Chapter 60 battles in the second half of january
By January 14, 1st Panzer Army had reached the Tirkassk-Pitovsk line and established a front facing the east.However, another new crisis is brewing in the area of the He Lide Army Group.
On that day, an enemy tank corps on the right flank of Army Group B, in the area of Frit-Piko, south of Mirirov, achieved the goal of a successful breakthrough to the Donets River.Although Army Headquarters gave this group a new infantry division (the 302nd Division), it was still impossible to stabilize the situation on the river with this strength alone.
When, on January 16, the Army Headquarters handed over the Ferit-Pike Group to the command of the Don Army Group Headquarters (and at the same time extended the front of the latter to the Ider River), could the group be withdrawn to Donets? The back of the river is not even sure.The enemy is planning to throw three or four mechanized corps into the Donets River on both sides of Kamensk and Shakhtinsky in Ferit Pico's own area.
Fortunately, a few days ago, Holliday's army had achieved an excellent success. Its two armored divisions had made a surprise attack on the Kalitva River (Kalitva), which prevented one of the enemy's attacks from It is swept away during the preparation phase.
Therefore, we ordered this group army to carry out the plan of withdrawing into the Donets River position in this way, so that one of its armored divisions could participate in the mobile defense in the Volkhstad-Kamensk area as early as possible. The defense of the newly taken over Kamensk-Voroshilovgrad area has no other forces to use except the scattered Italian troops.In other words, the front of Army Group Don was soon in danger of being turned from the west.
At the same time, it was clear that the enemy had another intention to encircle Holliday's Army from the east. At the point where Donets A meets the Don River, there was a hole between the right wing of the Army and the Fourth Panzer Army.The latter still needs to cover the northern flank of the 1st Panzer Army against the enemy who still has an advantage in front of the Marikh River Salsk. The enemy numbers of the two armies were found.Their attempt may have been to cross the Don River to Rostov, or to break into the rear of Holliday's Donets position.
Army Group Don then suggested that Fourth Panzer Army should now be allowed to move to its right flank, while temporarily leaving only one division in front of Rostov, keeping the crossing open for First Panzer Army.This naturally required the Army Headquarters to order the withdrawal of Army Group A, the withdrawal of the First Panzer Army to Rostov, and the withdrawal of the Seventeenth Army into the Kuban Peninsula.
It was again impossible for Hitler to make a quick decision.He also disagreed with the suggestion of the Don Army Group headquarters to concentrate all the armored divisions of Army Group A in the area of the Fourth Panzer Army for a short-range attack. This will not only facilitate the retreat of the First Panzer Army, but also It would also enable the rapid mobilization of the Fourth Panzer Army.
It was not until January 18 that Army Headquarters finally granted Fourth Panzer Army some freedom of movement from covering the northern flank of First Panzer Army on the Marek River northeast of Sarsk.On the contrary, Army Group Don still needs to protect the Rostov-Tikhorets railway line used by Army Group A until the 88th supply train passes safely and supplies are sent to the depot. Until the bridgehead position.The First Panzer Army is now preparing to withdraw to Rostov, or to withdraw into the Siban Peninsula, or an object of everyone's suspicion.
The German authorities spent a lot of time deciding whether to leapfrog their troops to the west within the southern flank, and the result would of course only benefit the enemy.It allowed the enemy to expand the results of the battle as much as possible after the Chinese, Italian and Hungarian troops collapsed on the front of Army Group B, and concentrate a strong force to prepare to cross the middle section of the Donets River and advance to the coast of the Sea of Azov or the crossing of the Dnieper River.At that time, we had no power at all to resist such a big offensive.At the same time, the enemy also had the opportunity to concentrate its forces on a direct assault on Rostov and through Voroshilov to encircle the western flank of Holliday's army.
On January 20, the enemy concentrated four corps in the area of the Fourth Panzer Army, crossed the lower reaches of the Marikh River, and launched an attack on Rostov.Their tanks reached the Rostov airfield.Although the 4th Panzer Army transferred the 16th Panzer Division to this northern flank and made repeated assaults on the enemy's southern flank in order to delay the enemy's progress between the Don and the Marek, it is natural that this force, it is impossible to stop the advance of all four armies.
At this time, the Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps of the group army was gradually retreating from the middle of the Malikh River to Rostov, so the enemy also attacked him at the same time. The main force of the Fourth Panzer Army, while on the other hand went to capture the Rostov Ferry behind it first.
In addition, the enemy also launched a fierce attack on the front of the He Lide Group Army.Here, too, the enemy's object is clearly to crucify our forces so that they can take Rostov and carry out a enveloping movement across the middle of the Donets.At the angle between the Don and the Donets, and on both sides of Kamensk, the enemy launched the above-mentioned attack on the battle group of General Mies, also in order to prevent any troops from coming from this point. The side pulled out to counter the attack on the middle section of the Donets.
The headquarters of the army group is still facing the same old problem. Which threat should be dealt with first?The two armored divisions (7th and 11th) in the area of Army Group Holliday had been transferred to the western flank of the middle section of the Donets.But whatever the danger there may be from a long-term point of view, Army Group Headquarters now sees relief from the Rostov threat as a more urgent problem.We must do everything possible to enable not only the Fourth Panzer Army, but at least the entirety of the First Panzer Army to pass through the city and retreat to the rear.Otherwise we would not be able to concentrate enough forces on the western flank of our army group, and save the entire southern flank from being surrounded and wiped out on the coast.
For this reason, Army Group Don decided that, in order to prevent the enemy from capturing Rostov, the above-mentioned two armored divisions should first be used to deliver a sharp blow to the enemy advancing across the lower reaches of Marikh towards the city.However, due to the lack of fuel (all supply trains were passing through Rostov at the time, heading for the Kuban bridgehead), and because of the bad weather and the inability to obtain the necessary air support, the effectiveness of this counterattack It is very slow but cannot be displayed, but time is already impatient.As the Sixth Army's resistance is now drawing to a close, within two to three weeks we shall see a large influx of enemy troops.On January 22, I had already told General Zeisler that I believed they would attack the Starobiersk area, that is, the wide gap between Army Group Don and Army Group B .
On the same day, Hitler finally decided that at least part of the troops in the First Panzer Army should not enter the Kuban bridgehead position, but instead retreat through Rostov, that is, enter the area that is scheduled to be the decisive battlefield in the future.Although from our point of view, this is only a compromise solution, but as far as the army group's own combat concept is concerned, it is always welcome.
But the most important thing is that this retreat must be carried out at the highest speed, so that the Fourth Panzer Army can also move to the west flank as quickly as possible.Whether the First Panzer Army could retreat quickly through Rostov depended entirely on whether the rest of Army Group A could adapt to the speed of movement.But it's clear, even now.That army group was still unable to increase its speed to the standard required by the situation.I cannot really find a satisfactory explanation for this.But later, when the 1st Panzer Army was put under my command, it was expressed to me that, had they not been repeatedly stopped by orders from higher authorities, they could have actually moved faster from the start. Both Army Group A and the Army Headquarters refused to admit this statement.But no matter how it is explained, the facts remain the same. Army Group A was so distracted by its left-wing movement on 23 January.It is also in the vicinity of Belaya Grilla, about thirty miles east of Tikhoritus and does not reach Tikhoritus until February 1st!
On January 23, Army Group Don took over another legacy, this time the southern sector of the front of Army Group B sandwiched between Donets and Starobirsk.Again, as usual, liabilities are more than inheritances.They included forty miles of additional frontage, and at least three corps of enemy forces were advancing in this area—one armored, the rest mechanized.The capital we have obtained, because the Italian troops can no longer be included in the calculation, so the only one is the 19th Armored Division, which is currently located near Starobirsk.But even the day after the takeover, the division was forced to surrender Starobiersk to the enemy.Under the excellent leadership of Lieutenant General Postel (Lt｜Gen‧Postel), this division was finally able to break through and retreat westward. For this heroic division, it should be regarded as an excellent achievement. Southward rotation across the Donets, that was not something it could have stopped.
Only on January 24 did Hitler decide that the entire First Panzer Army should henceforth retreat through Rostov, if possible.Since its southern flank was still at Armavir, this naturally meant that Fourth Panzer Army would remain on the south bank of the Don so that the Rostov crossing would not be cut off.Therefore, it seems quite doubtful whether this group army will still be able to reach the west flank of the group army group in time to exert its effectiveness.
Even so, two things are worth noting.
Army Group A was very reluctant to see one of its armies cross the Don River and escape its jurisdiction. This feeling is understandable, but it was finally able to recognize its own destiny and decided to join forces in the Don River. Netz River, and not in the Kuban Peninsula.In addition, the facts have gradually shown that it is impossible for any strong troops remaining in the Kuban Peninsula to cross the Kerch Strait to supply supplies.Therefore, Army Group A has now advocated that most of its forces should be retreated through Rostov as much as possible.
The second fact is that on January 25 the attack of the two aforementioned armored divisions on the enemy advancing across the lower Marek was already in effect.So at least for the time being, the threat at the Rostov Ferry can be temporarily lifted.
However, the situation on the southern flank of the Fourth Panzer Army took another sharp turn.The enemy had mobilized a fresh force, which seemed to be drawn from the Russian Army which was chasing Army Group A, and attempted to penetrate between the northern flanks of Fourth Panzer Army and First Panzer Army in order to encircle the former from the south and press the latter. Stay away from Rostov.Army Group Don immediately made a final request to Army Group A, asking it to use an armored division to participate in this battle and to speed up the retreat of the First Panzer Army to Rostov as much as possible.Finally, on January 27, at least the northern half of the 1st Panzer Army was placed under the command of Army Group Don, with the result that we ourselves already had the means for taking the above-mentioned measures.At the same time, because the Fourth Panzer Army still needs to keep the Rostov crossing unimpeded, the headquarters of the Don Army Group decided to first move the headquarters of the First Panzer Army, which will soon be withdrawn from the area south of the Don. , moved to the middle reaches of the Donets River.Then there are the divisions now retreating from Rostov, and the forces that can be drawn from the Fourth Panzer Army.
By January 31, there was no doubt that the First Panzer Army would be able to retreat through Rostov, but whether it could reach the Donets River at the right time to prevent crossing the river and go straight to the coast is questionable. Yet another question.Unfortunately, even now, the entire strength of the army has not been able to reach the decisive battlefield.Due to Hitler's constant hesitation, whether the group army should retreat to Rostov or to the Kuban Peninsula has not been decided. At that time, he failed to join the operation to Rostov, and was transferred to the Seventeenth Army.In addition, after some hesitation, Hitler finally reassigned the Thirteenth Panzer Division to Army Group A for use in the Kuban Peninsula.We managed to keep a gap until the final stage in order to allow the division to retreat into Rostov.These two divisions failed to join the main battlefield, and more than 400,000 people were actually paralyzed in the Kuban Peninsula.Evidently, the latter was sufficient to hold back a formidable enemy force, who had tried in vain to attack the bridgehead.But they never achieved the combat effect that Hitler hoped for, and in the end the enemy was free to decide the number of troops it should keep there. For the Flossisk seaport, this theory cannot be established either.In the end he was forced to abandon the peninsula.
On January 29, our headquarters were moved from Taganrog to Donetsk (Stalino). (We moved to Taganrog on the 12th), because the focus of the army group's operations has been moved from the Don River to the Donets River.In the battles in the Great Bay of the Don and the area south of it, the main purpose was to cover the withdrawal of Army Group A from the Caucasus, but the bigger question was whether the southern wing of the German army could be preserved.However, a new problem has already emerged, and this problem is whether the southern flank can maintain the Donets region.
This area, located between the Sea of Azov, the mouth of the Don River and the lower and middle reaches of the Donets River, is roughly in the west from Mariupol｜Krasnoarmeiskoye｜Isumen (Mariupol｜Krasnoarmeiskoye｜ Isyum) is bounded by a single line.As far back as 1941, this area was at an important place in Hitler's operational calculations, because he believed that the possession of this area was of great importance to the consequences of the war.On the one hand, he believed that we would not be economically able to support the war without this rich coal deposit.On the other hand, he believed that if the Russians lost this area, it would be a huge blow to their war power.Hitler said that among the coal reserves owned by the Russians (at least in the European part of Russia), the coal in Donets is the only one suitable for coking. If it is missing, the production of tanks and ammunition in Russia will sooner or later be paralyzed.I will not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this theory, but in fact, in the period 1942-1943, although Russia could not use this Donets coal deposit, it still produced thousands of coal deposits. Countless tanks and millions of shells.
The real question is whether we can continue to be the masters of the Donets Basin militarily.From a war economy point of view, it is undoubtedly valuable, and we should keep it.The only limitation, however, is that if we were to exploit the considerable Donets coal deposits for our own use, all the coal needed for the railways in this vast area would have to be brought from Germany, because Donets coal will not fit our locomotives.Because there are several times of trains transporting coal every day, military transportation is also affected proportionally.
In any case, Hitler still believed that there was no Donets Basin.Then Germany's war economy could not be sustained. (A year later he said the same thing about the manganese produced by Nikopol.) But since the frontal collapse of the Hungarian army south of Voronezh, the enemy reached the Donets The way of the river will be clear, and beyond it to the crossing of the Dnieper or the coast of Azov, so our possession of this area will begin to be shaken.
On January 19, I had a telephone conversation with General Zeisler. This was the first time that we discussed the issue of securing the Donets Basin.He had tried unsuccessfully with Hitler the day before, and now wanted my opinion on the matter.It was on this day that the entire front between Voronezh was in danger of rupture.I told Chazler that, however important the area was, and indeed it was from an economic point of view, the question was very simple and easy to answer.If we want to keep this area, we must concentrate a strong force without delay, as far east as possible, and if possible, in front of Kharkov.If for any of the following reasons, such as the fact that the two army groups in the center and the north do not think they can mobilize troops, the recruitment of new troops in the country has not yet been completed, the Army Headquarters is unwilling to mobilize troops from other battlefields, and finally, the present railway situation cannot afford it. Such a sudden movement, etc., if we cannot concentrate the necessary forces, then we will have to accept the inevitable consequences.If the southern flank of the German army remained in the lower Don region, it would be impossible to fill this gap with its own forces.At the same time, if the expected reinforcements take a long time to arrive and spread out in the far rear area, in other words, if they are completely out of touch with the operation of the southern flank, then it is impossible for the southern flank to be isolated there. battle.The battle on the south wing and the deployment of new forces must coordinate with each other in terms of spatial relationship, and must form a whole in the sense of combat.Unless the deployment of new troops can be quite rapid, and quite to the east, otherwise the Don Army Group will not be able to stay in the lower Don River and the Donets River for a long time.So it had to retreat back to join the new force.One of these two routes had to be followed, otherwise the Russians would have had the opportunity to cut off the entire southern flank before any reinforcements could take effect.
In any case, it is clear that the SS Panzer Corps, which was scheduled to concentrate near Kharkov in mid-February, was by no means strong enough to plug the gap between Froshirovgrad and Voronezh. the gap.If the southern flank remained on the lower Don and the Donets, the corps would not be able to make a well-timed attack on the north bank of the Donets in order to cover its flank.
In the next few days, the trend of the situation that occurred on the deep side of the army group is enough to increase the vigilance of the army group headquarters.As early as February 20, we noticed that two enemy corps were moving in the direction of Froshirovgrad, trying to outflank the left flank of the army group, that is, Ferit at Kamensk｜ Pico Group.At the same time, the enemy was probing the way forward against the remnants of Italy remaining behind the banks of the Donets east of Froshirov.In addition, the main body of the enemy's army is obviously moving west first, aiming at Starobirsk, which is of course also in order to gain room for maneuver.However, once the enemy has achieved these goals, it can be assumed that he is not only aiming to surround Ferit-Pike Group, but will continue to detour westward with a strong force, cross the Donets River, and go straight to The crossing of the Dnieper or the coast of the Sea of Azov.Only four days later, on January 24, we had reports of enemy cavalry in the Froshirovgrad area south of the Donets River. However, such alarms can often be false alarms. , issued by those suspicious township chiefs in the rear area.
On January 31, I sent another teletype telegram to Army Headquarters, reiterating my views on the defense of the Donets Basin.I say that the prerequisite for maintaining this area is to make a well-timed move in the direction of Kharkov to relieve the pressure on us, and the enemy in the area northeast of the city must come during the mud season beat it before.If, unfortunately, neither of the above is practically possible, the possibility of the basin being undefended must be withdrawn, at least to the east.In any case, from an operational point of view, any attempt to stay on the lower Don and the Donets is a mistake.
I went on to say that the second factor cannot be ignored either.If the enemy mobilizes more reinforcements from the Caucasus and Stalingrad, which seems inevitable, it will still be difficult to defend the entire Donets region with our existing forces.We cannot hope that the enemy's forces are exhausted (although their losses in attacking the Germans are heavy), or that their operations will automatically come to a halt because of supply difficulties.When General Zeisler, on the basis of accurate information from us, called Hitler's attention to the enormous numerical superiority of the enemy, Hitler always prevaricated him with the above theory.There is no doubt that what Hitler said was not without reason.We should remember, however, that when the enemy attacks the Allies, the cost to him is still low, and he is far more dependent on supply transport than we Germans are when we fight in enemy territory. Low.A few days later, our estimate of the enemy's intentions proved to be correct.It was evident that he seemed to be aiming to smash our Donets front on the one hand and at the same time round us westward.
On February 2 the enemy crossed the Donets east of Froshirovgrad, where the Italian troops failed to put up any serious resistance.The enemy's assault army has three tank armies, one mechanized army, and one infantry army, part of which is the force that defeated the Italian army on the Don River.The target of this army group may be Rostov or Taganrog.
Apart from doing its best to speed up the transfer of the First Panzer Army to the middle reaches of the Donets River within its own sphere of command, the Don Army Group has been in constant contact with the Army Headquarters since the end of January. For the policy of the entire operation, there were repeated disputes.As mentioned above, as early as January 19, I have already emphasized to General Chaisler that unless there is a strong force from the direction of Kharkov to intervene quickly and effectively, the entire Donnie Ci Basin will never be able to hold on.As this hope did not exist, I demanded that we should be allowed to withdraw our eastern flank in order to draw up forces to prevent the entire southern flank from being cut off.
We have already dispatched the 1st Panzer Army to the middle reaches of the Donets to counter the threats that are developing there.What needs to be done now is that the Fourth Panzer Army should also be withdrawn from the lower Don River and the Donets Balcony.Only in this way can the threat of the enemy attempting to enter the Isumon-Slavyansk line to cut off our line of communication with the crossings of the Dnieper River be met.In addition, on the Don River, in addition to the troops already found in Slavyansk, the enemy can mobilize more troops to cross the river to the lower Dnieper River.Except that the 1st Division of the SS Panzer Corps had just arrived in Kharkov at this time, in the area of Army Group B, there were only the remnants of the Italian Army Group, which basically could not make any effective resistance.This force cannot prevent the enemy from making a detour to our deep side.But the front of our army group must be considerably shortened before the Fourth Panzer Army can be drawn.What we are currently defending is a long arc formed by the lower reaches of the Don River and the Donets River, from Rostov to the area west of Voroshilovgrad, so the right wing of our army group must be retracted Arriving at the bowstring, when the German southern wing retreated from Rostov for the first time in 1941, it was the bowstring that was defended. This line is behind the Mius River and continues northward. , until the middle of the Donets River.Retracting the front to this position naturally means giving up the eastern part of the Donets coalfield.
In order to justify this retreat, I tried to state my long-term guiding concept for military operations to the Supreme Command once again.The following is the general content of a report I presented to Hitler personally:
Even from a purely defensive point of view, it is still impossible to hold the Don-Donets eminence for any length of time with the present strength of our army group.If the Supreme Command had decided to take a defensive position in 1943 because of the loss of the Sixth Army and a total of twenty divisions, then in order to protect the entire Donets Basin, all forces would have to be will be exhausted.The enemy, however, still retains complete freedom of movement and can scurry about at other points in the line of defense.The current danger is of course that Army Group Don may be surrounded on the coast of Azov, and Army Group A will be trapped on the Kuban Peninsula.But even if we could avoid this danger, and the entire Donets region could be held, the enemy's ultimate goal would still be to encircle the entire southern flank of the German Eastern Front on the Black Sea.
On the contrary, if the Supreme Command felt that the solution could still be reorganized in 1943, it could only start from the southern flank.However, it is absolutely impossible to use the Don River-Donets as the starting point, because this balcony is now exposed, not only is it difficult to supply, but it will also feel threatened from the side when it starts to attack.The only feasible way to make an offensive solution is to first attract the enemy to attack westward, directly on our southern flank in the lower Dnieper area.Having achieved this goal, we should launch a strong attack from the Kharkov area to cut off the Russian front, and then turn south to surround the enemy on the coast of Azov.
Hitler, however, was clearly unwilling to accept any such notion.Chaisler had already told him that the problem now was either to voluntarily give up the Donets area, or to let it die with the Don Army Group.Hitler responded to what his Chief of Staff had said by saying that, although his Chief of Staff might be right from an operational point of view, for economic reasons the Donets area was still not Being able to give up not only means that we will lose these coal deposits, but when the German army retreats, the enemy can regain these resources, which is very important for their steel production.As a compromise, Hitler had ordered that the first unit of the SS Panzer Corps to reach Kharkov, the SS Reich (SSReich) Division, should move from this area towards our Donets front. Launch an assault in the enemy's rear.
Apart from the fact that this single division was fundamentally inadequate for such a far-reaching operation (it would have routed six divisions at the outset), there was nothing to cover its ever-extending northern flank.At the same time, this division was put into battle, which meant that the SS Panzer Army was divided into use. In the near future, the only strike force that can join us is this army.Moreover, the Imperial Division can no longer be freely mobilized. Army Group B has already used it to deal with the rapid advance of the Russian army to Kharkov.At this time it was engaged in a difficult defensive battle at Volchansk.
During the next two days (February 4-5), the situation of Army Group Don clearly deteriorated, as the enemy put strong pressure on Fourth Panzer Army, which was covering the First Panzer Army through Rostow. Husband's retreat.Originally, the Russian army facing the 4th Panzer Army had three armies, but now two more armies were added, with the designations 44 and 48, both of which were drawn from the front of the Caucasus. It can be proved that the Seventeenth Army under the jurisdiction of Army Group A remaining in the Kuban Peninsula did not pose a threat to the Russian flank as supposed to prevent the enemy from moving its forces to the decisive battlefield.Before long, Army Group Don could expect a large-scale attack on the city of Rostov itself, as well as on the Don defense line on both sides of Novochirkassk.
In addition, it has been discovered that a strong motorized force is moving from Stalingrad to the Don.On the left flank of Army Group, the situation also became increasingly serious.To the east of Voroshirovgrad, in order to comply with the order of the army group on January 14, the Holliday Army has hastily transferred the Sixth Armored Division to the middle reaches of Donets.But it cannot drive the enemy across the river. The most it can do at present is to block the enemy within the bridgehead position it has already obtained.
Further west, the enemy could already cross the Donets with a wide front, where there was practically no defensive force left.The Russians have now reached the outskirts of Slavyansk and have taken Isummon too.
So even now, it seems quite doubtful whether the He Lide Group Army can withdraw to the Meas River position.The intention of the Army Group was to withdraw it to the Novochirkassk-Kamensk line by January 5, but because Hitler refused to allow us to withdraw the front to the Meuse, it was in fact detained at Don and Donets rivers.Had the enemy advanced rapidly to the southeast from Slavyansk, it would have been possible to deprive the Mias line of defense from the start.
Although the headquarters of the First Panzer Army and the troops we assigned to it are already walking on the road from Rostov to the middle section of the Donets River at this time, it still takes a few more days. Only the group army can conduct effective operations there.To make matters worse, the roads along the coast had thawed out, hampering the progress of the armored divisions, but in the northerly areas the ground was still frozen, so that the mobility of the Russians was not affected at all. Influence.
Faced with these ominous developments, Army Group not only renewed its demand for the immediate withdrawal of its right flank to the Meas, but also made a series of special demands to Army Headquarters, all designed to signal the seriousness of the situation.It called for the concentration of the 7th Anti-Aircraft Division (which was supposed to be responsible for air defense in the traffic area) to provide air and ground protection of the supply lines through Dnepropetrovsk.It also calls for immediate preparations for an airlift operation.So that if its rear line of communication is cut off by the enemy, it can be used immediately.It also requires sacrificing all supplies for Army Group B, and increasing rail transportation in this regard as much as possible. In fact, Army Group B has only an empty shelf left.The Army Group also requested that Kupyansk should be reached unless the planned assault of the SS Reich Division was completely successful, that is, before February 6.Otherwise, the SS Panzer Corps should attack Isumen on the south bank of the Donets River immediately after increasing the number of troop trains so that it can be concentrated near Kharkov.Finally, the army group demanded that the combat units of the 13th Armored Division and the two infantry divisions of the 17th Army be transferred immediately to the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where they should be replaced with new weapons and take over the Sixth Army transport and supply columns.
Although Hitler was unwilling to open his eyes and take a look at our longer-term combat concept, the snowflakes of demands seemed to be enough to make him realize the seriousness of the situation anyway.Indeed, as a result of these urgent telegrams a liaison plane landed at our airfield on February 6th to take me to headquarters to meet Hitler in person.The reason why he decided to summon me may be the influence of his chief guard, Shimonde, who visited our headquarters at the end of November. We once reported the current situation and the method of how the highest level should guide the war. A forceful expression was made to him.
The meeting between Hitler and myself on February 6, 1943 finally relieved the great threat to the entire southern flank of the German army and gave the Supreme Command at least one more opportunity for a stalemate on the Eastern Front.
Hitler began his conversation with an unreserved admission of the fact that he himself was entirely responsible for the fate of the Sixth Army, which I have reported in the previous chapter.在那個時候，我所獲得的印象，覺得他對於這一次悲劇是具有很深的感動，因為這不僅表示其自己的領導已經完全失敗了，而且對於那些始終信任他個人，而不惜英勇殉職的軍人們也不無內疚之意。可是以後，我對於希待勒的誠意卻不免開始感到懷疑了，事實上，他並沒有把這些軍人們當作人來看待，上至元帥下至士兵，都不過是他手中的工具而已。
不過就當時而言，希特勒表示對史達林格勒的悲劇願負完全責任的姿態，卻使我很感動，覺得他尚有騎士之風。不管他是故意的還是無意的，在他展開這次會談時，是的確表現出來了相當高明的心理技巧。他常常會這樣故作姿態，以取悅他所接見的來賓。
對於我自己而言，我已經下了決心，只想與他討論兩個問題。
第一個問題為在我們自己地區中的未來作戰指導。主要的條件為必須獲得希特勒的同意，始能放棄頓涅茨盆地的東部。在那一天內必須設法使他表示首肯。
第二個問題我想要提出的就是最高層的指揮問題自從勃勞希契元帥被免職之後，希特勒就一直自兼陸軍總司令。史達林格勒的悲劇即為這種領導方式的後果，所以現在也就使我有充分的理由可以提出這個問題。
現在光說第二個問題，我可以很簡單的說是未能獲得令人滿意的結論。我深知一個像希特勒那樣的獨裁者，是決不可能使他自己辭去最高統帥的職務，於是我嘗試使他接受一種解決方案，既不至於影響他的威望，而又可保證在將來足以獲得滿意的軍事領導。我要求他為了確保這種領導的一致起見，應任命一個真正的總參謀長，他應該完全信任他，並給予他以適當的責任和權威。
但是希特勒卻明顯不願意對於這個問題作無偏見的討論。他提出一些個人性的理由，對於過去的軍政部長勃洛姆堡，以及勃勞希契都不免嘖有煩言，表示他的失望。此外，他又坦白的宣稱著說，他不可能使任何其他的人員位在戈林之上，因為戈林也決不肯接受任何總參謀長的指導，即使後者是以希特勒的名義發佈命令的。希特勒是否真的不願得罪戈林，抑或只是以此為藉口，這我卻無法判斷。於是這樣就使我們回到第一個問題上，那就是頓河集團軍群地區中的作戰前途問題。
我開始把集團軍群的現況講給希特勒聽，並列舉出來由此所獲得的結論。我指出，我們的兵力無論如何都不能夠守住頓河和頓涅茨地區。不管希特勒對於這兩個地區的估價如何高，可是真正的問題卻是假使我們若想緊抓著整個頓涅茨盆地不放手的話，那麼結果就會使頓河集團軍群和A集團軍群都將隨之同歸於盡。反之我們若能在適當的時機中放棄其中的一部份，則也許即可以解除我們現在所面臨著的危機。
在把現有的情況說完了之後，我就努力設法使希特勒認清，假使我們一定要堅守這個頓河｜頓涅茨陽臺，其必然的後果將會是怎樣。現在B集團軍群已幾乎完全喪失了作用，所以敵人可以自由的把強大的兵力，通過該集團軍群的地區迂迴前進，直達第聶伯河下游或海岸，以切斷我方整個的南翼。我又強調說，這個南翼的命運也就足以決定整個東線戰爭的勝負。很明顯，敵人必然會繼續抽調其強大的預備隊（尤其是在史達林格勒附近的兵力），以切斷德軍的南翼，而使其目標終於能夠達到。因為這個原因，黨衛軍裝甲軍的任何反擊也決不足以攔截敵人所作的大迂迴運動。敵人有足夠的力量，一方面執行這個大包圍作戰，而另一方面同時在哈爾科夫附近還能掩護其西側面。即使德軍集中可能動用的一切援兵，也還是不足以阻止敵人的攻擊。所以必須要使用第一裝甲集團軍（現在正向頓涅茨中游地區運動）和第四裝甲集團軍，以對抗這個正在頓涅茨河與第聶伯河之間發展的威脅。用兩個集團軍的兵力，再加上即將來臨的增援，才可以穩住德軍東線南翼的情況即從亞速海起到中央集團軍群的右翼為止。除非把第四裝甲集團軍從頓河下游地區中抽回，否則即無此可能性。不過這個集團軍若是抽回，則也就無異於是要說應該放棄頓河｜頓涅茨河突出地，而撤回到沿著其基線的米斯河陣地中。現在是一天的時間都不能損失了。的確，由於決定的延遲，目前這個正在從海岸線起到頓涅茨中游負責防守全部正面的何立德集團軍，能否如期撤回到米斯河一線似乎都已經頗有疑問了。所以我必須在這一天要求希特勒立即批准放棄頓涅茨地區的東部，直到米斯阿一線為止。
當我陳述意見時，希特勒很冷靜的傾聽著，接著為了頓涅茨盆地的問題，而爭辯了幾個小時之久。甚至於在我們談話的第二部份中，當我和他私自談到整個的領導問題時，希特勒又還再度的提到這一點。
在相似的場合中我都有這種同樣的經驗，希特勒對於我在作戰問題上所發表的意見，總是避免作任何真正的討論。他甚至於也不嘗試提出一個他自己認為是更好的計畫，或是反駁我用來當作辯論基礎的假定。同時他也不否認情況是會像我所預測的那樣發展。但是他卻認為凡一切與目前最迫切需要無直接關係的話，都是一種假設，那都是可真可假的。事實上，所有一切作戰性的考慮，都必然是以假定為基礎的，尤其是我們已經把主動權輸給敵人了，所以更是隨時要設想敵人所可能採取的行動路線。因為沒有一個人能夠事先證明情況將會如何發展，所以唯一成功的軍事指揮官也就是能在思想上領先的人。他應該能夠透過永遠存在著的霧幕，看清敵人的未來行動方向，至少對於敵我雙方所具有的可能性，應能作正確的判斷。一個人所指揮的範圍愈大，則他的思想也就應該前進得愈遠。所要經過的距離愈長，則決定生效的時間也就愈慢。希特勒對於這種遠端的思想很不對胃口，至少在作戰領域中是如此的。很可能，他不願意看到前途的發展不如他的理想。因為這是不能反駁的，所以他儘量避免談論它們。
所以這一次也是一樣的，他儘量從其他方面去搜集其辯論的理由。他開始表示除非已經確實證明出絕無其他的辦法可想（他還是認為有辦法的），否則決不應自動放棄辛辛苦苦贏來的土地。這個觀點當然是每個軍人都能尊重的。我當然更願意提出一個成功的攻勢計畫，而不要求這種無可奈何的撤退。但是戰爭中卻又有一條著名的公理，凡是想要守住一切的人，往往最後將會喪失一切。
希特勒還有一個慣用的理論，那就是說當我方為了想集中兵力而縮短正面時，則敵人也同樣可以多出了相當比例的兵力，他若是把他們投擲在決定點上，則仍然還足以左右戰局。專就這個理論的本身而言，未嘗不是言之成理的。不過在任何這一類的兵力轉移中，真正的決定因素卻是要看雙方中誰能夠領先換言之，假使某一方面若能有機會作適合時機的行動，在決定點上抓著了主動權，則往往可以迫使行動較慢的敵人處於被動的地位，儘管後者的總兵力還是較強的。而且若是企圖守住頓河｜頓涅茨河突出地，則那樣綿長的戰線事實上將足以抵消防禦對攻擊所慣於享有兵力優勢。在這種情形之下，敵軍可以有機會在這延展過長的正面任意選擇一點來實行透入，他只要用相當小的兵力，而也不會遭受到巨大的損失。因為守軍缺乏預備隊，所以他可以折毀這整個的防禦體系。
希特勒同時也認為假使我們能夠寸土必爭的苦戰下去，則足以使敵軍每進一步都必須付出極高的代價，那麼即使是俄國陸軍實力雄厚，但其攻勢能力也總會有一天將要衰竭的。敵人現在已經一連攻擊了兩個半月而不曾中斷過，他的損失已經很高。不久就要成為強弩之末了。此外，當敵軍距離其出發陣地愈遠時，他的補給困難也愈大，這樣也就足以阻止其所可能計畫的任何大迂迴運動。
誠然，希特勒所說的一切都是不無理由的。毫無疑問，敵人已經受到了巨大的損失，至少，當他們攻擊德軍所防守的地區時，其攻勢力量的確已經犧牲了不少。不過在那些不曾遭遇到德國部隊頑強抵抗的地區中，他們的成功卻很輕鬆。同時，俄國部隊的重大損失尤其以步兵為最重也的確已使其素質大形減低，否則我們也就難於以寡敵眾了。不過不管敵人的損失是如何慘重，可是它的補充卻是源源不斷的。至於說到俄軍的補給困難問題，當然，他們若愈前進則困難也就愈大。不過在這個摩托化運輸工具的時代中，從俄軍的鐵路到亞速海或第聶伯河下游之間的距離，卻還不足以阻止俄軍包圍德軍南翼的行動。
在第一次大戰時，通常一個集團軍的作戰距離其鐵路終點不能超過九十五英里以上。這個數字在第二次大戰中已經不適用了，我們在東西兩線上的作戰都足以當作證明。此外，俄國人也是趕修鐵路的能手，而且在那種大平原上也不會有什麼困難的工程問題。無論如何，假使我們把一切的計畫都寄託在一種空洞的幻想上，希望敵人不久在兵力與機動兩方面會達到其極限，那才是大錯而特錯。而且我們自己的部隊也更是疲兵久戰，距離衰竭的程度也不太遠了。在這一方面，我應該強調說明，希特勒對於我們自己部隊的條件和損失，是具有充分認識的。不過他所不願意承認的，是那些新編的師因為缺乏戰鬥經驗之故，在最初上戰場時都曾經受到了太高的不必要損失。另一方面，他卻也同意承認空軍野戰師的試驗是完全失敗了，甚至於他更承認這完全是為顧及戈林的面子而成立的。
在有關作戰問題方面，希特勒實際上所說的就只有一點。他相信黨衛軍裝甲軍若能從哈爾科夫地區，向依蘇門的方向作一個東南向的突擊，則即足以解除俄軍對於頓涅茨中段地區的重大威脅。不過他的唯一保留之點，就是說在該軍第二個師尚未達到之前，這個帝國師應先用來對付在弗爾強斯克的敵人（第三個師還要更遲才能到達）。他對於這新成立的黨衛軍裝甲師所具有的突破能力顯然具有無比的信心。否則，這就足以表示他對於比較遠的威脅，尤其是當敵人在史達林格勒的部隊在一個新戰場上出現之後的可能發展，是毫無了解。
但是希特勒所反覆辯論的一點，還是他認為在目前不可能放棄頓涅茨地區。首先，他害怕這會影響到土耳其的態度。更主要的，他一再強調頓涅茨的煤對於敵我雙方戰爭經濟上的重要性。他說，俄國人只有重新獲得了這些煤，然後才能維持其鋼鐵生產，並使坦克、火炮和彈藥的產量不至於減少。當我提醒他說，目前俄國人雖然沒有頓涅茨的煤，但他們卻仍然能生產大量的坦克和彈藥，希特勒卻答覆說他們是僅僅靠儲存的鋼鐵才能活命的。他堅持說，假使他們若不能收回頓涅茨的煤田，則就不可能維持其原有的產量，於是也就足以阻止他們發動任何巨大攻勢了。敵人喪失了頓涅茨盆地中的焦煤、鋼鐵，以及其他的工業，當然在生產上會發生相當的困難，這是誰都不會否認的。照我個人看來。俄國人對於在一九四一年所損失的大量炮兵，到現在都還沒有完全恢復，即可以作一個明證。因為這個緣故，我們才可以勉強守住齊爾河的臨時防線。在這個冬天裡，敵人在有限的地區中曾經集中強大的炮兵，以使其獲得壓倒的優勢例如在頓河的三次連續突破但是很明顯，卻還不能使其所有各師都裝備完全機動性的炮兵。這個對於頓涅茨地區經濟重要性的討論，又足以使希特勒有機會表現出對生產數字和兵器威力所具有的驚人知識。
在這種是否應該據守頓涅茨盆地的辯論中，我最後手中就只留下了一張王牌了。在我尚未與希特勒會晤之前，德國煤業加迭爾的總經理，普萊格爾（Paul Pleiger），曾經來訪問我的總部。當我問他頓涅茨地區對於德俄雙方戰爭經濟的真正重要性究竟是怎樣時，他卻向我保證著說，在沙赫蒂（Shakhty）附近的礦區即在米斯阿以東的那一部份盆地是並無重要性的，因為那裡的煤不適宜於煉焦和供火車頭使用。這也就使希特勒無法從經濟戰的立場上來表示反對！
但是任何人若假定他現在就會承認他的失敗，那麼對於這個人的牛勁，實在是未免估計過低了。作為至少是可以當延遲撤退的理由，他最後又想到了天氣因素。好像是要交好運一樣，在過去幾天之中，天氣突然提早解凍了。越過塔甘羅格灣的冰上路線再使用是已經不太安全了，雖然頓河和頓涅茨河還是凍結著的，但是天氣若繼續轉暖，則不久也就會有解凍的可能性。
希特勒現在就用其雄辯滔滔的口才力勸我再等幾天，因為寬廣的頓河將會構成一個不可以越過的障礙物，而使敵人在夏季來臨以前都無法繼續進攻。相反的，假使我們的第四裝甲集團軍要想向西移動，則又可能會陷在泥濘之中。所以他認為在這種環境之中我至少還是應該等幾天再看。
當我仍不肯屈服，把整個集團軍群的命運寄託在天氣突變的希望上，於是希特勒才終於勉強同意把集團軍群的東部正面撤到米斯河。假使把有關指揮權問題的討論都包括在內計算，則我們已經一共談話達整整四個小時之久。
下述的一件小事也更可以證明希特勒是如何像牛皮糖一樣。當他已經終於批准了我的作戰意圖之後，我就起身告辭退出時，他又把我喊回去向我說，他對於已經批准的事情，當然不便反悔，不過他卻仍勸我是否能再考慮｜下，稍微等候一個短的時間。假使頓河地區解凍了，那就甚至於還能使我們在這個頓河｜頓涅茨突出地區中再停留下去。不過我卻仍然堅持不變。我所允許向他讓步的就是假使當天夜間的情況報告還不要求立即採取行動時，則我可以等到明天中午回到我的總部之後再下達撤退命令。
我為什麼對於我這次與希特勒的會晤要作如此詳細的記載，其原因不僅是因為它對於這次冬季戰役的勝負具有決定性的影響，而且在許多方面，這也可以當作一個典型的例證，說明希特勒的態度是如何頑固，和如何難於使他接受任何與他本意相違的事情