Chapter 61 Developments as of the end of February

After a long debate, I finally obtained Hitler's approval to withdraw from the eastern Donets Basin, thus allowing us to transfer the Fourth Panzer Army to the western flank.However, it is still a wrong assumption to think that the threat of the entire southern flank of the German army has been lifted.The procedure for leapfrogging Fourth Panzer Army from the east to the west flank was supposed to take about two weeks, based on distance and road conditions.In addition, since the enemy has already reached the vicinity of Voroshilovgrad on the south bank of the Donets River, it is enough to threaten the deep side of the He Lide Army Group, so whether the latter can safely reach the position of the Mies River is not sure.Furthermore, it is also doubtful whether the First Panzer Army can hold the front of the middle reaches of the Donets River.Finally, the situation in the area of ​​​​Army Group B, that is, in the Kharkov area, is even more anxious. The enemy has almost all opportunities for freedom of action.Not only can they go straight to the crossings of Dnipropetrovsk and Chaporozzi on the Dnieper River, thus cutting off the communication line of the Don Army Group there, but they can also cross the river further upstream, from the west. block it.Therefore, in addition to the transfer of Fourth Panzer Army to the western flank of our own army group, a new army had to be formed to replace the Allied forces in Army Group B, which had now practically collapsed.

At noon on February 7, I returned to my headquarters in Donetsk.The situation became more serious because Bataisk, a suburb of Rostov on the south bank of the Don, had been captured by the enemy.When I returned to the headquarters of the Army Group, I immediately gave the order to retreat, and the headquarters of the Fourth Panzer Army, together with all its divisions that could be mobilized, also began to leap forward to the west.The He Lide Group Army also received an order to retreat to the Novochirkask-Kamensk line in the first step. On February 8, a new crisis broke out in Rostov and Voroshirovgrad, when the enemy broke through from the bridgehead positions.The situation of the 1st Panzer Army operating in the middle of the Donets was also extremely critical and could not completely stop the enemy's advance between Lisichansk and Slavyansk.

In the area of ​​​​Army Group B, a new army was formed under Gen. Lanz, concentrated near Kharkov.The SS Panzer Corps, which was arriving one after another, was also assigned to his command.We had heard that the SS Reichs Division was preparing to destroy the enemy at Volsk, who was preparing to attack southeast as far as Isumen, but this was not the case at all.Instead, it retreated behind the Donets.Under these circumstances, Hitler's proposal to use the SS Panzer Corps to relieve the pressure on our western flank is completely meaningless. On February 9, the enemy had captured Balgorod and Kursk in the area of ​​Army Group B north of Kharkov.He is also advancing westward from the bend of the Donets River that surrounds the Isumen.In the gap between the Dnieper and the left flank of Army Group Center, apart from Army Group Nanzi (whose concentration in Kharkov had long since been disturbed) and Army Group B's Second Army west of Kursk (already dilapidated), There is no other force that can be used.

In view of the fact that the enemy is now able to execute a detour from Dnepropitovsk across the upper Dnieper, it is clear that, despite the steps taken to transfer Fourth Panzer Army to the western flank, the From a long-term point of view, the Don Army Group can hardly guarantee the safety of its rear communication lines with its own strength.So something more drastic has to be done.I immediately demanded that General Zeisler, within the next fourteen days, launch a new army in the area north of Dnipropetovsk, which should consist of at least five or six divisions, plus Behind the front of the Second Army, west of Kursk, another army was deployed in order to launch an attack to the south.I added that, if this is to be done, there must be a fundamental improvement in the efficiency of transport.Sending a division to the battlefield a little bit like in the past will not help the existing situation.

General Chaisler thought that from now on, there might be a chance to really help us.He hoped that at last he could draw more than six divisions from Army Groups Center and North and deliver them to us at a speed never seen before.The number of transport trains he assumed was thirty-seven per day, in other words, we could get one of these six divisions every other day.However, judging from the width of the gap torn by the front of the German army, of course, this force is at most enough to enable us to barely tide over the difficulties until the muddy season comes.At the same time, whether they can arrive on time depends on the development near Kharkov, which our army group has no power to influence.In any case, the entire southern flank of the German army was still in great danger, and the enemy could still advance to the shores of the Sea of ​​Azov before or just after the onset of the muddy season, or strike further westward, as far as the Black Sea. superior.

Although the deep side of the army group has become the main source of its anxiety, the situation on its own front is also not optimistic.The First Armored Army, the current commander is General Mackensen (Genv‧Machensen), and the chief of staff is Colonel Wenck (Col‧Wenck).Its task was to drive the enemy who had already crossed the middle reaches of Donets across the river, but it had already encountered two superior enemy forces.The first was to cross the Donets River at Voroshirovgrad, and was trying to insert itself between Army Group Holliday (which was retreating to the River Meuse) and the First Panzer Army (which was moving towards the Donets River from the south) ).The second branch has already crossed the Donets along the line Lishchansk-Slavyansk and is now planning to move its main force to its western flank on both sides of the Krivoi Torets superior.The 1st Panzer Army was in danger of being encircled on both flanks, and it had to try to defeat two enemy forces in succession.The original intention of the army group was to strike on its western flank first, and after defeating the enemy in Slavyansk, turn around and attack the enemy in Voroshilovgrad.Unfortunately, the army had already been obliged to contain part of its forces in the latter direction, and its forces were not strong enough to defeat the enemy at Slavyansk.In other words, south of Voroshilovgrad, there were not enough troops to stop the enemy's attack to the southwest.

This is the normal situation in a crisis, and a local crisis is often added to a major crisis, interacting with each other to make the situation more urgent.According to the results of a search conducted by the 1st Panzer Army before it dispatched the 40th Panzer Corps to destroy the enemy advancing from Slavyansk, it concluded that it was impossible to use tanks to pass through Kriftori The area west of the Tess River detoured the enemy, for the deep valleys that crossed the area were completely buried in deep snow.The attack of XXX Panzer Corps was therefore more or less a frontal attack east of and along the valley.As the severe cold of the Russian winter prevented troops from remaining on the open ground at night, most of the fighting was bound to be fought near the settlements in the valley of the Crivetorites, the first and chief object of which was to capture Large industrial town of Kramatorskaya.In such battles, however, there is no hope of a quick decision, but that is what we most desperately need.The 11th Armored Division, which was leading the offensive, was fighting hard.

The idea of ​​Army Group, which had been to encircle the enemy from the west and cut off its connection with the Donets, was beginning to fail.During the night of February 11th the enemy, with a strong armored force, passed through the supposedly impenetrable country west of the Crevetoritus, as far as Crishino.This again proves that the so-called impassability of the Westerners has only limited truth to the Russians. Part of the reason is, of course, that the wider tracks of Russian armored vehicles enable them to move over mud and deep snow more easily than Our own tanks do not have this capability.At Grighiro, the enemy had now not only penetrated the flank of 1st Panzer Army, but had also cut off the army group's main railway line from Dnepropetrovsk to the Krasrolmes River.Now only the railway line passing through Chaporozzi is still open, but because the bridge over the Dnieper River, which was blown up by the enemy in 1941, has not been repaired, the transportation efficiency will inevitably be greatly reduced.As a result, all goods had to be transferred, and oil trucks could not go directly to the front line.

While supplies to the front, especially oil, were threatened, the First Panzer Army was not only threatened by a detour from the west, but the enemy also tried to use the forces already penetrated from Voroshilovgrad to attack from the east. At the same time detour.In particular, one of the enemy's cavalry corps has penetrated all the way to the important railway junction at Debaltsevo, which is not only far behind the army's right flank, but also in Meath, which Holliday's army intends to occupy. Behind the river position.While it was possible to trap this army group at Baltesiv, its complete destruction became a difficult and time-consuming task as the enemy held on in the village.As a result, the 17th Armored Division, which the army's right flank desperately needs, is still stuck there and cannot move.

In the east, when Holliday's army retreated towards the Meas River, the Russian armored forces that had just rested and replenished followed behind and oppressed.As a result, we were temporarily unable to draw out the armored divisions in the army.However, this army group finally reached the Meuse River position on February 17 and organized a defensive line there. On the western flank, at this time, it is already possible to use the Viking division that arrived from the Don River to prevent the enemy's armored forces from entering Grichilo.However, the division was not able to quickly defeat the enemy.In addition to the fact that its troops have been considerably weakened in the recent bitter battle, its officers are also extremely lacking.The division was composed of Nazi volunteers from the Baltic and Nordic countries, and its losses were so severe that there were no officers who could speak its language to command the unit.This will naturally reduce the combat efficiency of this originally very useful unit.

At the same time, the Fourth Armored Army was still using roads and railways to mobilize from the lower reaches of the Don River to the west flank. Because of the bad road conditions, its progress was considerably delayed.Therefore, in addition to the fact that the enemy has penetrated into the side of the First Armored Army in Grichilo and can send fresh troops to reinforce the troops defending the area, there is an even more open door between the left wing of the First Armored Army and the Kharkov area. Dangerous exception.In this area, the enemy enjoys complete freedom of movement. The main reason why the Army Group's own area is so dangerous is that it stayed too long on the Don and Donets Rivers to cover the retreat of Army Group A.Since then, we have become increasingly anxious about developments in the Army Group B area. Having left some covering forces in the direction of Kharkov, the enemy moved his forces westward from Isumen to Pavlograd.From Pavlovgrad, they could go to the Dnieper crossings at Dnipropetrovsk and Chaporozzi, and thus cut off the communication of the army group across the river.In addition, they may try to defeat the Nanzi Army which is in the process of concentration.If they succeed, they will also be able to cross the Dnieper on both sides of Kremenchag, and then block the approach to the Crimea, as well as the first attack at Kherson. Dieper River crossing.The result was to encircle the entire southern flank of the German army.Although the onset of the mud season, usually around the end of February, may have hindered this great operation, the enemy could still advance to the objective after this period had passed. Based on the above considerations, on February 12, I sent a new judgment to the Army Headquarters and asked it to forward it to Hitler.Based on the aforementioned operational considerations, I would like to emphasize the following two points in particular: The first is the proportion of troops. I pointed out that although in the past three months, the enemy has obviously been trying to destroy or cut off our southern flank, but from the distribution of our troops, it seems that we are not at all. Don't pay attention to this fact.Even if you add up all the reinforcements sent to Army Group Don in recent months, the ratio of German troops to Russian troops in the Don and Army Group B areas is still at least one to eight, while in the center and south armies In cluster areas, the ratio is as high as one: four.It is understandable that Army Headquarters remained hesitant, fearing that a new crisis would be created if it drew forces from those two army groups.Moreover, what the Army Headquarters said in its previous reply to my request was not without reason. It said that almost all the reinforcements and weapons were sent to Army Group Don, and the result was that the Central and Northern Armies The war potential of the group is far inferior to ours.We should say, however, that while the divisions in the Army Group Don area had been fighting hard for several months, there was no such intense fighting in the center of the area of ​​the two Army Groups.In addition, our troops had to fight in the field, while the two army groups in the center and the north had already established a good line of defense. In any case, the most important factor was the enemy's decisive efforts directed not toward the center or north of the German army, but toward its southern flank, so that we must not continue to be at this disadvantageous numerical disadvantage. And even if we were able to relieve the danger of the crossing of the Dnieper River being cut off, the enemy would not give up his larger goal of encircling the German army on the coast.For this reason, no expense should be spared to achieve a radical improvement in the proportions of German forces on the southern flank, even with minor concessions on other fronts or on the Eastern Front. In addition to mentioning the basic issue of the overall distribution of forces, I also put forward to the Army Headquarters my opinions on the future operational guidance of the German southern flank.This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter (Battle on the Acropolis). On the night of February 12, the Army Group (now renamed Army Group South) moved its headquarters to Chaporozzi, because this will soon become a decisive point, so moving the headquarters here will also facilitate the battle. for the best control. On the night of February 13th we received a directive from Army Headquarters, apparently in reply to my suggestion of February 9th.In accordance with this suggestion, it decided to deploy a new army on the Poltava-Dnepropetrovsk line, and to deploy another army on the rear of the second army's southern flank.But in fact, this is all empty talk.The army that was going to deploy behind the second army never came.Although the Second Army once received a little reinforcement, it was at the expense of its promise to us.The army group that is going to deploy on the Poltava-Dnepropetrovsk line is actually the Nanzi Army, which has already been used in Kharkov.This army group, together with the area of ​​​​Army Group B, including Belgorod, was later assigned to the command of Army Group South.The Second Army was handed over to the Central Army Group, and the B Army Group headquarters was eventually withdrawn.