Chapter 53 Strategic Basis of the Winter Campaign

In order to appreciate the importance of this decisive battle on the southern flank, and the degree of danger involved, we must briefly review the operational situation at the outset. During the winter of 1941-42, Russia's military resources were only sufficient to stop the German attack on Moscow.So in the summer of 1942, the front again pushed eastward, finally reaching the Volga and the Caucasus. But now in the winter of 1942-43 the enemy finally felt strong enough to wrest the initiative from us.The question ahead was whether, in that winter, decisive steps could be taken to bring defeat to the German Army on the Eastern Front.Although the defeat of Stalingrad was extremely disastrous, it was not yet a decisive blow in terms of the entire war. However, if the entire southern flank of the German army was wiped out, it would pave the way for the victory of the Russian army against Germany.The Russian High Command had two reasons for wishing to achieve this goal on the southern flank of the Eastern Front.The first was the sheer numerical superiority of Russian forces, and the second was that the German leadership had made a great mistake at Stalingrad, which gave them a favorable operational position.The Russians undoubtedly pursued this goal, although they were unsuccessful.

During November 1942, the German front formed a broad arc curving eastward through the Caucasus and eastern Ukraine, the right flank of which met at Novorossisk The Black Sea passes through the northern Caucasus along the front of Army Group A (17th Army and 1st Panzer Army), but does not actually come into contact with the Caspian Sea on the east side. The deep and open side of this front faces south, and only the 16th Motorized Division is responsible for covering the east facing the lower Volga.This division is located on the Kamik Prairie east of Irista. The continuous defensive line of Army Group B began only at a certain point south of Stalingrad.From Stalingrad it retreats above the Don, and then along the Don to Voronezh.Within this army group, all the troops are the Romanian Fourth Army, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Sixth Army, the Romanian Third Army, an Italian and a Hungarian Army, and then the German Second Army.The main body of the German force had been trapped near Stalingrad for the past few months, so the rest of the front, especially along the Don River, was mainly in the hands of the Allies.Behind the fronts of either Army Group A or Army Group B there were basically no reserves worth mentioning.

On the enemy's side, their various armies, forming a Caucasus Front, a Southwest Front and a Voronezh Front, possessed superior forces not only on the front line, but also in the center of all these army groups (i.e., fronts) and the Eastern Front. Or in the Moscow region, as well as in its large rear area, there are also huge reserves. In order to understand the real danger of this situation, and the extent to which it is beneficial to the enemy, we should first clarify a distance or two of strategic importance. From the Don region where the Romanian Third Army was routed on November 19 (that is, the Don bridgehead position facing the Klemenskaya Russian Army and the region to the west), and from the Italian Army Group in Kansas The distance between the territory occupied on either side of Kassanskaya and the Don crossing at Rostov is a little more than one hundred and eighty-five miles.Not only the entire Army Group A, but also the Romanian Fourth and Fourth Panzer Armies had their lines of communication in the rear passing through Rostov.But Army Group A's left flank was at least 375 miles from Rostov, and Fourth Panzer Army, south of Stalingrad, was about 250 miles away.

Further to the rear, the German left flank crossed the Dnieper crossings at Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk.Connections through the Crimea and across the Kerch Strait were also not very effective.These important Dnieper crossings on the rear of the German southern flank were 440 miles from Stalingrad, and the left flank to the Caucasus front was more than 560 miles away.On the other hand, they are only 260 miles from the enemy's front on the Don, whether from Kansanskaya to Chaporochi, or from Svoboda to Neropitovsk. so so! What the practical implications of this situation are, I know all too well from personal experience.In the summer of 1941, I led the 56th Panzer Corps from Tilsit to Fenske, covering a distance of more than 190 miles in four days.Moreover, when I advanced in this way, I also faced quite tenacious resistance from the enemy, which was incomparable to the current resistance of the Italian and Hungarian armies on the Don River.And the Russian army still controls many reserves behind its front lines, which we did not have in the winter campaign of 1942.

In addition to strategic interests, the Russian army also has a huge numerical advantage.When the Don River Army Group began to struggle, the ratio of the strength of the enemy and our two armies has been seen in the previous chapter.The development of this proportion in winter can be represented by the following two figures.During March 1943, Army Group South (formerly Army Group Don) covered a front of 435 miles from the Sea of ​​Azov to the north of Kharkov with a total There are only thirty-two divisions in strength.Facing this area, the enemy had 341 large units, either on the front line or in the rear, consisting of infantry divisions, armored or mechanized brigades, and cavalry divisions.

The combat conditions of Army Group Don were constantly governed by two factors: The first point is an overwhelming numerical advantage.Even when this army group was augmented by the bulk of 1st Panzer Army and new forces provided by Army Headquarters, there were only three German armies in total, which were later increased to four.But the ratio of the German army to the Russian army is still one to seven. (The fact that some Russian units were numerically smaller than a German division was already taken into account). On the second point, there is another great inherent strategic danger, since the enemy's numbers are far greater than ours, and when our allied forces collapse, they also enjoy complete freedom of action at this time, and at the same time they reach the German army. The distance between Rostov, the lifeline of the southern wing, and the ferry of the Dnieper River is also much closer than ours.

The combination of these two factors was enough to suggest the danger facing the German southern flank.Once its supply line is cut off, they will all be forced to retreat to the coast of the Aizov River or the Black Sea, and the fate of final destruction there will also happen to be able to constitute a blockade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.After the Don Army Group and Army Group A are destroyed, the fate of the entire Eastern Front will be doomed sooner or later.