Chapter 56 Phase II: Fighting to Keep Army Group A's Rear Uncut

From the very beginning, the German High Command should have recognized that Army Group A could never remain in the Caucasus if the rescue of the Sixth Army was not immediately successful.In other words, there is absolutely no possibility of establishing a fairly stable situation within the great bend of the Don River.But when the enemy has opened a gap in the right flank of Army Group B, allowing it to go straight to Rostov, anyone should also be able to understand that the problem of holding the front of the Caucasus is no longer a consideration.Of course, unless Hitler is willing or able to draw a large number of troops from other theaters for reinforcements, this is the only exception.

As early as December 20, the day when the rout of the two Italian divisions exposed the flanks of Holliday's army and allowed the Russians to approach the crossings of the Donets, I had reported to Zeisler The general pointed out that if the enemy advanced in the direction of Rostov, he would now have the opportunity to strike a decisive blow on the entire southern flank of the German army.On December 24, I again reminded him of the fact that now not only the fate of Army Group Don was threatened, but also Army Group A. As I said above, when I asked for the withdrawal of troops in Army Group A to Rostov and reinforcements for the Fourth Panzer Army, I was refused.Even if the hope of rescue of the Sixth Army has long been lost, it is in the interest of Army Group A that the Fourth Panzer Army should still be reinforced, because if it is defeated, the enemy can rush into Army Group A. rear of the group.Because this is very understandable, Army Group A itself is absolutely unwilling to automatically assign any units to the command of Army Group Don, so this is also the responsibility of the Supreme Command. New split.That is a very urgent need. One of the possible reasons for Army Group A's refusal to give us the requested strength (see previous chapter) was their reluctance to dismantle their troops and units.Undoubtedly, getting larger units out of combat is a difficult task, and at least takes a lot of time.This approach, however, was partly driven by necessity and could not avoid the lack of adequate reserves to fill the holes created by the enemy's breakthrough.But there is another equally important reason, and that is that Army Group A has not had a full-time commander-in-chief for several months to keep everything on track.Many military commanders fail to appreciate that units must maintain their normal order of battle if they are to achieve maximum efficiency and maintain mobility.Under the current situation, Army Group A has not had a responsible commander for quite a long time, so it is not surprising that its troops are in disarray.

Due to the insistence of the Don Army Group, Hitler finally decided to order the withdrawal of the most exposed eastern wing of the A Group Army Group, the First Panzer Army, to Petigorsk on December 29｜Prasco In the Kuma area of ​​Pyatigork｜Praskoveya.But still unwilling to completely abandon the Caucasus front.Obviously, what he wants is to bend the eastern flank of Army Group A towards the Kuma River, so that it can operate on the Malikh Plain, so as to stabilize the situation between the Malikh River and the Don River, and at the same time enable The entire southern flank has unimpeded traffic across the lower Dnieper.Because Hitler pushed his front into the Caucasus and the Volga River in November, creating a protruding balcony (Balcony), so we are now in a disadvantageous dilemma, but until now this balcony has not been cancelled, and It just reduces its size.On the other hand, where to find troops to replace the losses of the Romanian and Italian armies and soon the Hungarian army remains a mysterious mystery.After a considerable time, this fact continued to require the abandonment of the rest of the Caucasus front.

In this second stage of bitter fighting, the Don Army Group faced the following tasks: This army group could not act according to the real situation and completely move its main force to the west flank, so as to eliminate the danger of being cut off. On the contrary, it was facing a growing crisis. Forced to have to fight for time.To the south of the lower Don it had to protect the rear of Army Group A and at the same time try to keep its lines of communication through Rostov unimpeded.With the meager strength of the Fourth Panzer Army, it is really difficult to complete such a double task in order to control such a vast area between the Caucasus and the Don River and to fight against such a powerful enemy force.In the great bend of the Don and in the area ahead of the Donets, the task of Holliday's army is to prevent the enemy's advance north of the lower Don so that it cannot quickly attack Rostov from the east, Cut off the Fourth Army and the A Army Group.In addition, it had to prevent the enemy from reaching the line of Volkhstad, Kamensk, and Froshirovgrad, in order to prevent him from crossing the Donets and threatening Rostov from the north.Finally, this army group had to try to keep the line of communication in the west unimpeded to the lower Dnieper, either with its own resources or with the meager reserves that Army Headquarters could send us.

Faced with all these tasks, all our troops have been exhausted for a long time, and the enemy forces we face are several times stronger than ours. These tasks are difficult, but the greater danger is that Army Group A cannot withdraw quickly from the Caucasus.This is another example sufficient to prove that a rigid order will inevitably degenerate mechanized combat into a static war.For the mere sake of economizing troops, immovable arms would often be buried in the ground, and provisions and ammunition would be stored in great abundance.In order to make the life of the troops a little more comfortable, a lot of equipment will also be set up. When the reserve team is lacking, it is a particularly important measure.Since horses are unsuitable for keeping in a stationary combat zone, they are often kept in remote rear areas, which in turn has a greater tendency to immobilize the combat unit.The conditions of the roads in Russia in winter, especially in mountainous regions, add to these difficulties.

The result is that both troops and command organizations often lose their ability to respond quickly, which is indispensable in mobile warfare every day.Inertia and rigidity prevailed, because this change was bound to cause a great deal of inconvenience and danger.The accumulation of arms, equipment, and supplies further hampered the movement of the troops and prevented them from moving.Because they are afraid that once they move, they will not have the energy to fight a new battle.The result is that whenever the relevant command and staff organizations are faced with the necessity of a large-scale retreat, they will inevitably ask for a rather long period of time in order to prepare for the retreat.They even simply refuse to retreat, because they feel that these equipment and supplies cannot leave.It is worth recalling that when the German offensive came to a halt in 1918, even the famous commander, General Ludendorff, never thought of making a heroic retreat in order to start a mobile war. The last hope of German victory.When making the final judgment, he still felt that many supplies that were already on the German front and in the rear area could not be discarded casually, or felt that the territory bought at a heavy sacrifice should not be given up.

The same is true of Army Group A.After talking to the chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army, it turned out that the unit had to be in motion after January 2, but when we helped with the fuel, it finally moved on New Year's Day.Even at this time, Army Group A announced a few days later that the First Panzer Army would withdraw to the Kuma River line in sections, so that equipment and wounded could be withdrawn from the Caucasus Mountains.In order to achieve this, it also said that the army needed 155 trains, 20 per division, and it would take another 25 days to get them all together.Although since the end of November, at least it can be seen that the rear of Army Group A will feel threatened sooner or later, but it is obvious that they have never been prepared for a retreat.One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly that Hitler had prohibited such preparations, and if he had not prohibited them in advance, he would have ordered them when he knew they were being prepared.But I feel that another equally important reason is that in recent months, Army Group A has lacked a responsible commander.

The Army Headquarters once considered giving me the unified command of Army Group A, and now the commander-in-chief of the Army Group has been promoted by General Kleist.To sum up, it is more or less inappropriate to place an army group or an army under the command of a headquarters at the same level.However, in the present urgent situation, this method may have its advantages, of course, the only condition is that it is no longer hindered by others.Any intervention by Hitler, and any deliberate decision by Army Group A which, because of his influence, was taken against me, can be canceled by this measure.However, Hitler was unwilling to accept my conditions, so Army Group A continued to maintain its independent status.All Army Group Don could do was to hasten the retreat of Army Group A so that it could draw its own forces, which might be of decisive importance south of the Don and on Army Group Don's western flank. of.All hopes were pinned on the shortest period of this second phase so that the southern flank of the German army could finally be stabilized.In order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to smash the enemy's attempt to turn the wing from the west.Later facts also proved that the time limit for withdrawing from the Caucasus could be considerably shortened.

The above-mentioned obstacles were caused partly by the inevitable consequences of static warfare and the difficulties inevitably encountered in mountainous battlefields, and partly by the reluctance of the Supreme Command to give up anything of its own accord.As a result, Army Group Don continued to fight bitterly in the Don region. From the end of December to the beginning of February, if we take into account the ongoing crisis on the part of Army Group B, we can see that this fact has caused the entire southern flank to suffer. The danger of being cut off is even greater. Old Moltke once said: Strategy is a set of emergency measures (Strategy is a system of Stop｜gaps).The battle now being waged by the two armies to which Army Group Don belongs is arguably the best example of this definition.Despite a series of crises, we have finally succeeded in accomplishing the above-mentioned tasks. The main reason is that the command and staff members of our armies and army groups can firmly abide by the two basic German leadership in principle:

1. The direction of operations must always be flexible and tactful. 2. Make commanders at all levels try to maintain the initiative and self-sufficiency. Obviously, both of these principles were diametrically opposed to Hitler's ideas.Regarding the first point, it can be clearly demonstrated in the battles fought by our two armies; as for the second point, I would like to briefly analyze it here. This has always been a characteristic of the leadership of the German army, and it has always allowed the subordinate commanders great freedom to give tasks to them only, and leave the method of execution to everyone's own discretion.This principle has been the peculiar tradition of Germanic military leadership from ancient times, making it different from any other country's army, at least until the time of old Moltke.In terms of tactical planning, old Moltke was unwilling to give such a large permission to subordinate commanders. He always liked to use lengthy and detailed instructions in order to make the execution of orders and tactical actions conform to a specific model.From the Germanic tradition, this should be regarded as a bad way.Admittedly, for mediocre commanders, this approach also has its advantages, that is, it can reduce the risk of failure.However, it is very easy to make the executor take rigid actions without considering the local situation.Worst of all, the preoccupation with safety deprives subordinate commanders of the opportunity to take independent and decisive action to expand some favorable situation at a decisive moment.The root of the old German method is to discover in the national character of the Germans that most people think that the Germans are blindly obedient. That is nonsense, and the Germans really have a stubborn personality.In addition, the traditional spirit of the Germans is to take adventure as the ultimate pleasure, and it is also related to this.Of course, if this independence is given to subordinate commanders, it must first be assumed that all military cadres equally recognize some basic tactical or operational principle.I think only the schools of the German General Staff could produce such a unified point of view.Nevertheless, there are many situations in which a senior commander in the field is faced with the question of whether to intervene in the operations of an army or other unit under his command.The more complicated the situation and the smaller the force he can use, the more he will be tempted to interfere in the affairs of his subordinates.

As far as my own Army Group Headquarters is concerned, I can say that I do not interfere with the operations of the armies unless there is a real and urgent need for it.Especially when the combat intention of the army group involves some kind of responsibility, it would be very unreasonable for the relevant army headquarters to shoulder this responsibility.On the contrary, we must intervene only by formal order, never by an unrecorded implicit method, which is enough to kill a group's initiative and avoid responsibility. Hitler knew very little about this ancient German principle of leadership, and he often used his instructions to interfere with the operations of his subordinates, as we have already seen.That is why we are overwhelmed by these orders when they relate to the actions of our neighboring army groups and those of the Army Headquarters Reserve.However, in most cases, when he ordered to stick to a particular front until the last soldier fired, the result was that the force of the environment always prevailed and forced him to admit the reality. Another point was discussed above, which was even more difficult to overcome: Hitler was always hesitant to decide on urgent needs and just wanted to buy time.Of course, in any case, we can't force him to give a certain order.Our only recourse in such a case was to report that if, on a certain day or a certain hour, Army Headquarters had no instructions, we were left to act according to our own judgment. In exact contrast to the above situation, I believe that no army group under our command, either in this campaign or in any subsequent one, will have any reason to complain that our decisions were too slow.When he still made any request or suggestion to my General Headquarters, they always got an almost immediate reply.It is only in the most difficult cases that Army Group Headquarters will occasionally delay a decision for a very limited period of a few hours at most, or as late as the next morning. For all but Stalingrad, despite Hitler's obstinacy and interference, this army group was always able in the end to obtain approval for the actions it demanded.