Chapter 23 Chapter 6: The Commander of the Thirty-eighth Army's Bystander

My later tasks in the execution of the Western Offensive were so unimportant that I could even leave this story out of the memoir at all, and it has nothing to do with the overall situation.The main reason why I include it is simply to express my gratitude for the courage and excellent achievements of the troops under my command at that time.Another reason is that after the German army successfully broke through the Somme, the 38th Army's operations can be used as an example of a pursuit battle. We marched from the Seine River to the Loire River, preventing the enemy from A respite until he finally breaks down.

While others continued to work on my ideals, I myself took a break from Stettin's busy schedule, sitting and watching my military department work on concentration, and at the same time was repeatedly ordered to inspect A new division in the formation of Zinan. On May 10, 1940, I was in Liegnitz, where I was taking a short leave to rest, when I heard on the radio that the Germans had launched an offensive on the Western Front.It is needless to say that for the next few days all my hopes and ardent desires rested entirely on the troops advancing through the Ardennes.Will they be able to break through the frontiers of Luxembourg and penetrate the Belgian lines on both sides of Bastogne before the strong French army arrives?When the armored force crossed the Meuse at Sedan, could it still maintain its momentum and form the basis for encircling the enemy's northern flank?

The reader must understand my resentment towards those who murdered me. When I had struggled for a long time before my project came to fruition on the Western Front, I personally sat idle in the heart of Germany. Zhonggan watched. On the night of May 10, the headquarters of the XXXVIII Corps was ordered to move to Brunswick, from where we moved to Düsseldorf, under the command of Army Group B.For the next few days I had nothing to do but wander about, inspecting the Belgian fortresses which our troops had taken.I also traveled to Army Group B headquarters and Sixth Army headquarters to be briefed on operational progress.There I found that they still had no clear conception of the final intentions of the enemy.At the same time, Army Headquarters did not seem to have this awareness, as it continued to keep silent about its own future, rather than extending the dividing line between the two Army Groups further to the northwest.

On May 16, our headquarters was transferred to Army Group A, and the next day I reported to my old commander, General Rundest, at Bastogne.There I was warmly welcomed by him, by my successor, Gen. V. Sodenstern, and by my old colleagues.And finally knew that the operations to pass through the Ardennes and cross the Meuse River were already proceeding smoothly.Our army was assigned to the command of the Twelfth Army, which was responsible for the task of going westward to the lower reaches of the Somme, and the newly formed Second Army was going to be sandwiched between the Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies. Front facing southwest.

When I first arrived at the headquarters of the Twelfth Army, I experienced an incident where Hitler directly intervened in military operations. According to Hitler's instructions, the Army Headquarters issued an order that the Kleist Panzer Army should not continue at this time. Moving across the Oise, Twelfth Army should turn southwest and take a defensive position.The Second Army should now insert itself between the Fourth and Twelfth Armies and take over the further westward advance.The reason, it is said, was that the Fuehrer wished to spare the Germans any setbacks at all costs, since even a temporary one would be enough to revive the morale of France, which had sunk into the abyss.He was afraid that if the Twelfth Army continued westward toward the lower reaches of the Somme as planned, its flanks might be in danger of being exposed.Therefore, if the French army launches a counterattack west of the Meuse River from the south, the German army may suffer a setback.

In other words, the propaganda interests of politicians have already begun to hinder the position of the Supreme Commander.On the one hand, it is quite clear that the opportunity of destroying the enemy in northern Belgium would have been lost by ordering Kleist's Panzer Army, which was scheduled to encircle the enemy from the rear, to halt on the Osé .At the same time, on the other hand, ordered the Twelfth Army to take a defensive position facing the southwest.The result is tantamount to automatically giving up the initiative between the Maas River and the Osé River.In fact, there was no reason at that time to expect any large-scale counter-offensive by the enemy in this area.According to the judgment of Army Group A, the enemy's army did have such a plan in mind, but it would take at least another week to gather the necessary forces to launch such a counterattack.However, the more important problem is still the basic concept that Army Group A has repeatedly stated to the Army Headquarters in the previous winter, that is, when advancing towards the lower reaches of the Somme River, when it wants to ensure the safety of its southern flank, it must There is only an offensive solution.

It is now evident that Hitler, though not courageous enough to accept a temporary risk on the southern flank of the German offensive, had declared his right to a personal and trivial control over the operations of the Army. But in fact, at this juncture, the reason why Hitler was able to use the reason of preventing the German army from being temporarily defeated as an excuse for his own intervention in operations may still be attributed to the incompetence of the Army Headquarters.Although Army Group A had already put forward such advice, when the first German army had crossed the Meuse River, the Army Headquarters did not immediately insert the Second Army into the front.It could be inserted between the Fourth and Twelfth Armies for the advance to the lower Somme; Between the Sai River, the offensive advances to the southwest.The reason why Army Headquarters failed to do this was not to prevaricate that there was not enough space on the front line to accommodate so many divisions.Because when the combat area is gradually relaxed, there will naturally be room to accommodate more troops.

This example merely proves once again that, even without any justification, it is always difficult for a plan to be carried out exactly in accordance with the ideals of its original designers. Even in this case, Hitler's intervention did not seriously affect the operation (not as seriously as when Kleist Panzer Army was ordered to stop the attack on the outskirts of Dunkirk later), but he assigned to the 1st The defensive mission undertaken by the Twelfth Army still gave the enemy an opportunity to rebuild a new front on the Aisne.Later, in the second stage of the French campaign, it took some hard work to break through it again.In this decisive sector, an offensive which would have prevented the establishment of any complete French line was sacrificed.This, together with the encirclement of the enemy's northern flank, were the two most important basic ideas in our proposals to Army Headquarters as we considered the inevitable second phase of the German offensive.

At this time, our military headquarters has also advanced to Clerf (Clerf).It was a picturesque little town in Luxembourg.At this time, we were no longer spectators, but began to command several divisions and followed the second army.It was frustrating to undertake such an insignificant task at a time when the enemy's northern flank was about to suffer a decisive defeat. It was about this time that I received word that my brother-in-law, V. Loesch, captain of a squadron of dive bombers, had disappeared near Brussels.Rosie, my wife's younger brother, always lived at my house when he was studying in Dresden and Magdeburg.He was my wife's favorite brother, as close as a child of ours, and his young wife still lives with us in Liegnitz.In the weeks that followed, she and her mother, as well as my wife, were troubled by the fact that there had been no news about his plane or its crew.The only thing that is known for sure is that Rossi was killed in the attack.It was not until after the French campaign that I was able to investigate, and after a long search, the wreckage of the plane was found near Brussels.According to the result of questioning nearby residents, it was learned that when it was just about to dive, it was hit by an anti-aircraft shell.Two crew members parachuted to escape and were shot dead by the Belgian army on the spot, one in mid-air and one on the ground.My brother-in-law and another passenger died in the plane.

On May 25, our headquarters was ordered to take over from the Fourteenth Panzer Corps. General Kleist left this headquarters, together with the 9th Armored Division and the 2nd Motorized Division, in Abbeville Amiens (Abbeville｜Amiens) area to secure its rear in the lower Somme.We took over on May 27th. At this time we do not have a fixed frontage in the area of ​​the lower Somme.The 2nd Motorized Division of XIV Panzer Corps held a bridgehead around Bel Avery on the left (south) bank of the river.The Ninth Armored Division had the same task at Amiens.The areas in between are merely monitored.The 57th Infantry Division was assigned to take over the defense of the 2nd Motorized Division.

However, the enemy could not concentrate enough forces to form a new line of defense along the banks of the lower Somme.Our bridgehead at Amiens was apparently facing a French colonial division and some British forces.The Abberville bridgehead faced a British division.Our task is to hold these two bridgeheads.Initially, the 9th Armored Division and the 2nd Motorized Division were supposed to remain north of the Somme as a mobile reserve after surrendering the defense of Aberville.But not long after, they also quietly drew back to the coast of the strait to participate in the battle there. When the defense was handed over, the commander of the Fourteenth Panzer Corps, Gen. V. Wietersheim, once stated to me that he did not believe in any possibility of large-scale enemy activity.An hour after he had left, reports came that the two bridgeheads were under heavy attack, and that there were also enemy armored forces on each side.By the afternoon, the attack was finally repulsed, with several heavy French tanks destroyed at Amiens and thirty British light and medium tanks at Abbeville.In the latter respect, one gunner, Bringforth, single-handedly destroyed nine of them.He was my first soldier to be awarded the Knight's Cross. Even so, I regard these attacks as evidence enough that the enemy either wishes to send a reinforcement across the Somme to relieve its heavily oppressed northern flank, or to form a new front.This makes us face the same problem, that is, I said above that I have analyzed Hitler's order for the Twelfth Army. Should we still take a defensive position in the lower reaches of the Somme?Or should we try to stay active? It was clear that Fourteenth Panzer Corps had been ordered to take a defensive position, and the results were unquestionable, allowing the enemy to establish a new line of defense along the lower Somme.Indeed, it seems doubtful whether we will be able to hold the bridgeheads of Amiens and Abberville once the enemy brings in fresh troops.The two mechanized divisions temporarily left in reserve on the north bank of the Somme would be extremely inappropriate for any fight for the bridgehead, since they could neither fill the bridgehead to strengthen their defenses; In fact, the bridgehead position was cleared and the Somme was crossed before they could be used to undertake the task of counter-offensive. Based on the above analysis, I believe that we should use these two mechanized divisions (or the infantry divisions to replace them) to conduct a surprise attack across the river in the area between the two bridgehead positions, and flank the attacking enemy forces. s attack.I have raised this opinion several times to the commander of the Fourth Army, General Kruger, and we have now assigned it to the command of the Army.What I had in mind was a mobile fight on the south bank (front) of the Somme until the fighting in northern Belgium was over and the German northern flank could swing forward across the Somme.Our goal is to prevent the enemy from forming a continuous front and blocking our army from crossing the river.It cannot be denied, of course, that this tactic might have encountered a very difficult situation for the corps when it fought alone on the south bank of the river.This is a risk, but it must be accepted for the sake of strategic continuity, because if the enemy has time to stabilize and consolidate the front of the Somme, it will be more difficult for us to attack it . But unfortunately, the commander of the Fourth Army completely ignored our repeated requests, and at the same time refused to transfer the second-line division, which, in fact, could be used for crossing the river.Was it his personal decision?Or according to the instructions of the Army Headquarters?I have no way of knowing.As a result, we had to fight defensively within the two bridgeheads, while allowing the enemy to establish a continuous front along the river line between the two bridgeheads.As a matter of fact, the defense of rivers seems to be generally known to two points, one is to defend the back of the river, and the other is to maintain a fixed bridgehead position to keep it open.The method of covering a river line by means of mobile combat in the area ahead of the river is not often mentioned in textbooks. During the next few days the enemy continued to attack the two bridgeheads, and for a time the positions around Amiens seemed dangerous.But when I observed the troops, I thought everything would be all right.In this defensive battle, the 116th Infantry Regiment, which was commanded by my old colleague in the 3rd Guards Infantry Regiment, the future Gen. Herrlein, performed extremely heroically . On the twenty-ninth of May, however, the situation in Abberville took a serious turn.There, the 57th Infantry Division, after a series of forced marches, took over the defense of the 2nd Armored Division, which was completely inexperienced in combat.Shortly after the division's arrival, the enemy launched an attack supported by powerful British armored forces. The German positions were breached in several places. Not only were there heavy casualties, but it was later discovered that there were also prisoners.Driving myself to Abberville, I happened to come across a battalion of German troops who, perhaps misinterpreting their orders, had withdrawn from their positions and were now advancing back through the town.I immediately ordered them to return to their original positions, and the division began to control the situation. Since General Kruger has actually authorized us to withdraw from the two bridgeheads if necessary, when we again requested to cross the Somme on both sides of Abberville, we would attack with a pincer attack. When retreating the enemy army, of course he was rejected again.It can be shown that those at the top, wishing to avoid taking the least amount of risk, had to wait until the fighting in northern Belgium had been completely over before making an orderly attack on the new front which the enemy was now forming. deploy. Needless to say, the enemy also used this period of time to mobilize his reserves and establish a new front line from the end of the Maginot Line in the area of ​​Crignan to the Somme.Between the Osé and the Meuse, Hitler had already voluntarily relinquished the initiative, enabling the enemy to establish his front on the Aisne. All attempts to maintain the initiative south of the Somme have now also been abandoned.