Chapter 22 The Struggle of Army Group A's Project

Naturally, in October 1939, I was not able to draw up such a clear and crisp battle plan in one go. Before ordinary people can achieve their goals, they have to work hard.There is no chance of a miracle happening.Nevertheless, when the Army Group presented its first proposal to Army Headquarters on 31 October 1939 on the policy of German offensive operations, the rationale for the new plan was already contained in Inside.More precisely, there are two documents that are relevant here.The first document is a letter written by the commander-in-chief of the army group to the commander-in-chief of the army, reviewing the basic issues related to launching an offensive under the special circumstances at that time.

At the beginning of his letter, Rundstedt emphasized that the operational orders issued on October 19 and 29 were unlikely to have a decisive effect on the war.The relative strength of the German and enemy forces was not sufficient to provide the necessary basis for a general victory.This operation was also entirely frontal, hopeless enough to turn the enemy's flanks and attack him from behind.The likely outcome might be a frontal battle on the Somme. At the same time, Lundster also pointed out that in the autumn and winter seasons, we will encounter great difficulties in order to effectively use our ace tanks and aircraft.Nevertheless, this offensive should still be launched, because only if it is successful, it will constitute a prerequisite for the operation of our naval and air forces against Britain.The experience of the First World War has proved that it is not enough to occupy only part of the coast of the Channel. For this purpose, we must control the entire northern French coastline to the Atlantic Ocean.

It would be unwise to expend the offensive capabilities of the German Army on a limited victory while Russia remains behind us.This offensive capability is a decisive factor on the Continent, and the friendship of Russia can only be ensured while we still have a strong army capable of offensive operations. As far as the present is concerned, the offensive capability of our army is still completely entrusted to the standing division. This situation will not change until the new formation has acquired the necessary training and stability.But to launch an important major offensive, it is not enough to rely solely on the standing division.

Perhaps due to the pressure of the Luftwaffe on the United Kingdom, it was enough to force the Western countries to launch an offensive first, but even if the British would demand such an action, it is still doubtful that the fighting spirit of the German army can withstand such a bloody battle.From our point of view, it is of course best to leave the heavy burden of attacking fortified positions and the breach of Belgian (and Dutch) neutrality on the enemy himself.At the same time, however, we cannot wait indefinitely while the British have time to make up for their deficiencies in armaments and aircraft production.

From a military point of view, the war against Britain could only be won by sea and air.If our army's offensive capabilities are wasted in non-decisive battles, the war will only be lost on the mainland. Rundstedt's letter was a warning that any German offensive should not be launched too early, in the fall.On this point, the opinions of Army Group A and the Army Headquarters are completely consistent.But the two sides disagree on the method that should be adopted.Rundstedt stated in his letter that operations directed by Army Headquarters operations orders did not guarantee us decisive success.

The second important document submitted by Army Group A to Army Headquarters was on October 31. Concrete recommendations were made for how a German offensive should be carried out.This document already includes all the necessary parts of the new plan, and it emphasizes the following three necessary conditions: a. Shift the focus of the entire operation to the southern flank. b. Use powerful motorized forces to break into the rear of the Allied forces in northern Belgium from the south. c. Use another group army to follow behind and take charge of offensive actions to defeat any large-scale counterattack made by the enemy to the south of our army.

Until November 3rd the letter elicited no reaction.On that day, the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army came to inspect the headquarters of our army group. I was ordered by General Lundest to directly explain our opinion to them.However, Admiral Brauchitsch flatly rejected my request for reinforcements (plus an army group and a powerful tank unit), saying that he also hoped to be able to draw them out.This clearly shows that he still completely rejected our proposals, but in the end he allowed us to be given an armored division and two motorized infantry regiments from the general reserve.

Unfortunately, the two of them also obviously maintained great doubts about the planned Western Front offensive, especially did not believe that it had a chance of winning a decisive victory.They asked our army commanders and army commanders to report on the current situation of the troops under their jurisdiction. Naturally, they raised many dissatisfactory opinions on the situation of the newly formed divisions. Judging from the replies to these complaints of the Army Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff, it can be seen that they themselves do not seem to have confidence in the offensive.

In order to remedy this bad impression, a few days later, Lundster summoned the generals in the army group to give lectures.On the basis of the concept of operations drawn up by his own staff, Rundstedt made it clear that there was practically every hope of success on the Western Front, although an offensive before the spring might not be so advantageous. On November 6, when the Army Headquarters asked us to express our opinion on the implementation of the operational order, we made another suggestion, but we still did not receive a reply. Whenever Hitler's favorite meteorological experts at the Air Force Headquarters issued a forecast that there would be a short period of good weather, Hitler immediately ordered the mobilization of troops.But every time this kind of prediction always failed, so it was temporarily stopped.

On November 12th we received the following order, which strikes me as a complete surprise: The Fuehrer has now decided to form a 12th Army on the southern flank of the 12th Army, or in the area of ​​the 16th Army. Three Rapid Troops Army.It should take advantage of the unforested terrain on either side of Arlon, Tintigny, and Florenville to advance towards Sedan and the areas east of it.The army was organized into the XIX Panzer Corps, the 2nd and 12th Panzer Divisions, a motorized division, and two SS regiments (Guards and Grossdeutschland). The tasks of this army group will be: a‧Defeat the enemy into the mobile forces in southern Belgium to relieve the burden on the Twelfth and Sixth Armies.

b. Use surprise attacks to gain a foothold on the west bank of the Maas River southeast of Sedan to establish a favorable situation for future operations.All the more so if the armored units commanded by the 6th and 4th Armies failed to succeed in their own areas. Then the Army Headquarters also made a cooperative expansion of its operational orders.Judging from the wording of the above-mentioned telegram, it can be understood that the allocation of the Nineteenth Army to the command of Army Group A was completely ordered by Hitler.So why is he like this?Perhaps because he recently met with the commander of the Sixteenth Army, General Busch, and was influenced by the latter.General Busey, already aware of my opinion, may have expressed to Hitler our desire for a rapid advance from the Ardennes with armored forces, and it is also likely that Hitler made this decision ingeniously.He is very sensitive to tactical gaps and has spent a lot of time on the map.He may recognize that Sedan is the easiest point to cross the Meuse River, and the armored forces of the Fourth Army in the farther upstream may find it more difficult.As soon as he had recognized Sedan as the most ideal crossing of the Meuse, he, as was his custom, immediately seized upon any such tempting object.When we obtained the Nineteenth Armored Army, we were very happy, but in fact, this method dispersed our armored forces.Because the commander of the Nineteenth Armored Army, General Guderian, was very unhappy about his new task at first. He always believed that the tank forces should be concentrated in one place for a violent strike.Just when I explained to him the combat ideal of our army group, which is to shift the focus of the entire offensive to the southern flank, and to make him also notice the Somme estuary behind the enemy, it is really a temptation. Guderian began to show boundless enthusiasm for our plan only after the sexual goals.In the end, it was also because of his extraordinary energy that he drove our tanks around the enemy's back and reached the coast of the strait.When I know that the concept I advocate to push a large number of armored forces from difficult areas like the Ardennes can be agreed by experts like Guderian and think it is quite feasible, for me personally Of course, it is also a relief. Going back to the matter of assigning the Nineteenth Panzer Corps to Army Group A, there is no doubt that Hitler only regarded it as a tactical measure, and its purpose was only to facilitate the crossing operation of Army Group B. . Nor did the Army Headquarters' supplement to its operational orders mention any provision for new objectives.It also had no intention of launching a large-scale detour in the area of ​​​​Army Group A in the direction of the mouth of the Somme in order to seek a final decision. On November 21, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Chief of the General Staff paid us another visit to Koblenz.In addition to the army commanders of Army Group A who attended the report, the commander-in-chief of Army Group B, Admiral Polk, and the commanders of the armies to which he belonged also participated. One of them is particularly worth mentioning.Brauchitsch had already asked the army groups and army commanders to state their intentions and deployments in the implementation of the Army Headquarters' operational plan.But when it was our army group's turn to speak, he announced that he only wanted to hear from the army commanders.Obviously, he was afraid that the headquarters of Army Group A would take the opportunity to put forward opinions contrary to the combat order. So we had no choice but to submit another memorandum to the head of the Army Headquarters stating our opinion on how the offensive should be carried out.Before that, we had two memorandums on October 31 and November 6; On December 12, the same request was made four times.All of these memorandums are broadly similar, so their contents will not be repeated here. At this time, it seems that Hitler has not only considered the use of the Nineteenth Panzer Corps in the area of ​​​​Army Group A, but also further considered that if the armored forces concentrated on the side of Army Group B cannot be acquired as quickly as desired As a result, there was the question of how to deploy additional troops to support the Nineteenth Army.According to the report of Greyler, who kept the war log in the Supreme Command, around mid-November, Hitler asked the Army Headquarters whether and what method to use to reinforce Guderian's Panzer Army if necessary, Greyler also reported that on or about November 20, Hitler had ordered the Army Headquarters to draw up a plan for quickly displacing the main force of the offensive should Army Group A achieve quicker and more far-reaching results. Move from the side of Army Group B to the side of Army Group A. Obviously, based on this instruction, the Army Headquarters moved the 14th Motorized Army, which was originally located east of the Rhine River, to a position behind the concentration area of ​​​​Army Group on November 14.Although this army is still part of the general reserve in name, the Army Headquarters can decide which army group to assign it to in the end according to future conditions. After all, it was Hitler who thought of shifting the focus of operations to Army Group A?Or does he now understand the opinion of Army Group A? On November 24, the day after Hitler addressed the senior chiefs of the armed forces in Berlin, he summoned Admirals Rundstedt, Busey, and Guderian.On the way back to Koblenz, I learned from Bussy's conversation that Hitler had expressed great interest in the views of Army Group A when he received them.If so, I believe his main concern was to increase the armor of Army Group B in order to break through the line of the Meuse at Sedan and thereby assist Army Group B in its operations.I think it is very unlikely that Rundstedt would take advantage of this opportunity to present to Hitler the plan we had drafted ourselves, especially when Brauchitsch's position was so precarious that he would not throw stones at him. According to Greiler's report, as early as the end of October, Hitler had already known the content of our plan from the forwarding of his chief guard, Schmund.At least as far as time is concerned, this statement is not without doubt.However, Schmund did come to see us on Hitler's order, the purpose of which was to investigate whether it was true that the bad weather and ground conditions had made the offensive impossible as stated in our report.Taking advantage of this opportunity, our Chiefs of Operations, Colonel Blumentit and Lieutenant Colonel Triskau, once told Simmund that the headquarters of the Army Group had proposed a new attack plan to the Army Headquarters and believed that it would be necessary Better than Army HQ's plan. A few days later, Blumentit, with my consent (though I felt very reluctant, although with Rundst's approval), sent Himmond a copy of my last memorandum.Whether it was forwarded to Hitler himself, or to Jodl, I cannot tell.In any case, when Hitler summoned me on February 17, 1940, for my opinion on the offensive on the Western Front, he never seemed to suggest that he had seen our submission to Army Headquarters. any memo. Perhaps at the end of November, Hitler's goal was to ensure that the focus could be shifted quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A when operations were already underway.But this does not mean that there has been any change to the existing plan, nor does it mean that he has accepted our combat concept.Although the Fourteenth Motorized Corps had moved to the rear of our assembly area, the original operational order was still fully in effect.Still as in the past, first of all, Army Group B will concentrate its forces to advance to northern Belgium in order to seek victory, while Army Group A will still take on the task of covering.The only difference was that Hitler wanted such a deployment that the focus of the offensive could be shifted quickly in the later stages.But the condition is that Army Group B failed to achieve the desired success, while Army Group A has achieved results relatively quickly. On November 30, I submitted a new memorandum to the Army Headquarters. This is the first time I have received a reply from the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Halder. From his reply, we can understand the above concept .In our own view, a new point of attack, through Army Group A, seems to have finally been established.As long as Ardennes' breakthrough is successful, the scope of operations will expand in the direction we have already explained.Halder, having conceded that our views were broadly in line with Army Headquarters, insisted that Army Headquarters' orders concerning the Nineteenth and Fourteenth Corps did not imply a new focus of the offensive, It just means that there is a possibility to create one if necessary.He added that, with influences beyond our control, deciding where to focus was no longer a matter of planning but a matter of command within the operation itself. Two conclusions can be drawn from the above description: (1) Hitler believed that his right to make important decisions already included the actual execution of the offensive. (2) He believes that the location of the offensive focus should be determined according to how the offensive develops.At any rate, for the time being, he is either ignorant of our own plan, or deliberately does not want to adopt it. Halder gave me another phone call on December 15, which confirmed my latter impression.On December 6th I wrote another letter to Halder in my own name, again stating all the reasons in favor of our plan of operations.In fact, this letter also included the entire new project.Because Halder had not received a reply until December 15th, he made a phone call with the Chief of Staff, Stepnager, and asked him how long the Army Headquarters was going to delay our proposal.That's why Halder called me.He assured me that Army leaders were in full agreement with us.However, they have strict orders that they must focus their attack on Army Group B, and they must wait until the offensive is launched before they are allowed to shift. From this it may be assumed that the leaders of the Army Headquarters had in fact accepted our point of view and had in some way passed it on to Hitler for nuclear seizure.However, at the same time, I also learned from General Warrimont (Jordl's deputy) and General Rosberg (Jordl's chief of operations) that the Army Headquarters never passed on our proposal to Hitler to let him know that there was such a The existence of ideas!So it all baffles us. Whether or not Army Headquarters would actually agree with us, this notion of never focusing on Army Group A until the offensive has launched is in any case completely incompatible with our thinking at Army Group Headquarters. It is true that the idea of ​​sitting still was invented by Napoleon.For the French, this has almost become an axiom, especially since the failure of their initiative to launch the Lorraine offensive in 1914. In 1940, there was no doubt that this was the only way Allied High Command could do.Since they want us to pay a heavy price for launching an offensive, they have every reason to sit back and wait.It is their duty to avoid as far as possible a test of strength in Belgium, while at the same time concentrating all their forces on a powerful counter-offensive on the southern flank of our offensive. But on our own side, we must never sit back and wait for the opportunity, and then decide when and where to play our trump card, because the battle plan of Army Group A is based on surprise attacks.The enemy could hardly have expected a strong armored force advancing through the Ardennes, with a whole army behind it.But if this advance is to achieve its goal, the lower Somme, all enemy forces thrown into southern Belgium must also be routed.We had to cross the Meuse at the same time as the remnants of these forces before attacking the enemy facing Army Group B in northern Belgium from the rear. Likewise, any attempt to break a strong enemy reserve on our southern flank (for example, between the Meuse and the Osé) must be made only when we have sufficient forces to maintain the initiative there. , will have the hope of success.This is again for the second act, which is to destroy the remaining enemy forces and create a favorable jumping position. If we want to wait for the development of the battle situation before deciding on the focus of our operations, then it is tantamount to giving up the opportunity to use the roundabout movement from the south to annihilate the enemy in northern Belgium.At the same time, its meaning is to give the enemy time to deploy a counterattack on our south flank, which is also his only chance to win. Suppose it is necessary to see whether we can achieve the effect of a surprise attack with inappropriate forces before deciding whether to allocate appropriate forces to Army Group A for a decisive main attack.The best criticism of this notion, then, is to quote old Moltke's dictum: A mistake made in the first stages of development can never be corrected. In short, we must not sit still and wait for the development of the offensive to be the concentrated attack of Army Group B capable of crushing the enemy forces in Belgium?Or is it a lonely Nineteenth Armored Army that can break through all the way to Sedan?If the plan of Army Group A were to be adopted, we should have been given adequate armored strength and three armies from the outset, although a third army could be added later due to lack of space.Therefore, in my memorandum of December 6, I specifically stated that what I wanted was not two armies (a total of 22 infantry divisions) and one armored corps, but three armies (a total of 40 divisions) and two mobile army.Coincidentally, when Hitler adopted our plan later, we actually got exactly this number of troops. So we must continue to struggle.The main problem we have to strive for now is to pass through the Ardennes immediately from the beginning of the operation, not only with the 19th Panzer Corps, but also with the 14th Motorized Corps. River Si, and has been driving straight down the Somme.Moreover, from the very beginning, the Third Army we demanded should immediately take offensive action against the enemy's forces west of the Meuse, which are spread out on our southern flank. If we can make the higher authorities accept these two demands, even if the Army Headquarters still does not fully accept our opinions, this offensive is destined to continue to develop in the way we hope, and finally achieve final victory. If, as old Moltke said, our own plan of operations was not sure of the development after the first encounter with the main body of the enemy; In the initial stage, the offensive was about to be thwarted, but that was again certain. But at the same time, Old Moltke pointed out that a military commander must look beyond this first contact and set it on the final goal.In our opinion, the so-called ultimate goal should be the overall victory in the European continent.This should have been the goal of the entire German offensive.It doesn't matter if it has to be achieved in two distinct stages. So Napoleon's method of temporarily not deciding the direction of the main attack is exactly what Hitler wanted to imitate. It may be a good solution in other situations, but in our own situation, its meaning is not to use Absolute victory is the goal. On December 18, since the letter I wrote to the Chief of General Staff on December 6 did not produce the desired effect, I wrote an offensive operation plan for the Western Battlefield based on our own operational concepts The draft was handed over to Admiral Rundstedt.Because he was going to have a brief meeting with the commander-in-chief of the army, and he was going to meet Hitler with the latter's consent.On December 22, Rundstedt held a meeting with Brauchitsch, but did not go to see Hitler.At the same time, I submitted this draft to the Army Headquarters in written form, because I hope that this concise document may be able to change the attitude of the Supreme Command Operations Department more than those purely theoretical explanations in the past.It was only after the war that I learned that the Operations Branch never received any memorandums from us at all from Halder. The weather in the second half of December made any thought of an offensive already off the table.In any case, it seems best to wait for some time before asking for a change in the battle plan from scratch, since we have provided enough food for thought so far.So I can go home for Christmas.When I returned to Koblenz from Liegnitz, I stopped by Army headquarters at Zorsen again to see if our draft plans had made any impression.General Stirpnagel again assured me that the Army Headquarters was in full agreement with us, but that they were restrained by Hitler's order from deciding where to focus the offensive. Again, as before, we do not know whether the Army Commander-in-Chief has made our proposals to Hitler.But it seems that he did not do this, because I learned from Lieutenant Colonel Hussinger in the Operational Department of the Supreme Command that Brauchitsch had not been close to Hitler since November 5. In the New Year, Hitler's meteorologists were active again.This kind of sunny and freezing weather can certainly enable the air force to engage in operations, but the cold weather is not conducive to the actions of the armored forces, especially the Eifel and Ardennes areas are covered with snow.But no matter what, Hitler still issued a code word order, asking the troops to enter the final assembly area separately. Undeterred by this, we sent another memorandum to Army Headquarters on January 12.Its title is The Offensive of the West, and it still repeats the same old tune, which shows that it is necessary to aim at final victory.Although at that particular time, there was no consideration of changing the battle plan.But we felt that once the actual war had begun our ideas still had an opportunity to be considered.And in any case, this order to launch an offensive has been repeatedly canceled in the past, so there is still hope this time, so we still have time to demand fundamental changes. But in order to do this, we must try to remove the major obstacles that have kept our plans from being adopted.Where is this obstacle?According to what the Army Headquarters told us, it was Hitler himself.Although the Army Headquarters has repeatedly emphasized that although they generally agree with us, Hitler's order is that the focus of the offensive should never be determined before the battle has begun.But did Army Headquarters actually forward our plans to Hitler?Because this is completely different from their own plan.Since Hitler and the head of the Army Headquarters have not seriously considered the possibility of winning a decisive victory in the Western Front so far, if we can directly show him our plan, it will probably make him Change your mind. For the sake of finality, in addition to the memorandum, a private letter from Admiral Lundster was attached, the last paragraph of which is as follows: Now that the army group knows that the Führer and Supreme Commander retains overall control over operations, and reserves (in other words, Army Headquarters is not free to make its own operational decisions), so I request that this memorandum be submitted directly to the Führer for approval. This request was suggested by me, but Lundster signed it without hesitation.To some extent, this is against the German military tradition, because only the commander-in-chief of the army and the chief of the general staff are qualified to make direct recommendations to the supreme commander. However, if the Army Headquarters really agreed with us, nothing would prevent it from taking our operational plan and presenting it to Hitler on its own initiative.If this shot was fired, it would give Hitler a chance to make a good impression on the Army Headquarters and restore all his final authority in matters of land operations.If so, no one could possibly be happier than I am personally.Because I am also an old man in the Army Headquarters. When Admiral Felitsch and General Baker were the chiefs, I was the chief undersecretary of staff, and I only wanted to improve the status of the Army Headquarters. (Note: Those of us at the headquarters of the Army Group never wanted to say publicly that we were the creators of this new project. In fact, until after the war, Rundstedt and Blumentitt After the conversation with Lied Hart, this inside story became known to the world.) On the contrary, the Army Headquarters had already tried to argue with Hitler without success.Well, because Hitler has always respected Admiral Rundst's opinions, if he can submit the plan signed by Rundest at this time, it will definitely have a considerable strengthening effect on the status of the Army Headquarters. . Maybe there was still a chance to convince Hitler.As Army Headquarters told us, he himself was the main obstacle to the realization of our policy.The response we received to this memorandum was again disappointing.It says that we think Army Headquarters only wants to pursue a limited number of goals, which is really a misunderstanding.It also stated that more troops may be allocated to Army Group A, but the actual timing of this should be determined by the Army Commander-in-Chief.It therefore saw no need to present our memorandum to Hitler, and did assure us that the Commander-in-Chief agreed with us. Although the Commander-in-Chief promised to agree with us, in fact we could clearly see that he was not willing to propose to Hitler the fundamental revision of the operational plan as we suggested.Conversely, the original battle plan remains valid.The outcome of the battle in Belgium still needs to be determined by the frontal advance of Army Group B. At least in the first stage of the offensive, the main force is still concentrated on that side. Army Group A still bears the responsibility of covering operations.Nor has its mandate been expanded in any way. As for the movement of the focus of the offensive in the future, it still has to be decided according to the progress of the battle. Army Group A did not have the armored forces it needed. According to our plan, it must be under our command from the beginning of the operation, so as to have any hope of a successful surprise attack in southern Belgium and a detour towards the mouth of the Somme. .At the same time, Army Group A may not necessarily enjoy the security of adding another Army Group, which is also necessary in order to cover our offensive and prevent the enemy from counterattacking. As if unconsciously, both the German and Allied High Commands considered it safer to engage in a direct confrontation in northern Belgium, and were reluctant to take risky actions.On the German side, it was unwilling to adopt the plan of Army Group A. On the Allied side, in order to avoid fighting in Belgium, they concentrated their efforts on attacking the southern flank of the German army.At this point another incident occurred which many considered to be decisive enough to prompt the German authorities to make a radical change in their operational plan and to adopt the proposal of Army Group A. The operations chief of the 7th Airborne Division accidentally made an emergency landing on Belgian territory, thus putting at least some of the operational orders of the First Air Force Army into Belgian hands.Therefore, it should be assumed that the Western countries, through the relations of Belgium, can know the content of Germany's current combat plan. In fact, this unfortunate incident did not lead to any change in the operational plan, although perhaps enough later to make Hitler and the Army Headquarters more receptive to Army Group A's proposal.Because on January 25, in Bad Godesberg (Bad Godesberg), there was a meeting of commanders, and the commanders of the two army groups AB and the respective armies participated.It has been quite a while since this unfortunate incident, but the basic attitude of the Army Headquarters has not changed in any way.The tasks of the various army groups and armies are still roughly the same as in the past. The mission of Army Group B was slightly expanded, and the Eighteenth Army was now supposed to occupy the whole of the Netherlands, not just the area outside the so-called Dutch Fortress.As for Army Group A, everything remained the same.Although we managed to move the headquarters of the Second Army into our area, it was still controlled by the Army Headquarters, like the Fourteenth Panzer Corps.Although I have stated on the instructions of my commander that pushing a single corps of the XIX Panzer Corps out of the Ardennes will not necessarily guarantee our success at Sedan, since the enemy is now concentrated on the Meuse. A fairly strong force (French Second Army).But Brauchitsch still refused to give them to our command.This proves that the determination of the higher authorities has not changed, and that they still want to wait until after the battle has been carried out before moving the focus.It also proved that the loss of operational orders in Belgium did not change the resolve of the high authorities. Nevertheless, five days later, Army Group A submitted a new memorandum to Army Headquarters based on the information we obtained at the time.We pointed out that in the future there may be strong French forces, especially mechanized units, that will be deployed in southern Belgium.In such circumstances it was absolutely impossible to hope that the strength of the Nineteenth Panzer Corps alone would be sufficient to overcome this enemy force or force the crossing of the Meuse. 二月七日，我們在科布侖茲又舉行了一次沙盤演習，從這次演習上也可以明白表示出來，若單獨使用第十九軍是大有疑問的。哈爾德將軍也出席參觀這一次演習，我感覺到他至少最後也已經開始承認我們立場是正確的。 正當此時，我自己的命運卻發生了一個突變。一月二十七日，我接獲通知說我已被任命為第三十八軍的軍長，其軍部是正要在國內地區中開始成立。倫德斯特上將告訴我，在一月二十五日那次會議中，陸軍總司令早已把這個決定悄悄告訴他了。其理由是說，現在，一成立任何新的軍部，就必須輪到我去接充軍長，因為比我資淺的萊因哈特將軍（Gen‧Reinharht）同時也要升任軍長了。從正常的人事程式上來看，這種辦法固然是並無錯誤，但正當大攻勢即將發動的前夕，卻突然調動一個集團軍群的參謀長，則似乎是很奇怪的。事實上，那些人事問題的考慮可能都是一種藉口，毫無疑問，陸軍總部對於我這樣一再與他們頂撞，實在是感到厭煩，所以只想找一個機會把我這個厭物送走。 在上述的沙盤演習結束之後（那還是由我主持的），倫德斯特上將就當著所有出席人員的面，向我致謝，表揚我在參謀長任內的功績。他在這種場合中的措詞，是足以深切反映出來那個偉大指揮官的一切慈愛和俠義的風度。此外使我更感到滿足的，是我們集團軍群中的兩位集團軍司令，布西將軍和李斯特將軍還有古德里安將軍，對於我的離去也都表示真誠的悲哀和同情。 九月九日，我離開科布侖茲前往李格尼茲。我所信任的同僚，布魯門提特上校和垂斯考中校，卻並不因為我的離去，而就放棄了這個鬥爭。他們仍然繼續努力下去。 我相信，那可能是垂斯考的努力，才說服了他的朋友，希孟德（希特勒的侍衛長），為我找到了一個機會，得以當面把我們的意見向希特勒陳述。 二月十七日，我奉召往柏林，以新任命的軍長身份向希特勒報告。一同召見的還有其他的軍長，在賜宴的時候，照例也都是希特勒一個人說話，大家不過隨聲附和而已。他表現出對於技術發明方面具有驚人的知識。 當我們在宴會結束起身告退時，希特勒就命令我隨他往他的書房中去，在那裡他請我把如何執行西線攻勢的個人見解講述給他聽。我不知道他是否已經知道我們的計畫，或是了解到何種程度。但無論如何，我卻發現他了解得非常的快，並且完全同意於我所說的一切。 在這次談話之後，我就立即把其內容寫了一個節略送給A集團軍群總部參考：當一九四○年二月十七日，以第三十八軍軍長身份向元首報告時，前集團軍群參謀長獲得了一個機會，把本集團軍群對與西線作戰的意見，曾向元首直接陳述。他的說明內容如下： （一）攻勢的目標應為在陸上獲致決定性的結果。對於現有作戰命令中所規定的有限目標即在比利時境內盡可能擊敗敵軍的最大單位和佔領海峽海岸之一部分而言，這種政治和軍事的賭注未免太高。在陸上的最後勝利才是合理的目標。 所以這個作戰的目標應該是在法國贏得一種最後的決定，並擊毀法國的抵抗。 （二）這就必須修改現有的作戰命令，要求絕對地從一開始起，就把攻擊重點擺在左翼方面，即為A集團軍群；它不可以再留在B集團軍群方面或是暫時不加以確定。 在現有的安排之下，最好的成就也不過是當英法盟軍向比利時前進時，即對其作正面的攻擊，並且使他們退向索姆河，到了那裡作戰即可能會發生停頓。 假使若把主攻之點移到南面的A集團軍群方面，則其任務即為衝過比利時和馬斯河並向索姆河下游的方向上挺進。那麼預計在比利時北部出現的強大敵軍，當受到B集團軍群正面攻擊，被迫後退時，同時其後方也將被切斷，而將遭到全面的毀滅。這只有當A集團軍群迅速衝到索姆河下游時，然後才有這樣的可能性。這應該是戰役的第一階段。第二階段則將為用一個強力的右面鉤擊，包圍全部的法軍。 （三）要達成這個任務，A集團軍群應含有三個集團軍。所以另外一個集團軍應加入在其北側面。 最北面的一個集團軍（第二集團軍）的任務為越過馬斯河，直趨索姆河下游，以切斷在比利時北部境內敵軍的退路。在其南面，另一個集團軍（第十二集團軍）應在色當兩側渡過馬斯河，然後轉向西南方，以便用攻擊方式，粉碎法軍在馬斯河以西的反攻企圖。 第三個集團軍（第十六集團軍），最初的任務為在馬斯河與莫斯里河之間，掩護整個作戰的南側面。 空軍應儘量提早擊碎法軍的集中，因為假使法軍還要作任何的企圖，則一定就是要想在馬斯河的兩側，作大規模的反攻，可能會延展到莫斯里河為止。 （四）若專憑第十九裝甲軍的兵力在色當強渡馬斯河，那好像是只用一半的力量來作戰。假使敵軍在比利時南部，用強大的摩托化兵力來迎擊我們，則這一個軍的兵力是太單薄，不足以迅速擊碎敵軍，並一直衝過馬斯河一線。反之，假使敵人僅用其現有的強大兵力，扼守馬斯河一線，則該軍也同樣無力單獨渡河。 假使我們準備使用摩托化兵力來作開路先鋒，則至少應用兩個軍同時在查理維里（Charleville）和色當渡過馬斯河。此外第四集團軍的裝甲兵力也應在古費特（Givet）獨立渡河。所以第十四軍從一開始時起，就應與古德里安軍並肩前進，決不可以等候未來的發展才再決定它應該用在那一方面。 元首對於上述的意見，完全表示同意。不久之後，就會有新的作戰命令發佈。 可惜，這個新的作戰命令已經不再經過我的手中。我只知道二月二十日，希特勒命令頒發它。它的內容大致是與我長期苦戰的要求相符合。其要點如下：（一）兩個裝甲軍（古德里安將軍所率領的第十九軍，和魏特夏將軍（Gen‧V‧Wietersheim）所率領的第十四軍）領導前進，應在查理維里與色當之間，渡過馬斯河一線。他們由一個新成立的裝甲集團軍（Panzer Group）來指揮，司令為克萊斯特將軍（Gen‧V‧Kleist）。（二）原屬B集團軍群的第四集團軍改屬A集團軍群，並配以所要求的兵力。現在當第十六集團軍已經向南旋轉時，所以有了空間，可以把該集團軍立即插入A集團軍群的界內。（三）原屬B集團軍群的第四集團軍，也改由A集團軍群指揮，以使後者在向索姆河的前進中，可以獲得必要的調度。（至少以後在前進過程中，A集團軍群是常常調動這個集團軍最南端的軍，以進展其邊界。）依照這個新命令，陸軍總部是已經暗中完全接受了A集團軍群的觀點。作戰的重點是已經完全移到了南翼方面。同時B集團軍群仍留有足夠強大的兵力，共為三個集團軍，足以達成其在比利時北部和荷蘭境內的任務。A集團軍群現在就可以衝出阿登，越過馬斯河，直達索姆河下游，以奇襲敵人。 這樣可以阻止在比利時境內作戰的敵軍退過該河。它同時也能夠有效的應付任何指向德軍攻勢南側面的巨大反擊。關於一九四○年五月間，德軍突擊作戰的執行方面，我只擬作下述的評論：應該感謝德國部隊的優秀素質，尤其是裝甲單位，結果B集團軍群的攻擊所獲得的成功，是遠比所料想的要更具有決定性。因為比利時的要塞頗為堅強，而且他們又被迫只能作正面的攻擊，所以這種成就是很難能可貴的。 儘管如此，盟軍之所以在比利時北部一敗塗地的真正決定性原因，卻還是受到了奇襲。A集團軍群從阿登突出，越過了馬斯河，直達到了海峽海岸。除了倫德斯特上將的卓越領導之外，我認為，這個成功主要的應歸功於古德里安將軍，他把集團軍群的作戰原則變成了實際的行動。 在比利時北部的成功，並不如理想中那樣完全，依照邱吉爾所報導的數字，從敦克爾克撤出的敵軍總數共為三十三萬八千二百二十六人，其中二千一百七十六人為法軍，儘管他們把一切的重兵器裝備都丟光了。盟軍之所以能夠撤出的主因，是由於希特勒曾經兩次命令我方裝甲部隊的停進一次是在前進的途中，另一次則在敦克爾克的郊外。 對於後述的命令，共有三種不同的解釋理由，但其真正的效果卻無異於是在海峽上架了一道金橋，幫助英軍的撤退。第一個原因為希特勒希望保留德國的裝甲兵力以供法國戰役第二階段使用，就這一方面，據說凱特爾曾經告訴希特勒在敦克爾克附近的地形是不適宜於使用坦克的。第二個原因為戈林曾經向希特勒保證，空軍即足以獨力阻止敵軍逃出敦克爾克。戈林是死要面子，而且極愛吹牛，所以我相信他很可能說過這些話。從軍事的觀點來看，上述的兩種辯論都是錯誤的。依照希特勒與倫德斯特之間的談話，第三個理由是說希特勒故意讓英國人逃走，因為他相信這樣可以增進與英國人之間的諒解。 不管這個答案是怎樣，敦克爾克是希特勒所犯的一個最具有決定性的錯誤。它影響了其對不列顛的入侵企圖，並使英國人以後在非洲和義大利能夠繼續作戰。儘管希特勒接受了A集團軍群的觀念，從阿登衝出，切斷在比利時北部的敵軍，直起海岸並達到敦克爾克的門外為止，但是他卻並未完全採納其另一個觀念，即同時為第二階段建立一個起點。所以德國統帥部為了掩護A集團軍群機械化單位的前進，並防止敵軍在馬斯河兩岸上的反攻起見，只留下一連串的兵力構成了一道防線。 顯然它是認為用立即向南對馬斯河以西地區發動攻擊，一勞永逸的撕開敵人在馬斯河與奧塞河之間的正面，以阻止敵人反攻的手段是未免太冒險了。從以後在俄國戰役中的經驗上看來，希特勒對於作戰問題是的確具有某種天才，但他卻缺乏一個軍事指揮官所需要的徹底訓練。這種訓練使後者在一個作戰的過程中，敢於接受相當的冒險，因為他知道他能夠控制它們。所以在這種情況之中，希特勒寧願採取防禦行動的安全解決，而不願接受A集團軍群所建議的較果敢的方法。 這對於希特勒而言，只可以說是運氣太好，因為敵人並未發動任何大規模的反攻，雖然事實上，後者是很易於集中五十個師左右的兵力，在馬斯河的兩側發動一個反攻。 即使暫時放棄在荷比兩國要塞地區以外的一切東西，也都是不要緊的。所以，在德軍攻勢的第一幕完成之後，雙方又再度沿著一條連續的正面互相對峙著，這條戰線沿著馬奇諾防線到卡里格南（Carignan），然後再沿著埃納河和下索姆河走。德軍的第一個任務又是要再度突破這一道正面。所以在德軍攻勢的第二階段中，為什麼能使敵軍如此迅速全面崩潰的主因是一共有兩個：（一）由於在比利時北部受到了重大的損失，所以已無適當的人力來據守其從瑞士邊界直到海岸為止的綿長戰線。（二）法軍的士氣早已受到了重大的打擊，而且更沒有任何部隊可以敵得上德國裝甲部隊的素質。假使盟軍統帥的行動是像A集團軍群總部所想像的，則他應決定在馬斯河的兩側發動一個大規模的攻勢。依照A集團軍群的計畫，是應該趁敵軍尚在集結階段時，即先加以擊碎，假使B集團軍群，同時在圍殲了比利時北部的敵軍之後，也在下索姆河之上，向前旋轉照施里芬計畫的典型，包圍其餘的法軍，則我們可以在馬奇諾防線的後方，以反正面一戰而把敵軍全部解決。 事實上，除了讓英軍從敦克爾克逃走了以外，我們在法國戰場上還算是終於已經贏得了一次卓越的勝利。因此上述的分析也似乎是多餘的。不過其唯一的重要性，也許即可證明，即使敵人能有較大的活力和較好的判斷，這個新計畫也還是照樣能夠贏得這次戰役不過在第一個階段中，在馬斯河與莫斯里河之間，也許將遭遇到緊急的場面。