Chapter 16 Chapter 15 Hitler's Strategy

Hitler's various campaigns, both before the start of the Second World War in 1939 and during this war, serve as clear examples of the methods he employed in the same manner as in the previous chapters of this book. method discussed in the chapter.The strategy Hitler used in the first phase of his war was the strategy of the indirect line, and he also reached new heights, both materially and psychologically, on the battlefield and in the arena.Later, he also gave his enemies the opportunity to use indirect routes against himself. In war, the most important point is not to underestimate the enemy.It is also important to understand the methods used by the enemy and to see through their attempts.This is an indispensable premise. With this understanding, it is possible to foresee the enemy's actions in time and take preventive measures.Some peace-loving countries, because they missed the opportunity and lacked due attention and judgment on what Hitler would do in the next step, were always unable to catch up with the bus, and they inevitably suffered a lot.If any country sets up an enemy research department in its government advisory body to study all aspects of war and all problems related to war, and to predict and judge the enemy's next move in a timely manner, then It must be of great benefit.

It must come as a great surprise to future historians that the governments of some democracies did not see in advance the course Hitler was going to pursue.Because there has never been a person like Hitler who was not only ambitious, but also so openly and clearly stated the fundamental nature of his actions and the specific methods he would adopt to achieve his goals.Hitler's "Mein Kampf", together with his many speeches and individual remarks, provide people with a large number of facts, enough to explain the direction of his actions and their logical connections.This very clear self-confession of Hitler is the best evidence that his success was neither accidental nor the result of easygoing.This self-confession is also a stark example of the truth of the proverb: people do stupid things!Not even Napoleon despised his enemies so much, nor ventured so fully to state his intentions.The reason why Hitler dared to show no scruples in this regard was because he recognized a common problem among people, that is, he is able to see the details, but he does not see the truth.Hitler understood a principle: Putting things in the most obvious place may be a good means of camouflage, because things placed in obvious places are not easy to be noticed; sometimes, the most direct line of action is instead The most unexpected.As in the art of secrecy, by publishing as much as possible as possible, people will not imagine or suspect that there are still a few secrets.

Lawrence, Britain's top spy, once pointed out that Lenin was a man who not only conceived a revolution, carried it out, but also consolidated it.This remark is equally applicable to Hitler, and one might add: he also wrote a revolution.This is obvious.Hitler used the methods of the Bolshevik Revolution and benefited a lot from it.He not only learned how to seize power, but also learned how to expand it.Lenin once said that in war, the soundest strategy is to wait until the enemy has lost his mind before fighting, so that a fatal blow can be easily accomplished. Hitler once said that our real wars are fought long before military operations begin.Lauschlin quoted Hitler's remarks in his book "Hitler's Confessions".When discussing this issue, Hitler declared: It is my greatest interest to try to break the enemy's mind before the war has begun.Anyone who has fought on the front lines will want to avoid unnecessary bloodshed as much as possible.

Having focused his attention on this question, Hitler began to divert his thinking from the traditional trends of German military thought.For a century Germany's military theory has always regarded battle as the most important thing, and has led a large number of countries to develop their theory along a very narrow line.They took Clausewitz, the Prussian philosopher of war, as their guru, and accepted his difficult maxims wholeheartedly.For example: to solve a crisis by bloodshed, to try to annihilate the enemy's army, is the first child of war. Great results can only be produced by great and comprehensive battles. Blood is always the price of victory. Generals who thought they could win without bloodshed.Clausewitz rejects the idea that there is an ingenious way of disarming and subduing an enemy without shedding a lot of blood.This is the true embodiment of the art of war.He denounced this view as an idea trafficked from the fantasies of philanthropists.Clausewitz did not see the fact that the basis of this kind of thinking is self-interest towards the country, and it is the hope to find a favorable way out for the nation, rather than a simple compromise.As a result, many generals have become blind Clausewitzians, always looking for battles at the first opportunity, no longer trying to create a situation in their own favor in advance.So, in the course of the war of 1914-1918, the art of war became nothing more than a formula for mutual slaughter.

Despite the limitations of Hitler's views, he nevertheless went beyond the generally accepted traditional boundaries.The following remarks cited by Lauschlin serve as proof.Hitler said: People kill each other, but there is a generalized strategy when they can no longer achieve their goals by other means. It uses psychological weapons. If I can use better and cheaper methods than military means To achieve the goal of disintegrating the enemy, why should I use military means?Our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, control them, and conquer them through themselves. To what extent did Hitler give new directions and elucidate German military doctrine?It is only necessary to compare his theory with that of Ludendorff to see its breadth.Ludendorff was the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces in World War I and a supporter of Hitler. He cooperated with Hitler in 1923 in an attempt to seize power by marching to Berlin, but failed.

After the establishment of a totalitarian state, after almost twenty years, Ludendorff reflected on the lessons of the last war and came to his conclusion that this is the blueprint for the future general war.In his writings Ludendorff began to attack the theories of Clausewitz, which had been the basis of German military doctrine in 1914.According to Ludendorff, Germany's mistake at the time was not that it used excessive violence regardless of the consequences, but that it did not use violence effectively enough.He criticized Clausewitz for exaggerating the role of politics too much.In order to demonstrate this point, he quoted Clausewitz's words: Political intention is the end, and war is only a means to achieve this end. If there is no certain end, the question of means cannot be considered.According to Ludendorff, this is an outdated view.The principle of total warfare requires that in times of war, the entire nation must devote all its strength to the war; in peacetime, it must go all out to prepare for the next war.War is the highest expression of a nation's will to survive. Therefore, politics should be subordinated to the interests of war.

After reading Ludendorff's book, we can understand that the main difference between his theory and Clausewitz's is that he regards war as a means without an ultimate end. If it pursues any purpose, it is to turn the whole country into a military camp.In fact, this view is not so novel as Ludendorff himself imagines.The ancient Spartans had adhered to this principle, and the result was only to paralyze and perish themselves.The purpose Ludendorff pursued was nothing more than to turn the whole country into a warlike whole and create a super Sparta, so the basic task he set for himself was to unite the whole nation.To this end, he tried to create a new religion of nationalism.According to its dogma, the most honorable task of all women is to bear children in order to bear the burden of total war, while the task of all men is to develop their abilities to this end, in other words, the task of people is to procreate and reproduce , in order to carry out the massacre.Moreover, for the sake of unity, Ludendorff favored the old methods of persecution and forbade anyone from opposing the views of the Supreme Commander.

Ludendorff also advocated that a country should have a self-sufficient national economic system in order to meet the requirements of total warfare.From this point of view, he also seems to recognize that military power should be based on economics.But there is one thing that makes people feel strange: on the one hand, Ludendorff admitted that the blockade of the Allied forces played a major role in the First World War and caused great difficulties for Germany; I firmly believe that it is the battle between the two armies on the battlefield that determines the outcome of the war.Ludendorff himself did not realize that this was a contradiction.On this issue, he also praised the old German theorists, saying: Clausewitz only wanted to annihilate the enemy in battle.In Ludendorff's view, this should be an eternal principle.However, Hitler took a different view.He believes that the real purpose of a military leader should be to achieve victory without fighting.

In Ludendorff's mind, the way to fight future wars seems to be just to expand the scale of the attack he launched in 1918.His attacks at that time were indeed intimidating in the beginning, but in the end there were no results.For him, this attack was still a battle, in which infantry, under cover of artillery, mortars, and machine guns, and supported by tanks and armored vehicles, charged forward and fought to the end, hand-to-hand combat. The enemy overcomes.All the actions of the troops are to achieve the purpose of the battle; the role of mechanization is only to speed up the start of the battle.

Ludendorff expressed no objections, either morally or military ethics, to the widely adopted general methods of warfare.He pointed out that due to the needs of total warfare, the idea of ​​canceling unlimited submarine warfare need not even be considered theoretically.He believes that in future wars, all ships that want to enter the enemy's ports, even ships with the flag of a neutral country, should be sunk by aircraft and submarines.When talking about direct attacks on civilians, he emphasized that in the future, bomber fleets will be used to attack civilians mercilessly.However, his special emphasis was still on the military aspect, requiring that the air force be used on the battlefield, first of all to destroy the enemy's army.Only after this purpose has been achieved can the air force be used to attack the enemy's strategic rear.

Ludendorff welcomed every new weapon and equipment, but he just blindly added these things to his statistics without considering how to use them from the needs of grand strategy.He has never seriously thought about the interrelationships among various factors in the war, and even lacks a clear concept.In short: Ludendorff's military point of view is to maximize the various types of armed forces, thinking that in this way a certain state can be achieved.As for what this state is, he is neither interested nor worried about it.Obviously, there is only one idea that he wants to express affirmatively, that the supreme military commander should give instructions to political leaders, instructing them how to work, and the latter must obey his instructions, complete their tasks, and contribute to the war.In other words, those who are responsible for determining national policy must hand over full freedom of action to the supreme military commander and give him a blank check so that he can freely draw on the existing resources of the nation to solve the future of the nation. matter of life. Between Ludendorff and Hitler, there are many ideas in common, for example, the concept of race, country and German nation should have the right to dominate the world and so on.However, there are also many differences between them, especially in terms of how to achieve their goals. Ludendorff's absurd thesis calls for a policy of strategic control, that is, the idea that the army itself can determine its own tasks.Hitler took a much simpler approach to solving this problem.He concentrated both functions in himself.So, like Alexander and Caesar in ancient times, Frederick the Great and Napoleon in later generations, he holds great power by himself.He thus has an unrestricted opportunity to prepare and develop his means for his own ends, which strategists generally do not have.At the same time, he recognized, in time, a truth: Owing to professional prejudice, it is difficult for a general to admit that military weapons are only one of the many tools used by grand strategy to achieve victory. There are certainly many reasons for a country to join a war, but its most basic purpose, simply put, is to ensure that its policies continue to develop, that is, to overcome the resistance of other countries and tenaciously promote its own independent policies.The source of conflict and its main cause lie in the will of man.If a country wants to achieve its own goals in war, it must try to change the opponent's will and make it subordinate to its own policy.If this is clear, then the one military principle which the disciples of Clausewitz regard as the most important, namely, the principle of destroying the main body of the enemy's army on the field of battle, will be placed on an equal footing with the other principles and means of grand strategy. status.The so-called other principles and means refer to various indirect military actions, as well as economic pressure, public opinion propaganda, and diplomatic means.One must never place too much weight on a single tool, since circumstances may sometimes render it ineffective.The smartest way is to choose and combine the most effective means to achieve the most suitable, deepest and most economical purpose.In other words, it is to enable the victorious country to subdue the enemy with the minimum military consumption and minimum losses, and to strive for a good future after the war.Even the most decisive victories are of practically no value if the victorious nation itself suffers heavy losses and is exhausted after the war. The purpose of grand strategy is to reveal and exploit weaknesses in the enemy's capabilities and to organize armed resistance.As for strategy, it is to find the weakest point of defense on the enemy's front and destroy the enemy there.Using one's own forces to attack places where the opponent's forces are strong can only result in unnecessary losses for oneself, and finally feel that the gains outweigh the losses.For an attack to be effective, it must hit the enemy's weak point. The best and most profitable way, therefore, is to try to disarm the enemy and avoid as far as possible the use of forceful combat to destroy the enemy.The method of fighting recklessly to destroy the enemy's army not only involves the danger of exhausting one's own strength, but also may lead to the opposite result, causing oneself to suffer defeat.Therefore, the thinking of a strategist should focus on paralyzing the enemy, not how to physically destroy them.In the lower stages of war, a man killed in battle is only the loss of a soldier in the army, but a living man whose nerves are shaken can become the vector of the germs of terror, enough to create a terror. The phenomenon.In the higher stages of the war, if the opposing commander is psychologically shocked, the entire army he leads can be rendered ineffective in combat.And at a higher stage of the war, if the government of a country is psychologically oppressed, then all combat power possessed by the government may also be neutralized.This is like a situation where both hands are numb or paralyzed, and the sword must fall from the palm. Now repeat the basic idea of ​​the first chapter again: Through the analysis of war, we can see that the superficial strength of a country is expressed by the number of its citizens and resources. However, this strength must be reflected Coming out depends on the health of its internal organization and nervous system, that is to say, it depends on its command stability, popular morale and supply function.Applying pressure directly will often make the opponent's resistance shrink and harden instead, just like squeezing loose snow into a snowball, the tighter the pressure, the slower it will melt.Whether in policy or in strategy, or in other words, in diplomatic or military strategy, the indirect route is the most effective means of destabilizing the enemy's psychological and material , only in this way can favorable conditions be created for destroying the enemy. The real purpose of strategy is to minimize the enemy's ability to resist.From this, another axiom can be drawn: in order to achieve a certain goal, several interchangeable goals must be cast at the same time.When attacking a certain point, it should be able to threaten another point at the same time, and when necessary, the assault force can indeed be diverted there.Only with this flexibility in choosing targets can strategy adapt to sudden changes in the situation. Whether it was nature or nurture, Hitler had a deep understanding of these strategic truths, and few others have come close to him.Using psychological strategy in the political sphere, he seized power in Germany.When implementing this strategy, he tried his best to attack the shortcomings of the Weimar Republic, took advantage of the weakness of human nature, and instigated conflicts between capitalists and socialists in terms of interests. Impression, and then it seems to have changed his point of view, turning to the other party to please.In this way, successively and suddenly, he plays with indirect devices, and finally achieves his goal. After Hitler seized power in Germany in 1933, the scale of his use of this indirect method was further expanded.The following year, he first signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland, the purpose of which was to protect his eastern flank.In 1935, he voluntarily abolished the restrictions on German armaments imposed by the Versailles Peace Treaty. In the following year, he sent German troops to re-enter the Rhine region, which was not allowed to be fortified under the peace treaty.In 1936, he cooperated with Italy and began to secretly support General Franco to overthrow the Spanish Republican government by means of pretending to be a war.This is an indirect method aimed at the strategic rear of France and Britain, and it constitutes a check in the grand strategy.After Hitler weakened the position of France and Britain in the west in this way, he re-established fortifications in the Rhine area to cover his west.After that, he had the opportunity to transfer the main force to the east.This is precisely a step in the continuation of indirect actions aimed at strategically striking at the foundations of the Western powers. In March 1938, Hitler occupied Austria, thereby completely exposing the western flank of Czechoslovakia, and at the same time breaking the iron ring formed by the French around Germany after the First World War.In September 1938, due to the signing of the Munich agreement, Hitler not only took back the Sudetenland area, but also paralyzed Czechoslovakia strategically.So, by March of the following year, he had completely seized the already paralyzed country and encircled one of Poland's flanks. Hitler took advantage of this series of ingenious actions that did not actually shed blood, using the so-called peaceful march as an excuse, and under the cover of a clever propaganda smoke screen, not only destroyed the French's original control over Central Europe and the strategic encirclement of Germany, but also fundamentally This changed the situation on the European continent, but put France under siege.Such a process coincided with an ancient motto, that is, to occupy a favorable position first and then challenge it. It's just that his scope of operation was wider this time, his plan was bigger, and his skills were higher.Throughout this period of transition, German power continued to grow.From the direct point of view, its armaments have developed on a large scale, and from the indirect point of view, its main imaginary enemy country has been weakening day by day due to the elimination of its allies and the cutting of its strategic foundation. In this way, by the spring of 1939, Hitler no longer felt afraid of an open decisive battle.It happened that at this critical moment, the wrong actions taken by the British benefited him again.At that time, Poland and Romania were already strategically isolated by Hitler, but Britain suddenly offered them assurances.It is Russia that can give effective support to these two countries, and when Britain made its own guarantee, it happened that it did not obtain any guarantee from Russia in advance.The British have always adopted a policy of appeasement and concessions. It is very rash to take such a blind step this time.At that time, the British pledge amounted to an open challenge to Germany.These parts of Europe were practically beyond the reach of British and French armed forces, and the British guarantee just constituted a kind of temptation, which made Hitler develop an almost irresistible desire to attack Poland.Thus, the Western countries themselves undermined the strategic foundation.Originally, due to their weak strength, the only possible strategy they could adopt was to unite and build a strong front to deal with any attack from Germany in the west and prevent the occurrence of aggression, but now, instead, they provided Hitler with A favorable opportunity allowed him to break through the defensive line in a vulnerable area, and thus achieved victory in the first battle. As Lauchlin writes, Hitler's plans were always to target isolated and vulnerable states by surprise, while always placing the burden of offensive operations on his opponents.This is because the German leaders recognized the value of modern defense more clearly than any commander-in-chief and state activist on the Allied side.Now, Hitler had a favorable opportunity to realize his plan.Under such circumstances, Hitler's strategic principles have become very obvious. He must immediately sign a non-aggression pact with Russia, so that the Russians are in a neutral position and promise not to intervene.Hitler finally signed such a treaty with Russia, so he felt that his confidence was greatly enhanced, and he was in a position of both sides.In this way, if the Anglo-French allies fulfill their promise and decide to declare war on Germany, they will automatically give up their defensive advantages and be forced to adopt an offensive strategy, and they will be under extremely disadvantageous conditions. The most necessary resources will be lacking for this.If they only aim to break through the Siegfried line and stop advancing, that will prove their uselessness and lose their prestige in vain.If they continue to attack hard, they will inevitably suffer great losses. When Hitler returns to the west and turns to attack, their own resistance will be relatively weakened, and the chance of winning in the future defense will inevitably be smaller. The only advisable way for Britain and France to extricate themselves from this dilemma, and to deny Hitler full freedom of action, was to impose economic sanctions, to break diplomatic relations, and to provide troops to the victims of German aggression. By.This policy has given Poland considerable assistance, but for Britain and France themselves, compared with the possible consequences of declaring war on Germany under unfavorable conditions, the loss of their own prospects and prestige is nothing. will be much smaller. However, the French army still launched a very uncertain attack on the Siegfried line, which turned out to be fruitless.The prestige of the Allied Powers was further damaged by its defeat, which had been exaggerated in advance.The Germans were rapidly developing victories in Poland, which, in contrast to the defeats of the Allies, heightened the fear of Germany in the neutral countries.As a result, their confidence in the Allies was greatly shaken.This time the damage was even greater than any other compromise by the Allies. Hitler was then able to consolidate his military gains and take full advantage of his political advantages, for he had a fortified defense line on the western front as cover, while the self-proclaimed saviors of Poland were unable to break through This line of defense.From then on, Hitler remained securely on the defensive, waiting for the war-weariness of the peoples of France and Britain, for it had become more and more obvious to them that the war was being waged blindly.But the politicians on the Allied side were singing the high-pitched counteroffensive long before they had the tools to turn their ideals into reality.As a result, they are only vainly provoking the enemy to strike first, and they have no ability to parry themselves.The attitude of the Allies, which only talks but does not act, provided Hitler with a new opportunity.Give him a new stimulus, make him dare to strike first, turn to attack first.At that time, many people in Britain and France were thinking about whether some small neutral countries adjacent to Germany could be used as a passage to the German flank, but at this time, Hitler invaded and occupied five neutral countries in one go. Attack the flank of the Confederates.He took this action completely recklessly, which is the very nature of aggression. During the first months of the war, Hitler envisioned maintaining Norway's neutrality to cover Germany's northern flank.In addition, the iron ore imported by Germany from Sweden had to be transported back through the Norwegian port of Ralvik on the Atlantic Ocean.However, when it became more and more obvious that the Allies planned to occupy Norway, Hitler feared that the other party's control of Norwegian waters and ports would put him at a disadvantage, so he acted first and occupied the country first. The entire occupation of Norway was originally planned by Hitler.As early as 1934 he had communicated to Lauschlin and others his idea of ​​seizing major Scandinavian ports by surprise attack, using small The naval landing force, under the cover of the air force, carried out a series of assaults at the same time.The proper place for the landing force to land would be directed by the fifth column lurking in the Scandinavian countries, which would be responsible for clearing the way for the landing force first, under the pretext of protecting these countries from Invasion by other powerful countries.The war artist also once said: This is an adventurous and interesting battle, and there is no precedent for it in the history of the world.On April 9, 1940, this astonishing project came to fruition, even more so than originally expected.Hitler once worried that it would be difficult to expand the results of the landing at certain locations. Therefore, he expected to seize more important strategic strongholds.In fact, he seized all the targets expected to be captured without hindrance, and his greedy hands stretched as far as the north of Ralvik. The astonishing ease with which the victory was achieved, and the ease with which the Allied attempt to penetrate Norway was thwarted, naturally encouraged Hitler's subsequent desire for a more powerful assault, which he had already planned. all right.A few years ago, when discussing the circumstances under which he dared to take the risk of provoking a major war, Hitler had expressed his intention to take the defensive position on the Western Front and let the enemy attack first. Immediately swept Scandinavia and the Low Countries (Netherlands and Belgium) to improve their strategic position, and then made a so-called peace proposal to the Western powers.He said: "If they don't want that peace, then they might try to throw me out.In either case, they have to bear the burden of launching the attack.However, the environment subsequently changed.After Hitler occupied Poland, he immediately put forward a peace proposal, but it was immediately rejected by Western countries.From then on, he decided to use his strength to oppress the French to seek peace, and transferred his troops to the western front, preparing to launch an offensive in the autumn of 1939.Hitler was forced to postpone his attempt because of the dissent from the German generals who did not believe they would have enough troops to defeat the British and French forces, and the weather was also very bad.But this delay made him more and more impatient, and the generals could no longer hinder him after the Norwegian victory, which he had won by disregarding their generals' cautious advice. Long ago, when discussing the possibility of such an attack, he had declared: I would enter France on the right side of the Maginot Line without losing a single soldier.It is true that Hitler's statement is exaggerated, but in terms of his achievements in May 1940, his losses are indeed insignificant in proportion to his gains. According to the original plan, the main assault of the German army will be on the right flank, and the army group commanded by Polk will take on this task.By early 1940, however, the plan had undergone a radical revision, shifting the focus to a central location, in the Ardennes area.This modification was carried out on the advice of General Manstein, Chief of Staff of Army Group Lundest, who had presented evidence that an attack through the Ardennes area would have a greater chance of success, since this was the direction the enemy expected The direction least likely to be attacked. The greatest feature of the operations on the Western Front was that the German High Command tried to avoid any direct attack. Although they had the advantage of modern combat tools at the time, they always continued to take the indirect route of action.The Germans made no attempt to break through the Maginot Line.Instead, they first launched a decoy attack on two small neutral countries (the Netherlands and Belgium), which Hitler used to lure the British and French allies out of the fortifications on the French-Belgian border.When this Allied force rushed into Belgium, the German air force consciously did not stop it, and finally the army attacked the basic group of the French army from the rear. The campaign was carried out by a small German shock group.The group's strength is not large, only a small part of the entire German army, but it is composed of all tank divisions.The German Army Command has been quite clever. They realized that if they want to win as soon as possible, they need to rely more on technical equipment rather than a lot of manpower.This time, the German assault group was indeed very small, so that some German generals had great doubts about the possibility of their assault being successful.The German army's complete victory was mainly due to the recklessness and stubbornness of the French high command. They concentrated almost all of their heavy troops on the left flank in an attempt to make a decisive offensive in Belgium. Only a few second-rate divisions were left to defend the mountainous forested area of ​​the Ardennes.According to the estimation of the French, it is very difficult for the mechanized troops of the German army to pass through the Ardennes area.On the contrary, the German army just took advantage of the Ardennes, thus achieving the suddenness of the operation.This fact proves that the Germans were able to accept the lessons of history well and understand that natural obstacles are easier to overcome than man-made resistance, because if someone resists with a strong defensive position, that position is always not easy to break through. It is also clear that once the Germans advanced beyond Sedan and advanced their attack at high speed, they threatened several other targets in succession at the same time, thus making it impossible for the French to judge the direction of their next attack.Sure enough, the French didn't guess that the German army would attack Paris first?Or go straight to the rear of the French army in Belgium?When the German armored division turned rapidly to the west, the French could not make a correct judgment whether the Germans were heading for Amiens or Lille.德軍就是這樣，聲東擊西，隱蔽著自己前進的真正方向，迅速地達到了海峽岸邊。 德軍的戰術也是完全與其戰略相適應的。他們避免一頭撞上去的硬攻，總是尋求弱點，力圖沿著敵人抵抗力最弱的路線前進。同盟國方面的國務活動家們，當時完全不理解現代戰爭的特點，曾經一再號召他們的軍隊用不斷加強力量的反擊來擊退敵人的入侵，可是德軍的坦克洪流卻迂迴繞過盟軍大群大群的步兵，一直橫掃而過。如果盟軍沒有受命放棄要塞防禦，那麼也許還有可能擋住德軍這股坦克洪流的進攻。而在現在這樣的條件下，企圖進行反衝擊和反突擊，只是顯得微不足道，不可能有什麼效果。同時，盟軍的指揮官們，總在尋找會戰的機會，而德軍的指揮官們，由於吸取了過去的經驗，卻是力圖在戰略方面癱瘓敵人，極力避免進行會戰。為了達到這一目的，德軍曾使用坦克、俯衝轟炸機和傘兵，以此在敵人後方製造混亂，破壞其交通線。說來也是一種諷刺，法國在總結戰爭經驗的時候，艾倫賽元帥曾經宣稱，德國的將軍們必將遇到困難，因為他們之中沒有一個人在第一次世界大戰時達到過大尉以上的軍銜。他認為這是德軍的一個大弱點，誰知這個弱點卻正是一個大優點。八年以前，希特勒也曾經批評過德國的將軍們，說他們被囚禁在自己技術知識的牢籠裡，完全沒有活躍的思想，看不見各種新奇的事物。然而，儘管存在這些弱點，但有一些年輕的德國軍官確系後起之秀，他們對於新的觀念有著非常敏銳的判斷力。 不過，德國所以取得勝利，並不單純是使用新兵器，採取新戰法和實行新的戰術戰略的結果。在戰爭的進程中，希特勒使間接路線具有了更加廣泛的規模和更加深刻的內容。他能達到這種造詣，曾經得益於布爾什維克革命方法的研究。同時，新型的德國軍隊也在應用英國人首創的機械化戰爭技術方面佔領了上風。不管希特勒本人是否意識到，他在這兩方面所使用的基本方法，都是中古時代蒙古人成吉思汗已使用過的方法。成吉思汗在準備進攻某一個國家的時候，總是首先在那裡尋找有影響的代理人，使他們從內部破壞這個國家的抵抗力，製造混亂，並準備建立起聽命於他的新政府。希特勒認為，對於這類人物沒有必要進行收買，可以不要賄賂，因為在統治階級當中，他能夠獲得這種自告奮勇的走狗，即一些抱著野心想出風頭，有著權勢欲和出於黨派仇恨的人物。後來，為了給自己的部隊開拓道路，希特勒便在選定的時機使用了他的敢死隊。這是一些早在和平時期滲入敵國領土的人物，他們化裝成商人或旅客，一旦獲得相應的信號，就換上敵軍的制服，相機進行活動。他們的任務是，破壞敵人的通訊和交通，散佈假消息，如有可能，還可以對各類重要人物進行綁架。對於這種化裝的先鋒隊還必須以傘兵部隊予以支援。 在希特勒有意發動的戰爭中，德軍的正面進攻始終只有欺騙和牽制的作用，是一種簡單的軍事遊藝。他們的基本注意力，總是放在以這種或那種形式從後方攻擊敵人的行動上。希特勒對於正面強攻和肉搏戰鬥，是抱著輕蔑態度的，而這些都是一般軍人的基本知識。他總是採取雙管齊下的辦法來發動戰爭，一手是渙散敵人的士氣，一手是瓦解敵人的組織。進一步說，就是要使戰爭本身更多地只有心理上的作用，要用思想充作工具：用言論來代替武器，用宣傳來代替炮彈。在第一次世界大戰時，步兵實施攻擊之前，總要先實行炮兵火力準備，以便破壞敵人的防禦工事。與此相似，希特勒認為，在未來的戰爭中，必須預先摧毀敵人的士氣。因此，應當使用各種類型的武器，特別是進行宣傳。他說：儘管戰爭的教訓已很明顯，但將軍們仍在希望自己成為光明磊落的高貴騎士，把戰爭幻想成為騎士比武那樣的單純。可是，我不需要騎士，我只需要革命。 對於希特勒來說，戰爭的目的只是迫使敵人投降。他認為，如果敵人的抵抗意志已被摧垮，已經麻木，那麼，殺戮就是多餘的舉動。而且，要靠殺戮來達到目的，實在是太麻煩，也太浪費。把細菌注射到敵人的機體內部，讓他們的意志發生癱瘓，這是一種間接的方法。按照他的意見，似乎是最有效的一種方法。 以上所述，就是希特勒的戰爭理論，一種使用心理武器的戰爭理論。那些企圖阻止他的人，實在應該首先瞭解他的思想。這種理論在軍事方面的應用，曾經清楚地顯示了它的價值。採取促使敵人軍事機器的神經系統發生麻痹的行動，要比對敵人有生力量直攻硬打更為有效。但是，這種方法在政治領域內的應用，其效果並不是那麼令人滿意的。人們公開地提出了一個問題：如果不首先使用新的兵種，採取新的進攻方法打擊敵人，促使敵軍發生癱瘓現象，那麼，單純使用心理上的武器能否達到瓦解敵人抵抗的目的呢？即以對法戰爭為例。我們可以看到，不要說法國人的抵抗意志已經預先遭到破壞，僅僅是軍事技術方面的優勢，德國也足以使法國覆亡。 如果在力量和使用力量的技巧兩個方面具有一定的優勢，那麼，這股力量總是可以擊段另外一股力量。但是，力量卻不能摧毀思想。由於思想總是捉摸不定，而且只能接受心理上的影響，因此，思想的穩定性常常使崇拜力量的人們陷入死胡同。在這些人當中，可以說，沒有一個人能像希特勒那樣，對於思想的威力有足夠的認識。可是，希特勒在其權勢和力量日益增長以後，對於力量的使用也就日益倚重了。這一狀況足以證明，他對於自己的政治手段未免估計過高，以為他可以控制別人的思想來供自己驅策。然而，一個思想如果不是來自實際經驗，那就一定不會有生命力，而且會產生嚴重的反作用。 希特勒還進一步發展了他的進攻戰略藝術。同自己的敵人比較起來，他比任何一個人都更好地掌提了在第一階段運用大戰略的本領。這就是善於發展和協調使用各種形式的軍事活動，使用一切可能的工具，以此打擊敵人的意志。不過，希特勒也和拿破崙一樣，對於在更高階段上運用大戰略的問題，則是認識不夠清楚的，也就是說，在作戰時缺乏遠大的眼光，缺乏預見性，不能隨時考慮到戰後的和平問題。一個人如果要做到這一點，那他不僅應該是一個戰略家，同時還應該是一個領袖，也是一個哲學家。戰略和道德原則是有矛盾的。至於大戰略則是具有同道德原則相吻合的趨勢，因為它在任何的力量變化當中始終不會脫離其最終目標。 為要證明他們的進攻總是攻無不克，德國人反而在戰略方面，經濟方面，特別是心理方面頗為嚴重地削弱了自己的防禦力量。當德軍部隊的足跡踏遍歐洲各國領土的時候，他們帶給人們的，只有愁苦，沒有和平。因此，他們只是廣泛地散布著不滿的種子，助長著對於希特勒思想的反感情緒。由於必須同佔領國的居民經常接觸，德軍部隊也就很容易地受到這種思想細菌的傳染。各個部隊的情緒也彼此相互傳播，從而加深了病態。於是，希特勒所鼓勵的尚武精神，開始搖搖欲墜，隨之一落千丈。人們感到孤立，產生思家心理，出現厭戰情緒，這樣便在德軍士兵當中引起了不健康的思想。 因為進攻的勢頭膨脹過度，希特勒終於把機會提供給了尚在與他角逐的對手（英國），使他得以從自己手裡把優勢搶了回去。要是英國方面具有更大的政治遠見，對於大戰略能有更充分的認識，那麼，這件事情可能發生得更早一些。不過，即使缺乏這一點，形勢終於發生了變化，有所改善，而且只要大不列顛帝國繼續存在，沒有失敗，這件事情總是要發生的。希特勒要想獲得他理想中的和平，就必須取得完全的勝利，而要達到這個目的，又勢非征服英國不可。同時，不管他再向哪一方向發展，其前進的距離愈遠，則如何控制被征服民族的問題也就愈大。所以，希特勒這時每前進一步，其滑倒的危險性也就隨之增加一分。英國人面臨的問題卻很簡單，但也並不那麼容易。他們就是要堅守下去，等待希特勒失足，要使他像拿破崙那樣，鑄造無法補救的錯誤。可幸的是，希特勒很快就犯了這樣的錯誤，比他面臨覆滅的時間要早得多。對於這個錯誤，希特勒是無法補救的，因為他曾經過分地迷信進攻戰略，以致對防禦戰略完全格格不入。這也和拿破崙一樣，由於戰爭初期的勝利得來太輕快了，他便一味地迷信進攻手段，以為只要進攻就足以解決一切問題。