Chapter 54 Essentials of Operational Policy

Based on the above analysis of the strategic situation, in the entire southern flank campaign in the winter of 1942-1943, the problems of both sides were the same.Can the Russians capture the southern flank of the Germans and complete their decisive step towards final victory?Can the German army avoid this tragedy? The battle plan adopted by the Russian army is obvious. It was a good opportunity offered by the German High Command in person, and of course they gladly accepted it.The first step of the Russian army should be to encircle and wipe out the Sixth Army in Stalingrad, which is a very natural decision.

In its further operations, the enemy prepared to take advantage of its overwhelming success in the area of ​​the Loech-Hungarian forces to increase the force and scope of its strikes in order to outflank the southern flank of the German army from the north and west.His object was first to cut off this wing from its traffic area, and enclose it on the coast.This strategic conception was all the more promising because the southern flank of the German army had been left too far away by its High Command. On the German side the question to be decided was much more difficult, and our own negligence and the first unexpected success of the enemy on both sides of Stalingrad put us in great danger.However, from the perspective of the overall strategic situation, on the first day when the enemy launches an attack, our Supreme Command should recognize the seriousness of the situation and imagine how it will develop, especially in the situation faced by Army Group A in the Caucasus. How great is the danger.

In a nutshell, the German High Command had to choose one of two routes.The first is that when the Sixth Army is first attacked, it should be withdrawn from the Volga before the enemy encircles it, and then, with the assistance of strong reinforcements, use this army to try to restore the enemy's position on the Don. The situation in Dahewan.At the same time it was necessary to use German forces to reinforce the Don region occupied by Allied forces.However, it is obvious that the German army did not have the necessary troops to make such a solution at that time, and at the same time, due to the lack of existing railway transportation, it was impossible to make these troops arrive as scheduled.And ordering the Sixth Army to withdraw from Stalingrad is something that it has been unable to make up its mind for a long time.In fact, within a few weeks after the Russian offensive was launched, it became clear that the army was doomed, and that the most we could hope for as a whole was that it be able to contain as many enemy forces as possible. The army's strength has reached the longest time.Such was the task of this heroic army, until at last it sacrificed itself.

Nevertheless, even after such an unfavorable turn of events with Hitler clinging to Stalingrad, and with all hopes of rescuing the Sixth Army proving to be illusory, the German High Command had no chance. There is still a second route that is unimpeded.A serious crisis could be turned into a victory by giving up the lands it had won in the summer campaign (which would have been impossible to hold anyway).To achieve this goal, it is necessary to withdraw the forces of Army Group Don and Army Group A from the eastern salient area of ​​the front according to a certain time limit, and first turn them into the lower reaches of the Don River or behind the Donets River. It was then diverted to the lower Dnieper region.

At the same time, any forces that might be mobilized, including the extra forces in the two army groups due to the shortened front, should be concentrated, let's say the vicinity of Kharkov as the concentration point.When the enemy tried to pursue the retreating German army or cut off its crossing of the Dnieper River, they should take on the task of attacking the enemy's flank.In other words, the idea was to transform a large-scale retreat into an encirclement operation with the aim of driving our pursuers to the sea and annihilating them there. When the hope of rescuing the Sixth Army was over, Army Group A's position in the Caucasus was already in jeopardy, and the enemy's breakthrough in the front of the Italian Army threatened to cut off the entire southern flank, Army Group Don Qun immediately proposed the above-mentioned plan to the Army Headquarters.

But Hitler was not one to take this course of action readily, since it would first require him to abandon the territory he had conquered in the summer of 1942, and it would no doubt involve a considerable degree of operational risk.Such a procedure was entirely inappropriate for Hitler's personality, which I had already analyzed in detail in Chapter Eleven.Because he was so inexperienced in combat issues, he even hoped to send the SS Panzer Corps, which had just arrived in Kharkov, into battle to restore the situation on the entire southern flank. As far as the Don Army Group is concerned, the above-mentioned first route is out of consideration before it catches up with the battlefield, because at that time, the Sixth Army has already been completely surrounded.In addition, when the headquarters of our army group was established, we were handed over to us some broken troops, and the reinforcements received later were extremely limited. With this force, it is absolutely hopeless to fight a battle in the Don River. Especially when the Italian Army was defeated, the reinforcements were detained in the area of ​​​​Army Group B, so there was no hope.As for the second route, that is, to turn a large-scale retreat into a counterattack against the enemy's northern flank when the enemy has taken advantage of the victory and pursued it, that is something that the Don Army Group has no right to carry out.To carry out this task we must have command of the entire southern flank and have free access to Army Headquarters reserves.

On the contrary, what the Don Army Group can do is limited to things within its own command range.So it can only try to cope with this dangerous situation again and again.As the battle progressed, the situation became increasingly dangerous. The first task facing the Don Army Group was to rescue the Sixth Army.Initially this took precedence over all other operational considerations. Once this task could not be completed due to various reasons (detailed in the previous chapter), our army group immediately began to study how to avoid a greater defeat (loss of the entire southern wing).Since the troops still available at the Army Headquarters are not enough to keep the German southern flank from being cut off from the lower Don and Dnieper rivers, the only remaining countermeasure is to shorten the eastern flank of the army group and shrink it out. The force was used on the west flank.Therefore, the success or failure of everything depends on whether our thinking can go ahead of the enemy, and we can quickly transfer the strength of the east wing to the west wing to intercept the enemy's roundabout movement. They are gradually developing westward.Our task was made more difficult because our neighbor to the north, Army Group B, was gradually disappearing as a result of the loss of Allied forces.On the other hand, it would be impossible to move sufficient forces to the west unless it was possible to mobilize forces from Army Group A, which Army Group Don could not command.

Although the concept is larger in scale and longer in duration, the tasks before us are of a nature similar to those faced by General Paulus at Stalingrad between 19 and 23 November. exactly the same.This time, regardless of localized oppression, we must immediately transfer our troops to the position where the survival of our rear lines of communication is at stake, while at the same time maintaining our combat mobility.The only difference is that in Paulus's case all decisions had to be made hastily within days, or even hours, and he could not have hoped for reinforcements from the start.In our case, too, this idea dominated all our operations and brought us into conflict with the Supreme Command for several months.

In its essence, the concept of leapfrogging from the east to the west to counter enemy attempts to cut off our entire southern flank is quite simple.But in war, the simplest things are often the hardest things to do. The real difficulty is not in making the next decision, but in implementing it.In the present situation, if any force were to be drawn from the eastern flank, the result would necessarily be a danger which no one could be sure of being able to overcome.What is more difficult is that, if such a movement of forces is to be timely, it must be acted upon before the danger of such a cut-off is fully manifested.Let alone a few weeks, at least when the danger was not serious enough for Hitler to recognize it, action should begin.Finally, there is another point. The development of the situation in the area of ​​​​Army Group A has long been sufficient to prevent us from carrying out this leapfrog plan. See below for details.

So, although the concept is so simple and sound, it turns out to be difficult to realize when we are faced with such a growing situation.It was just as difficult to get the High Command to accept this idea, at least hopefully in time for it to be really effective, since the latter's point of view was also opposed to ours.Hitler wanted to stick to what he had gained in principle, but we believe that operational mobility is the real key to victory. In this regard, our operational staff and combat troops are superior to the enemy status. The circumstances at the time when Army Group Don took over its command, together with the constraints imposed on it by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and its dependence on the actions and attitudes of neighboring Army Groups, were sufficient to make the Army Group take a step-by-step approach, But at the same time try not to sacrifice its fundamental formula.

Based on the above analysis, it seems that the winter campaign of Army Group Don (later renamed Army Group South) between 1942 and 1943 can be divided into four consecutive phases: In the first stage of the struggle to rescue the Sixth Army, the Don Army Group put everything they had into a desperate gamble. The second phase was the struggle of Army Group Don to try to keep the rear of Army Group A safe from the threat, while the latter was fighting from the Caucasus. The third stage is the actual battle to keep the communication line of the German southern flank from being cut off. The fourth stage saw the army group's successful attack on the enemy at the Battle of Kharkov, although on a smaller scale than would have been ideal.