Chapter 27 Appendix II: Strategic Analysis of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War

(This is an excerpt from an article. The author is General Yandin, Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. The article was published in the September 1949 issue of "Barracks", which explains in detail the use of the indirect route.) The task of strategic planning must be viewed from two perspectives.The same goes for tactical planning, only on a narrower scale.On the one hand, we must try our best to prevent the enemy from taking actions according to the basic principles of warfare; on the other hand, we must make full use of these principles to better achieve our goals.Therefore, those responsible for the planning of our army's operations must take account of all the principles that the enemy may use.

Let us now see what principles the enemy may employ, and what we must do to meet them.These are: In order to deal with it, the principle of suddenness must make the reconnaissance agencies at all levels carry out continuous activities; The principle of reasonable aim To deal with it, tactical feints can be used, strategic, psychological and political offensives can be adopted; The principle of saving troops In order to deal with it, you can attack the rear communication lines and warehouses, so as to contain the enemy's troops and force the enemy to divide their troops into battle; The principle of coordinated action in order to deal with it, it is necessary to attack the command channel of the enemy army;

The principle of concentration In order to deal with it, feints and air raids can be used in order to divide the enemy army; Principles of Security To deal with it, a combination of the above-mentioned principles must be taken, as well as other measures, which will be discussed below; The principle of the aggressive spirit. In order to deal with it, the aggressive spirit must be exerted by itself; The principle of mobility To deal with it, we can take the method of destroying the lines of communication. As for our own plan of action, the focus must be on ensuring the attainment of the military-political objectives prescribed by the Government for each phase of the war; and at the same time combining primary operations with secondary operations and feints.But we must always remember: the basis of a plan should be to maximize the effectiveness of the principles of warfare, and to try to achieve that before the battle begins, the fate of a battle is determined in advance in terms of strategy, or to take a step back, At least the most favorable conditions for victory should be created for oneself during the battle.In fact, this is the secret to a good strategic plan.Clausewitz famously said: Blood is the price of victory.It now appears that this view is outdated.

The days of tactical attacks from the front are turning into legend.There is now a tactical art whose main task is to attack the enemy's flanks and rear.Generals are still debating the strategic applicability of this approach.Of course, this method is also completely applicable in battle, but it is used in another form.There is no doubt that the indirect route strategy is the only sound and reasonable one.Captain Liddell Hart has excellently written about the strategy of the indirect line, and its application to strategy.He explained that the content of the indirect route in strategy is much wider and more complex than in tactics.In order to make the principles of warfare conducive to achieving one's own goals, strategic indirect routes must be used. Only in this way can the outcome of the battle be determined in advance before the battle begins, making it beneficial to one's own side.To do this, you must first complete the following three tasks:

1. Cut off the enemy's communication lines and prevent the advance of its reserves and supplies; 2. To block the enemy's route of retreat, thereby destroying their will to resist and demoralizing their morale; 3. Attacking the enemy's command organization and depriving its headquarters of the ability to effectively command troops. The importance of these three tasks can be expressed by a famous quote from Napoleon.He said: The whole secret of military science is to make yourself the master of the lines of communication. Completion of these three tasks will create the conditions for realizing the basic mission of the strategy.When Liddell Hart analyzed the purpose of strategy and the responsibilities of strategists, he once made a precise explanation: the real purpose of strategy is not to find a battle, but to find a favorable strategic situation, even if this situation itself cannot to produce a decisive result, but it is possible to achieve this purpose in this situation followed by a battle.

In order to obtain this decisive strategic situation, the most important means is to accomplish the above three tasks in order to disperse the enemy's organization.If this step can be achieved, generally speaking, it is possible to disintegrate the enemy army, or defeat the enemy army in battle.On the other hand, when planning to accomplish these tasks, political factors must be taken into account, because political factors have an impact on the method of accomplishing the tasks.For example, when destroying the enemy's lines of communication and blocking their retreat, the closer the place to perform the task is to the enemy's main force, the faster our side will take action.Or to put it another way, if an attack is made against the enemy's shallow rear, the effect will be reflected quickly; if an assault is made against the deep rear, the effect will not be reflected so quickly, but its impact will be greater.Therefore, when formulating a plan, the time factor required for combat must be taken into account.In our last year's war, by its very nature, there was an artificial reason for the constant intervention of the United Nations, but the time factor was limited.Therefore, when formulating a plan, you have to choose the route of quick victory, and you would rather give up a greater effect.On this point, we will explain in detail below.

A few words to add on the question of the rationality of the objective.The goal must be simple, but the methods to achieve the goal should be diverse.Otherwise, one approach fails, and the entire plan of action is shattered.Therefore, when drawing up a plan, there must be several plans: if then; then, then; or in other words, once it appears, then it should.On this issue, Liddell Hart has rightly pointed out that plans are like fruit trees.If a fruit tree does not have branches, it is of course impossible to expect it to bear fruit.If a plan has only one plan and one goal, then it is like a bare log that cannot bear fruit.

The purpose of my writing this article is to encourage our soldiers to conduct a careful analysis and study of the campaigns in which they participated, so that they can try to apply this strategic insight and assumptions instead of holding on to them, because that is the case in our military There have been many reflections in the publications.Here, I would also like to give a brief introduction to several battles in our war last year based on the above insights.The most important battles of last year were: the Battle of Ten Plagues (combat against the Egyptian Army); the Battle of Ramping (again against the Egyptian Army); Leary Lake area).From a strategic point of view, the Battle of Rhodes (that is, the battle of signing the armistice agreement) should also be counted in it.An analysis of these campaigns shows that the plans for these campaigns are based on the strategic principles and methods mentioned above.This means strategically adopting an indirect route, destroying lines of communication, conducting blockades, using tactics as much as possible to achieve surprise, and quickly and thoroughly smashing the enemy's deployment plan.As for the time factor, it is certainly not the last one in terms of importance, but sometimes it cannot depend on ourselves, but it still has a considerable influence on the choice of method.

When the Egyptians invaded our country, they hoped to open our doors, so they went up the coast road and advanced as far as Isdod.After the enemy was blocked, he sent some troops to attack in the direction of Jerusalem, and advanced to Falluja.At that time they had a great superiority in numbers, held several fortified areas, and were superior to us in defensive weapons.This forces us to avoid frontal attack operations.However, enemies also have weaknesses.As Napoleon said back then: The whole secret of military science lies in making oneself the master of the lines of communication.One of the most basic weaknesses of the Egyptian army is that the line of communication is too long.

The purpose of the Battle of Ten Plagues was to open the road to Negev (the southern part of Palestine, formerly known as Nedrep) and destroy the enemy's expansion plan.When operating, we should make full use of the weakness of the long communication lines of the Egyptian army.The three methods I listed above, that is, destroying the enemy's supply routes, blocking their retreat routes, and attacking the enemy's command organs, can be found in typical examples in the Ten Plagues Campaign.Consider the following facts: 1. To carry out a breakthrough east of Aymancia, while using paratrooper sabotage teams to conduct a large number of harassment activities.As a result of this move, the enemy's line of communication to the east was cut off, and the 113th highland was seized, making it impossible for the Egyptian army to deploy its own forces.

2. Seize Escalon, thus blocking the main enemy's retreat route, and at the same time cutting off their communication lines, causing them to panic, thus completely shaking the enemy's will and morale; , the enemy had to decide to retreat, causing morale to be even lower.Incidentally, this is also an example of blocking the retreat directly behind the enemy's rear. 3. Repeated bombing of Gaza, Majdal, Rafah (30 kilometers southwest of Gaza) and Arish (43 kilometers southwest of Rafa) and other cities, destroying the enemy's communication system and command organization, that is, completely Paralyzed their nervous system. It must be pointed out that our army is divided into several independent large units to fight against the enemy's northern group and western group respectively.This allows our army to have a certain degree of flexibility in command, and can deploy troops and shift focus according to actual requirements. The ramming battle was fought in the Oja|Arish area.The object of war is still the Egyptian army.This battle can also provide several useful examples for military scholarship.At the beginning of the battle, Egypt failed to coordinate the actions of its two groups, the East and the West, and thus failed to obtain decisive strategic benefits.After the Battle of the Ten Plagues, the Egyptians hesitated to use their Eastern Bloc to cut off and blockade the southern part of the Negev region. As I said before, the best way to deal with the offensive spirit of the enemy is to promote the offensive spirit of your own troops.This principle is the operational basis of the impact campaign.Our Prophet has already said: Whoever comes to kill you, kill him first.Launch a powerful attack on the enemy from the rear, choose a road via Haruza to Jiao (which the enemy considers impossible), and conduct a strategic feint against the Western Group of the Egyptian Army along the coast (tactically, Psychological and political threats simultaneously) All these measures combined ensured the victory of our army. The battle of ramming clearly demonstrates the purpose of a truth strategic plan mentioned above, which should strive to make the fate of a battle determined in advance before the battle has even begun, or at least should create favorable conditions during the battle, in order to achieve decisive results.The victory of the ramming battle developed into a pursuit of the enemy in Egypt.This fact also well proves the correctness of another principle: the blockade of the enemy's location and the speed of the blockade are closely related to the size of the effect.If our army breaks through in the direction of Arish and controls the point of Abu Awejira (30 kilometers west of Ojja) in the Sinai desert, then we will achieve even greater decisive results.Of course, doing so will take more time.On the other hand, our army quickly turned to the outskirts of Rafah and firmly pinched the enemy. On the surface, it seemed that it was difficult to produce any major impact due to the fact that they were too close to the main force of the enemy and that they even had an advantage in tactics. The effect, however, was in fact quickly achieved, forcing Egypt to demand a truce. The battle of Rhodes (the battle for the signing of the Armistice), the establishment of Herasa, and the expansion of territory in the so-called Triangle and the Arach area all provide us with lessons about the tools and tactics used strategically The tools used are different.Sometimes strategy can use political means to create favorable conditions so that victory is tactically easy to achieve.As long as these tools are used properly, a lot of troops and blood and sweat can be saved. Last, but not least, I want to talk about the Battle of Sinan.This is a typical blitzkrieg, but also a good example of a strategic solution to the mission.The significance of this strategic solution is no less than that of a tactical solution, and under the specific circumstances at the time, it even appeared to be more effective.After Gao Keji exerted pressure on Marana, he really wanted to solve the task tactically. If we were lured by him and sent troops to make a new frontal attack on him, then he would force us to accept a battle and make him Gain favorable results, while our previous efforts are wasted. In the Battle of Sinan, we adopted an indirect route strategy, using flexible and changeable combat methods as much as possible, and constantly striking the enemy according to the overall plan and purpose.However, the basis of all our actions is still the three basic methods mentioned above: destroying communication lines, blocking retreat roads and attacking command organs.Our army is divided into two groups: starting from Safed all the way, heading north to attack Sasha; starting from Kabri all the way, heading east, passing Tabha, and continuing to rush forward.It was a brilliantly planned strategic encirclement operation in the 1948 campaign, which led to our immediate victory and thus served as a shining example. At the end of this article, I would like to emphasize that I do not intend to discuss the entire process of combat operations in detail, but just point out these operations from a strategic point of view, so as to encourage everyone to understand their meaning and role. Overview of the battle Compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Lorch, Director of War History Division of the General Staff of the Israeli Army 1. Battle of Ten Plagues (October 15th to 21st, 1948) During the ten days between the first armistice and the second, that is, from July 9th to 19th, fighting on other fronts showed that the initiative was completely in the hands of the Israeli army.They fought successfully.As for the Egyptian army, the situation on its front has hardly changed much.The urgent hope of the Egyptian army is to quickly defeat the poorly equipped and exhausted Israeli army and win a quick and decisive victory.But this hope finally came to naught.Since the first armistice they have concentrated their efforts on consolidating their positions in Palestine.These positions are mainly distributed in Arab settlements, and their layout is as follows: (1) Extend north along the coast road until you reach Isdud; (2) Proceed northward along the road to the north of Oja, passing through the strongholds of Asruj, Beer Sheba, Hebron and Bethlehem; (3) Go eastward along the Majdal road, and cut across to Beit|Javrin. This is an east-west road, which just connects the above two north-south roads. The Egyptians made a great effort, but only captured two Jewish settlements along the coastal road.There was a third settlement there, but the local residents successfully repelled repeated attacks by the Egyptian army, and after the conclusion of the first armistice agreement, these residents all evacuated the village.Negev is a semi-desert area in the south of Palestine. According to the partition resolution of the United Nations in November 1947, it has been assigned to the State of Israel. Still safe and sound.However, its line of communication with the north, that is, with the center of the State of Israel, was cut off from the east and the west by the Egyptian army, which occupied the flanks of the two aforementioned roads across the road. Obviously, the above-mentioned situation cannot continue for a long time.Even if the Egyptians intended to abide by the terms of the armistice agreement, the truce could only be temporary, and they would not take these conditions seriously. At that time, according to the armistice agreement, the Egyptians could use the crossing road for a certain period of time, while Israel could use the road from Oja to Vefrem (the old name of Bethlehem) during other periods.This situation is in favor of Egypt, who can count on completely eradicating the Jewish base areas in the Negev area in the future, or force the Jewish residents to surrender by starvation.The issue of supplies forced Israel to take the initiative, and there was also a trend that the established military posture would serve as the basis for a future political settlement, which meant that Israel might lose the entire Negev region. The task facing the Israeli military authorities is quite daunting.The military situation in the combat zone is precarious.Under the UN resolution, the Israelis could send a convoy of supplies south.However, the convoy was attacked by Egyptian troops and some vehicles were set ablaze, forcing the convoy to return to its original station.It has become obvious that any countermeasures taken by the Israeli army will not have any surprise effect on the Egyptian side.However, there is only one route to the Negev, which is the road from Majdal to Beit Jaffrin. To ensure the smooth flow of this route, one or several strongholds must be occupied on both sides of the road.The Egyptians, however, had strong fortifications at these points.Moreover, for the Israeli military authorities, this move should have been made in the early stages of the war.In other words, the Israeli army will not only temporarily lose the means of surprise attack, but also will have to direct its strikes directly where the Egyptian army can expect it. From the perspective of the Egyptian army, their deployment lacks depth.The positions of the Egyptian army are distributed in several narrow defensive zones: one is the coastal zone, sandwiched between the coast and the Negev area; the other is along the road from Majdal to Beit Jaffrin; Sanjo develops to the northeast and extends to the Judea Mountains.This weakness in the deployment of the Egyptian army can be used by me.We can use this to offset most of our shortcomings in combat.However, in order to achieve this goal, our strength in the south should be larger than what we have.Therefore, before the Ten Plagues Campaign started, we used airlift to transport a considerable number of mobile troops to the isolated Negev area. Having completed these preparations, we launched our offensive on October 15, 1948.In the afternoon of the same day, the Israeli Air Force attacked the Egyptian airport in the Arish area, and at the same time attacked the following targets: such as Gaza, Escalon, Majdal, and Falluja.The attack caused heavy losses to the Egyptian Air Force.Therefore, in subsequent operations, although the Egyptian Air Force continued to operate, it has not been able to regain air supremacy.Immediately afterwards, the Israeli army launched an attack at night and broke through the Egyptian defense line near the village of Escalon on the coastal road.This breakthrough seriously threatened the Egyptians' communication lines, and later completely cut off their communication lines.As a result, the Egyptian side was unable to freely transfer reinforcements and supplies to Majdal, and was forced to withdraw a considerable number of troops from the main battlefield.For the same purpose, the Israeli army carried out a series of assaults to the south. The task was to blow up the bridges and railways between Arish, Rafa and Khan Younis (eight kilometers northeast of Rafa). At the same time, in the Beit Jafrin area, the Israeli army also occupied several high grounds that were not stationed by the Egyptian army, thus cutting off the crossing road from Majdal to Beit Jaffrin.Thus, by the morning of October 16, without any serious fighting, the Egyptian lines of communication were cut off to the north and threatened to the west.The situation that has been formed is conducive to the Israeli army breaking through the Egyptian defense line in the north.At dawn on October 16, the Israeli armored forces and infantry cooperated to attack the village of Amansia and the ancient city of Jieli.However, the attacking force was hit hard by well-organized artillery fire from the Egyptian army, and some tanks were destroyed.Unable to charge without the support of tank fire, the infantry were ordered to retreat. The purpose of capturing the village of Amansia was to threaten the Egyptian army's position from the road junction in the rear, but this purpose was not achieved.Because there was no other way to think about, we had to directly attack the Egyptian army position near the junction of the road.At that time, the defense of the Egyptian army was based on several highlands: some positions were directly close to the intersection of roads; , it can overlook dozens of kilometers around the area.There is of course no indirection to attack such high ground.On the night of October 16, through fierce hand-to-hand combat, sometimes even using teeth as weapons, Hill 113 and several other hills were finally captured.This hand-to-hand combat proved that the Egyptians not only knew how to organize a defense, but also how to hold a defensive position. That night, the Israeli army also launched an attack on the right flank of the Egyptian army in the Judea Mountains southwest of Jerusalem.The purpose of this attack was to play a strategic clamping role, but it did not help the troops who captured the intersection of the roads, because this is the hardest of all nuts. On October 17, the Egyptian army carried out a tenacious counterattack, the purpose of which was to restore the line of communication between Majdal and Faluja.But they came to no avail.None of the heights we had taken had been recaptured.In this way, the following situation was formed at that time: Although the Egyptian army could no longer use the east-west transversal road, we also failed to open the north-south road from Oja to Vefrem (i.e., Bethlehem). .To this end there are but two means: either take the remaining positions held by the Egyptians along both sides of the north-south road in the area of ​​Hulaikat; Carter.For the next two days, we spent our strength in this area, hoping to achieve one of the above two goals, but the Egyptians continued to carry out a tenacious defense there, and constantly organized counterattacks. Although the Egyptian forces have been holding the position between the east of the fortress of Iraq-Suweidan and Amancia, that is to say, the famous pocket area of ​​​​Falluja, which was called at that time, Houleikat finally On the night of the 19th, it was captured by the Israeli army.After many months of isolation (actually beginning in December 1947), a solid bridge was finally established between the Negev and the rest of Israel. The rest of the operation may be briefly described as follows.On the western front, since the Israeli troops had penetrated deeply into the Escalon area, the Egyptian army's line of communication was in danger of being cut off, so they withdrew from Majdal without firing a single shot; Many strongholds were abandoned, including the Jewish villages of Yad Mordha and Nitchanim, which fell to the Egyptians after fierce fighting in May.On the Eastern Front, the Egyptians were completely driven from their mountain positions by our rapid advance to the outskirts of Bethlehem (Wifrem).On the northern front, only the Egyptian army in the pocket of Falluja still resisted tenaciously.This action of the Egyptian army hints at the dangers we have caused them by taking the indirect route.The Israeli troops cut off the enemy's line of communication, not only making it impossible for the Egyptian army to retreat, but also forcing them to rely on a tenacious defense organized on the ground.However, the Israeli army's encirclement of the pocket-shaped area was getting smaller and smaller, and on November 8th it captured the fortress of Ilak-Suweidan. As a result, the Egyptian army had no other choice but to surrender . One thing is very intriguing.Among the enemy files seized in this fortress, a copy of "Indirect Route" was actually found.The book was the private property of the commander of the Egyptian garrison, and now it has become the trophy of the commander of our assault force. (General Yandin’s Note: This is fortunate for us, because they do not really understand the precise meaning of this book, otherwise, they would not be able to take advantage of our surprise attack, and our strategic plan is precisely Based on ideas from that book.) At the same time, on the southern front, our army captured Beer Sheba, thus bringing the operation to its climax.In order to quickly expand the results of the battle, our army marched southward along the road that was just opened, drove into the Negev, joined our troops that were already there, and captured the city of Beersheba on the night of October 20. The Egyptian garrison commander in Beersheba may not have understood the development of the fighting on the northern front. He did not expect that Israeli troops would appear in front of the city so quickly.The garrison, therefore, panicked under the sudden onslaught, and surrendered after only five hours of fighting.In World War I, British troops occupied the city of Beer Sheba.Almost on the day the British had entered the city thirty-one years earlier, the Egyptians had announced their surrender.After the fall of Beersheba, the fate of the Hebron defenders was decided, but they soon received Arab reinforcements, so their right wing retreated south from Beersheba and entered the Arab region. Sluge area. 2. The Battle of Crash (December 22, 1948 to January 7, 1949) Before the start of the Battle of Crash, the deployment of the Egyptian army had some similarities with those before the Battle of Ten Plagues, but the scale of this battle was much smaller than the previous one.Egypt is still divided into two groups: the left-wing group is assembled along the coastal road, the northern end of which has reached Gaza; the right-wing group is deployed along the road from Oja to Asruj (south of Beersheba).Between these two groups, there are two transverse roads: one from Rafah to Ojah, part of which is in Egypt;In addition, some Egyptian troops are stationed in the pocket of Falluja near Hebron.Although the Egyptian army has not yet been defeated, it seems obvious that the Egyptian army will not dare to launch a large-scale offensive campaign without the assistance of at least one army in the Arab countries.As long as the Egyptian army still controls a considerable area in Palestine, it will always be a rather serious threat to our young country, and to eliminate this threat, the Egyptians must be completely defeated. The Egyptian deployment was based primarily on two assumptions, one of which was correct, while the second was wrong, and ultimately led to their defeat.The first assumption is that whoever holds the lines of communication in a sparsely populated area such as the southern Negev can control the entire region.The second assumption is that only the existing gravel roads are considered as the traffic lines in this area.Therefore, their defense in this area once again adopted a support point system, and it was arranged along the highway; the layout of the shooting area (shooting zone) was only for the defense of the communication line, so the highway itself became the main target of shooting. The lessons that the Egyptians learned from the Battle of the Ten Plagues are only the following two points: one is to realize that the Israeli army has experience in night combat; the other is to pay attention to the Israeli air force.For this reason they better camouflaged their positions and fortified their night defenses. Our general plan of attack was roughly the same as Allenby's plan for the third Gaza campaign in the autumn of 1917, except that the direction of attack was different: Allenby attacked from the south, while we attacked from the south. Attack from the north.The main concept of the campaign is to attract and pin down most of the Egyptian troops in the western region, and then conduct a decisive assault to squeeze out the eastern group of the Egyptian army and drive them back to the border of Egypt.After completing this task, our army should turn to the northwest, threaten the enemy's communication lines leading to Egypt, and force them to withdraw from the Gaza area to the coastal area.If necessary, a direct attack on Gaza could also be launched in the final phase of the campaign. At the beginning of this battle, the Israeli Air Force carried out concentrated and violent attacks on the Egyptian army airports and troops distributed in Rafah, Khan Younis and Gaza. artillery bombardment.That night, our army on the western front captured several highlands about 13 kilometers south of Gaza, thus posing a threat to the enemy and possibly cutting off the road from Rafah to Gaza.As the Israeli command had expected, the Egyptians immediately fell into the trap.They concentrated a considerable number of troops in this area, including most of the tanks, for counterattacks. At the same time, they also strengthened the defense forces from Gaza to Rafa. Although the Egyptians took back the eighty-six highlands after tenacious fighting, our goal of dispersing the enemy's forces has already been achieved.Therefore, when we launched an offensive in the eastern region, we achieved the effect of a surprise attack strategically.The first objective was to clear the enemy forces on the Beersheba-Oja road.Of course, the Egyptians were prepared for our action, but they did not expect that our scouts discovered an ancient road from the Roman era.It started from Beersheba and passed almost in a straight line to the rear of Oja.In particular, they did not expect that our engineering units had secretly built this road so that medium and heavy tanks could pass through it.And yet that's exactly how it went.When the Egyptian combat security force stationed in Asrujh thought that the attack would come from the road in the direction of Beersheba, and was nervously monitoring the road in that direction, the light and fast troops of the Israeli army suddenly entered the desert in the desert. Appeared, not only seized a series of strongholds further south, but also cut off the road from Oja to Rafa at two points.At dawn on December 25, the city of Oja was attacked.At this time, its connection with the northern outpost and the western base had been cut off.Although the garrison there put up a desperate resistance, but because foreign aid had long been cut off, and the reinforcements were repulsed by the Israeli army blocking the direction of Rafa, they could not resist the strong onslaught of the Israeli army. In the early morning, he abandoned the city of Oja and took the initiative to withdraw to the desert.Thus, after a few hours, Asrouge, who was completely isolated, was captured by our army.As a result, the entire road from Beersheba to Oja was completely controlled by the Israeli army.Our battle plan for the first phase has now been completed. Although the various units of our army were deeply fatigued after continuous fighting, they only took a very short rest. As soon as the supplies arrived, they immediately started the second phase of the battle, that is, they began to advance into Egypt.On the night of December 28, our troops captured Abu Awejira, an Egyptian base on the Sinai peninsula on the way to Ismailia.The column of our armored tanks then moved along the road to Arish and seized an airfield south of the town, where several planes remained intact.At this point, with just one more leap forward, we could gain positions across the coastal road and reach the coast near Arish.However, for political reasons it was impossible for us to take this step.Although the Egyptian army had fought in Israel and had been kept silent, when the Israeli army entered the land of Egypt, it was immediately considered intolerable.Due to strong political pressure and the threat of military intervention from the British side, the armored force had to be ordered to withdraw to Israel. Our army has no other choice but to pursue the above-mentioned purpose in the Rafa area north of the border line, that is, to go out to the coast.To this end, the strength of several brigades was concentrated there, and the attack was launched from the southeast of Rafa.Subsequently, some positions were captured near a cemetery, from which the huge fortress built by the British in Rafa city could be clearly seen.At the same time, some highlands were also occupied on the south side of the road from Ali to Rafa.The fighting reached this stage, forcing the Egyptian side to call for a truce on the afternoon of 7 January. Although our army received the retreat order when the offensive was at its climax, we were satisfied with the results after checking the results.Except for the narrow strip of Gaza, the Egyptian army was completely driven out of Palestine.The vast majority of their armies were wiped out or destroyed, and it would take a considerable time for them to regain their fighting strength.以色列軍雖然在數量上幾乎沒有超過擔任防守任務的埃軍部隊，而且武器裝備要比他們弱得多，但是仍然取得了上述成果。 三、希南戰役（一九四八年十月二十八日至三十日）當阿拉伯國家的正規軍侵入巴勒斯坦的時候，原來由法弗齊‧高克吉指揮而擔負著作戰重擔的解放軍，隨即撤退出去進行整訓，或者說得更準確些，準備去改編成為正規軍。在第一次休戰以後，高克吉成了加利利地區的主人。他相繼與敘利亞、黎巴嫩和伊拉克等國建立了聯繫，但名義上只接受阿拉伯聯盟的直接指揮，而不在這些國家中任何正規軍的指揮體系以內。 在兩次休戰之間的十天戰鬥中，高克吉喪失了下加利利的大部分地區，並且包括拿撒勒在內。不過，他仍然把自己的大部分隊伍撤退到了上加利利，在那裡佔據著一個長約三十二公里，寬約二十四公里的矩形地區。由於已經遭受嚴重的損失，一般看來，他似乎不可能在短時期內採取大規模的進攻行動，但他有可能同某一個或者幾個阿拉伯國家的正規軍聯合起來，因而仍然是一股潛在的威脅力量。而且，他當時盤據在加利利高原之上，處於內線作戰的地位，從巴勒斯坦西部的高地上，可以向以色列部隊所控制的三個狹窄地帶的任何一個發起進攻：向西，與黎巴嫩軍配合，能夠攻入齊布倫谷地；向南，與伊拉克軍配合，能夠攻入埃斯納倫谷地（艾爾莫卡達河谷地）；而最可能的是，與敘利亞軍配合，在富拉湖地區攻入約旦河谷地。 大約在十月中旬，高克吉看到以色列部隊正忙於埃及前線的戰鬥，認為時機已到，居然不顧停戰協定的約束，貿然決定首先動手。他期望獲得部分的勝利，至少挽回一點威信，因此，決定對夏吉克｜阿貝德地域內的以軍陣地發起進攻。這是一個要塞，位置在山脊背上，標高為七百六十公尺，從那裡可以望到馬拉納居民地，能夠瞰制富拉湖谷地。由於遭到突然襲擊，這個要塞終於失守了。於是，馬拉納村再度被切斷，富拉湖谷地也處在危險當中。 可是，高克吉又失算了，而這一次的錯誤竟引起了致命的後果。以色列軍最高統帥部考慮到，高克吉既然破壞了停戰協定，進行了挑戰，那就趕緊利用埃軍戰線剛剛趨於平靜而以色列空軍正好空了出來的機會，一勞永逸地把高克吉的解放軍解決掉，即把他們完全趕出巴勒斯坦，若有可能，就把他們全部消滅。這樣一來，便引起了一場希南戰役（希南是黎巴嫩古代一個國王的名字）。這次戰役的進行，總共不到六十小時，高克吉的部隊被完全趕出了巴勒斯坦，其中很大一部分是被我軍殲滅的。 高克吉所駐守的地區，本是一個進行遊擊戰的理想地區，只要擁有相當的兵力和鬥志，那是很適於組織防禦的。對於現代的正規軍來說，這個地區卻有一個很大的弱點，那就是道路稀少，交通不便利。而這一點正是對高克吉的作戰行動有所影響的。那裡可供使用的大道，南北向的只有一條，東西向的算是四條。其餘小道，只能徒步通行，絕大部分難於使騾馬通過。薩沙村是整個地區交通道路網的樞紐部：從海岸邊上過來的，有巴沙至塔爾希的公路和納哈里亞至塔希哈的公路；從南面來的，有法拉底亞公路；往北進入黎巴嫩的，是馬利基亞公路，而黎巴嫩是高克吉的補給基地。 高克吉的兵力區分為人數大體相等的三個部分，每一部分都叫作雅爾莫克旅。但是把它們稱之為旅，似乎有點名不符實，也不能把它們的名稱去同拜占廷時代奪取巴勒斯坦的雅爾莫克那個名字相比。他們的部署是：第一個旅配置在艾克里公路以南，第二個旅扼守著包括薩沙在內的東北地區，第三個旅駐防西北地方，司令部則設在塔希哈。 我軍的計畫大致如下：派遣兩支部隊，分別從南面和西南面實行佯攻，吸引住高克吉駐在南面的兵力，而以第三支部隊從西面進攻，搶佔塔希哈這個據點。同時，以輕型裝甲車輛、半履帶車輛和步兵組成主力集團，從薩費德地域出發，向西實施進攻，力求奪占薩沙村，使我進攻部隊的側翼和後方在南面和西面都不致受到威脅。而當我東西兩面實行夾擊的部隊匯合以後，他們即應擴張戰果。其任務：一是肅清突出部上的殘敵，消滅那些已經落入口袋中的敵人；二是沿著東北方向發展進攻，掃除馬利基亞至梅圖拉公路兩側的敵軍，以保障富拉湖谷地中猶太人村莊的安全。 空軍的任務：在進攻開始前的那個下午，首先對主要目標如塔希哈、薩紗、馬利基亞等進行轟炸；以後，根據召喚對進攻中的陸軍部隊實行支援。炮兵數量很少，基本上只能配屬給主力集團，即使如此，其實力也不過勉強地湊成起一個炮兵連。 這個計畫中對裝甲部隊的使用，是值得特別注意的。初看起來，在這個地區使用坦克是很危險的，因為它們必將限制在少數幾條道路上面，而敵人已經佔領了道路兩側的高地，隨時都對我構成威脅。儘管如此，我們還是決定使用裝甲部隊，而且把它作為突擊力量，用來進攻主要目標，以阻止或遲滯敵人援軍的接近。行動的快速性是奪取勝利的決定性條件。這次作戰能否成功，從政治理由和軍事因素來衡量，將取決於我們能否在任何一支阿拉伯正規軍來援以前把高克吉打垮，或者迫使他來不及把輜重撤出而逃走。否則，高克吉即使喪失了薩沙，也很容易恢復態勢，有捲土重來的機會。在這樣的條件下使用裝甲兵力，的確是一種冒險，可是很幸運，我們用得頗為成功。 關於計畫的執行方面，可以略述如次。在進攻的第一夜，由於掃清路上的障礙物和排除地雷花了過多的時間，打亂了原來的計畫，以致本來應在夜間發起的對於梅倫和吉希的進攻，推遲到拂曉才進行。不過，東面那支部隊卻進展順利。到十月二十九日淩晨，他們已在薩沙方向上前進了很遠的距離，在該據點南面佔領了兩個村莊，並擊退了敵人幾次反衝擊。敘利亞正規軍的一個營，曾經趁著黑夜來援，開進了戰鬥地域，可是，在他們還沒有來得及佔領陣地以前，我軍就對它發起衝擊，把它完全殲滅了。總之一句話，敵人當時陷在驚慌失措之中，又在突然襲擊之下被打敗了。 在此同時，從南面和西南面實行佯攻的兩支部隊，卻沒有完全完成自己的任務。他們成功地迷惑了敵人，使高克吉以為我軍的主要突擊仿佛來自南面。但他們並未能在那裡鉗制住高克吉的兵力。高克吉隨即命令他的部隊沿著阿克里公路向北撤退，而那裡正是我軍實施主要突擊的地區。不過，敵人撤出去的這些兵力，對於那裡戰鬥行動的結局並沒有發生多大的影響。 西面那支部隊，在二十八日夜間未能完成攻佔塔爾希的任務。因此，一些已經向我軍投降的村莊又採取了近乎叛變的不即不離態度。這是因為那裡的居民有所畏懼，害怕萬一高克吉獲勝而招來麻煩。 十月三十日拂曉，我軍攻佔了薩沙村。於是，高克吉所部撤離了塔希哈，我軍隨即於早晨進入了該城。幾個鐘頭以後，東西兩支兵力的先頭部隊已經匯合一起。但是，大部分的阿拉伯士兵都突出了我軍的戰線，逃進了黎巴嫩境內。以後，我軍乘勝追殲高克吉殘部，不僅肅清了上加利利地區，一直抵達巴勒斯坦北面由聯合國所決定的分界線上，而且有少數部隊進入了黎巴嫩，到達了瓦迪｜杜比邊上。 十月三十一日六時，也就是戰鬥打響以後還不到六十小時，希南戰役使告結束了，我軍幾乎沒有什麼損失。