Chapter 20 Reasons for objection

It is interesting that my initial reaction to the plans determined in these two operational orders was emotional rather than rational.As far as I can see, the strategic intentions of Army Headquarters were, in their essence, modeled entirely on the famous Schlieffen plan of 1914.I at least feel it a disgrace that our generation should fail to come up with a better plan, but to copy old papers, even though they were written by a master like Schlieffen.What's more, we have tried this plan once in the past, and the enemy has already fully warned against its reuse, because anyone with a little knowledge of military science will surely understand that in 1939, Germany Humans are less willing (or unable) to attack the Maginot Line than they were at Verdun|Toul|Nancy|Epinal in 1914 The line is especially bad.

But my sentimental initial reaction did not do Army Headquarters justice.The first reason was that the plan had come from Hitler's personal psyche, and the Army Headquarters should not be responsible.The second reason is that, in fact, it did not exactly copy the Schlieffen plan.The opinion that this plan is identical to the Schlieffen plan is widespread, and strictly speaking only two things are true: (1) in 1939 as in 1914 , the Germans focused their offensive on the northern flank; (2) Both plans were to attack through Belgium.In addition, the plan for 1914 is far from the plan for 1939.

On the first point, the situation is quite different.In 1914 it was also possible, as Schlieffen hoped, to obtain a strategic surprise attack.Even though this does not include the advance through Belgium, it does apply to the concentration of the main body of the German army on the extreme northern flank, which Hitler's considerable intentions in 1939 could not. Do not let the enemy know. Secondly, in 1914 there was also reason to hope, like Schlieffen, that the French would launch a premature offensive against Lorraine and thus give us a good chance.In 1939 such a development was hopeless.The enemy will immediately deploy a strong force to counter our attack through the Belgian and Dutch countries and the two sides will collide head-on.In addition, the French are likely to launch a strong counterattack against the southern flank of our main force as our army advances through Belgium.In other words, the Schlieffen Plan was basically unusable.

Besides that, it didn't take long for me to see the whole notion that neither Army Headquarters nor Hitler intended to copy Schlieffen's plan.When Schlieffen drew up his plan, he aimed at the utter and complete defeat of the entire French army.His goal is to use a large roundabout operation to clear the enemy army extending northward. After clearing the entire northern part of France, it should continue to press down until the west of Paris, and push the entire enemy army from Metz (Metz) to the west. ) through the frontal oppression of the Vosges mountains as far as the Swiss border, forcing the enemy to surrender.In order to achieve this goal, he would rather take the risk of accepting the initial setback in Alsace, and at the same time hope that the enemy will launch an offensive against Lorraine, so that by virtue of their own actions, it is enough to make the German army's roundabout operation a complete success.

In contrast, the battle plan for 1939 did not include an intention to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion.Its goals were clear: (1) a partial victory over Allied forces in northern Belgium, and (2) a geographical gain to capture the Channel coast as a base for future operations. Perhaps when Admiral Brauchitsch and his chief of staff were drawing up the battle plan for 1939, they kept in mind what old Moltke said in the introduction to the German General Staff's history of the Franco-Prussian War if: No plan of battle can be sure of its development after the first encounter with the main force of the enemy.Only a layman in the development of a campaign would think that he can carry out the original plan systematically in all the details until it reaches its predetermined conclusion.

If Army Headquarters bases its plan on this theory, it means that it reserves the right to decide whether to and the right to use what means to continue the offensive. But from all the instructions I had received at Zossen I could not but assume that the Army Headquarters considered the chances of a decisive victory in France extremely slim, if not non-existent.Afterwards, the commander-in-chief of the army and his chief of staff visited the headquarters of our army group many times for inspection.My impression was also strengthened by their attitude, for when we insisted on the need for a general victory, they never paid any serious attention to it.Likewise, I doubt that Hitler himself really believed at the time that it was possible to completely defeat France in this planned course of action.In fact, his main concern may have been that he recalled that when our aborted offensive in 1914 turned out to lack the necessary bases even to carry out a submarine war against Britain.So he now pays special attention to the acquisition of such bases, in other words, the occupation of the coast of the strait.

It was now evident that the complete defeat of France could no longer be accomplished in a single blow, as Schlieffen had planned.As explained above, this necessary condition no longer exists.But if the design is to go on to the further and complete defeat of France once the partial victory imagined by the Army Headquarters has been won, then the present operation must at least be connected with this final objective!First, it should require the complete destruction of the enemy's northern flank in order to establish a decisive advantage for a second move aimed at annihilating the remaining Allied forces in France, and second, it should simultaneously create A favorable strategic situation from which to launch this further blow.

In my opinion, there is no guarantee for the fulfillment of these two basic requirements in the current combat plan. When the German shock force, Army Group B, has forty-three divisions in total, when it reaches Belgium, it will bump into twenty divisions of the Belgian army. If the Netherlands is also included in the battle plan, it will be even more difficult. Plus ten divisions of Dutch troops.However inferior these troops were to the Germans in terms of quality, they had strong fortifications (on both sides of Liège and along the Alpere Canal) and natural obstacles (in Belgium there was the Alpere Canal, which flowed into the Antwerp fortress; and the fort line of the Maas River with Lamour as the hub; there are countless waterways in Holland.), so it is very conducive to defense.And within a few days, these forces could be reinforced by the Anglo-French allied forces (including all their tanks and motorized divisions), which had already assembled on the French-Belgian border to prevent the German invasion.

Therefore, it is impossible for the right wing of the German army to use a large-scale detour movement to obtain a strategic surprise attack like in 1914.When the Anglo-French allies arrived, the Germans had to fight an opponent of equal strength and more or less face to face.Therefore, the success of this first blow must be sought by tactical means, because there is no opportunity for strategic use of the offensive. Had the enemy been able to show considerable skill in leadership, he might have avoided total defeat in Belgium.Even if he couldn't hold Antwerp, Liège, the Meuse (or Seamouse) line, he might still be in fairly good order, retreating to the rear of the Lower Somme.Once there, he can mobilize his strong reserve force and establish a new front.By this time the German offensive must have gradually lost its momentum.And Army Group A would be powerless to prevent the enemy from establishing a new line of defense from the end of the Maginot Line east of Sedan to the lower Somme.In this way, the situation of the German army will be quite similar to the situation after the autumn battle of 1914.Its only gain is to occupy a wider coastal base along the strait.We were therefore neither able to destroy the enemy forces in Belgium, which is a necessary condition if we were to gain a proper advantage in the decisive phase, nor to establish a favorable strategic situation for the ensuing campaign.The operations planned by the Army Headquarters can at most achieve a partial victory and nothing else.

Facts later proved that in 1940, the enemy army was completely defeated in Belgium. This should be thanks to the ingenious use of Army Group B. As a result, both the Dutch and Belgian armies were forced to surrender.But no matter how great our confidence in the leadership of the German army and the striking power of the armored forces, such success cannot be estimated in advance.If the other party had had better leadership, the story might have been completely different. The main reason why the enemy suffered a crushing defeat in northern Belgium was that our side changed its original combat plan later. The tank units of Army Group A were able to drive in, cutting off their lines of communication and forcing them off the line of the Somme.

Finally, there is one more thing which was not taken into account in the Army Headquarters plans as to the extent to which a decisive enemy commander could be employed.No one should assume that the opposing commander lacked such leadership, especially since General Kamaling was quite well known on our side at the time.Before the war broke out, General Baker had visited General Gamelin and had made an excellent impression of him. A decisive enemy commander could have stopped the expected German advance through Belgium while at the same time launching a massive counteroffensive against the southern flank of the German northern flank.Even if the troops designated to support the Netherlands and Belgium had already been invested in Belgium, fifty to sixty divisions could easily be drawn from the Maginot Line to launch such a counter-offensive. The farther Army Group B advances in the direction of the English Channel and the mouth of the Somme, the more favorable the enemy will be for a counterattack on this flank. Army Group A, with a total strength of only twenty-two divisions, seemed uncertain whether it could stop this assault.No matter what the result is, development along this line, strategically speaking, is difficult to achieve a total solution in the western battlefield.