Chapter 27 Chapter 8 Armored Army Drives Straight

At the end of February 1941, I handed over my duties as commander of the 38th Army on the shore of the Strait and became commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, which was establishing its military headquarters in the interior of Germany.For me, it was finally a wish fulfilled, because long before the Western Front, I had always wanted to command a mechanized army. Of course, as the commander of the army, he has no right to ask all questions about the Russian campaign in advance.I personally did not receive an operational order until May 1941, and it was nothing more than an instruction to which Panzer Army my corps belonged to.

Therefore, I cannot comment on all the practical guidance of the Russian operation in 1941 as I did on the Western Front, because the final formation of the Western Front operation plan was personally influenced by me. However, I think there are two factors that can be explored: The first is that the mistake Hitler made, if no one else made a mistake, was that he underestimated Russia's resources and the fighting qualities of the Red Army.Therefore, all his ideas are based on the assumption that Russia can be defeated by military means in a single campaign.Even if this were possible, a simultaneous internal collapse of Russia must be contrived to achieve this goal.But Hitler's policy was exactly the opposite.His policy in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe was carried out by the Gestapo, completely neutralizing all efforts of the military authorities.In other words, his strategic policy is to destroy the Russian system as quickly as possible, but his political behavior is exactly the opposite of this goal.In other wars it is common for political and military leaders to diverge in their goals, but this time it was different because both military and political leadership lay in the hands of Hitler alone.As a result, his political measures on the Eastern Front completely violated the strategic requirements, and he lost all possible opportunities for a quick victory.

The second factor was the failure to achieve strategic unity at the highest level, Hitler and Army Headquarters.This criticism applies equally to the overall battle plan and to the execution of the 1941 campaign.Hitler's strategic goals were mainly based on political and economic considerations.Its content is: 1. Occupy Leningrad (he believes that this city is the cradle of Bolshevism), using this method, he believes that he can also join hands with the Finns to dominate the Baltic Sea.2. Occupy the Ukrainian raw material area, the arms production center in the Donets Basin and the Caucasus oil fields.He hoped that the capture of these territories would bring about the total collapse of Russia's war economy.

The Army Headquarters, on the other hand, believed that the Red Army had to be defeated before conquering and defending these strategic areas of unquestionable importance, and they believed that the main Russian forces could be encountered only on the road to Moscow, the city of Russian power. The focal point, that's something this government dared not risk throwing away.There are three reasons for this: 1. Compared with the situation in 1812, Moscow has now really become the political center of Russia.2. If the armament-producing areas east of Moscow and around the city were lost, at least Russia's war economy would be severely damaged.3. The most important reason is that from a strategic point of view, Moscow is just at the center of Russia's European part of the transportation network.If the city is lost, the Russian defense line will be split in two, and the Russian high command will no longer be able to conduct unified and coordinated operations.

From a strategic point of view, the differences between Hitler and the Army Headquarters seem to be: 1. Hitler hopes to seek a decisive battle on both wings. (Judging from the comparison of the strength of the two sides at that time and the vastness of the battlefield, it seems impossible for Germany to conduct such a decisive battle).2. The Army Headquarters wants to seek a decisive battle in the center. The German army's direction of operations was finally based on this basic strategic difference.Although Hitler agreed with the distribution of forces suggested by the Army Headquarters, placing two army groups north of the Pripyat Marsh and only one army group south of it, the question of strategic objectives remained throughout the campaign. The corollary of the debate was that not only was Hitler unable to achieve his goal, which was too far away, but it also confused and destabilized the goals of the Army Headquarters.

The full text of Hitler's general intentions as stated in the Barbarossa order reads: to destroy the main body of the Russian army in western Russia by decisive operations, including deep penetrations of armored vanguards, and to prevent the retreat of its combat-worthy units into the heart of Russia .Fundamentally speaking, this can only be regarded as a strategic formula, or even a tactical formula.It should be thanks to the excellent staff work of the German army and the heroism of the combat troops that it was able to achieve amazing achievements and almost brought the Russian army to the brink of failure.But this kind of formula cannot replace the real battle plan, its preparation and execution require high-level opinions to be completely consistent.Based on the proportion of troops on both sides and the distance of the attack, it seems to be assumed that two battles are required to destroy the Russian military power.

However, as an army commander, I am of course not qualified to intervene in the plans and intentions of the Supreme Command.Naturally, therefore, I did not suspect at the time that there were such significant strategic differences between Hitler and the Army Headquarters.But before long even this division began to be felt in my class. The 56th Army belongs to the Fourth Panzer Army of the Northern Army Group and is scheduled to attack from East Prussia.The task of Army Group North (Marshal Lieb, Commander-in-Chief) was to advance from East Prussia to destroy the enemy in the Baltic region before advancing on Leningrad.

The Fourth Panzer Army (commander Admiral Hopner) was ordered to advance across the Dvinsk (Dvinsk) to the Dvina River (Dvina) to occupy all crossing points , and continued in the direction of Opochka. To the right of the 4th Panzer Army is the 16th Army, commanded by General Busch, which is to advance through Kovno (Collator's Note: Kaunas); to its left is the 18th Army, commanded by Ku General Zeller, head towards Riga. On June 16, I arrived at the assembly area of ​​the 56th Panzer Corps.Admiral Hopner has issued orders for the advance of Fourth Panzer Army: The 56th Panzer Corps (8th Armored Division, 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and 290th Rifle Division) should break through to the east from the forested areas north of the Memel River and east of Tierst to reach the The main road of Dinask northeast of Kovno.On its left, the 41st Armored Corps, commanded by General Reinhardt, has two armored divisions, the 1st and 6th, the 36th Motorized Rifle Division and the 269th Rifle Division. Proceed towards the Dvina River Ferry in Jakobstadt.The SS Skeleton Division also belonged to this group, advancing behind at first, and then advancing behind the fastest-moving Panzer Corps.

In order to cut off all enemy forces in front of the Dvina and meet Army Group North's operational deadline, the complete capture of the bridges over the Dvina is decisive, since the great river is a formidable obstacle.The advance of the Fourth Panzer Army was a race to see which corps reached the Dvina first.The Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps was destined to be the winner, because intelligence indicated that we would face less resistance than the Forty-first Panzer Corps.For this reason, it has one more armored division than ours. I have suggested that our army should be the main force in order to find the enemy's weakest link.But the Panzer Army Command did not support this opinion.Before I begin to describe the operations of the Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps, it is necessary to state a fact that suffices to explain the difference between military standards and political leadership.

A few days before the attack, we received an order from the Supreme Command, the so-called "Order of the Political Commissar".The main content is to shoot all the captured Russian political workers on the spot to show the spirit of anti-communism. I think from the perspective of international law, the status of these so-called political commissars is indeed very special.They are not considered military, but unlike priests, medics, and field journalists, who can obtain non-combatant status.On the contrary, they were a mad fighter whose combat activities were almost illegal in the traditional sense of warfare.Their task was not only to monitor the Russian military, but also to bring maximum cruelty into the war, which was completely at odds with the traditional attitude of military behavior.These commissars were to blame for making the methods of fighting and the treatment of prisoners completely in violation of the Hague Convention.

Regardless of one's view of the commissar's place in international law, it would be against military tradition to execute prisoners on the spot.If such orders are carried out, it will not only damage the honor of the soldiers, but also damage the morale.So it was my duty to report to my superiors that no one under my command would carry out this order.Most of my subordinates fully agree with me, and they all act in the same way.My superiors also approve of my attitude.Efforts to revoke this order were soon effective, as it became clear that this order would only prompt the commissars of the Russian army to force their troops to fight to the bitter end by all the most brutal means. At thirteen o'clock on June 21, we were ordered to attack at three o'clock the next morning.The dice have been rolled. Because the space allocated to our army in the forest area north of the Memel River is extremely limited, we can only let the 8th Armored Division and the 290th Infantry Division attack the enemy's border positions first.At this time, the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division remained on the south bank of the river. Initially we encountered only light resistance near the border.But it was soon blocked by a well-prepared bunker network. It was not until noon that the 8th Armored Division broke through the enemy's fortress north of the Memel River and overcome this hurdle. On the first day, the Russian army showed its true colors.We had not long advanced to discover a German patrol which had been previously cut off by the enemy, all killed and decomposed.My adjutant and I are used to traveling in areas where the enemy has not yet been wiped out. After seeing this cruel scene, we both thought that it would be best not to be captured by such an opponent when we encountered such an opponent.In the future, we often encountered Russian troops raising their hands and surrendering, but when the German infantry approached, they would immediately grab their weapons and shoot.There are also wounded Russian soldiers who will pretend to be dead, and after our troops pass by, they will shoot from behind. According to the general impression we have obtained, the enemy troops at the front do not seem to feel the pressure of a sudden attack, but the Russian command system cannot be said to be responsive at least, so that although they have a strong reserve, they have never been in any coordinated way. into battle. There has been much debate over whether the deployment of Russian forces is defensive or offensive.However, if one takes into account the concentration of forces in the west of Russia, and the strong concentration of armored forces around the two districts of Bialystok and Rava, then perhaps we should echo Hitler's statement that sooner or later Russia will take the offensive.On the other hand, however, the deployment of Russia's forces on June 22, 1941 cannot be said to mean that Russia was ready to take any immediate action with the intention of aggression. I think the closest thing to the truth is that the purpose of Russia's deployment is to be able to cope with various situations. In order to occupy eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the three Baltic countries, Russia has already used quite a strong force.Undoubtedly on June 22, 1941, Russian troops were still scattered in these deep areas, so they could only be used for defensive tasks.However, once there are any changes in the political or military situation in Germany, the form of this deployment can also be changed immediately.Without any delay, the Russian forces could immediately turn to the attack.So although they were formally on the defensive until June 22, the Russian deployment was indeed a potential threat to the Third Reich.At the first favorable opportunity, Russia, military or political, might attack Germany directly. Of course, in the summer of 1941 Stalin would have preferred to avoid conflict with Germany.But if, sooner or later, the development of the international situation led the Russian authorities to believe that political pressure on Germany and even military action could be taken, then this temporary defensive deployment could quickly turn into an offensive one.That is what I call enough for any situation. Now back to our Fifty-sixth Panzer Army. If this army is to achieve the task of completely occupying the Dvina River crossing, it must concentrate on two things.On the first day it had to penetrate fifty miles into enemy territory to capture the crossing of the Dubisa at Erogola.The experience of the First World War gave me a good idea of ​​the Dubisa River area.This is a deep and steep canyon, and no tank can climb such a steep slope.In World War I, it took our railroad engineers months to build a wooden bridge.If the enemy had time now to blow up the large road bridge at Erogola, the army would be unable to advance, and the enemy would have time to establish a defensive position on the steep slope across the river, which would be difficult to break through anyway.So we also lost the possibility of taking the bridge of Dynask by surprise.The ferry at Erogora was an essential springboard for us. General Brandenburg's 8th Armored Division got the job done, although the Army's demands seemed excessive. I was with the division most of the day.After breaking through the enemy's frontier positions and overwhelming all resistance in the rear, the Erogora Ferry was finally captured with a search force at dusk on 22 June.The 290th Infantry Division also followed behind with a record-breaking marching speed.At noon, the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division also began to cross the Memel River and pointed towards the ferry south of Erogola. The first step has been successful. In order to succeed at Dinask, the second condition is that the army must rush forward to reach the place regardless of whether the troops on both sides can advance together.Whether we can take those precious bridges in their entirety depends on whether the enemy will be fully surprised.Naturally, we also know that this action will inevitably involve considerable risks. Everything was as we expected, our army was lucky and encountered a weaker section of the enemy's defense zone.Although the enemy counterattacked repeatedly and fierce battles occurred several times, our army quickly broke the enemy's resistance.By June 24th when the 41st Panzer Corps on our left was blocked by strong enemy positions near Shafli, and on our right the left flank of the 16th Army was still fighting for Kovno , the Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps has actually reached the Dinask Highway in the Vilkomir area, has penetrated 105 miles into enemy territory, and not only outstripped the German troops on both sides, but also drove the Russian troops in the border area. The army was left far behind.Now it was only eighty miles further to reach the bridges of Dynask.But can we sustain this pace?The enemy will inevitably counterattack us with his elite reserves.And they could at least temporarily fill the gap in our rear to cut off our supply lines.But despite the warnings given to me by Panzer Army Command, we were unwilling to let luck slip away for the sake of prudence.Although the 290th Infantry Division naturally cannot catch up with other units of our army, but because we have this division behind us, we have obtained considerable security, especially since it also attracts the attention of the enemy more May attack our rear.At this time, the military headquarters was leading two mechanized divisions to advance towards the goal of Dinask. The 8th Armored Division took the road, and the 3rd Motorized Division advanced along the more difficult path south of the road.Along the way, the two divisions repelled the enemy's reserves, which were used to counterattack.Some of these battles were quite intense.The enemy lost seventy tanks (about half of our total tank force) and many artillery pieces.At this stage, we simply don't have the time and manpower to hold captives. On the morning of June 26, the 8th Armored Division had arrived outside Dinask, and at 8:00 a.m. I received a report at the division headquarters that our charge had seized two bridges.Inside the city and across the Dvina the fighting was still going on, but the Great Highway Bridge was in our hands intact.The sentinels ordered to blow up the bridge were knocked down a few yards from the bridgehead.The railway bridge also suffered only minor damage and can be used as usual.The next day, the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division captured another crossing on the river by surprise attack.Our goal has been reached! Before the attack had begun, I was asked how long it would take us to reach Dynask, if possible.I replied that if the goal cannot be reached within four days, then it will be difficult for us to completely capture these ferries.Now counting from midnight, we did finish our task after four days and five hours.Calculated in a straight line, we have already penetrated 200 miles into the enemy's territory in one breath.The reason why we have achieved such remarkable success is that we are united in one mind, willing to take the greatest risks, and rush straight to the goal.We did feel honored when we drove over those bridges into Dinask, though the enemy had burned most of the city when they withdrew.Especially the price we paid is not too high, so we are more satisfied. Of course, as far as the north bank of the Dvina River is concerned, the position of our army cannot be regarded as too safe.The left flanks of the 41st Panzer Corps and the 16th Army were still behind us, at a distance of sixty miles and a hundred miles respectively.Between them and us there are several Russian corps, all now retreating towards the Dvina.On the one hand, we must guard against the enemy's full-scale attack on the north bank, and on the other hand, we must watch the south bank against the enemy approaching from the south.Our situation is extremely dangerous.But we are not anxious about our present isolation, which will not last indefinitely. On the contrary, it is the question of our next course of action that worries us most.Should our goal be Leningrad or should we turn to Moscow?On June 27, the commander of the Panzer Army came to see us in a light Stuka dive bomber, but he brought no news. It would be reasonable to assume that, as a commander of a Panzer Army, he should always have some idea of ​​future goals, but that was not the case at all.Our enthusiasm was tempered by orders to widen the bridgeheads around Dynask and keep the crossing open.We had to wait for the advance of the 41st Panzer Corps and the left flank of the 16th Army, which were ordered to cross the river at Jakobstad. While this is indeed the safest staff college answer, we have new and different thinking.In our opinion, the sudden appearance of our army in the deep rear of the enemy must cause considerable confusion in the enemy's army.They evidently intended to drive us across the river with all their might, and were gathering men everywhere to join the attack.So the faster we advance, the harder it is for them to have a chance to systematically counter us with a superior force.If we advance straight towards Pskov while still securing the crossing of the Dvina River and at the same time Panzer Army follows us with another Panzer Corps and advances through Dinask, then most likely However, the enemy will still launch sporadic counterattacks against us with all available forces at hand. At least at this stage, they cannot fight a formal battle.As for those remaining enemy troops south of the Dvina River, they can be left to follow-up infantry units to mop up. It goes without saying that when a single Panzer Corps or even an entire Panzer Army ventured deep into the heart of Russia, of course the deeper it went the more dangerous it was.Conversely, the safety of a tank force operating behind enemy lines depends roughly on its ability to keep moving.As soon as it comes to a standstill, it will be attacked from all sides by the enemy's reserves. But the High Command disagreed with us, and it was not their fault.For now, the goal of Leningrad seems to be moving away from us, leaving us waiting in Dinask.Everything is as we expected, the enemy is now sending reinforcements everywhere, not only from Pskov, but even from Minsk and Moscow.We were soon obliged to repel their attack on the north bank, and several positions had become dangerous.During the counterattack, the 3rd Division took back some temporarily abandoned areas. Our troops found the remains of three officers and thirty soldiers left in a field dressing station. They were all wounded who stayed there, but was massacred. In the next few days, the Russian Air Force also went all out to destroy the bridges that had fallen into our hands.With insane courage, squadron after squadron attacked at low altitude, only to be shot down by our fighters and anti-aircraft guns.They lost sixty-four planes in one day. Finally, on July 2, we were able to move again, when the SS Skeleton Division joined our army as the third mobile unit, and the 41st Panzer Corps passed through Jakobstadt. the Dvina River.For the task of advancing, the 4th Panzer Army was assigned the Erzeshiza|Ostroy|Pskov axis.So now it is finally determined that Leningrad is the target! Even so, six days have been wasted since our army rushed to Dinask with a surprise attack.The enemy had had time to recover from the shock they had felt when the Germans suddenly appeared on the north bank of the Dvina. A deep tank assault like the one carried out by the Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps on Dinask was bound to cause confusion and terror in the enemy's traffic areas, it cut off the enemy's chain of command and made it practically impossible for them to coordinate everything countermeasures.But now these advantages are beginning to be shaken by the decision of the Fourth Panzer Army to consolidate the Dvina River position. Although the motives of the Army Headquarters are very good, the result may be completely opposite.Do we still have that luck?This seems suspicious.Obviously, the only chance is that this Panzer Army should act as a whole.However, it just failed to do this, although the enemy's resistance was not enough to stop its advance. At the beginning, however, the Panzer Army advanced evenly from the Dinask-Jakobstad line in the direction of Pskov.The 56th Panzer Corps advanced along the Dinask|Rzeshiza and Ostroy|Pskov roads east, with the 41st Panzer Corps on its left.The enemy's resistance had become more tenacious and orderly than in the first few days of the campaign, but was still repeatedly defeated by our troops. Panzer Army was now approaching the Stalin Line, an unevenly fortified line built along the old Russian border from the southernmost tip of Lake Pskov west of Pskov to Veliky Luki.At this stage, Army Group Command again assigned the main road to the 41st Panzer Corps, which continued its advance towards Ostroy.The Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps turned to the east to advance towards Veliky Luki and Opochka. The intention was that we should break through the Stalin line and bypass the powerful Russian armored forces based in Pskov from the east. Such a force exists, and the Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps can execute this operation quickly, so it is certainly a good plan. However, in our opinion, this possibility is not great, because if the army is to advance in the direction ordered, then the corps will have to cross the Everglades in front of the Stalin line, so we strongly object and maintain that both corps should maintain The original axis of advance went straight to Ostroy, but it still had no effect.I should be sorry to say that our apprehensions about that swamp were misplaced.The 8th Armored Division reached the wooden trestle across the swamp, but it was already blocked by the vehicles of a Russian motorized division.It will take days to clear the roads and repair the damaged bridges.When the division finally emerged from the swamp, it met strong resistance again, and the enemy was repulsed after a fairly fierce battle.The 3rd Motorized Division found only a narrow plank road, which their vehicles could not pass.So I had to withdraw again and was ordered to follow the 41st Panzer Army and advance towards Ostroy. As the SS Skeleton Division advanced towards Gross Luki, it encountered better ground, although it included a line of strong concrete fortifications.Now the division was showing its inherent weakness, which was doomed inevitably because of the lack of serious training and proper experience of the officers and non-commissioned officers.As far as discipline and appearance alone are concerned, this division undoubtedly makes a good impression.I even have reason to praise their very good marching discipline, which is a very important condition for the effective movement of motorized troops.The division was fierce in its attack and resolute in its defence.I have commanded it several times since and consider it the best SS division I have ever seen.Its teacher was also a brave man at that time, and he was wounded and died soon. Still, these advantages don't add up to offset the shortcomings of its leaders in terms of training.The division suffered heavy losses because the troops hadn't learned all the common sense that the Army units had already learned by the time they entered the battle.Their losses and lack of experience have caused them to miss many favorable opportunities, thus causing them to fight many unnecessary battles.As a result, I went to rescue the division again and again, but I still couldn't stop the surge in casualties.Ten days later, the division's three regiments had to be reorganized into two regiments. Although SS divisions have always fought bravely and achieved some success, it would have been an unforgivable mistake to organize them into a separate military organization.There are many selected supplementary personnel who could have been used to fill vacancies in the Army, but they are all consumed in the SS on a large scale. This loss of blood is actually not worth the candle.Of course, the SS units themselves cannot be blamed for this unnecessary consumption of manpower, but mainly those ambitious people who insisted on creating these special units for purely political motives and in spite of the opposition of all military authorities. In any setting, however, we should not forget that the SS were indeed good comrades in arms, and when they fought alongside the Army at the front, they often showed their bravery and reliability.Doubtless many of them would have been more than willing to formally join the Army without the grip of a villain like Himmler. Before going back to describe the operations of the Fifty-sixth Panzer Corps, I should briefly describe the actual situation of how the command system of a tank force worked in the last World War, so as to give the reader a general impression. Until the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, my grandfather was able to gather his staff on a hill from which he could look over the entire battlefield and personally direct all the actions of his corps.He could even ride directly to the front to inspect the unfolding regiments.This situation is of course long past.Due to the increasing artillery range, the headquarters in World War II gradually retreated. At the same time, due to the vast battlefield, visual observation and personal command became impossible.Effective telephone contact has been a decisive factor since then.Schlieffen's vision of a generalissimo sitting in his office and giving orders on the phone has truly come true. World War II brought a whole new approach to command, especially for highly mobile units. Since the situation changed so rapidly and the opportunity was fleeting, no armored commander could allow himself to be overwhelmed. Tethered in a distant command post in the rear.If he waited too far away for a report from the troops at the front, he would be too slow in making a decision and miss every opportunity.Moreover, when a successful operation has just been completed, the commander must immediately try to eliminate the natural phenomenon of combat fatigue, so that his subordinates can obtain new combat effectiveness.More importantly, because the new type of mobile warfare places unprecedented demands on the energy of officers and soldiers, higher commanders should lead by example and live with the front-line troops as much as possible.Ordinary soldiers often feel that senior officers are simply enjoying themselves in the rear and have no idea what is really going on on the front lines.So if he can see that senior generals can take the lead and take the lead, it will give him a sense of satisfaction immediately.And only by being with the combat troops every day can we know their needs, listen to their complaints and try to help them.A senior general should not just ask his subordinates to complete the task, he should also be a comrade in arms, sharing the joys and sorrows with the soldiers.Additionally, when he visits frontline troops, he can also give himself a new boost of energy.It was not uncommon for me, when I was in divisional headquarters, to hear distressed and anxious words about the demoralization and fatigue of the fighting units.This is a headache for the higher commanders all day long, because it is his responsibility to the regiment and battalion and other units.But when I go to the forefront, I am often overjoyed, because I find that their confidence and optimism are beyond my imagination.So when I sit down to smoke a cigarette with the crew of a tank, or have a small talk with the personnel of an infantry company, I can immediately feel their full energy, which is also the trademark of the German military, so I The spirit lifted.This type of experience is the best thing a senior commander can hope for.Unfortunately, the higher the rank, the fewer such opportunities, and the commander-in-chief of an army group or the commander-in-chief of an army group cannot be as convenient as a commander. Of course, even army commanders can't be on the road forever.If a person is constantly rushing in and out of the front line, and can't find himself when needed, then in effect, it is tantamount to handing over the command to the staff.This can also be a good thing in many situations, but it is by no means normal. The final key, of course, is that command operations should be properly organized, especially in highly mechanized units, so that continuity should be maintained at all costs. The logistics department of the army can only move once every few days to keep the supplies in line.But the corps commander and his operations department had to advance once or twice a day from their tactical headquarters in order to keep them in constant contact with the mechanized divisions.Therefore, this military department must have a high degree of mobility, the number of personnel must be reduced to a minimum, and everything must not be particular about. We never waste time looking for a place to live.We lived in chateaux while fighting in France.But the small wooden cabins on the Eastern Front are not attractive at all, especially when they are full of bedbugs.So our tactical command is often in a tent, plus some communication command vehicles.I myself always slept in a small tent sharing a sleeping bag with my lieutenant.During this long drive, I slept in the bed less than three times.The only person who wouldn't sleep in a tent was my chief military aide who preferred to sleep in his car.Unfortunately his long legs had to be left outside the car door, so after a night of heavy rain, the wet boots would have been impossible to remove. We usually pitched our little tents in the forest near the main axis of advance, always by the edge of a lake or stream if possible, into which we could dip in for a quick bath before breakfast, or to wash off the fullness on our return from the front. body dust. The Chief of Staff was of course always at headquarters for work and calls, and I was often on the road during the day and often at night.Usually, after receiving the situation report at dawn and issuing the necessary orders, I set out early in the morning to inspect the division headquarters and front-line troops.At noon, I went back to the command post to stay for a while, and then went to inspect another division.By the time I got back to the command post, it might have moved to a new location.By this time it was dark and we were exhausted.In such cases, it is usually always due to the foresight of my second assistant, Major Lehman, who would treat me with a roast chicken and a bottle of fine wine for a special treat. Of course, this elastic method of command was only possible because of the radio.I always traveled with a radio van, and my comms officer, Kohler, was a very good man who later became a major staff officer.He kept me in constant contact with the Army, with regular reports on what was going on at the front, and immediate communication back of the decisions I made at the front.It should be added that when I was in prison after the war, Kohler proved himself to be an unselfish friend and helped my wife on several occasions. Besides my pilots, Nagel and Schumann, my frequent travel companion was my lieutenant, Lieutenant Spechett.He is the best cavalry officer, keen and brave, not afraid of danger, cheerful, and a very good assistant to me.He likes best to accompany me on search operations.When I was an army commander, there were many such opportunities, and I could go to the front line almost every day.以後當我升任集團軍司令後，就不能那樣天天往前線跑，於是他就變得很不高興。這是一位青年軍官的常態，我總是設法使他有領導戰鬥的機會。在克里木，他曾兩次率領搜索中隊，發揮出極大的機智與勇敢。當我們在列寧格勒前線時，我派他到一個師去服役，但是中途因為飛機失事犧牲。這對我是一個巨大的打擊。 現在再回到第五十六裝甲軍方面。到七月九日，很明顯，第四裝甲集團軍的企圖派我這個軍從東面迂迴在普斯科夫的敵軍已經沒有成功的希望了，原因有二，一是沼澤地，另一就是敵軍的猛烈抵抗。現在已無其他途徑可以選擇，只有抽回軍部和第八裝甲師，讓他們再沿著原有向北的軸線向奧斯特羅伊進發，第三摩托化步兵師早已走上了那條路。儘管如此，自從離開迪納斯克以來，依照七月十日所獲得的情報，本軍也已經擊潰了敵方的四、五個步兵師，一個裝甲師和一個摩托化師這些兵力遠比我們自己要強大得多。除了我們已經收容了好幾千名俘虜以外，自從離開德國國境以來，我們的戰利品一共有六十架飛機，三百一十六門火炮（包括反坦克炮和高射炮在內），二百零五輛坦克和六百輛卡車。不過敵人雖已被迫向東退卻，但卻並未遭到毀滅不久這個事實就變得很明顯了。 現在這個裝甲集團軍已經集中在奧斯特羅伊周圍，我們軍部希望能迅速向列寧格勒前進：我們自己通過盧加，而第四十一裝甲軍則通過普斯科夫。照我們看來，這樣可以使我們獲得最好的機會，不僅能迅速攻佔該城，而且還能切斷面對第十八集團軍的敵軍，不讓他們經過裡窩尼亞退入愛沙尼亞。在東方側面保護這個作戰的責任則應由跟在第四裝甲集團軍後面前進的第十六集團軍來擔負。 不過裝甲集團軍司令部所決定的辦法卻完全不同，這可能是根據最高級當局的命令。 第四十一裝甲軍奉命沿著大路，通過盧加向列寧格勒前進。第五十六裝甲軍又再度被拉向東方，奉命通過波科霍夫｜諾夫哥羅德進向丘多沃，以求儘量提早切斷列寧格勒與莫斯科之間的交通線。這個任務固然也很重要，但卻又再次使這兩個軍分開得太遠，結果使每個軍都缺乏必要的打擊力量。尤其是在這一面遍佈森林和沼澤的地形，事實上很不適宜大型裝甲部隊的行動。 更令人遺憾的就是黨衛軍骷髏師又不由第五十六軍指揮了，它在大盧基奧波切卡地區的任務改由第二百九十步兵師接替。這個黨衛軍師現在留在奧斯特羅伊以南擔任裝甲集團軍的預備隊。於是又像離開德國邊界時的部署一樣，集團軍主力再次放在左翼的第四十一裝甲軍方面。至於第五十六裝甲軍則奉命只用一個裝甲師和一個步兵師的兵力向東往丘多沃進行大迂迴運動，而且由於黨衛軍師不再在其右面成梯次跟隨前進，所以南翼也就缺乏必要的保護。如果再考慮到敵軍雖已被擊敗，但卻並未被殲滅，就可以明白這種危險的程度。 儘管如此，我們卻仍然堅信本軍將繼續從運動速度中去尋找安全保障。 第三摩托化師在奧斯特羅伊歸還本軍，它經過一場苦戰之後已於七月十日攻克了波科霍夫，現在奉命沿著一條次要道路向北前進。第八裝甲師奉命通過佐爾基什前進以奪占姆沙加河流入伊爾門湖處的重要渡口。 經過一連串戰鬥，其中多數都很激烈，本軍在以後幾天之內仍能繼續前進。除了七月十四日清晨敵軍曾在斯赫倫河北岸攻擊本軍指揮部以外很顯然是敵方的搜索兵力敵軍就未曾威脅過我們南翼的開放側面。同一天在我的堅持之下，第八裝甲師在擊敗了有炮兵和坦克裝備的敵人，攻克佐爾基什之後，挺進到姆沙加河地區，不過卻發現橋樑早已被炸毀了。 此時，裝甲集團軍司令部已經把它的前進主力向盧加公路的西面移動。它已經把第四十一裝甲軍的三支機械化部隊都向北調動以阻止第十八集團軍前方的敵軍從普斯科夫湖以北通過納爾瓦撤退。該軍只有一個步兵師（第二百六十九師）還留在到盧加的公路上。所以第五十六裝甲軍在向丘多沃的大迂迴運動中，現在就更感孤立。所以我們立即向集團軍司令部提出要求，指出如果我們這個軍還想達到原定目標的話，就必須立即獲得黨衛軍骷髏師和第十六集團軍第一軍的密切支援，他們都與我們相當接近。 不過這個要求尚未獲得答覆，第五十六裝甲軍卻已開始遭遇困難。七月十五日清晨，我們在佐爾基什以西和斯赫倫河岸邊的軍部指揮所中接到了幾個極不愉快的報告。敵人已經向第八裝甲師的側翼（現在一直延伸到姆沙加河）發動了強大攻擊，同時又從南面越過斯赫倫河進攻。這就是說位於佐爾基什與姆沙加河之間的第八裝甲師戰鬥部隊的主力與該師的後方支隊（軍部也在一起）之間的聯絡將被切斷。不僅如此，敵人還在我們後方造成了合圍之勢，其強大兵力正從南面向我們的補給線進攻。同時，已經向北面前進得更遠的第三摩托化師，也發現自己正受到敵方優勢兵力的攻擊，那是從烏托戈什的北面和東北面發動的。 很明顯，敵人的意圖是想包圍孤立中的第五十六裝甲軍。因為黨衛軍骷髏師未能沿我們後方右側面作梯次跟進，所以才使敵人可以集中位於我們南方的兵力，越過斯赫倫河向我們進攻，同時，由於第四十一裝甲軍已經離開盧加公路，結果在那一面強大的敵軍也騰出手來，他們現在正向我們北方側翼進攻。 我們此時的處境實在很不樂觀，我們自己也在懷疑這一次所冒的危險是否太大。我們是不是因為過去的成功而掉以輕心，所以對南側的敵人沒有予以足夠的重視呢？但如果不這樣做，我們又是否還有機會完成任務呢？照現有事實看來，我們所能選擇的唯一途徑就是經過佐爾基什把第八裝甲師撤回以避免受到包圍。第三摩托化師也應該擺脫戰鬥以使本軍恢復行動自由。以後幾天，敵人都在傾全力執行包圍作戰，除步兵師之外又加上兩個裝甲師，並有強大的炮兵和空軍支援。第八裝甲師終於還是從佐爾基什向西突圍並實行重組，儘管一度曾經暫時依賴空中補給。第三摩托化師在擺脫敵人之前，一共擊退了十七次連續的攻擊。同時，當裝甲集團軍司令部又把黨衛軍師再度撥交我們指揮之後，就能肅清本軍補給線上的殘敵了。 到七月十八日，這個危機已經成為過去。本軍現在在德諾附近已經建立了一個堅強正面，大致面對著東面和東北面。由於第十六集團軍的第一軍現在已經衝向德諾附近，所以我們原來在南翼的威脅也已解除。 我們俘獲了一架聯絡飛機，有伏羅希洛夫元帥的一封親筆信，這也使我們更感到放心。我於一九三一年在莫斯科與伏洛希羅夫元帥有一面之緣，他現在正指揮著面對我們的這個方面軍。這封信的內容不僅證實了俄國陸軍的相當部分都已被殲滅，而且特別提到了在佐爾基什附近的戰況。 當被包圍時，我們與後方之間的聯繫就只有飛機和無線電。可是等我們的交通線恢復之後，官樣命令又馬上如雪片一般飛來。其中有件事值得一提，那是從最高統帥部發來的電令。因為莫斯科的無線電廣播對本軍的被圍曾經舉行了一個過早的慶祝節目，並報告說已經俘獲了某種有關我方多管火箭發射筒的機密資料。俄軍對這種新兵器明顯感到厭惡，因為它們可以發射燃燒彈，面對著我們的俄軍早已用明碼無線電向我們提出警告，說如果我們不停止使用這種武器，他們就會用毒氣來報復當然這只是一種空洞的威脅，因為俄軍自己的化學戰防禦工具是不完備的。 在這種情形下，他們俘獲這些資料後，自然要大吹大擂一番。現在最高統帥部就要我們解釋為什麼這種機密文件會落入敵人的手中。很明顯那不是從戰鬥部隊手中奪去的，而是當俄軍切斷我們補給線時從某個運輸縱隊繳獲的。當裝甲部隊在我方正面深遠前方作戰時，這類事情必然是會發生的。所以我們對最高統帥的查詢據實呈報，並補充說為了避免再發生類似事件，今後我們深入敵縱深以不超過六十英里為原則。 七月十九日，裝甲集團軍司令部告訴我們，現在已計畫派第五十六裝甲軍通過盧加向列寧格勒前進。已經集結在盧加公路上的第二百六十九步兵師已撥交給我們指揮。我們所主張的集團軍全部兵力應集中在一起的建議，還是未被採納我們主張寧可跟著第四十一軍從納爾瓦以東前進（那裡有四條可用的道路直達列寧格勒），而不願沿著盧加軸線前進，因為那必須通過森林濃密地區。 此外，我們必須首先與第一軍配合向東攻入姆沙加河地區，那是我們曾經到達過的。很顯然最高統帥部還是不想放棄大迂迴運動的計畫，甚至還準備繞到伊爾門湖以東去。就目前而言，我們與第一軍不得不又捲入新的戰鬥中。敵人也終於被趕到姆沙加河對岸去了。 七月二十六日，陸軍總部第一副總參謀長保盧斯將軍來我軍視察。我把當前情況講給他聽，告訴他我們這個裝甲軍是如何在一個最不適宜使用裝甲部隊的地區中把實力逐漸消耗掉了。我也請他注意到分散這個裝甲集團軍兵力的不利。我軍的三個機械化師已損失六千人之多，而部隊和裝備也都已經用到了最大限度，儘管第八裝甲師在休息幾天之後還是設法使能用的坦克數量從八十輛增加到了一百五十輛。 我告訴保盧斯，最好的辦法是把整個裝甲集團軍從幾乎毫無希望迅速前進的地區中撤出來，而轉用到莫斯科方面去。反之，如果進攻列寧格勒和穿越丘多沃執行大迂迴運動的計畫一定非保留不可，那麼就必須使用步兵直到肅清森林地區之後，我們這個軍必須保留起來以便對列寧格勒作最後突擊，否則等這些機械化師到達列寧格勒時就會喪失戰鬥力。我又指出，無論如何這樣的作戰是需要時間的。如果我們想迅速佔領列寧格勒城和海岸線，那麼唯一的辦法就是應該集中裝甲集團軍的全部兵力在納爾瓦以東地區並且向該城進攻。 保盧斯將軍完全同意我的看法。 可是事實的變化卻與這種想法大相徑庭。當第十六集團軍，包括第一軍和剛到達的另一個軍，已經接替了伊爾門湖以西姆沙加地區的防務之後，第五十六裝甲軍就應該從通過盧加的道路改向列寧格勒進攻。而為了這個目標，我們總共只分配到三個師：第三摩托化步兵師，第二百六十九步兵師和新到的黨衛軍警衛師。 這種辦法進一步分散了裝甲集團軍的機械化兵力。黨衛軍骷髏師仍留在伊爾門湖邊，由第十六集團軍指揮。而第八裝甲師則由集團軍司令部收回作為預備隊，它暫時被用來肅清交通線上的遊擊隊這個任務不僅太浪費，而且也極不適當。這個軍現在只有一個機械化師（第三摩托化師）在盧加地區，而第四十一裝甲軍在納爾瓦以東的戰鬥中卻用了三個師。古德里安上將對裝甲兵的使用曾擬定了一條格言，就是不准分散，只准集中。而我們的情形恰好與這種理論相反。我們一切要求保留這三個機械化師的努力都完全失敗了。經驗早已證明，當兵力日益缺乏時，只有極少數指揮官還能設法維持整齊的戰鬥隊形並避免分散他們的部隊。 如果要我對盧加附近的戰鬥加以詳細敘述，也許需要太多篇幅。的確那是非常艱苦的戰鬥。幾個星期以前，敵人在這個地區還只有相當微弱的兵力，現在卻已經增加到一個完整的軍，下轄三個師，並有強大炮兵和裝甲部隊支援。尤其盧加附近本是俄軍的一個訓練地區，所以敵人對周圍的情形非常熟悉，此外，他們也有足夠時間構築適當的工事。 當這些戰鬥仍在進行時，我軍又分配了新任務。最後，它終於奉命與在北面的第四十一裝甲軍匯合起來向列寧格勒進攻。可是即使到現在，還是只有軍部和第三摩托化師能夠調動，而第八裝甲師和黨衛軍骷髏師仍然繼續執行其現有任務。 八月十五日，我在盧加的任務移交給第五十軍，該軍軍長為林德曼將軍，是我在第一次世界大戰時的老朋友。接著我們開始向北移動。我們的新指揮所設在納爾瓦西南約二十五英里遠的楚德湖畔。道路是那樣糟糕，我們花了八小時才走過一百二十五英里的距離。當我們到達楚德湖之後，那天夜間又接到集團軍司令部的電話，命令我們停止第三摩托化師的前進它是跟著我們走的並於明日清晨再轉回去，改向在德諾的第十六集團軍報到。我們，連同第三摩托化師和黨衛軍骷髏師是剛從伊爾門湖地區抽回的，現在又馬上要重新加入那一方面。對這樣的調動，當然不會有人表示滿意。也許唯一的例外就是我們的軍需處長克萊因斯密特少校，雖然這個消息要使他的補給運輸安排轉上一個一百八十度的大圈子，可是他卻依然興高采烈，毫無怨言。 所以在八月十六日，我們又沿著那條壞路再回德諾去。這一次的距離為一百六十英里，一共走了十三個小時。僥倖的是第三摩托化師還沒有向北走多遠，所以很容易將它調過頭來，不過部隊的感想如何卻是我們不願想像的。這種改變的最後原因，或許還是因為我們的總兵力不適當以及在列寧格勒、普斯科夫和伊爾門湖之間是完全不適於坦克作戰的地區。 當我們到達第十六集團軍司令部時獲得的情況大致如下：第十軍本來在伊爾門湖以南集團軍群右翼作戰，現在受到遠為優勢的敵軍（俄國第三十八集團軍，包括八個師和騎兵部隊）的攻擊，正在節節敗退。它正在伊爾門湖以南，正面向南進行困難的防禦戰，而敵人明顯想從西面實行迂迴。第五十六裝甲軍的任務就是緊急援救該軍。我們這個軍應採取的行動可能的話應儘量不引起敵人注意就是讓它的兩個機械化師進入德諾以東的敵軍西側，當敵軍忙於攻擊第十軍時，就可以出其不意席捲他的正面。我們面臨的是一個有意義的任務，而黨衛軍師又歸我們指揮也很使人感到愉快，唯一遺憾的卻是第八裝甲師未能參加這次作戰。 到八月十八日，這兩個師秘密進入敵人西側的偽裝集結地區的行動可以說是完全成功了。當本軍於次日清晨發動攻擊時，敵人遭到了完全的突襲。我們從側面席捲敵人正面的計畫完全成功了，在以後的戰鬥中，第十軍也轉守為攻，與我們聯合起來圍剿潰敗中的俄國第三十八集團軍。到八月二十二日，我們已經到達斯塔拉雅｜魯薩的東南，雖然在沙質地面上幾乎完全沒有道路，但兩個摩托化師的步兵還是繼續徒步作戰。在這幾天，單是第五十六裝甲軍就已俘獲一萬二千名俘虜，坦克一百四十一輛，火炮二百四十六門，以及許多自動武器和摩托化車輛。在戰利品中有兩個有趣的東西。一個是一門嶄新的德國八十八毫米高射炮，那是一九四一年才製造的。另一個是俄國的多管火箭炮，這是第一次落入德軍手中。我特別希望把這件戰利品送往後方，卻發現車胎已經被人拆走了。調查之後發現這是我的第二助手雷曼少校所幹的好事，他發現這些車胎非常適合用在我們自己的指揮車上。當他奉命歸還原物時，表現十分幽默。 當戰鬥部隊用盡精力之後，於是就可以享受一次短假，於是又有撤回第五十六裝甲軍用在其他方面的議論，結果是第十六集團軍還是在伊爾門湖以南繼續東進。不過到八月底，夏天的第一場大雨開始把所有路面都變成了泥沼，於是兩個機械化師都暫時不能動彈。同時，敵人也在調集新的兵力來代替已被擊敗的第三十八集團軍，沿著柯爾門｜伊爾門一線，又有新的集團軍番號出現第二十七、第三十四和第十一，三個集團軍群。於是又有新戰鬥發生，但是為了節省篇幅起見，不擬詳述。 第五十六裝甲軍在強渡波拉河之後，一直挺進到傑米揚斯克附近為止。除了敵軍的抵抗已經日益頑強以外，沿著泥濘數尺深的道路前進，也使人員與裝備都感到吃不消。在這個階段，我的全部時間都花在各師方面，但即使是我那輛堅固的指揮車，也時常還是要用牽引車拉動才能繼續行走。 在這個階段中我們更能感受到希特勒與陸軍總部之間在目標上的分歧。前者為列寧格勒，而後者則為莫斯科，第十六集團軍司令佈施上將告訴我說他的意圖是一直向東推進到瓦爾代高地為止，以便以後可以向加里寧｜莫斯科軸線前進。可是北方集團軍群總部卻不同意。九月初，第五十七裝甲軍從中央集團軍群地區加入北方集團軍群作戰。九月十二日，我們又奉到指示，說不久就要向南移動，改歸中央集團軍群的第九集團軍群指揮。甚至一位軍長對這樣的調動也感到莫測高深，不過我卻得出了一個總結論，一切都是因為希特勒和陸軍總部之間對戰略目標還沒有作出最後決定。 無論如何，在這幾個星期，第十六集團軍（連同第五十六裝甲軍在內）所進行的戰鬥卻可說是非常成功。到九月十六日，德軍統帥部就能夠宣稱俄國的第十一、第二十七和第三十四這三個集團軍的主力都已經完全被擊潰。有九個師被認為已經毀滅，另外還有九個師也被認為已經受到了慘重損失。 不過我們對這樣的成就卻還是缺少真正的滿足感。因為誰都不知道我們真正的戰略目標是什麼，或者說這些仗究竟是為什麼而打。不管怎樣，像我們在迪納斯克進行的神速前進已經不會再有了。 我當第五十六裝甲軍軍長的時間現在已經不多了，九月十二日的夜間，帳篷外面正下著傾盆大雨，我與一兩位參謀正在打橋牌以消磨時間並等候黃昏情況報告。突然電話鈴聲響了，我的朋友集團軍司令佈施上將要與我講話。通常這時來電話總不是好事，可是這次佈施卻把一個命令宣讀給我聽。 步兵二級上將曼施坦因應立即前往南方集團軍群總部報到，並接任第十一集團軍司令。 從此以後我就可以率領一個集團軍獨當一面了，任何軍人都可以了解我此時的愉快和驕傲的心情。對我而言，這好像就是我戎馬生涯的頂點了。 第二天清早我就向所轄各師道別可惜只能用電話接著又向軍部人員致謝。我對第五十六軍所屬的全體官兵深致謝忱，因為在過去幾個月中，軍部和各師已經成了一個完整的整體。 對於新職務和較大的任務，我當然感到很愉快。但是我卻深知在軍人生活中，最滿意的階段也許從此不會再有。這三個月中，我與戰鬥部隊共同生活在一起，共患難也共用成功的愉悅。今後，由於地位的關係，也許就不能再和部隊如此親密接近了。 在戰役最初階段，第五十六裝甲軍的長驅直入，真可說是達到了一個坦克兵指揮官的夢想。這種生活經驗也許今後不會再有了。離開我的軍部僚屬，也使我內心感到悲傷。尤其是我那有經驗的參謀長埃爾維菲爾特上校，他是一個冷靜超群的好顧問，其他人員也同樣非常傑出。 當我於九月十三日正式向我的老友佈施上將告別時，我攜同到新職位的部屬就只有我的副官和兩個駕駛兵。他們現在都已經作古。