Chapter 62 Phase Four: The German Counteroffensive

Thus, in mid-February 1943, the crisis in the area of ​​Army Group South reached a new climax.The enemy is in its northern neighborhood preparing a large roundabout movement to encircle and wipe out our entire southern flank.But very paradoxically, just when this crisis reached its peak, the seeds of counterattack also began to germinate. However, the current situation is still looking bleak.There is no doubt that the withdrawal of Army Group B at this time is a dangerous measure.Although apart from the Second Army, it now has only some residual units, but it is still an indispensable link in the command system of the entire Eastern Front.Its withdrawal created a large gap in the front between the two army groups in the center and the south.

In addition, in fact, the headquarters of the Army Group South cannot immediately take over the Kharkov area (that is, the area held by Army Group Nanzi) assigned to its command, because the communication link has not yet been established.Before we take over, Kharkov will be lost too.In fact, due to the efforts of our Army Group Communications Corps and the guidance of our Communications Commander, Gen. Muller, this takeover was even the fastest.In addition, my friend, Gen. Fellgiebel, Director of Communications, has also given us great assistance. The withdrawal of Group B's headquarters certainly made the command of operations more complicated and difficult, but it also had another benefit.After the Nanzi Army was under the command of the Southern Army Group, it also enabled us to exercise absolute command at the determined place and timing.This contributed considerably to the final success of the winter campaign.

By this time the Kharkov area had become a new source of anxiety for the Army Group, although Army Group B, and Hitler himself, so to speak, continued to command there for several days.The Nanz Army, which had been ordered by Hitler to defend Kharkov at all costs, is now likely to be like Stalingrad again, and it will become a matter of face.In addition, in order to relieve the enemy's pressure on the left flank of Army Group South, this army will launch an assault in the direction of Losovaya with the SS Panzer Corps as its core.There are only two of the latter's three armored divisions.

Obviously, with the current strength of this army group, it can only hope to achieve at most one of these two tasks.It was either dedicated to fighting near Kharkov, or to rescue the left flank of Army Group South.So I suggested to Hitler that this Army Group Nanz should temporarily abandon Kharkov and try to attack the enemy forces south of the city first.This temporarily relieved the threat of the army group being encircled by the enemy crossing the Dnieper on both sides of Klemenchog.On the other hand, when we have engaged the Fourth Panzer Army, we will be able to repel the enemy attacking Chaporozzi and Dnepropetrovsk with our own strength.Once the Nanzi Army had defeated the enemy south of Kharkov, he could turn around and take back the city.

However, this plan did not fit Hitler's vision.Because Kharkov is the fourth largest city in Russia, in his mind it has already become a symbol of prestige.So on February 13th, through Army Group B, he issued another strict order to Army Group Nanzi, ordering it to defend Kharkov at all costs. I then asked the Army Headquarters to tell us whether this order would remain in force after Army Group Nanz had been transferred to our command, or if the SS Panzer Corps was threatened with siege in Kharkov. should still be complied with.At the same time, I also demanded an answer to the general condition study I sent to Lotzen the day before.In reply to me, General Zeisler told me that Hitler considered my opinion to be premature.I replied to him that I think that the thinking of an army group should at least take into account that the situation in four to eight weeks is not like our current Supreme Command, and it seems that it does not even consider things in three days.

As far as the situation in Kharkov is concerned, circumstances finally prevailed over Hitler's will.The SS Panzer Corps was indeed in danger of being surrounded there, so on February 15, it violated General Nanz's order and voluntarily withdrew from the city. Army Group B communicated this fait accompli to us, and it was at this time that it itself finally handed over its final command.Had this evacuation of Kharkov been carried out on the orders of an army general, Hitler would undoubtedly have court-martialed him.But because it was the action of the SS Panzer Corps (and it was not bad), it turned out to be nothing.However, a few days later, General Nanzi was still dismissed and replaced by General Kempf (Gen‧Kempf). The reason was that Nanzi was an expert in mountain warfare, while Kempf was an expert in tanks.

At the stage when Army Group B handed over its jurisdiction to Army Group South, the situation around Kharkov was rapidly deteriorating, and Army Group South's line of communication across the Dnieper River might be cut off at any time.On February 16, we received reports that the enemy was advancing with great force from the area west of Isumon towards Pavlovgrad and Dnepropitovsk, as we had previously expected.Had they managed to reach Rossovaya or Pavlovgrad, the rail link through Poltava would have been cut off. At the same time, the arrival of reinforcements allowed by Army Headquarters slowed again.The schedule was thirty-seven trains a day, but on February 14th, only six trains arrived.

Furthermore, Army Group Center declares that at present it lacks the necessary forces for any serious cooperation with Army Group South along the dividing line between us.It would be in our real interest to stop the retreat of the Second Army at this time. The situation had become so critical that Hitler decided to pay a visit to my headquarters himself.It is evident that some of the criticisms I have made in the past have had a considerable stimulating effect on his thinking.I certainly welcome his personal convoy, as it will give me the opportunity to speak straight to the dawn, and it will also allow him to come and see for himself the difficulties we are in; (The enemy is also attacking it), but it is naturally very difficult to ensure his safety, especially since he has announced his intention to stay for a few more days.He and his entourage, including General Jodl, the chief of staff, and his personal chef, were entertained and lived in our headquarters, and the entire surrounding area was tightly sealed off.Even so, security was not guaranteed, because Hitler's arrival was still known.He was instantly recognized by soldiers and party members in the streets as he drove from the airport to Chaporozzi.The only troops we could use for our security duties were our headquarters guard company and a few anti-aircraft units; and soon after, enemy tanks were so close to the city that they could already open fire on the airfield on the east bank of the Dnieper. .

Hitler reached my headquarters at noon on February 17th.I began to report to him the following situation in person: Holliday's army had reached the Meuse River position today, but the enemy was in hot pursuit.Fourth Panzer Army had stopped the enemy's advance at Grichilo, but had not yet been able to destroy it.Likewise, in the Kramatorskaya region, the battle for the enemy advancing along the Lishchansk-Slavyansk line remains undecided.Army Group Nanzi is withdrawing from Kharkov and has moved southwest to the Mosh area. I then reported to Hitler my intention to order the safe withdrawal of the SS Panzer Corps from Kharkov, leaving only the remnants of Army Group Nanz to continue to occupy the area.From the Krasnograd area, the SS Panzer Corps was preparing to make a surprise attack southwestward roughly in the direction of Pavlovgrad, and join up with the 4th Panzer Army, which was advancing there.The task of these forces would be to destroy enemy forces advancing through the wide gap between 1st Panzer Army and Nantz's Army.When this task is completed, the Holliday Army and the First Panzer Army will no longer be in danger of being cut off, so we can start the attack in the Kharkov area.

Hitler first refused to discuss my proposed operational procedures.He didn't even admit that there was already a strong enemy force advancing through the area between the 1st Panzer Army and Holliday's Army.At the same time he was afraid that the battle I imagined between the Dnieper and the Donets would be mired in the mud.Since it was already mid-winter, this possibility should be considered.But the main reason for Hitler's opposition may still be his desire to recapture Kharkov immediately, and he hopes to take this action as soon as the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps have been concentrated.The fact is that any attack in the direction of Kharkov presupposes the removal of the enemy's threat to the crossings of the Dnieper.Unless the line of communication across this river remains unimpeded, the Fourth Panzer Army or the Holliday Army cannot continue to survive.In addition, if you want to launch a strike against Kharkov, you need to cooperate with at least a part of the Fourth Panzer Army.And when at last the thawing of the ground was sufficient to force a temporary end to the operation, it was also in the area between the Donets and the Dnieper that it was first affected, and in the areas around and north of Kharkov, the impact was later.We can therefore reasonably hope that after defeating the enemy forces now advancing between 1st Panzer Army and Holliday's Army, we will still have time to attack Kharkov.On the contrary, if we reversed the order, it is doubtful whether the two operations could have been equally successful.

Because Hitler was always opinionated, another heated debate arose.I finally managed to end the debate this time by pointing out that in any case the SS Panzer Corps must first be concentrated on the Kharkov-Krasrograd road, but this was not possible until February 19 at least. It cannot be completed, so it will not be too late to decide whether to attack south or north.The reason why I adopted this policy of delay is that I know that the Fourth Panzer Army will not be able to participate in operations until February 19th.At the same time, I also think that the evolution of the actual situation in the future will be enough to force Hitler himself to understand. On January 18, I had another audience with Hitler.The enemy has already used a strong force to attack the Meas River, and has penetrated into several places in front of the unconsolidated He Lide Group Army.In addition, we have not yet been able to annihilate the enemy cavalry corps besieged at Balthif's Point in this frontal rear area.I told Hitler, however, that there was an urgent need to bring motorized units from here to the West Wing.The enemy's mechanized forces had also penetrated into the side of the First Panzer Army in Grichiro, so the forces there were restrained. On the other hand, there is now conclusive evidence that the enemy forces advancing in the gap between the 1st Panzer Army and the Nanzi Army are concentrating on attacking the Dnieper River crossing.The designation of its 267th Infantry Division has been found south of Krasrograd, and its 35th Guards Division, including a tank battalion, has also captured Pavlovgrad.An Italian division located there (remnants of the former Italian Army) retreated hastily when the enemy approached. Army Group Nanz has reported that the wheeled vehicle units of the Skeleton Division of the SS have been completely immobile in the mud between Kiev and Poltava.In this way, Hitler's hope of immediately attacking north and retaking Kharkov was completely destroyed.If the SS Panzer Division could not even hold the city without the strength of this division, it is even more hopeless to retake the city now.But when this division can be reached is currently unpredictable.So the only line we can take now is to attack southeast to destroy the enemy advancing through the gap between Army Group Nanz and 1st Panzer Army.Since the thaw is imminent in that area, no more time can be lost.Under these circumstances, Hitler finally agreed with me, and immediately used the first immediately available division of the SS Panzer Corps, the Reich Division, in the direction of Pavlovgrad.As for the Führer's Guards Division, it fought against the enemy forces pressing south from Kharkov and covered the operations of the Fourth Panzer Army.The only hope now was that the Fourth Panzer Army, reinforced by the Imperial Division, would succeed. Then, after this decision, I presented my opinion on the general situation to Hitler once more.I pointed out that even if we were able to avoid unfavorable developments, it was not too sure until the mud season came but I still had to think ahead.This mud can only interrupt operations for a few weeks at most.After this, our army group would have a front of 470 miles long to defend, and the total strength of the whole army, including Nanzi's army, would be no more than 32 divisions.On the contrary, once the muddy season is over, the enemy will definitely concentrate its main force on the southern flank of the German army, preparing to encircle and annihilate it on the Black Seashore. I told Hitler that with just over thirty divisions defending a front of 470 miles, a stronger enemy could penetrate at any point at will.In addition, there was no force sufficient to prevent them from continuing to circle the army from the north until they reached the Sea of ​​Azov or the Black Sea.Therefore, once the muddy season is over, this army group must not sit still and wait for the enemy's breakthrough or detour.Unless the Army Headquarters can launch an offensive at the right time to relieve the pressure felt by this front that protrudes too far to the east, it will definitely not last long. The purpose of my putting forward this idea is to persuade Hitler to seek a general solution from a long-term perspective once and for all to combat problems.But it was clear that he had no intention of making such a promise.Although he also admitted that the strength of the army group is too weak.It is not enough to defend that front next year, but he does not accept the ratio of troops I told him.We have confirmed that the enemy forces facing us have a total of 341 large units. Hitler did not deny this number, but he believed that these units were not of much value.When I retorted that our own divisions were exhausted at the same time, he replied that during the mud season we could replenish our forces and issue new weapons which of course should be This is true, but he does not admit that at the same time, the enemy can also send its 1.5 million new troops in 1926 to the front.Nor does he admit that within two months (that is, about the length of the mud season), the enemy produced enough tanks to replenish them with sixty armored brigades.Hitler, on the contrary, desperately emphasized that the Donets region would be decisive for Russian tank production if it were allowed to fall again into enemy hands.As for his own command of the Germans on the Eastern Front in 1943, he could not draw from any other field to launch a major offensive, and he had nowhere to find large numbers of new conscripts.On the other hand, however, he believed that with the help of new weapons, he could at least perform limited and partial operations.This brought Hitler back to the question of weapons and weapons production, and made it impossible to fathom his intentions concerning future summer campaigns.We seem to live in two completely different worlds. On February 19, another meeting was held, this time Field Marshal Kleist was also called to attend.It is evident that Hitler's presence at my headquarters has at last given him a considerable awareness of the dangers of Army Group South, for he now declares that Army Group A should transfer as much of its troops as possible to Army Group South in the future. group.In other words, Army Group A should be regarded as a nearby force reserve of Army Group South, so Hitler's plan to use the Kuban bridgehead in the future has been temporarily shelved.But unfortunately, future facts have proved that due to the limitation of transportation means, this savings bank has failed to play its role.The Cuban bridgehead continues to be isolated.Past experience has already taught us that if a force is pinned to a wrong location, it will be very difficult to mobilize it. Things became even more tense that day when the enemy of considerable strength reached the Sinsinokovo railway station.The enemy has now not only temporarily cut off the main supply line of the center and right flank of the army group, but also is only between thirty-five and forty miles away from the place where the German Fuehrer is stationed!As there were no troops to move around, it was a real relief to me when Hitler flew back to his headquarters that afternoon.For on the following day, it was not surprising that enemy tanks were able to prevent us from using the airfield on the east bank of the Dnieper. My last request to Hitler was that in preparing the strike on the western flank I would need to use all the panzer divisions, in other words, they would have to be drawn from the Meuse position.The only reason why the position on the Mias River has not been breached is because the main body of the enemy army has to pass through the Rostov bottleneck, so it has not yet reached it.The possibility of taking the Donets region from the east cannot be ignored.Unless we first eliminate the danger that the line of communication in the rear of the army group will be cut off, otherwise we will be helpless.Hitler seemed to understand this too. At any rate, I got the impression that Hitler's visit to my headquarters was enough to help him understand the imminent danger of the encirclement on the southern flank of the Eastern Front.Nevertheless, not long afterward, a story came from Army Headquarters or General Schmund that Hitler's main reason for making this trip was to cheer up our Army Group.I've never felt that my headquarters needed such a boost, and even if we're not prepared to live up to Hitler's ideal of fighting for every inch of land without regard to consequences, I dare say that to find another headquarters, it would be possible to In this crisis-ridden situation, it seems that it is not easy for those who are willing to ensure victory like us.In this respect there is absolutely no disagreement between myself and my staff.