Chapter 21 Army Group A's plan

The above objection came to mind when I studied the operational orders of the Army Headquarters, which formed the basis of our recommendations.So we put forward a series of memorandums to persuade the Army authorities to accept our views.Since there are naturally some repetitions in these proposals, I will only give a general account here, and also point out the comparison with the operational intention of the Army Headquarters: (1) I think the goal of the Western Front Offensive should be to seek a decisive battle on land.Pursuing only the limited objectives outlined in the Army Headquarters plan seemed unreasonable both in terms of the political risk (undermining the neutrality of the three nations) and the military gamble.The offensive capability of the German Army is our trump card on the European continent. It would be too inappropriate to allow it to be consumed by such half-hearted measures as long as Russia is considered.

(2) The focus of our attack should be on Army Group A, not Army Group B.The task envisioned by Army Group B in the present plan was to launch a more or less frontal attack on a waiting enemy force; even if the initial success was considerable, it would probably be exhausted at the Somme up. The real opportunity was in Army Group A, where the main idea was to launch a surprise attack through the Ardennes.Because of the treacherous terrain, it would never have occurred to the enemy that we would use any armor here.In this way, it will be possible to rush to the lower reaches of the Somme and cut off the line of communication between the enemy troops who have already thrown into Belgium and the ferry.Only by this means will it be possible to completely annihilate the entire right wing of the enemy in Belgian territory and to prepare for the final victory in France.

(3) Apart from contributing this major opportunity, Army Group A could also save the German offensive from a major danger. Had the enemy acted rationally, he might have avoided an unfavorable duel in Belgium, and retreated behind the Somme.At the same time, he will also concentrate all available forces to launch a major counter-offensive on our southern flank, with the goal of encircling the main German army in Belgium or in front of the Lower Rhine.While it may be assumed that the French High Command lacked such audacity, and that the allies of France might have objected to such a bold decision, the possibility cannot be disregarded.

Should our offensive be halted at the lower Somme, the enemy will at least be able to establish a new continuous line of defense with all the reserves at his disposal.This line of defense may start from the northwest end of the Maginot Line east of Sedan, and use the natural barriers of the Aisne River and the Somme River to reach the Strait. To prevent this, it was necessary to smash immediately any concentration of the enemy's forces on our southern flank.Neither on either side of the Meuse, nor between the Meuse and the Oise, should give them the opportunity to complete the concentration.In this area, the integrity of the enemy's front must be destroyed first, and the point of view is to be able to turn around the side of the Maginot Line in the future.

(4) Army Group A, which is the main force in the scheduled battle, should be given the strength of three armies, not just two armies. (Perhaps in the initial stage, for space reasons, more divisions may be temporarily accommodated in the area of ​​​​Army Group B.) Army Group One was to attack across southern Belgium, cross the Meuse as it had been supposed to, but then head straight down the Somme and attack the enemy facing Army Group B from the rear. The other army group should advance in the southwest direction. Its task is to crush any enemy forces concentrated in the area west of the Meuse River and attempting to launch a counterattack on the south flank of our army.

The third army, still as originally planned, covered the deep flank of the entire operation from the north of the Maginot Line sandwiched between Sierk and Mouzon (east of Sedan) . Since the focus of operations has shifted from Army Group B to Army Group A, we have put forward the following two requirements: (1) Increase the strength of an army group.Even if it is necessary to join the army group after the offensive is launched, it must be designated in advance. (2) Strong armored forces. Although the above is very brief, it also represents the main trend of thought in the memorandums repeatedly submitted by our army group headquarters to the army headquarters.