Chapter 17 Chapter 16 Hitler's Heyday

In 1939, the German army conquered Poland, and in 1940, went on to ravage all of Western Europe.This has great significance in military history, and it is indeed a very clear example of the theory of high-speed mechanized warfare.The theory originated in England, but it was the Germans who put it into practice, and the main credit should go to General Guderian, the founder of the German armored tank force.Although the senior generals of the German army held a somewhat skeptical and prudent attitude towards the new technology, and provided more funds for its development, they failed to meet the requirements put forward by the supporters of the new technology. However, the results of the development of the new technology , still surprising.This new technology not only revolutionized warfare, but changed the entire course of world history.This is because the influence of Hitler's victory on the situation and future of Western Europe cannot be eliminated even after his complete defeat.In addition, as a result of Britain's enormous efforts in defeating Hitler, the center of world power began to shift to the Western Hemisphere.Russia's control of the European continent is another dangerous result, which is also of epochal significance.

As a result of this war, there have been two revolutions: one is the change in the method of warfare; the other is the transfer of the center of world power.In the various campaigns, there have also been some extremely valuable examples of the use of the indirect route strategy.An analysis of the various battles on the Western Front makes it obvious that the new mechanized forces would not necessarily have been able to win without new methods of fighting.However, the effects always complement each other.The speed and flexibility of mechanized troops just made the indirect route more powerful.

Unfortunately, Poland happens to be an ideal place to play such a role.It has a border line of 2,000 kilometers with Germany, and after Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, it has added 800 kilometers.In this way, the southern flank of Poland was as completely exposed as the northern flank facing East Prussia.The entire western part of Poland thus formed a huge salient, surrounded on three sides by German territory. For Poland, the danger was increased by the incorrect disposition of the army, which placed most of its forces on the front of the salient.The reason for this is, on the one hand, that they have a natural desire to protect their main industrial area, that is, the area west of the Vistula River; Military power is overconfident.

The strength of the Polish army in peacetime is as great as that of the French and a little less than that of the Germans.It had thirty infantry divisions and twelve cavalry brigades.The industrial resources of the nation, however, are insufficient to employ its manpower adequately, or even to furnish its active forces with adequate armament.By the time of mobilization, the number of their divisions can only be increased by one-third, while on the German side, except for tank divisions and motorized divisions, the number of other divisions can be more than doubled.Moreover, Poland has almost no modern combat weapons like tanks, so Germany's weakness in expanding its armored forces is of little consequence.

The situation was further complicated by the flatness of the Polish plains, which facilitated the movement of the enemy's mechanized units.However, in general it is not as convenient as France, because Poland lacks good roads, lacks sandy soil, and in some areas there are many swamps and forests.However, the timing of the invasion was chosen by the Germans to minimize the danger of the aforementioned weaknesses. Given that Poland was already surrounded by Germany on three sides, it was natural for the Germans to adopt an indirect route strategy of a physical nature.Because of their use of this method, the effect of the indirect route appears to be even greater.

In the north, the main force of the invading army was the Polk Army Group, which consisted of two armies, namely Kuhler's Third Army and Kruger's Fourth Army.The former attacked south from East Prussia; the latter advanced east across the Polish corridor to join the Kuhler Army Group and encircle the right wing of the Polish Army Northern Group. Attacking in the south is the Lundest Army Group, which has a more important task.Its strength is almost double that of the Northern Army Group in terms of the number of infantry, and more than double the number of tanks.This army group was organized into three armies: Blaskowitz's Eighth Army, Rechnau's Tenth Army and Liszt's Fourteenth Army.The Blaskowitz Army Group was the left wing of the Army Group. Its task was to advance towards the large industrial center of Lodz, participate in the encirclement of the Polish Army in the Poznan salient, and at the same time cover the flank of the Rechnau Army Group.Army Group List acted as the right flank of the army group. Its task was to attack Krakow, outflank the flank of the Polish army in the Carpathians, and at the same time send a tank corps through the defiles in the mountains.Army Group Rechnau was in a central position, responsible for the decisive assault, and was therefore reinforced by a large number of tanks.

On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland.On September 3, when Britain and France declared war on the basis of their pledges to Poland, Kruger had cut off the Polish Corridor to the lower Vistula.At the same time, Kuhler had driven from East Prussia and continued to press forward, approaching the Narew River.And the significance is even more significant.The armored units of Army Group Rechnau had reached the Warta River and forced their way across.At that time, the List Army attacked Krakow from two sides.On September 4, the vanguard of Rechnau had crossed the Pilica River and was within fifty kilometers of the frontier.Two days later, his left flank was well past Tomaszow, while his right flank entered Kielce.

Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the German Army, once issued an order to continue to attack eastward, approaching the Vistula River, and crossing the river to advance.However, Lundest and his chief of staff, Manstein, took the initiative to modify his plan.They correctly judged that the main force of the Polish army still remained west of the Vistula, so traps should be set there to capture the Polish army.Their estimates are not bad at all.Therefore, Reichnau was ordered to turn north with his left wing force, use a tank army as the lead, advance to the Lodz area, insert into the rear of a huge Polish army group, and then, in the area between Lodz and Warsaw , Seize favorable terrain along the Buzula River.The sudden northward maneuver of the German army did not encounter much resistance from the Polish army, because the unexpected happened, so that a large number of Polish troops were cut off and unable to pass through the Vistula River.

The superiority gained by the Germans by a far-reaching strategic breakthrough in the direction of least resistance was subsequently reinforced by a shift to the tactical defense.After that, in order to consolidate their victory, they only need to stick to the territory they have won.They repeatedly repelled the hastily organized counter-assaults of Polish troops.These Polish troops have just come down from the front and have lost contact with their own bases, so their supplies are increasingly in short supply. Moreover, there are two armies of Blaskowitz and Kruger on their flanks and rear, so that they face pressure is increasing.Although the Poles fought very tenaciously and bravely, the deep impression left on the Germans was that after all, only a small number of people finally broke out and joined forces with the Warsaw garrison.

On September 10, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, Marshal Smigle Ritz, issued an order to all remaining troops, asking them to implement a general retreat to southeastern Poland.He counted on organizing the defense on a relatively narrow field for long-term resistance.However, whether his plan was correct has not been proved, because the encirclement of the German army from the Vistula River to the west has become tighter and tighter. The Wa River is going deep into the east of the river, and is conducting a larger-scale encirclement maneuver, which also surrounds the flanks of the defensive positions that the Polish army may establish between the San River and the Bug River.

The Germans took an obvious indirect route, directly to and around the Bug River.This is the farthest and most eastern border of Poland.At the beginning of the invasion, Guderian's tank corps served as the vanguard of Kruger's Fourth Army. After crossing the Polish corridor, the army launched an offensive in a northwest direction and entered Germany's own East Prussian province.Afterwards, the army quickly passed through German territory and advanced to the far left, that is, the eastern flank of Kuhler's Third Army.This army group was attacking southward at that time.On September 9, Guderian's tank army crossed the Narew River and marched southward.By the 14th the army had advanced 160 kilometers into the Brest-Litovsk region and reached the banks of the Bug, that is to say, the bottom of the Polish salient.Afterwards, his troops continued to advance southward, walking another 65 kilometers, and reached the city of Fuwoda, where they joined forces with the Kleist tank army attacking from the south, and together sealed the entire encirclement.As a result of this, the Polish troops were destroyed long before the Russians crossed the eastern border of Poland on September 17. Nine months after the military campaign in Poland ended, the Germans scored another brilliant victory on the Western Front.The characteristic of this victory is that although the purely military indirect route is not obvious, the psychological indirect route is more prominent.Its principle is to seek to destabilize the enemy.Based on this idea, take deceptive measures in advance to lure the enemy, and strive to achieve suddenness in the direction, time and method of operations, so as to expand the results of the battle most rapidly along the line of weakest resistance and try to reach as far as possible. Deep development. As early as early October 1939, immediately after the conquest of Poland, Hitler issued his first instructions for preparing an offensive on the Western Front.In these instructions, he emphasized that if Britain and France do not agree to end the war, then he must take action as early as possible, because a long delay will make the enemy's military strength continue to grow, and may cause some neutral countries to fall. To the Allies.According to Hitler, time was always against Germany in every respect.Therefore, he once expressed his concern that if he followed the advice of his military advisers and continued to wait, then the increase in the military power of the Allies might surpass that of Germany; A limited number of resources are consumed cleanly.At the same time, Germany may also receive a fatal blow from Russia in the back, because Hitler has already felt that although he concluded a treaty with Stalin, Stalin's guarantee of neutrality will not last long, once he believes that the time is ripe for him , then he will do it right away.This fear prompted Hitler to try to launch an offensive early and to use force to force the French to sue for peace.He believed that as soon as France withdrew from the war, the British would follow in their footsteps and follow suit. According to Hitler, he had enough troops to defeat France, because he had a great advantage in new weapons, and this was decisive.He said: Our armored tank units and air force are not only tools of offense, but also tools of defense.Their technology, as far as the current level is concerned, has reached a very perfect level, which is unmatched by any other country.Their military operations, secured by proper organization and experienced leadership, can develop a strategic potential that no other nation has.Of course, Hitler had to admit that the French army still had advantages in old traditional weapons, especially in heavy artillery.But he also pointed out that in modern mobile warfare, these old weapons no longer have decisive significance.Because he has a technical advantage in the direction of new weapons, even if the French army may have an advantage in terms of troop mobilization figures, it does not need to be considered. The leaders of the German army agreed with Hitler's fear of a protracted war, but did not agree with his plan to launch a blitzkrieg for a quick victory.The military leaders felt that there was still not enough strength to destroy the French army, so they advised Hitler to take defensive action to wait for France and Britain to automatically add up, or to prompt them to start an offensive.As long as they launched an offensive, the Germans had an opportunity to counterattack completely and could then turn to a counteroffensive. Hitler suppressed these objections and finally decided to launch the offensive in the second week of November 1939.However, due to changes in meteorological conditions, unfavorable weather forecasts, and failures in railway transportation, it was postponed for three days.Then, due to various similar reasons, short-term postponements were continuously carried out, a total of eleven postponements until the middle of January of the following year.Later, the issue was shelved for a long time.So it was in May that an advance order was issued to really determine the date for the start of the offensive.During this time, however, the battle plan had undergone fundamental revisions. The German operational plan was drawn up by the General Staff headed by Halder.The original plan called for the main assault to be carried through central Belgium, exactly as it had been in 1914.In this way, Army Group B led by Polk will take on the main offensive task.The Army Group A led by Lundest is deployed on the left flank and is expected to cross the valleys and forests of the Ardennes and attack in a secondary direction.At that time, the hope of victory on the Ardennes side was completely an illusion, because all tank divisions were transferred to Polk's Army Group B.The German General Staff believed that the terrain in the Ardennes was completely unsuitable for tank operations. However, Manstein, Lundest's chief of staff, felt that the plan was too conventional, an almost blind repetition of the 1914 plan.A surprise attack through Belgium would not have a surprise effect on the British and French allied forces, and they were just prepared to block this assault.According to Manstein, the plan also had another shortcoming, which was the selection of the British army as the main target, and the British army was generally considered to be stronger than the French army.The third flaw, in his view, was that even if the assault was successful, it might just drive the Allies back, leaving the Germans with nothing but the Flemish coast.Therefore, even if this plan can succeed, it will not achieve decisive results.In order to obtain a decisive result, only the indirect route can be taken, which is to cut off the enemy's communication lines and block the Allied retreat from Belgium. Manstein suggested that the focus should be shifted from the right flank to the center, and the main assault should be carried out through the Ardennes area, that is, should be chosen in a direction that the enemy did not expect.He believes that although the mountainous terrain is dangerous and difficult to pass, it is not impassable, and armored tank units can still be used effectively there.For his suggestion, Guderian expressed his authoritative opinion as an expert to support it, thus strengthening his belief. Hitler appreciated the bold and adventurous spirit of this new plan.However, the real reason for the final decision to change the original plan was an unexpected event.On January 10, 1940, a staff officer of the German army, carrying documents related to the original plan, flew from Munster to Bonn, lost his way due to heavy snow, and landed in Belgium by mistake.The German High Command was of course afraid that he would not have time to burn the archives (in fact, he only burned part of them).Even after this incident, the German Army Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff refused to fully accept Manstein's plan.Therefore, Manstein had no choice but to directly ask Hitler for instructions. In the end, Hitler intervened in person and made a personal decision. This extraordinary plan was finally finalized. During this period, a false alarm made the Allies automatically reveal their intentions.The German High Command clearly saw that the Allied forces were moving a considerable number of troops into the Belgian interior.This fact also prompted the Germans to change their plans as suggested by Manstein. Judging from the subsequent developments, the original old plan is almost impossible to produce decisive results, and it is impossible to completely destroy France.This is because if the German army attacks directly from central Belgium, it will definitely encounter the main force of the British and French allied forces, and this is their most elite force with excellent equipment; at the same time, they will also encounter various types of obstacles , such as rivers, canals, and large towns.Of course, on the face of it, the terrain in the Ardennes appears to be an even more insurmountable obstacle, but if the Germans were able to get through the forest in southern Belgium before the French High Command noticed the danger, their subsequent What we are facing is the slightly undulating French plain, which is an ideal area conducive to the large-scale use of tanks. Manstein has also seen the possibility of the Anglo-French allied forces going deep into Belgium, and believes that this will be even more detrimental to the German army.His estimate was spot on.According to the plan drawn up by General Gamelin, the commander-in-chief of the British and French Allied forces, the left flank of the Allied forces has been strengthened. It is expected that after the German army enters Belgium, the army will also advance eastward immediately, reaching the line of the Dale River, and if possible, it can be farther. Some.This Plan D, like the French Plan No. 17 in 1914, suffered a fiasco.They were tantamount to automatically falling into the snare of the German army.The deeper the British and French allied forces penetrated into Belgium, the easier it would be for the German army to attack through the Ardennes to reach the rear of the allied forces and cut off its left wing troops. To make matters worse, Gamelin transferred most of his mobile forces to Belgium, leaving only a few inferior divisions to form a thin barrier to cover the attacking troops, whose front happened to be facing the Ardennes junctions they considered impassable.When the Germans broke into the French flank, Gamelin immediately lost his balance, and it was difficult to restore the shattered stability, because his elite troops, which could be used to seal the breach more easily, had already been transferred to Belgium. I went to the mainland.Gamelin threw them far into Belgium, robbing himself of strategic flexibility. This danger, present in the French rear, was not so noticeable for a while at first.This is because the initial German assault on the Netherlands and northern Belgium had the effect of attracting the attention of the French High Command.At that time, the German army dispatched airborne troops to land suddenly in the rear of the Netherlands. With the German army's violent attack on the front, the Dutch army collapsed without a fight and surrendered on the fifth day.The forward position of the Belgian army was breached on the second day of the German offensive.Therefore, they retreated to the line from Antwerp to Namur according to the plan, and joined the British and French allies according to the agreement. In the Netherlands, as early as the morning of May 10, the German airborne troops had suddenly landed near the capital, The Hague, and the transportation center, Rotterdam, to harass them.At the same time, German paratroopers also landed in the Dutch border defense fortress area 160 kilometers east of Rotterdam to cooperate with the army's offensive.In this way, the two fronts and the rear, coupled with the harassment of the Luftwaffe, caused great confusion and panic in the Netherlands.A tank division of the German army, taking advantage of the panic of the Dutch, passed through a gap in the southern border fortifications, galloped into the Netherlands, and joined forces with the airborne troops that landed in the Rotterdam area on the third day.The Dutch army, which was strategically defensive, had to switch to a tactical offensive for which they were ill-prepared in terms of training and equipment.At that time, although the main defense line of the Dutch army had not been broken, on the fifth day, the Netherlands surrendered. The direct invasion of Belgium by the German army also had a certain sudden effect on the psychological aspect, so that the invading army won a quick victory.The offensive on land was undertaken by the Sixth Army under the command of Rechnau, and its strength was quite strong.In order to proceed in a proper manner, the army must first overcome a rather difficult obstacle.To this end, 500 paratroopers were sent to support it.These 500 paratroopers were first used to seize the two bridges over the Albert Canal and one of the most modern fortresses in Belgium, the Fortress of Aiben Emir.The fort is flanked by a water barrier.This small paratrooper unit actually had a decisive impact on the outcome of the entire incident.This is because the approach chosen by the Germans to the Belgian border had to pass through that part of the Dutch territory jutting out to the south, commonly known as the Maastricht cecum, which is twenty-five inches wide. In this way, as long as the German army starts to cross the Dutch border, the Belgian border guards will have enough time to blow up the bridge on the Alpey Canal before the German army arrives. German paratroopers landed near the two bridges in the dark.This was a new and only viable method of capturing the two bridges that had not been bombed.In order to seize the fortress of Aiben Emir, the German army sent 80 armed men to drive glider to land directly near the fortress, and immediately blocked the fortress.As a result, although the fortress had 1,200 defenders, it was completely sealed within twenty-four hours.Subsequently, the German army who arrived by land captured the fortress.The Germans crossed the Albert Canal on two bridges captured by the paratroopers and plunged directly into Belgian territory.Due to the oppression of the German army, the Belgian troops retreated steadily and reached the Dyer River defense line. At this time, the British and French allied forces also arrived there. The plan to use airborne troops to carry out raids in the Belgian and Dutch countries was drawn up by Hitler himself.However, its glorious success was also the result of the excellent leadership exercised by the intrepid General Studen in carrying out the plan. At this time, the armored tank units of the Lundest Army Group had passed through Luxembourg and the southern part of Belgium and reached the French border.Its main force was five tank divisions and four motorized infantry commanders, who happened to join forces there, under the command of General Kleist.Leading in front of the group was Guderian's corps, organized into three tank divisions.When they crossed the 110 kilometers of the Ardennes, they encountered very weak resistance from the French army on the way.As a result, the German army successfully penetrated into France, and at dawn on the fourth day after the offensive began, it reached the banks of the Meuse. It was a brave and risky move to use a large number of tanks and cars to cross the impenetrable region of the Ardennes.Since ancient times, strategists have regarded the Ardennes as an impassable restricted area, and even infantry dare not use them in large quantities, let alone tanks and cars.However, this view worked well for the Germans, increasing their chances of a surprise attack.At the same time, the dense forests there served as a cover for the German offensive preparations and assault forces. However, although the armored tank units achieved the purpose of the surprise attack relatively easily, a relatively large water obstacle like the Maas River immediately appeared in front of them.How long it will take to cross this river is a matter of great concern.Later, General Dumec, chief of the French army's general staff, once said regretfully: We thought that all the activities of the enemy army were similar to our own.Of course, it is assumed that they will have to transport a sufficient amount of artillery before they dare to make an attempt to force the Meuse River. To achieve this goal, it will take at least five or six days, so we can take it easy. reinforce. It is worth noting that the estimation of the time by the French coincides with the views of the senior German commanders. The French High Command believes that the German army's forcible crossing of the Meuse River will not start until at least the ninth day.This also happened to be the time originally scheduled by the German High Command.However, when working on the map in February 1940, Guderian made a suggestion that the armored tank troops should forcefully cross the Maas River as soon as they arrived, rather than waiting for the main force of the infantry to arrive.His opinion was strongly criticized by Halder.According to Halder, at least nine or ten days of preparation should be required before one can speak of forcing the river.At a meeting in March, Hitler asked Guderian what his next steps should be if he had captured a bridgehead on the Meuse.Guderian replied that the results of the battle should be expanded immediately and began to advance westward, pointing directly at Amiens, and even pointing directly at the major ports on the shore of the La Manche Strait.Many generals shook their heads in disapproval of his adventurous actions.However, Hitler nodded approvingly, expressed his agreement with a wink, but at the same time said another question. On the morning of May 13, Guderian's tank army entered the Sedan area and reached the Maas River.At noon that day, he began to forcibly cross the river and attack the opposite bank. By dusk, he had successfully crossed the river.On the same day, Rommel's 7th Tank Division also crossed the Meuse at Dinan, 65 kilometers to the west.This action just distracted the attention of the French High Command and created the conditions for subsequent assaults in new directions. At noon on May 14, Guderian's three tank divisions all crossed the Maas River.After repelling a belated counter-attack by the French, he turned sharply and rushed westward at a rapid pace.By the evening of the next day, Guderian's tank had broken through the last line of defense on the west bank of the Maas River, and then drove on the road leading to the shore of the Strait of La Manche, from here to the sea, only about 270 ten kilometers. On the night of May 15th, Kleist, who was more cautious, ordered Guderian to stop the attack and first secure the bridgehead position to wait for the infantry to come to take over the defense.After a heated debate, the order was amended to allow Guderian the right to expand the bridgehead.Therefore, Guderian took advantage of this authorization and hurriedly developed westward, advancing 80 kilometers the next day to reach the banks of the Oise River.The rest of the armored tank forces also rushed westward together, expanding the breakthrough of the entire front to 100 kilometers.As a result, a torrent of tanks entered along the road leading to the rear of the British and French Allied forces, which at this time were in Belgium. The French high command was not sure which direction the German tanks would take, which made the German advance easier.The greatest advantage of the German breakthrough at Sedan was that it was in a moderate location, allowing the German army to attack in any direction and pose a threat to several targets at the same time.In this way, at the beginning, the French could not guess whether the German army's goal was the shore of the Strait of La Manches?Or straight to Paris?Although the direction of the German attack appeared to be heading west, the French continued to fear that they would suddenly turn south and attack Paris.The German plan was inherently flexible strategically, but its flexibility was further enhanced by the rapid movement of the armored tank crews.This combination of flexibility and rapidity put the French Army Command in a dilemma. At that time, the solution to the problem depended entirely on the time factor.The French, as a rule, were slow to adapt to changing circumstances, and their countermeasures were therefore ineffective every time.At the same time, the advance speed of the vanguard of the German army was so fast that not only the French high command, but even the German high command could not have expected it.The training received by the French army was still the old tradition during the First World War, and the development of military operations was very slow, so they could not adapt to the new requirements psychologically.That's why they were paralyzed so quickly.However, the greatest weakness of the French army does not lie in the small quantity or poor quality of their weapons and equipment, but mainly in the backwardness of their military theory.Their combat views are far from being as advanced as the opponent's, but they have developed very slowly, and they have basically not jumped out of the circle of the First World War.The victors are often proud and complacent, often have conservative ideas, and end up being the losers in the next war.In history, there are many such examples. The German High Command remained concerned that several tank divisions were making strategic advances so risky and deep in the enemy's rear.Hitler himself also nervously showed a very restless mood. He was always worried about his southern flank, so he ordered the westward troops to stop the offensive for two days, waiting for the Twelfth Army to catch up and form a flank defense line along the Anne River. to cover the flank of the attacking force. This delay almost killed the future of the German project, and the German offensive might have failed if the French army had not been so severely paralyzed.A week after Hitler's first hesitation, a new doubt arose that cost the Germans even more.However, since the German tank units had won enough time in the initial stage, and the enemy was already in disarray, the two-day pause on the Oise River line this time would not have much impact on German plans.But this fact is still enough to show that there is still a big gap in the understanding of the time factor among the senior commanders of the German army.Moreover, the differences of opinion between the old and new factions are even more serious than the differences in understanding between Germany and France. In protest of the order to suspend the offensive, Guderian submitted his resignation on May 17, requesting the dismissal of the command.However, on this day, when he submitted his resignation, he was comforted by his superiors, and at the same time was allowed to continue to carry out powerful reconnaissance.He made his own interpretation of this authorization, that is, to move forward as much as possible.Once the ban was lifted, he rushed forward even faster than before.He reached Amiens on 20 May, and then, crossing Abbeville, he reached the shores of the Strait of La Manche, thus cutting off the retreat of the Anglo-French forces from Belgium to France. On May 22, due to the order of his superiors, Guderian paused for another day unwillingly, and then continued northward, heading towards the ports of the La Manche Strait to penetrate deep into the rear of the British army.At this time, the British army was still in Belgium, resisting Polk's infantry attacking from the front.Guderian's right neighbor was Langhard's tank corps, which also belonged to Kleist's formation, so it turned to the north to attack at the same time.On the 22nd, Guderian surrounded Port Brunn and advanced to Calais the next day.Later, he arrived at Gravelin, which was only sixteen kilometers from Dunkirk.At the same time, Langhard's tank force also reached the canal line from Eure-Saint-Omer to Gravelin and took a bridgehead position on the other side of the canal.In this way, there is only one port of Dunkirk left in the hands of the British army, and it is the only way of retreat.However, the next day, Hitler suddenly ordered them not to attack Dunkirk.This order just saved the British army from being destroyed together with the Belgian army on the left and most of the three French armies.The order was not revoked until two days later.The Germans immediately resumed their offensive.But by this time, the Allies had strengthened their defenses, making it impossible for the Germans to break through.As a result, 224,000 British troops and 114,000 Allied troops (mainly French) finally withdrew by sea.Even so, the Germans still took one million prisoners, while their own casualties were only 60,000.That is the great achievement of taking the indirect route. On the eve of the attack on Dunkirk, why Hitler gave such an order to delay the fighter plane, the reason can never be explained clearly.The first reason, perhaps as Hitler himself said, was the fear of completely sinking his tanks into the swamp.The Flanders Plain is a large swamp area. During the First World War, Hitler, as a small squad leader, had personal experience there, and the swamp had a deep impression on him.The second reason is that he hopes to keep the combat effectiveness of the armored forces intact so that they can completely destroy the French army in the second stage.The third reason was that he was tempted by Goering, believing that the German air force had the ability to stop the British army, which was already in a desperate situation in Dunkirk, from withdrawing from the sea.However, after carefully analyzing the combat situation at that time, we can also find a direct reason that affected the issuance of this order, and it was mainly a psychological effect.This is a small-scale counterattack carried out by two British tank battalions in the Aras area on May 21.This counterattack was aimed exactly at the flanks of the attacking German units along the coast.英軍的這次反衝擊，使希特勒本人以及德國的某些高級指揮官更加擔心，認為德軍在法國境內的戰略突破實在是太深入和太冒險了。這個反衝擊恰巧又是在最關緊要的時刻發起的，因而在心理上對德軍高級指揮人員產生了強烈的影響。克萊斯特曾經多次制止古德里安前進，集團軍司令克魯格，這位克萊斯特的頂頭上司，也認為在阿臘斯的情況沒有弄清以前，不宜繼續發展進攻。他們兩人的擔心，很自然會要影響到隆德斯特。這樣，當五月二十四日早晨希特勒到達隆德斯特總部進行視察時，就在會議上聽到了隆德斯特的觀點，因而也加深了自己的懷疑，於是他在會議之後立即下達了暫停進攻的命令。勃勞希契和哈爾德當時本是傾向繼續實施坦克進攻的，但希特勒自然能夠找到許多的擁護者來支持他這一次非常謹慎的想法。 這次戰役的下一階段，即最後結束階段，是在六月五日開始的，也正是德軍進入敦克爾克的第二天。德軍這次新的進攻，其序幕就是一個令人吃驚的場面。本來，德軍裝甲坦克部隊都在向西北方向實施進攻，可是突然得到命令，馬上掉頭南下，迅速地實施了新的攻勢。這樣快速地向新的方向變更部署，正是部隊機械化以後大大提高了機動性的結果，足以引起戰略的革命性變化。 德軍發動進攻的新戰線，是沿著松姆河與安訥河臨時構成的一道防線，是由法軍殘存部隊防守的。這道防線比法軍原來的防線還要長，而防守的兵力卻更加單薄。因為這時法軍已經損失了三十個師，除了留在法國的二個英軍師外，幾乎得不到同盟國方面的任何援助。魏剛取代甘梅林以後，集中了六十六個師的兵力，其中有十七個師配置在堅固築壘的馬其諾防線裡面，這條防線是同松姆河｜安訥河防線連接起來的。 在這個第二階段中，隆德斯特的集團軍群又充當了具有決定意義的角色。但是，在原定計劃中，並沒有給它規定這個任務。戰役開始時，德軍現有十個坦克師，卻有六個配屬給了波克。隨著作戰情況的發展，波克實施的突擊吸引住了敵人的注意力，因而使隆德斯特發揮了主要作用。作戰主力在戰鬥過程中轉移到隆德斯特的地段，是德軍有能力迅速改變主攻方向的一個例證，說明有了裝甲坦克兵力以後，這是完全可能的。 波克指揮下的幾個集團軍，是在六月五日發起進攻的，而隆德斯特集團軍群，則在四天以後才開始動手。他所以稍晚一步，是因為需要更多的時間來變更部署。在波克集團軍群的進攻中，主要突擊方向上的進展，反而不如其右翼方面那樣迅速和深入。在那裡，隆美爾率領的那個坦克師在第三天早晨就突破了法軍的防線。 這次的迅速突破，表明隆美爾確實英勇過人。任何守舊的敵人都夢想不到這個人竟能如此神速。這種突破手段，在任何司令部演習和作業當中，實際上都是不會設想的，是認為不可能的。可是，隆美爾想到了，也作到了。在隆美爾進攻的地段上，法軍把松姆河上的所有公路橋樑都炸毀了，但是卻留下兩座鐵路橋。他們留橋的目的，是想用來進行反攻，而且仍在幻想著組織這樣的反攻。法軍認為，保留兩座橋樑不會有多大的危險，因為這是一條單軌鐵路，是沿著兩個狹窄的堤岸敷設的，而這堤岸又經過河邊一段沼澤草地，大約有一公里半的長度。所以，要想沿著這條窄線進攻，特別是通過橋樑，即令是步兵，也如同走鋼絲一樣，很危險。然而，隆美爾卻大膽地在黎明前搶佔了這兩座橋，並在河對岸佔領了一塊高地作為立足點。接著，他馬上拆毀鐵軌和枕木，並不顧敵人炮火的威脅，把他的坦克和運輸車輛送去走鋼絲。他的行動獲得了成功，在過河當中，只有一次停頓了半個小時，那是因為有一輛坦克衝接近橋頭時被敵炮擊中，暫時地阻塞了道路。 到這天黃昏時，隆美爾突破了敵人的防禦，縱深達到十二公里，第二天，增加到三十二公里，而在第三天，便突進了五十公里。他的進攻速度所以快捷，是因為他採取越野路線行進，儘量迂迴繞過了前進道路上的設防據點。由於這樣深入突破，把法軍第十集團軍切成了兩段。於是，德軍的其他各師也都朝著這個擴大了的缺口湧來，繼續向前衝擊。到第四天，也即六月八日的夜間，隆美爾到達了盧昂以南的塞納河岸，一路上完成了六十五公里的迂迴機動，穿過了法軍那道已經混亂不堪，而且不成體系的防禦線。這道防線是法軍為了防守通向盧昂和塞納河的接近路而倉促設置的。當法軍正在慌亂之中，來不及對這個大型水障礙組織防禦時，隆美爾便一鼓作氣奪占了塞納河上的渡口，並渡過了該河。六月十日，隆美爾師急轉向西，進行了八十公里的躍進，到黃昏時，抵達了海岸。這樣，他就切斷了法軍第十集團軍左翼五個師（包括英軍的第五十一師，即蘇格蘭師在內）的後退通路。這些被圍部隊於六月十二日在聖瓦列里被迫向隆美爾投降。 此時，集團軍群的右翼從松姆河地區向南實施的主要突擊，遇到了很大的困難。這個突擊是克萊斯特的兩個坦克軍負責實施的，分別從亞眠和佩龍尼附近松姆河對岸的橋頭陣地出發。他們指望用這樣一個鉗形突擊掐死法軍。六月八日，在右翼實行迂迴的那個集團，終於在亞眠附近突破了法軍的防禦，並急速向南挺進，直抵瓦茲河的下游；可是，在左翼實行迂迴的那個集團，卻在佩龍尼以北遭到了法軍的頑強抵抗，因而未能前進。 六月九日，隆德斯特集團軍群開始在安訥河地區發起進攻，並很快突破了法軍的防禦。於是，德軍最高統帥部決定，把克萊斯特的兩個坦克軍抽調回來，投向東面，使它們從安訥河地區的巨大缺口進入戰鬥，向香巴尼方向發展勝利。克萊斯特的兩個坦克軍能夠迅速地調到新的方向，又是一個例證，說明坦克部隊具有快速性，因而也就具有靈活性。 這一次，具有決定性意義的突擊又是由古德里安完成的。這次突擊再一次明顯地證明，進行深遠的戰略性突破與間接路線結合起來，將能達到何等的效果。這時，古德里安升任為隆德斯特集團軍群的裝甲坦克集團司令。古德里安的兩個坦克軍從加來海峽地帶出發，繞行了三百二十公里的長距離，升到安訥河畔的雷代耳地區進行集中。當第十二集團軍的步兵在恰陶｜波爾森附近（雷代耳以北十公里處）的河對岸奪占了三個小型立足點以後，古德里安即乘著黑夜之便，把他的先頭師送上了這些小據點。第二天，也即六月十日的早晨，這些先頭坦克師馬上發起衝擊，以高速度向前推進，而對途中有法軍據守的村鎮和森林則迂迴繞過。接著，法軍的裝甲坦克部隊投入了戰鬥，一路上發生了多次坦克交戰，德軍乘勝前進，所以，在頭兩天之內，德軍的坦克兵即前進了差不多三十二公里。第三天，古德里安的右翼即到達了馬恩河畔的夏龍，第四天，又進到維特里｜勒｜弗朗蘇瓦，距離進攻出發陣地差不多已有一百公里。古德里安的左翼，在擊退了來自側翼的法軍反衝擊以後，也同時趕到了這一地區。以後，古德里安即以更高的速度發展進攻，直抵朗格高原，前進到馬其諾防線的後方，隨即穿越這個高原地區，轉向東南挺進，一直到了瑞士邊境。第五天，也即是六月十四日，在躍進八十公里以後，一舉奪占了肖蒙城。六月十五日，德軍又完成了這樣一個躍進，穿越第戎地區，達到了索恩河畔。十七日清晨，古德里安的先頭師越過索恩河，繼續前進一百公里，到達了靠近瑞士國境的蓬塔爾利埃。這次的遠距離進攻，把仍然固守著馬其諾防線的大量法軍的後撤道路，全部切斷了。古德里安屬下的其他各師，此時則在向北席捲，前進到了摩澤爾河畔，其目的是為了切斷法軍的退路。到了這個時候，法國政府看到，自己的軍隊要被毀滅了，於是決定投降，並向德國人發出了要求停戰的呼籲。 出於希特勒在此以後並未能征服英倫三島，所以從更高級的戰略觀點來看，歐洲大陸上所取得的決定性戰略勝利，實際上並沒有產生多大的效果。希特勒因為自己下令停止向敦克爾克的進攻，弄得後來自討苦吃。當初，如果他能阻住英軍，使其不得從最後一個漏洞中溜走，那麼，大不列顛帝國必將陷入毫無防衛力量的境地。這樣，希特勒即使倉促組織登陸，也能夠達到彼岸，足以佔領英倫三島。因為喪失了這個千載難逢的好機會，未能在敦克爾克那個陷阱中把英軍一網打盡，所以，如不能很好地組織一次強大的登陸戰役，他就不可能有征服英國的希望。而要組織這樣的戰役，他既沒有預先的計畫，也沒有相應的準備。對於這個方向，他調集力量的行動實在太遲了，而他的和平攻勢也顯得軟弱無力。後來，在不列顛之戰中，德國企圖爭奪控制海路的制空權遭到了失敗，希特勒入侵英國的整個計畫，也就完全付之東流。 大不列顛帝國沒有被征服，它面前的英吉利海峽（拉芒什海峽）變成了一道巨型的反坦克壕，這對於希特勒來說，不能不感到憂慮。英國屹立近旁，就使希特勒控制整個歐洲大陸的計畫受到與日俱增的威脅。這個失算對於他實在是一個致命的打擊。這個計畫的破產，自然導致了後來的不祥結局。 在下一年度，希特勒仍然不斷地追逐著勝利，開始在巴爾幹，隨後又在俄國。當他還沒有在俄國腹地被阻止以前，其勝利似乎仍有希望。可是，要想實現自己的計畫，他的資源已經不足了。儘管他在一九四一年仍然取得了輝煌的勝利，但可以說，不列顛之戰的失敗，已經是他覆滅的開端。如果追本溯源的話，這又是在攻佔敦克爾克時表現很不堅定的結果。