Chapter 26 sea ​​lion combat

I think this is the appropriate place to allow me to comment here on Hitler's invasion plan and the reasons why he abandoned it. If Hitler really believed that by defeating France he had won the war and that the conquest of Britain was only a matter of time, then he was dead wrong.The British reaction to his surrender was icy, proving that neither the British government nor the people could persuade. So Hitler and the Armed Forces Command had to think second. Any politician or supreme commander, when a new situation suddenly occurs in the war, will face the same problem or military setbacks, or unexpected developments in politics, such as the addition of another powerful country the enemy.In such a case, he would probably have no choice but to abandon the existing war plan altogether.At the same time, it may be felt that he overestimated his own resources and underestimated those of the enemy, and that he was frustrated or erred in political judgment.

But the situation is very different when a Marshal or Supreme Commander is studying what the next step is when his military operational objectives have been fully achieved and far exceeded what was originally conceived.Whether Germany had a so-called war plan at that time is really a big question. It is true that no war develops completely according to a fixed plan on one side.But since September 1939, Hitler had ventured into war with Britain and France, and it was his duty to consider in advance various possible developments and ways of dealing with them.It is quite evident that before the offensive against France was launched, or even during it, the German High Command had no war plan for what to do once the desired victory had been won.Hitler hoped that the British would surrender voluntarily, and his military advisers felt that they should wait for the Führer's decision.

The above-mentioned situation is the inevitable consequence of Germany's lack of perfect military high-level organization.When Hitler assumed the role of Supreme Commander, he did not establish a Reich General Staff to deal with matters of grand strategy.In fact, no military authority under the head of state, who is responsible for making political decisions, is mandated to formulate such an overall strategy.From the beginning, Hitler regarded the Supreme Command as a military secretariat. In any case, its head, Keitel, was also the person least capable of advising Hitler on strategic issues.

As for the commander-in-chiefs of the three military services, Hitler actually did not allow them to have any influence on grand strategy.Although they occasionally expressed their opinions on relevant policy issues in private conversations, in the end Hitler still made decisions based on his own thinking.Hitler was so insistent that he alone had the right to determine a policy that there was no other fundamental decision on the overall policy of war that I know of, other than perhaps Raeder's initial suggestion in the Norwegian campaign, yes Credit can be attributed to any of the three service chiefs.

Since no agency, let alone the Supreme Command, was ever authorized to draw up war plans, the result was that everyone had to follow the Führer's instincts.People like Keitel and Goering have always regarded Hitler as a natural saint and are willing to bow their heads and ears.Brauchitsch and Raeder had no choice but to accept in silence.As a matter of fact, the general staffs of all the three armies have carried out studies on long-term policies within them, but this is of no benefit to the overall situation (for example, as early as 1939 to 1940, In the winter of 1999, Marshal Raeder ordered the Naval General Staff to study the technical possibilities and requirements of landing on the British coast.).Germany did not have a true chief of staff who Hitler considered not only an expert or executive, but also qualified to be in charge of overall strategy.

The result of this form of command is that, as I said above, when the battle in the Western Battlefield is over, we immediately face the problem of how to proceed in the next step. In addition, the German High Command had two new facts to contend with: 1. There exists an undefeated England which is still unwilling to make peace with Germany. 2. Our new neighbor, Russia, is in danger of intervening, no matter how peaceful it now pretends to be.In November 1939, when Hitler emphasized the need for a quick victory on the Western Front, he had already recognized the existence of this threat.

Based on these two facts, it is obvious that the most urgent task of the Third Reich should be to end the war with Britain as soon as possible. Only in this way can Stalin miss the opportunity to benefit. If an understanding cannot be achieved between Britain and Germany, Germany must try to use military strength to eliminate its last rival, Britain.This is indeed a tragedy, because during this period neither side attempted to determine once and for all the future fate of Europe on the basis of common sense.True enough, Hitler was willing to avoid a life-and-death duel with Britain because his real target was to the east.

But his peace-probing speeches in the Reichstag after the French campaign were too general to elicit a good response.In addition, Hitler was so proud of his victory at this time that he already had fanatical confidence in his own victory, so even if the other party agreed to peace talks, it seemed that he would accept a peace treaty based on reason and justice.And what is more, he is now also a prisoner of his own actions, having given Russia half of Poland and the Baltic states, which can only be recovered by a new war.He allowed Italy to devour French territories, and made himself dependent on his allies.In the end, since the annexation of the Czech Republic, his credit in the world has gone bankrupt. Even if he is willing to sign any agreement, no one will trust him anymore.

Had Hitler, after defeating France, been able to negotiate a reasonable peace, the German people would have shouted long live to him. The Germans did not want to incorporate into the empire those lands where the Polish population had an absolute majority, nor did they want to take back areas that had once belonged to the Holy Roman Empire.The idea that the superior race should dominate Europe, and indeed the world, was not seriously considered in Germany except by a few fanatical partisans.Hitler had only to blow his whistle and order his propaganda troops to turn back, and the voice of the German people for a reasonable peace would immediately and automatically manifest itself.

On the other hand, however, the British national character Churchill personally represented was likely to prevent the British from any serious consideration of a reasonable peaceful settlement at this or any subsequent stage of the war.The resilience of the British is admirable. Once they enter the battle, no matter how difficult the current situation is, they have the determination to fight to the end.In particular, they only know that they hate Hitler and his regime unconditionally, and the so-called Prussianism, but they ignore that Russia is a worse political system and a greater threat to Europe.In addition, British policy also has a traditional bias, which is to maintain the balance of power in Europe.Britain's final motive for going to war was to restore this balance, because Germany was too powerful on the Continent, so Britain demanded to defeat her.However, the British did not realize that the world situation has changed, and Russia has become a great evil in the world, so a global balance of power is a greater need.

Besides, Churchill may have been too much of a warrior.All he had in mind was the battle and the final victory, and he never penetrated beyond the military objective into the political sphere.It was only a few years later, when the Russians had entered the Balkans, that Churchill began to notice the dangers of this development, but by then he was outmatched by the combined forces of Roosevelt and Stalin. In addition, people like Churchill certainly did not ignore the potential threat Russia posed to Germany.But as far as the war was concerned, he thought it was to the advantage of England.On the contrary, he never imagined that if he made peace with Germany at this time, the two totalitarian countries would soon fight each other.In fact, if Churchill could make a calm assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of Germany and Russia, he would definitely recognize that this is a situation in which two tigers fight each other and both lose.Therefore, the result of this situation will automatically make the Anglo-Saxon nation the master of the world. Let alone this struggle is enough to determine the final fate of these two totalitarian rulers. In an age of dictatorships, ideological struggles, and crusades, where the sentiments of the masses are manipulated by unbridled propaganda, reason simply does not exist.Therefore, it is very unfortunate for the people of both sides and the whole of Europe that Britain and Germany finally have no other way to go, so they have to continue fighting. So after the battle on the Western Front, the German High Command's answer to the question of the next step was to continue fighting against Britain.But in the fact that Germany had no war plan beyond the European battlefield, it was destined to have serious consequences.Now, while Hitler considered (without actually making up his mind) the plan to invade Britain, all practical preparations for this purpose were not yet completed.We therefore missed one of our best opportunities to exploit British weaknesses immediately.So much time was wasted in the preparations now begun, that the success of any landing simply because of the weather became very doubtful. This last fact, together with other factors (to be described in detail below), finally gave Hitler a reason (or an excuse) to abandon his plan to invade Britain and turn directly to attack Russia.This result is well known. Before I explain the reasons for this decisive change, I think we should first analyze, if Hitler finally launched a war against Britain, what are the chances of its success? We have three methods at our disposal, the first is to cut off their sea supply lines and force the British to their knees.Since Germany now fully possesses the coasts of Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France, which she can use as bases for air and submarine warfare, hers is in this respect more advantageous. The resources side is not so favorable.As far as the Navy is concerned, the number of submarines is far from adequate, let alone heavy warships, especially aircraft carriers, whose cooperation is necessary even for submarine warfare.Furthermore, the UK's anti-submarine defenses will still have the upper hand until we are unable to disable the UK Air Force.As for the Air Force, its tasks should be divided into the following three areas: 1. Obtaining air supremacy should at least eliminate the ability of the British Air Force to participate in anti-submarine warfare. 2. Paralysis of British ports. 3. Cooperate effectively with our submarines to attack enemy ships. In effect, these jobs amounted to overwhelming the RAF and destroying its production centres. The Battle of Britain suffices to prove that the Luftwaffe was not capable of achieving this goal in 1940.Whether the result would have been different if the weather had not been so bad during August and September of that year, or if Germany had not changed its focus from fighting the RAF to attacking London, is uncertain. matter. All in all, however, with Germany's very limited number of bombers and the dearth of long-range fighters, it seemed impossible to quickly overwhelm the RAF and destroy production centers in the summer of 1940.If the battle is determined solely by the quantity of material resources, the time and force required will often exceed the original estimate.If the two sides are more or less evenly matched, the battle can only be achieved by virtue of superior leadership, and it is seldom a battle of strength. So we have to be prepared for a long fight.Just as the submarine fleet must first be expanded to ensure success, similar steps must be taken on the air force side. This is a fact that has to be faced squarely. To force a great power like Great Britain to submit by means of strategic aerial warfare as envisioned by Gen‧ Douhet was, at least at the time, a real challenge. Naive idea.Later, the Allied air war against Germany was equally ineffective. In any case, if once the decision is made to bring Britain to its knees by cutting off the sea lines of communication, the whole of Germany's war potential should be devoted entirely to the production of submarines and aircraft.For this purpose it is also necessary to reduce the army in order to divert manpower to industry. This struggle will be long-term, and that is its danger.No one knows how long the Russians will be quiet.If Germany reduced her army and turned her entire air force against the British, Russia would at least be political blackmail, if not war. Another danger is that the United States may not sit back and watch Britain slowly be hanged by Germany, but may intervene early.As far as air and naval battles are concerned, they can quickly participate.Had the Germans actually invaded Britain, it would have been too late for them.Nevertheless, if Germany had a genuinely strategic policy, this course of action had a chance of success.Of course, we should always be wary of the possibility of American and Russian interference, and we must also stick to the two main objectives of destroying the British Air Force and cutting off British supply lines.Any attempt to break the morale of the enemy with an assault on a city will only hinder the chances of victory. The second possible method of defeating England is what I might call a Mediterranean scramble.It can even be said that Hitler, including all German military leaders, was once accused of being unable to jump out of the circle of continental thinking, and never recognized the importance of the Mediterranean Sea as the lifeline of the British Empire. Perhaps this is true, Hitler's thinking was limited only to the continent, but if Britain lost its position in the Mediterranean, would it be forced to give up the fight; on the other hand, what consequences did the conquest of the Mediterranean have for Germany? It seems to be quite doubtful. Undoubtedly, the loss of the Mediterranean would be a severe blow to Britain.The possible effects on India, the Near East and oil supplies would be severe.In addition, the blockade of this sea is enough to make the food problem of Britain more serious. But will the blow be fatal?Not in my opinion.The British can still get in touch with the Middle East and the Far East by circumventing the Cape of Good Hope. Unless the British Isles are strictly sealed off with submarines and aircraft, otherwise this line of communication will be cut off, that is to say, the first method mentioned above will still be used.But the first method may be enough to nail all the resources of the Luftwaffe, leaving it with no spare power to deal with the Mediterranean!The loss of Gibraltar, Malta, and its positions in Egypt and the Near East would have been painful, but certainly not fatal, for the British.And judging from the national character of the British, that will only strengthen their national will.The British will never admit defeat, but will only fight more fiercely.The slogan that the Mediterranean is the lifeline of the British Empire is a lie.At the same time, the British Dominions will never withdraw their support to Britain. The second question was what consequences the scramble for the Mediterranean would have on Germany itself.First, although Italy may serve as a good base of operations, it is well known that its military power can only make a very small contribution in this struggle.In particular, the Italian fleet was absolutely powerless to drive the British fleet out of the Mediterranean. So the main responsibility for this struggle will fall on the Germans, but Italy treats the Mediterranean as its private property and demands overall command, which in fact only makes it more difficult for the Germans. Malta and Gibraltar must be taken, and the British driven out of Egypt and Greece, if we are to dispossess the British in the Mediterranean and deal them a fatal blow.There is no doubt that if Germany wants to shift its strategic focus to the Mediterranean, this task must be solved in a military way. But the problem goes beyond that.In order to capture Gibraltar, Spain's consent must first be obtained and in fact it will never be possible or put pressure on the Spaniards.The significance of these two routes is to end Spain's neutrality.With or without the consent of Madrid and Lisbon, Germany would have no choice but to protect the entire Iberian coastline and secure supplies in that area.Both countries would be likely to resist, especially Portugal, and its colonies would immediately be taken by the British.In any case, the Iberian peninsula would consume a considerable amount of the German army in the long run, and the reaction to the German occupation of Spain and Portugal in the United States and Latin America would be very harmful. Since both Italy and Spain demanded to carve up French colonies, it was difficult to obtain a real peace treaty with France.Eventually Germany would be forced to occupy French North Africa to prevent a maritime nation like Great Britain from attempting to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean someday. Once the British were driven out of Egypt and Greece, it seemed necessary for the Germans to enter the Near East again, not least to cut off Britain's oil supplies.Some people think that establishing a base in the Near East has two major benefits for Germany: first, it has the possibility of threatening India, and second, it can threaten Russia's side to deter it from interfering in Germany.I feel these claims are unrealistic.In addition to the adverse reactions to the local people after the German troops entered these countries, there are two other aspects that must also be paid attention to. Fighting India and Russia from the Near East, simply for reasons of supplies, can never be truly successful.Because Britain is a sea power, it has the upper hand here.In addition, the consequences of the presence of German forces in the Near East may have prompted Russia to launch a war against Germany earlier. The crux of the whole problem of the Mediterranean, as I see it, is that even the loss of control of the Mediterranean by the British is not enough to determine its fate.Furthermore, if a decisive battle were to take place for the sovereignty of the Mediterranean Sea, it would eventually draw down a large number of German troops, enough to induce Russia to invade Germany.The need to wage war on Germany is all the more when we take into account the Balkans and influence in the Near East, which Russia might be interested in. The idea of ​​attacking Britain from the Mediterranean direction is actually quite similar to Napoleon's fantasy of attacking Britain by conquering India via Egypt.This line would keep German forces in an indecisive direction for a long time.In addition, it would give the British homeland time to rearm, and it would give Russia a sense that Germany could take advantage of it. Since the Mediterranean route cannot play a decisive role in our war with Britain, we have to consider the third route, which is to invade the British mainland. Before getting to this point, I should mention the practical results of our Mediterranean strategy.Just like the old mistakes he often made in the direction of Russia in the future, Hitler was always unable to use the appropriate force at the appropriate time.His biggest mistake was not being able to take Malta in one go, which was almost certainly successful in the initial stages.His mistake was decisive for the eventual loss of North Africa and all other consequences. During June, 1940, Hitler began to conceive plans (though, as I say, without determination) for the invasion of Britain, and ordered proper preparations to begin. This operation was named Sealion, but it was only ready to be carried out after certain prerequisites had been fulfilled.The preparations for the execution of this plan, as well as the many disputes (mainly between the navy and the army), had already been discussed by others.Therefore, this part of this book will not be repeated at all. What we are going to do here is limited to the review of the following three important issues: 1. Could the invasion of England force it to give up the struggle?If this action is successful, will it be enough to determine the entire domain? 2. Is the invasion really hopeful of success?What will be the consequences of failure? 3. On what grounds did Hitler finally abandon this plan (that is, give up the idea of ​​solving Britain) and turn to Russia to attack? Regarding the answer to the first question, we can say that invasion is the quickest way to overwhelm Britain, and that neither of the other two methods can achieve a quick solution.But is this the final outcome?Even if the British Isles fall, the Churchill government is likely to move to Canada and continue fighting.Whether the other dominions will still obey its leadership is unpredictable.But in any case, the conquest of the British Isles does not mean the complete failure of the British Empire. (Note: Whether the British people will continue to resist, or whether a puppet regime will emerge, is also unpredictable.) But the most important point is that it can be concluded that if Germany conquered the British Isles, it would deprive the other party of the absolutely indispensable base for launching a sea attack on the European continent, at least at that time.Even if the United States went to war, it would be absolutely impossible to cross the Atlantic Ocean and invade Europe without this island as a springboard at that time.If Britain were occupied, the British air force eliminated, the British fleet driven out of the Atlantic, and the war potential of these islands completely eliminated, Germany would be able to cope with the Mediterranean without fear of any containment. And even if the British government was determined to fight after losing its homeland, it had little hope of winning.In this environment, will all the dominions continue to support it? If the Russians, for the foreseeable future, no longer have hope in the so-called Second Front, what is the significance of its potential threat to Germany?Would Stalin, with Hitler's acquiescence, turn his attention to Asia?Had the Americans known that they would bear the burden of war alone, would they have launched a crusade against Germany? There are no definite answers to these questions today, nor will they be in the future.It is true that Germany cannot force other countries to accept peace across the sea.However, one thing can be asserted, if Britain can be captured, Germany's position will in any case be much happier than what Hitler will cause later. From a military point of view, a successful invasion of Britain in the summer of 1940 would undoubtedly be the right answer.What steps should be taken to enable Germany, after victory, to secure a negotiated peace, which should be a reasonable goal of German policy, but is outside the scope of this book on military science. Let us now return to the military aspect and analyze the question of whether there was any hope of success in the event of an invasion of Britain in 1940.I am sure there will be disagreement on this point, and there is no doubt that sea lion operations involve enormous risks. Even so, we cannot conclude that the German army, which relied on relatively primitive means of crossing the sea, is doomed to fail just because we saw a large amount of technical equipment when the Allied forces invaded Europe in 1944.Likewise, the absolute, and indeed decisive, air and sea superiority of the Allies in 1944 did not apply to the situation in 1940. In June 1940, the German army had none of these advantages, but it had another decisive advantage in that the British coastline was initially almost completely free of any organized defense.The British army lacked proper equipment, training and leadership.At least that's what its Army strength was in the summer of 1940.Britain was largely defenseless.Had Hitler not allowed the British Expeditionary Force to escape at Dunkirk, Britain would have been truly defenseless. In the summer of 1940, the success of the invasion of Britain depended on two factors: 1. The invasion plan should be carried out as early as possible, so that Britain can be hit while it is still defenseless, and can take advantage of the good weather in summer. (According to our own experience, the strait is still calm in July and August and the beginning of September every year.) 2. We should have the ability to counter the British air force and fleet in the Straits during the crossing period and in a period thereafter. So when we were uncertain about the weather and the ability of the Luftwaffe to achieve a minimum air superiority, the Sea Lion operation was destined to take great risks.Therefore, the German military authorities can not help but feel hesitant and uneasy about the implementation of this plan. Hitler himself was not as clear-cut as he had been in the past.The usual top-down drive was absent at all levels.General Jodl, who was in charge of the Joint Operations Division, considered the invasion attempt to be a last resort in the light of the circumstances. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Goering did not at all consider his air offensive an integral part of the invasion plan.On the contrary, he continued to disperse and waste the strength of the air force, proving that he regarded the air offensive against Britain as an independent operation. The Admiralty was the first authority to raise the question of an invasion of Britain, at least on the basis of its practical studies, that such an operation was feasible provided certain preconditions were met.In addition, it is more than anything concerned with the inappropriateness of its equipment. The most positive point of view was undoubtedly that of the Army Headquarters, which, however, did not seem to have entertained the idea of ​​an invasion until the fall of France. One thing is certain, if and when the Sea Lion project is actually carried out, those Army units that will be tested first will be the ones with the most enthusiasm and confidence in the preparations.Because the 38th Army under my command was scheduled to cross the sea in the first wave, I am qualified to say this.We do not underestimate the danger, but we have great confidence in our success.At the same time, we didn't know much about the fears of the other two services at the time. Everyone knows that Hitler finally canceled the Sea Lion project for two reasons (or excuses).The first is that the preparation time is too long, so that the first wave of troops will not be able to cross the sea until at least September 24.This time is no longer possible, because even if the first wave can succeed, the follow-up troops still need good weather to cross the sea.Second, the fact that up to this time the Air Force had not achieved the necessary air superiority was the really decisive reason. Even if the above two events were sufficient reasons for suspending the invasion plan in September 1940, it does not prove whether the invasion would have been equally impossible had the German High Command handled events differently.It was also a major basis for criticizing Hitler's determination to avoid a showdown with Britain in order to turn around and deal with Russia. The question is whether the above two facts are absolutely unavoidable, but inevitable? As far as the first point is concerned, the extension of the landing until the end of September can undoubtedly be avoided.Suppose there was a war plan and the focus was on defeating Britain.Then while the Western Front campaign is still going on, a considerable part of the technical or preparatory work can be carried out at the same time.Had such a plan existed, it would have been an inconceivable oddity to have allowed the British to escape at Dunkirk, whatever Hitler's motives.If the Germans had decided to invade Britain at the latest when France fell (that is, mid-June) instead of a month later (that is, mid-July), the landing would not have been until late autumn at the latest.The order was issued in July, but all necessary preparations were completed in mid-September. Had the decision been made four weeks earlier, the crossing might have been possible in mid-August. As for the second reason for abandoning Operation Sea Lion, namely, that the progress of the Battle of Britain was unsatisfactory, it can be remarked as follows: an isolated air campaign was conducted in the weeks before the invasion Dominance is a leadership error.The purpose of obtaining air superiority over Britain before the invasion is of course to ensure the success of the invasion.The result, however, was to fight under unfavorable conditions, vainly and prematurely exhausting the strength of the air force. If the Luftwaffe authorities could make a calm assessment of the comparison of the strengths of the enemy and our two sides, they should at least doubt whether their own strength can carry out this kind of attack on the British Air Force and its production center and win a decisive victory. First, the German Air Force Headquarters underestimated the strength of the British fighter force and overestimated the effectiveness of its own bombers. In addition, the effective radar system of the other side also made them subject to surprise attacks.Second, the range and penetration of the bombers (and even more so of the fighters) were far from what was required, with the result that the British air force could avoid devastating blows.Over Britain, German fighter jets were engaged in unfavorable conditions, and bombers were often not properly protected by fighter jets. These considerations should have been enough for the Luftwaffe to decide to refuse a showdown with the RAF, to wait until the actual invasion had begun, and to force the RAF to engage under similar conditions, that is, over the Channel. Finally, the German authorities made another major mistake, suddenly shifting the operational objectives of the air offensive when the two sides actually happened to be tied.On September 7, the center of gravity of the attack shifted to the City of London, a target that had nothing to do with the preparations for the invasion. The ideal of first gaining air superiority before an invasion is all well and good, but a careful analysis of the factors should have been enough to convince the German authorities that a decisive air strike should be more closely coordinated with the invasion.Of course, some people will object, saying that the tasks of the air force are too many: 1. Attack the air base in the south of England, 2. Cover the loading work in the French port, 3. Protect the transport ship crossing the sea, 4. Support the A wave of troops landed, 5. Cooperate with the navy and coastal artillery to prevent the intervention of the British fleet. However, all these tasks are not simultaneous, they can be solved consecutively.For example, the British fleet, apart from light forces stationed in southern British ports, may not join the battle until after the first wave of troops has landed. All depended on the outcome of a great air battle, which should have been fought over the Channel or the south of England when the naval and army invasions began.The conditions in which the Luftwaffe would be in this battle would be far more favorable than if they were to carry out air strikes deep inland. Naturally, this course of action smacks of all-or-nothing, but one must be prepared to pay such a high price if one is to risk an invasion in this environment. When Hitler abandoned his plan to invade Britain in September 1940 for the aforementioned reasons, these reasons may have sounded good at the time, but in fact, only because there was no one in the German High Command except Hitler. Any authority can be responsible for the overall strategic policy, so this reason will appear.Germany does not have such an authoritative authority that can draw up a war plan that includes Britain at the right time, and can effectively guide the invasion, treating it as a unified combat operation of the three armed forces. If it is said that the German High Command voluntarily gave up this opportunity to make a final blow to Britain, the reason for this must not only be found in the shortcomings of the staff organization, but also Hitler's political thinking. There is no doubt that Hitler always wanted to avoid conflict with the British and the British Empire.He has repeatedly stated that the destruction of the British Empire is not good for Germany.He also admired the empire as a great political achievement.Even if we don't want to take these words at face value, at least one thing is certain: Hitler knew that if the British Empire were destroyed, it would not be himself and Germany but the United States, Japan, and Japan. , or Russia.According to this realistic view, so his attitude towards England is not hypocritical.He does not want or expect a war against Britain, so he wants to avoid a showdown with Britain as much as possible. This attitude, combined with his complete failure to imagine that victory over France could be so easy, is enough to explain why Hitler did not adopt a war plan aimed at defeating Britain.The problem was that he didn't want to land in England at all.His political ideas clashed with the strategic demands of a victorious Western Front.The most regrettable thing is that his political views have not won the sympathy of the British. In contrast, Hitler's attitude towards Russia was quite different, despite his alliance with Stalin in 1939.He had always mistrusted and despised the Russians.He was also afraid of the traditional expansionist tendencies of the Russians, although he himself signed the Treaty of Moscow, which opened the door for Russia to go west. We should assume that Hitler knew that when two totalitarian powers became close neighbors, sooner or later they would collide.In addition, he also insisted on the concept of his living space, which can only be found in the East.這些理由都足以證明遲早要與俄國衝突，當法國淪陷後，希特勒似乎感覺到他自己已經是歐洲的主人，所以他認為可以動手了。同時俄國正在德國東界上增兵，因此也更引起了希特勒的疑忌。 希特勒現在面對著侵英的問題，他深知這個行動所包括著的高度危險。假使這個入侵戰失敗了，則參加作戰的海陸軍將會全軍覆沒，甚至空軍的實力也會大為削弱。雖然從純軍事的觀點來看，入侵的失敗並不使德國的軍事力量受到不可補救的損失，但是較重大的影響卻還是在政治方面。一方面，這種挫敗將更增強了英國人繼續戰鬥的決心，另一方面又會影響到美俄兩國的態度。更重要的是一個軍事上的大敗會使這位獨裁者在德國和全世界的威望受到嚴重的打擊。 這正是這位獨裁者不敢冒的風險。正好像他對大英帝國的態度使他不想與它攤牌，又好像他對於英國人心理的誤解，使他希望和平解決一樣，現在他也不想冒險而自動撤退了。他希望能避免與英國決戰的危險。他不想毀滅英國的強國地位，而只想打掉它手中的最後武器，使英國知道和平解決的必要。 可是在這裡，希特勒還是犯了最大的判斷錯誤。因為有一件事是必然的，假使希特勒在這個對他自己最有利的時機放棄了對英決戰的機會，結果遲早德國會被迫處於一個更壞的情況中。對英國的戰爭拖得愈長，俄國對德國的威脅也就會愈大。 當希特勒在一九四○年的夏天裡，未能冒險對英國作決定性的打擊時，他也就喪失了唯一的機會。他不能再等待了，只有在這個時候，他還可以冒險去發動一個預防性戰爭，以消滅俄國的威脅，而暫時不必害怕在西方受到敵人的牽制。 事實上，這也就等於說因為他不願意接受侵英的冒險，結果反而作了更大的冒險即兩面的戰爭。同時拖了那麼久才終於放棄了入侵的計畫，希特勒也就浪費了一年的時間。在這一年當中，德國很可能獲得一個最終的解決。這種延遲是一個永遠無法補救的損失。 九月底海獅作戰取消後，第三十八軍恢復了正常的訓練。渡海的裝備都撤入了港口中，在英軍空襲下，它們早已損毀了許多。在這個時候我們對於希特勒有關俄國方向的意圖還一無所知，他的最後決心可能是在以後才下的。直到一九四一年春季，我才聽到一點風聲。那時我正調了一個新職。