Chapter 57 Battle of the Fourth Panzer Army on the South Bank of the Lower Don

Fourth Panzer Army had two different tasks to fulfill if it was to keep the rear of Army Group A secure.It had to stop the enemy, now in pursuit, from advancing on the rear of 1st Panzer Army until the latter had turned from the Caucasus and formed a front to the east.At the same time, it must try to prevent the enemy from rushing into the lower reaches of the Don River to attack Rostov, and at the same time cut off the rear communication lines of the Fourth Panzer Army and Army Group A. It was evident that this army was not strong enough to carry on a delay operation against the enemy over the entire vast area between the lower Don and the northern tip of the Caucasus.For since the loss of the Romanian troops, the only remaining strength of this army group is the 57th Panzer Corps near Kotnikov, which has only two armored divisions which have been seriously weakened ( 17th and 23rd).The Fifteenth Air Force Field Division had not yet completed its combat readiness.The 16th Motorized Division remaining in Irista has not yet been able to hand over its defense to the forces of Army Group A.

Army Group Don made every effort to get reinforcements to the army as soon as possible, but the result was in vain.The proposal to transfer the Third Panzer Army from Army Group A has long been rejected by the Army Headquarters, and the Seventh Panzer Division was originally intended to be used by the Don Army Group to reinforce the Fourth Panzer Army, and now it is being detained by Hitler again. , because the Italian Army has collapsed, he will use this division to cover the north of the Rostov ferry.In essence, this concept is not bad, but the infantry divisions we require from the side of Army Group A (such as the 19th Army) can also undertake this task.But in spite of this, Hitler still refused to allocate that division to our use, because he was afraid that when this division left the Roverossiysk area, it would be enough to disintegrate the Romanian troops.

While the First Panzer Army was turning back, some of the powerful enemy units following the Fourth Panzer Army took the opportunity to sneak into the rear of the First Panzer Army, causing a serious crisis there.Although the 16th Motorized Division was able to mount a successful attack to prevent the enemy from entering the backside of the Marikh River, this delayed the division's participation in the operations of the 4th Panzer Army until mid-January. Together. Army Group Don took steps to reinforce 4th Panzer Army in its own area, but this too was destroyed by the enemy.We had thought of drawing the 11th Armored Division from the great bend of the Don to reinforce the Army Group.When the division was about to cross the lower reaches of the Don River, the enemy had already crossed the river in two separate places, and from the south and southeast they rushed into the rear of the Mis group, which was still facing the north and guarding the lower reaches of the Zill River. .In order to meet this attack, and to allow the Mis group to turn around, take a position behind the Kagalnik River, and turn the front to the east, the 11th Armored Division must be used in the area north of the Don River. , so the Fourth Panzer Army could no longer get the help of the division.

Therefore, in the end, there is only one Viking SS division that can be used to reinforce the 57th Panzer Army, which was sent by Army Group A, and the 16th Motorized Division. to participate in combat. By this time, the Fourth Panzer Army was under strong pressure from the Russian army.There are two Russian armies advancing through Kotelnikov, the 2nd Guards Army and the 51st Army. They have a total of one tank army, three mechanized armies, three infantry armies and one cavalry army.Soon after, a third army group (the 28th) attacked further south from the Kamik steppe.We can safely assume.The purpose of this army group is not only to contain the Fourth Panzer Army from the front, but also to turn around from the north and the south in order to completely encircle it.

Facing such an overwhelming enemy force and covering such a vast area, Hitler was absolutely mistaken if he thought that he could order us to hold a certain front, or that he had to obtain his approval before any retreat could be made.As an obstacle, in the current situation of the Fourth Panzer Army, the effectiveness of a strong defense line is really no better than a spider's web.Nevertheless, he repeatedly used orders of this type in an attempt to restrict our freedom of operations and resolutely refused to give reinforcements to the Fourth Panzer Army.So on January 5, I felt it necessary to ask for my resignation, and I sent the following telegram to the Chief of the General Staff:

If these suggestions are still not adopted, and this headquarters is still restrained in every situation as in the past, then I think that there is really no need for me to hang on to the post.In these circumstances it would be best to replace me with a Quartermaster. [Note: The Quartermaster (Sub｜directorate) in the headquarters of the Army Group handles its affairs directly under the orders of the Quartermaster｜General. 】 Judging from the facts available, the aim of the Fourth Panzer Army was not to provide undue resistance along an overstretched front, but to concentrate its forces.Only in this way can it make a strong resistance on the key points, or find a good opportunity to deal a surprise blow to the enemy.It is evident, therefore, that it often withdraws completely from some areas, while giving only the thinnest cover to others.

Admiral Howth, assisted by his enviable Chief of Staff, Gen. Fangohr, accomplished this difficult task with cool determination and brisk leadership.He deftly hampered the enemy's progress, but never held any point for too long, lest he risk exposing himself.In addition, he quickly concentrated his forces on the two wings and repeatedly defeated the enemy's detour attempts. Although the headquarters of an army group cannot provide the army with sufficient strength to carry out its difficult tasks, we can at least alleviate its responsibility by issuing special orders for its most difficult and delicate problems.As I have already said, the Fourth Panzer Army actually has two tasks at the same time.It wanted to prevent the three Russian armies following from attacking the rear of the 1st Panzer Army, which had to turn around from the Caucasus and face the east before it could defend itself.At the same time it was to prevent any attempt by the enemy to approach Rostov along the lower Don.Had the Russians achieved this goal, all three of our armies fighting south of the lower Don would have been cut off.

The capabilities of the Fourth Panzer Army could at most solve only one of these two tasks.Which of them should be given priority is a decision only the army group headquarters can make.It is true that the threat to Rostov is a greater danger from a long-term point of view, but if the 1st Panzer Army happens to be surrounded by the enemy just as it is turning around to enter a new position, then hold Rostov Tove would also become meaningless, and the three armies south of the Don would be doomed to die together.On the contrary, if the retreat of the First Panzer Army can be successfully completed, then we can also have troops to save Rostov from the crisis.

The enemy is trying to expand both opportunities simultaneously.As mentioned above, the strength of the 16th Motorized Division was just able to catch up as scheduled, preventing the Russian army from attacking the rear of the 1st Panzer Army.However, based on the same combat objective, the enemy once again attempted to detour the 4th Panzer Army from the south and put himself in a position between the 4th Panzer Army and the 1st Panzer Army.At the same time the enemy attempted to advance through Constantinrovkaya along the lower reaches of the Don to Rostov.On January 7, after the Cossacks defending the river had fled, a small enemy force crossed the north bank of the Don at a point only twelve miles from the headquarters of Army Group at Novozirskaya. .In order to deal with this sudden intruder, we had to drag a few tanks from the repair factory to use.Later this tank corps (of which that small force was a part) turned to Proletarskaya and threatened the rear of the 4th Panzer Army, which means that, at least for the next few days, Rostov will be free from threats.And the Fourth Panzer Army managed to cope with this threat on its northern flank.

By January 14, 1st Panzer Army had finally barely completed its retreat, and its left flank now established a front that stretched from Cherkask to Petrovskoye.This means that now there is at least the possibility of operational cooperation between the First and Fourth Armored Armies, although there is still a wide gap between Pitovsky and Proritaskaya. gap, but part of it is covered by the muddy plains of the Marek River.Thus the first part of Fourth Panzer Army's mission, even if the rear of Army Group A was not threatened in the area south of the Don, was completed.So that left the second part of the task, to keep the army group's line of communication through Rostov from being cut off.

Facing the enemy's strength several times superior, and after the First Panzer Army reached its intended front line, it was almost impossible to take action in order to prepare for a further retreat in the rear area, so the First Panzer Army was ordered to The second part of the task is more difficult to complete.In fact, the task of the Fourth Panzer Army was almost impossible to complete, and its chance of success or failure could be said to be short-lived, because until this time, Hitler was still not determined to abandon the entire Caucasus.The question of whether the First Panzer Army should withdraw to the north bank of the Don, or whether the entirety of Army Group A should remain on the Kuban, remained unresolved.