的，是聯軍方面的突然襲擊行動，使他受到強烈打擊的，是他對於聯軍戰略性突擊感到已無能力擊退的心理。這種情況對他產生的影響，較之人員、武器和國土的損失要嚴重得多。