Chapter 26 Appendix I: Indirect Route Strategy in the North African Campaign

(This is a long letter written by Major General Dorman Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff of the British Middle East Command, to Liddell Hart from the Middle East in 1942. In the 1946 edition of "Indirect Route" , this letter was published as a preface to the book.) Dear Bazel: I have already told you that twice, in 1940 and 1942, during the campaign in Egypt, when we were in serious difficulty, your thinking served us well.Sidi Barrani, Egypt, 1940; the offensive plan to destroy the enemy's Army Group Graziani and repel its first invasion is a prime example of using your indirect route strategy.The smashing of Rommel's offensive plans in the Alamein area in July 1942, although achieved through defensive strategic and tactical action, was also based on your indirect line of thought.A long time ago, I wanted to tell you the story of what happened in detail.You can see in this letter that whenever we ignore your principle of the indirect line, it pays dearly.

In September 1940, I resigned from my position as director of military training in India and was transferred to the Middle East to serve as the principal of the newly formed Middle East Staff College.At the beginning of October, when Graziani's army was stopped near Sidi Barrani, I also went to the front line in the Western Desert and lived with Akonor's troops for two weeks.Despite Graziani's superiority on land and in the air, Aconnor studied the possibility of switching to a counterattack.We discussed Graziani's dispositional weaknesses and the possibility of extensive maneuvers from the south of the Great Slope.The purpose of this maneuver is to form what you call a strategic barrier behind the enemy forces near Assaluma (75 kilometers west of Sidi Barrani) and Halfa, or at Sidi Conduct a counter-assault in the Barani area.Finally, due to the difficulty of transportation, we finally had to adopt the second option.

At that time, the air force in the Middle East was relatively weak, but part of it was transferred to Greece.This necessitated a delay in the start of the attack.It was not until November 21, 1940 that Weaver sent me again to the British Army Headquarters in the Western Desert.There, the Fourth Division of the Indian Army was planning a trial attack on a fortified desert camp.Because on the defense line south of Sidi Barani, the Italian army happened to have such a fortified camp.Therefore, Aconnor hopes that I can personally express some fair and reasonable opinions.This experimental attack can be said to be a rehearsal exercise.It adopts a purely frontal attack method, and must advance in a direction that the enemy can fully predict, and must directly pass through the minefield. At that time, we did not have any mine-clearing tools.In terms of time, it was also necessary to give our artillery four hours after sunrise to prepare for test firing.This is of course very dangerous, because during this interval, our attacking force will be forced to lie down under the attack of the enemy's superior air force.All in all, this method, although not contrary to official instructions, was completely incompatible with the tactical situation at the time.Therefore, such an attack will undoubtedly fail.That night Aconnor, Growe, and I, after discussion, worked out a very unorthodox method of warfare, but of a decidedly indirect character.We wrote our conclusions into a report titled "Methods of Attacking Desert Camps".This document later became a guide for conducting desert operations, with very good results.The basic spirit of the file, whether it is the choice of combat direction and method; or, the calculation of time, and the estimation of mental factors, are all based on the principle of applying your indirect route.

On December 8, 1940, we started our march and gradually approached the enemy.During the night we concentrated our forces in the area south of Nibawa, that is, at the southern end of the enemy's front camp, near a passage between this camp and the camp at Sofafe.These two camps just covered the Italian flank turning back from the south.At dawn on December 9, a tank battalion of the group army (drawn from the 7th Royal Tank Regiment), as well as part of the motorized units of the Indian Fourth Division, began to attack from the rear and quickly occupied the Nibawa camp.Afterwards, they began to advance towards Tumalu, and also took this place from the rear.This time, we changed the practice of conducting artillery test firing for a long time. The subsequent artillery support was completely completed without test firing.Seventy-two artillery bombarded the camp of the Italian army with fierce firepower, and cooperated with the tanks attacking from the front to carry out the impact.We are very satisfied with artillery, call artillery fire: demoralizing fire, and it is.At this time, the 7th Armored Division had quickly crossed the access road and rushed westward, reaching the rear of the enemy's advance area, thus cutting off their connection with the reinforcements and blocking their retreat to Sallum. .Such a tactical combination of actions using indirect routes completely disrupted the enemy's defense system.Thus, the enemy's resistance began to crumble.We were on the east side of the Great Slope and surrounded most of the Italian army.Despite the enemy's numerical superiority and command of the air, our losses were minimal.Therefore, Wei Weier once said to me in a letter: It is of course dangerous to give up a little principle to a certain extent, but if there is no such compromise, it will be difficult for anyone to win a battle.

During this offensive, there was an interesting incident: Due to the shortage of means of transportation, Aconor had to stockpile drinking water and ammunition within the maneuvering area of ​​the outpost, that is, under the nose of Graziani , for the needs of two days and nights.If the combat operation cannot be successfully concluded within this time limit, lack of drinking water will necessitate a retreat and the use of supply vehicles to transport infantry.I do not think that any British commander, or even that of Continental Europe except the Russians, would have attacked under such unfavorable conditions as Aconnor.Moreover, Aconor also made a second such attack at Bedavum.Aconor was a brave man, good at calculating, good at using the principle of the indirect route, and therefore a very dangerous opponent.

In January 1941, after our army advanced to the east of Cyrenaica, I prepared a report on the operations to capture Bardia and Tobruk.Aconor told me about his next move.Therefore, I participated in the planning of the implementation of the roundabout maneuver, and got the opportunity to follow the 7th Armored Division to execute the roundabout on Bedafum.By this maneuver we cut off the retreat of the remnants of the enemy south of Benghazi and prevented them from withdrawing to the Tripolitanian area. There is no doubt that Aconor's operations from December 1940 to February 1941 were strategically and tactically based on your indirect line theory Outstanding example.The battle near Sidi Barrani was a good start, followed by a series of brilliant operations until the final battle at Bedafum, which ended with lightning speed, all of which are direct evidence of victory by the indirect route.Please remember that my mind was filled long ago with the essence you distilled from historical experience, and within this essence is filled with your own military philosophy.The most amazing thing is that all these operations of ours have brought your theory into full reality.Aconnor was indeed a first-rate commander. Strictly speaking, he could be regarded as the only leader of the British field forces in this war. He was able to kill foxes in the open and flat fields.

It was not until the end of 1941 that I received a reprint of your authoritative classic, The Indirect Route, which you sent me over the summer.In the next five months, I read and re-read and conducted repeated research.This book aroused my re-understanding of strategic principles.Backing up your theory with the facts of the North African campaign makes its significance more apparent. In the spring of 1941, Rommel made his debut and suddenly appeared on the battlefield in North Africa.Thus, the indirect route becomes a weapon against us.Our small and poorly equipped force retreated hastily to Tobruk, narrowly avoiding the fate of destruction.Regrettably, at this time, Akonor and we parted ways.At that time, a bold decision was made to defend Tobruk forty-five kilometers south of Tobruk with four and a half brigades in order to recover from Rommel the weapons using the indirect route.However, such a small force is really too little to organize the defense, but it is all we have in North Africa.This brave move stopped Rommel's advance.During the whole summer and autumn, they felt that their strength was insufficient, and they could only besiege us at Tobruk on the one hand, and hold their positions at Salum on the other hand, preventing us from going to the rescue of Tobruk by land.This decision to stick to Tobruk was made because of the persistence of Churchill and Weaver.On April 10, 1941, I flew to Tobruk and conveyed the order to Mohid to hold the city.

In June 1941 we launched an offensive on the Egyptian frontier.Although the situation at the time was favorable for a broad range of indirect lines of action, our actions were of course a frontal attack, which of course resulted in no results.It is also for this reason that our attack from Palestine to Syria (then under the control of the French Vichy government), that is, a direct and obvious attack, has met with great difficulty.If it hadn't been for the detour from the northern part of Iraq to hit the key point of the enemy's eastern flank, it would have almost failed.That roundabout offensive operation proved the correctness of attacking the enemy's rear.All these battles have proved your theory is correct.

In June 1941, the commander in the Middle East was changed. Auchinlek was transferred from India and was ordered to reorganize and rectify the army that had lost its vitality in the western desert of Africa, and was ready to go to the Xilambaga area again. The Axis Army launched an attack; from then on, the troops originally in the Western Desert were reorganized into the Eighth Army.Tobruk was still besieged by the enemy, and Rommel was gradually concentrating his forces, preparing for a decisive blow to the weak areas of the city defense.In November, before Rommel was ready to attack Tobruk, we launched a pre-emptive attack on him.The code name for this operation was the Crusades.Strategic intent is very sensible.It placed Konnihan, commander of the Army Group, in a favorable strategic situation: first, he had a favorable line of operations, starting from a supply base hidden in the desert near Madrilla, and extending to the north; One of two targets can be chosen, either attacking the rear of the enemy besieging Tobruk, or attacking the troops defending its borders.On the other hand, Rommel's situation is very bad, and the situation of his force allocation is extremely unfavorable to him: not only is his back against the sea, but he is also forced to fight on both sides, he has to besiege Tobruk and defend The positions in the Halfaya area are therefore very short in depth.Our advance began at Madrilla, forcing the Germans to fight me at right angles to their lines of communication.Although the situation was extremely favorable to me, it was still not possible to destroy Rommel's troops.This is because our battle plans are not tactically sound.At that time, it was envisaged that we would use our armored forces to draw Rommel's tank forces out, hold them back with fighting, and then attack the enemy forces near Tobruk or attack the enemy forces defending the border area.Although this action can have a strategic surprise effect on Rommel to a considerable extent; however, he relied on his superior technical weapons to better organize the coordinated actions between the tank troops and other arms, so that he made use of it from the very beginning. We were defeated tactically.The result was a bitter fight, and it was not until the end that the British defeated the German counterattack.The overall combat operation is dispersed into individual activities of each unit.Litsch had been slow to take the indirect route action via Birgobi and Adem (south of Tobruk), thus giving Rommel an opportunity only at the expense of his deployments on the Egyptian border and Barr Dia's forces, and orderly withdrew their main force to the Aguila area.

After that, we completely forget about the principle of the indirect route again.Rommel soon struck out from Aguera against our various units spread over the vast ground, and again we were defeated in a panic.On one occasion, he actually broke into Musus and threatened Benghazi and Mekili (160 kilometers west of Tobruk) at the same time, which put Li Teqi in a dilemma.Going back from here, Li Teqi almost lost thousands of miles and returned to Tobruk. Finally, he finally stopped on the line of Gazala｜Bir Hakem (75 kilometers southwest of Tobruk) up the heel.From February to May 1942, the Eighth Army held this line of defense, resting there to recover.At the same time, Rommel was firmly occupying the Jeblin Akdal line, preparing for further attacks.At this time, I arrived at the front line of the Eighth Army for inspection.Thus, began to consider the combat deployment of the modern group army.It occurred to me that their disposition was almost the same as that of Graziani's forces at Sidi Barrani, with almost the same shortcomings.That is to say, Li Teqi repeats the mistakes that others have made before.The deployment of its troops is not only short in depth and inflexible, but also the small detachments are far away from each other, so they cannot provide timely tactical support.Therefore, its failure is inevitable.

Here, we have to mention one of the most complicated major issues in fighting in the desert, that is, the relationship between front and depth.What ratio should there be between the width of the front and the deployment depth of the advancing troops and reserves?In the desert, mechanized forces have great freedom of maneuver, but the size of field forces is necessarily limited because of supply difficulties.Therefore, a defensive army is easily surrounded by roundabouts from the flanks.To guard against this danger, troops in desert operations always try to extend their fronts, to the detriment of the depth of defense and the employment of reserves.However, this problem has never been properly resolved.This tendency is especially pronounced when an army has few mobile units and not enough tanks, or when commanders fail to take into account the peculiarities of desert warfare.In the autumn of 1942, Rommel himself made this mistake.In the July campaign he had extended his front so far that his southern flank reached the Catara Depression; so that when Montgomery attacked he had little depth in his defense. The defeats suffered by Graziani and Litchi illustrate that they failed to follow a basic principle of strategy: when the enemy advances to your rear or happens to change the situation of the campaign, in order to move troops in a new direction To fight without being weakened, it is necessary to avoid confusion and demoralization of the troops.Therefore, in the disposition of forces, careful consideration should be given to prevent the enemy's advance to the rear from forming an indirect line within the strategic sphere.That is to say, the defending army must form a solid defense on its wings and rear, which should be as strong as the front defense.To defend, one must not only block the enemy's attack, but also create conditions for a counterattack. Only such a defense is an effective defense. How should the defensive troops deploy their forces?There are three options to choose from: one is to make a line configuration, and at the same time control the fast reserve team; the other is to make a ring configuration, which is also a line configuration, but its rear is closed in a circle, which can be called Hedgehog-shaped configuration; the third is to make a checkerboard configuration, that is, to organize many resistance hinges.The distance between these points of resistance should be moderate, so as to facilitate the use of reserves and the timely support of each other with artillery.Therefore, the configuration of the resistance hub must ensure that at least 75% of the mobile weapons can be concentrated on any point under attack in time, and their speed should be ahead of the enemy so that the enemy cannot destroy the resistance stronghold.That is to say, the idea of ​​rigid defense within a division's defensive zone should be abandoned to a certain extent. However, our field doctrine has always adhered to this traditional concept.According to the spirit of the doctrine, our commanders are all inclined to this kind of understanding: if several divisions must be arranged in a line in a zone, then their attention should only be on their own defensive front. It is necessary to provide some kind of support to the left and right friends and neighbors, and to consider one's own vital interests first.Because under such conditions, the reinforcement of the divisions attacked by the enemy in the first echelon and the cover of the rear of the defensive zone are usually taken by the reserve team.The difficulty of defending open ground with a small force is great.At this time, the defender must overextend his front, so it is impossible to form a sufficient defense in depth, and it is impossible to leave a large reserve.In terms of personnel numbers, frontal width and mobility, if not regressing to the standards of the Waterloo era, the lack of depth and reserves is bound to be felt. Modernizing the way the Roman legions were deployed seemed the best solution to this problem.In this way, when a group army is defending, it can divide its troops at many points, and the horizontal and vertical distances between each point can generally reach nine kilometers.At each point, a considerable number of artillery and infantry should be left behind; the remaining artillery, infantry and armor should be used as a reserve force, which can be freely moved within the defensive zone, or can be concentrated to support threatened points, or used Strike the flank and rear of the enemy trying to outflank me.If an army group has the strength of four infantry divisions and one armored corps, it can defend a rectangular area with a width of 40 kilometers and a depth of 30 kilometers.Such a battle layout can guarantee mutual support among various units, and the armored tank units of the armored army can be used as a reserve.The airfield should be deployed behind the position, covered by ground forces.On the two outer sides of this rectangular area, some light fast troops should be deployed, and they should have their own independent supply and maintenance areas.As for the heavy armored units, they should be arranged in a relatively rear position, but still within the reach of the artillery fire of the defensive stronghold.Such a deployment, in terms of general requirements, is to make the entire defense system flexible.On open terrain, the various resistance hubs of each legion should occupy high ground so as to observe the surrounding situation and control the surrounding terrain.If the terrain is undulating and the roads are vertical and horizontal, the resistance hub should be selected at the intersection of the roads.In short, the whole defense should be mobile and solid. If the deployment of the Eighth Army south of Tobruk had met the above requirements, Rommel would have been defeated.However, as mentioned above, the Eighth Army is actually deployed in a single line, with a wide distribution. As long as the enemy conducts an assault in the traditional way, it is likely to be defeated.On May 27, 1942, Rommel launched his attack in this way.His plan is to use most of the tank troops of the Italian African Army on the front, control the front of Litchi, and bypass the Free French with a small number of German African Army and some better Italian troops. The troops were in the garrison area of ​​Bir Hakeem, inserted between Adham and Wrights Reed (Knights Bridge), and directly hit Litage's weakest defense.Although the initial attack was not completely successful, Rommel defeated Litchi, paralyzing the British army and thus creating the conditions for its next move.Then, first of all, he wiped out an isolated brigade of the 50th Division, and further seized some positions of the Free French forces in Bir Hakam, thus ensuring the safety of his rear.After that, he repelled several frontal counterattacks of the British army in a row, causing heavy losses to the British side, and then launched a new attack in the direction of Adham.This attack again placed Litchi in a dilemma, for it threatened two targets at once, the rear of the Qachala defense force, and the area due east of Tobruk, which was It is the terminus for unloading our railroads, and has many field depots.This threat had such a shock to the British Army Commander that he withdrew more than half of the Eighth Army to the Egyptian border.In this way, the troops remaining in Tobruk were limited, and lacked the cover of attack aircraft, so that they did not escape the doom of being wiped out. In this battle, Rommel showed great skill in using the principle of the indirect route.At that time, the German army was not strong, with only two tank brigades and four mechanized infantry brigades.Relying on this small number of troops, Rommel adopted various methods of defeating and completely defeated Li Teqi's entire Eighth Army.He used a large number of Italian troops in the front, but it was difficult to use them elsewhere. On June 25, 1942, Auchinlek had no choice but to directly replace Li Teqi and go out to direct the operations in the Western Desert in person.I accompanied Auchinlek to the headquarters of the Eighth Army.Rommel had tried to cut off the Eighth Army's retreat to Egypt, but the remnants of the Army got rid of the enemy and retreated to Matruh, a transportation hub.The arrival of Auchinlek brought a new atmosphere to the struggle.He deployed all his remaining troops and weapons between Matruh and Purcia.As Commander-in-Chief, he has the authority to make broader strategic decisions to maximize the concentration of forces to meet the critical situation of the moment.The first question he faced was, where exactly should he meet the enemy?Either near Matruh, or continue to retreat eastward.The defensive positions in the Matruh area have always had the reputation of being strong and invincible, so at first glance it seems to be an ideal battlefield.However, if Matruh is to be held, an armored force strong enough to prevent the enemy from detouring through the desert must be in place.If there is no such a force, the defensive positions of Matruh and Baguchy will eventually become concentration camps short of water, and the enemy can completely sweep them from the side and directly attack the Nile Delta. In the early stage of the battle, most of our armored tank units were lost.The Commander-in-Chief therefore decided to delay the enemy's advance in the area south of Marut, thereby gaining time for a solid defense to be organized near El Alamein, where the defense of Egypt was expected to take place.However, in addition to this principled decision, he also made two other decisions in an attempt to change the course of the entire battle.In this way, his actions naturally have the value of the indirect route.The first decision was to centrally control all artillery within the scope of the group army. Before that, all artillery was scattered and assigned to field infantry brigades in regiments.The second decision was to abandon the former pre-established positions between El Alamein and the Katara Depression, which were too widely spread for the manner of fighting he was about to conduct.This latter decision greatly confused the enemy at the time.Therefore, the German army also tried to distribute its forces along the front, making their non-mechanized infantry defense line a very weak link. I think history has provided proof.From June to July 1942, Auchinlek's command of the Eighth Army not only saved the Allied forces from further disastrous defeats, but also made people who study military science in the future have an indirect The use of lines is also a typical example; although his strategy cannot but be defensive, his tactical actions are everywhere offensive.After withdrawing his remaining forces to El Alamein, his first concern was to stop Rommel's rapid advance along the coast to Alexandria.From July 1st to 3rd, Axis forces attacked positions south of Alamein, but all they encountered was heavy artillery fire and aerial bombardment.Our line of defence, stretching from Alamein to the mountains of the Waisat, has great resilience.The structure of this line of defense itself is quite extraordinary, where infantry and artillery are actually mixed together, fighting shoulder to shoulder.In fact, the basis of this elastic line was twenty-five-pound guns, which were covered by closely adjacent infantry, supported by some of our surviving tanks.Facing a line of defense like ours, the German African Army was actually eclipsed by it.They were unable to break through this line, and on July 3 the attack finally ceased. At this time, Auchinlek decided to switch to the counterattack without hesitation.He attacked Rommel's right flank with Gaut's left flank, which included the mobile units of the New Zealand Division and the 7th Motorized Brigade.At that time, this enemy force was on the road between the coast and the Katara depression.This counterattack caused heavy losses to the Italian division of Ariti.In order to save the crisis, Rommel decided to transfer most of his German troops to the right flank, and stretched all the way to the Katara depression, while leaving his left flank completely defended by Italian troops.On July 10, the Australian Ninth Division under the command of Mohid launched an attack. Rommel barely escaped the fate of being defeated by relying on the support of airlifted troops from Crete.He then moved the exhausted German troops back to the north from the right flank.Since then, Auchinlek has launched a third attack.This time, the New Zealand division was used to attack the Italian troops in the center of Rommel's line of defense. After three such well-planned attacks by Auchinlek, the Italian army was demoralized and almost completely disintegrated, forcing Rommel to spread his Afrika Korps from the coast to the Katara Depression. A line of defense of about 60 kilometers in between, in order to strengthen the resistance of the Italian army.As a result, one of the most effective elements of Rommel's tank army, the so-called Afrika Korps, completely lost its mobility. By mid-July 1942, the attempt by the Axis forces to break into the interior of Egypt was completely bankrupt.Since then, due to fighting and disease, the enemy's casualties have increased, and the losses have increased day by day.In this open desert, they guarded a 60-kilometer-long line of defense, and were constantly bombarded mercilessly by our powerful air force and concentrated bombardment by more than 300 field artillery.Rommel's plan to attack the Nile Delta was completely shattered.Since his arrival at the Alamein line, the total number of prisoners in his force amounted to nine thousand.However, Rommel still had considerable recovery ability at this time.Therefore, it was necessary to greatly enhance Egypt's defense capabilities and improve the current position of the Eighth Army.Once Rommel attacks again, he can be completely defeated.If circumstances compel him to retreat in order to get rid of this completely exposed and overstretched line, he may be pursued.However, given Rommel's personality, the possibility of him taking this step seems very small. Our most urgent task at present is to strengthen the position of the Eighth Army in the open area between the coast and the ridge of the Waisat Mountains.The southern flank of their position was completely exposed.Moreover, we have seen twice in these campaigns that troops deployed in this desert are easily overwhelmed by smaller forces. The problem facing Auchinlek was to free the Eighth Army's flank from the threat of Rommel.The method he adopts is the theory I have explained above.Immediately after abandoning the unsuitable positions established in 1941, he immediately established a new line of defense in the rear of the Eighth Army, not too far from the defensive front.This line of defense extends to a point south of the ridge of the Outer Sutter Mountains, at a distance of about thirty-two kilometers, and is composed of points of support (hinges of resistance).These support points are laid out in a chessboard formation, each stronghold is nine kilometers apart horizontally and vertically, and each is defended by an artillery company of 25-pound guns and two infantry battalions.A division has three infantry brigades, and each brigade is in charge of a sector in which there are three such points of support.No single stronghold is isolated, and all these strongholds can support each other. However, these strongholds constitute only a skeleton.All troops that are not responsible for defending a certain stronghold can fight freely on this chessboard; they are deployed at various intermediate locations, under the command of Auchinlek, and can be transferred to other places at any time according to the needs of the situation, so they can handle it freely in front, back, left, and right.On this large chessboard, minefields and mine belts are also set up, the principle of which is to make them neither hinder one's own counterattack nor be used by the enemy.When an army is so deployed, their fronts can be shifted as circumstances require, without losing their stability.In this way, each unit will no longer be in danger of fighting alone, they can support each other, and the senior commander will not be distracted by fear of attack in the rear.The failures of Graziani and Litchi in the past were all due to this reason.Auchinlek's headquarters is in this chessboard defense system.However, such changes alone are not enough.If the enemy attacks on one or both wings of this defense zone, he may attack both inside and outside.Therefore, Auchinlek prepared to use armored forces and motorized forces to counterattack such actions from the southeast.His plan can be said to use the indirect route from three aspects: in order to resist the enemy's attack in an indirect way, he designed a checkerboard stronghold; scattered troops in the defensive zone can restrain the attacking enemy; heavy tanks Groups and groups of mobile light tanks can carry out assaults on the flanks or rear of attacking enemy forces. Even if Rommel could drive us out of the Alamein-Waisat Mountain checkerboard defense area, before the Eighth Army received reinforcements and supplementary supplies from the country, it would not be possible to defeat us.Because while building the Alamein line of defense, we began to build a second line of defense in its eastern area to prevent the loss of the Alamein position.For this purpose we have also deployed fortifications in the area of ​​Alexandria, whose fortifications have extended to the desert in Anria (23 kilometers southwest of Alexandria) and to the east of the Nile.Barriers from Wadi Latru have also been used as the basis for a zone of defense.To the west of Cairo, the fortifications in the Nile Valley area have been extended to the line of the Faron River, and preparations are being made to build bridges across the Nile near Madi and to the south.These fortifications provided the Eighth Army with the possibility, when it had to withdraw from the Alamein position under Rommel's pressure, to carry out an orderly retreat and to threaten the enemy from both directions at any time flank. On August 6, 1942, before leaving after visiting the Eighth Army, Wei Weil once said to me: Your deployment is very beneficial.With such a defensive method, it is of course possible to make a frontal retreat to lure the enemy troops and make them throw themselves into the trap.Have you ever had such a plan?In fact, we did consider this possibility and think that the concept is very promising. For military science, it can also be said to be a kind of misfortune, because the defensive layout of the Eighth Army did not have the opportunity to stand the test of actual combat.By the time Rommel launched another attack in September, the Eighth Army had already been replenished and surpassed the Germans both in terms of numbers of personnel and in terms of firepower and armored weapons. When attacking, we were immediately counterattacked by our reserve team.They lost over sixty tanks for nothing.從總的進展情況來看，戰鬥局勢是按照奧欽列克的計畫發展的。隆美爾終於喪失了主動權。這次的成功，可以說完全是奧欽列克的勝利；其他指揮官們只不過由於他的遠見而受到實惠罷了。當然，也不能因此而降低了司令官的功績。隆美爾的敗局雖然早在七月就已經決定了，但是直到十月，當蒙哥馬利發起反攻時，才真正獲得了奧欽列克所開創的這場勝利。這次阿拉曼防禦部署所發揮的間接路線和攻勢防禦精神，在你的著作中都可以找得到理論的根據。 在這次戰爭中，我們駐中東的部隊曾經有兩次經受著生死存亡的危機。當時，如果處置失當，則情況將是另一個樣子，部隊的命運也就很難設想。第一次發生在西迪巴臘尼的進攻戰中，第二次則是保衛埃及的防禦戰。如果說，阿康諾爾在西迪巴臘尼不能取勝，奧欽列克直接指揮第八集團軍時在阿拉曼地區遭到失敗，那麼，軸心國的部隊將會佔領埃及和中東。那樣的話，戰爭的歷史可能會完全改觀。任何一個將軍，當他處於奧欽列克的地位並面臨如此嚴重的危局時，恐怕很難像奧欽列克那樣表現出冷靜和明智。在軍事學術史上，無論是攻還是守，恐怕很難找到這樣完整的例證，以來說明間接路線的妙用。很明顯，阿康諾爾和奧欽列克所以作出這種決定，你著作中的思想，對於他們是有影響的。一九四二年的局勢最後能夠轉危為安，轉敗為勝，其主要原因看來就在於此。坦率地說，而且我也曾多次指出過了，事情正是這樣。當然，這並不是說，阿康諾爾和奧欽列克，以及其他任何一位優秀的將軍，都是照著書本來打仗的。但這卻可以說明，他們是系統地研究過戰爭理論的，而且不僅平時研究，戰時也在研究。從這一連串戰役的研究中，我們可以看到，凡是採用間接路線的戰徑，幾乎都能贏得勝利。由此便能得出一個結論，一個司令官決不應該忽視間接路線原則。當然也有例外。當地面兵器、機動力和空軍力量方面擁有絕對優勢時，或許可以不用這一原則。我還要指出一個情況，在加紮拉的隆美爾，和在西迪巴臘尼的阿康諾爾，都曾是沒有空中優勢的。所以，儘管空中優勢能發揮巨大威力，但它還是不能補救地面指揮官的無能。 凡是頭腦清醒的讀者都知道，在你的這本書裡是找不到包打勝仗的現成答案的。不過，他們卻可以從中找到一把解決戰爭問題的鑰匙這就是採用間接路線的作戰方法。這雖然是一個很簡單的工具，但是卻只有頭腦精明而又沒有保守思想的人才可能使用它。換句話說，只有視野廣闊的軍人才能用它。人們也許會問：這是否適用於今天的戰爭呢？應該說，對於怎樣進行戰爭，不可能有一條固定而現成的規律。只有具體地判明情況，正確地估價各種行動方法的利弊，才能找出最好的間接路線形式，從而在心理方面和物理方面剝奪敵人的行動自由。在某種情況下，這可能與破壞敵人的補給有關，而在另一種情況下，則在於保證各種火器充分發揚威力。是實行攻擊，還是採取防禦，要根據間接路線的要求來確定。在戰略性的防禦中，可能要採取某些進攻性的行動。而戰略性的進攻，有時就是從戰術防禦開始起來的。在這裡，頭腦的判斷力具有重大意義。擺脫各種陳規陋俗，常常可以達到進攻的目的。總想進行防禦，即使力量相當雄厚，也是一種失敗情緒的表現。採取間接路線的目的，是要尋找敵人的弱點，摧毀敵人的士氣。有的，這個目的就只是在心理上瓦解敵軍的領導。在這種情況下，取勝的程度如何，取決於積極行動的一方在採取行動過程中究竟有多大的自由權。為了達到最終的目的，必須經常考慮到下一個突擊的行動方向。然而，決不可能預先準備好一套方案，不能坐待間接路線形式自行到來。這一切的一切是沒有成規可循的，運用之妙只是存乎一心而已。 所以，已經用不著再多說了。為了奪得勝利，在軍事活動的各個領域中，首先需要的是健全的理智，嚴密的邏輯和摒棄一切俗套的能力。對於負責獨當一面而需要自己作出決定的指揮官來說，這後一種素質是特別寶貴的。毫無疑問，間接路線原則是贏得戰爭勝利的一種工具。 always loyal to you 艾利克 一九四二年十月