Chapter 70 The spread of the fire

By 27 August, a fairly complete front had been rebuilt from Kharkov to Sumy, thus providing temporary relief from the tense situation on Army Group's northern flank.But at this time the situation in the Donets region has become unprecedentedly critical.Therefore, the headquarters of the army group put forward a general request: if the mission does not change, more troops must be added to its south wing, otherwise it must be given freedom of movement in order to shorten the front to prevent the enemy's offensive. As a result, Hitler decided to call an impromptu conference in southern Russia.The location was in Vinnitsa, where he used to have his base camp in the past.During this meeting, my army commander and I, as well as a corps commander and a division commander, all made generous statements to Hitler, explaining the current situation, especially the conditions of the troops.In particular, I point out that only 33,000 supplements have been made to the total number of casualties of 133,000.Although the enemy's combat strength may have been considerably weakened, they were heavily replenished and so were able to continue the offensive.In addition, they also continued to draw reinforcements from other regions.Based on the existing situation, I firmly believe that the Donets area can no longer be defended with the existing forces, and as far as the entire southern flank of the German army is concerned, the greatest danger is also on the northern flank of the army group.In the long run, the 8th and 4th Panzer Armies would be powerless to stop the enemy's breakthrough to the Dnieper.

I clearly proposed two plans to Hitler: 1. Quickly allocate new forces to our army group, no less than twelve divisions in any case, and draw troops from other relatively calm fronts to replace our exhausted divisions .Second, or abandon the Donets area to draw troops from the army group. Hitler remained completely objective throughout this discussion, and although he was constantly expressing his opinion on all technical details, he still agreed that the Army Group should receive strong support and allowed as much support as possible from both the north and the center. The army group deployed reinforcements.As for the replacement of tired divisions by drawing troops from other, calmer areas, he thought it would be possible to decide in a day or two whether such a possibility existed.

These promises proved to be unfulfilled the next day.Russian forces had begun attacking the left flank of Army Group Center (Second Army), achieving a partial breakthrough that forced the Army Group to retreat westward.In the area of ​​​​the Fourth Army, the enemy also attacked successfully, causing another local crisis in this army group.On August 28, Field Marshal Kruger, Commander-in-Chief of the Central Army Group, came to talk once, and he never heard of the transfer of troops from his jurisdiction.Now the North Army Group also declares that even the strength of a division cannot be mobilized.As for other theaters, Hitler's first thought of waiting for developments and seeing whether the British would now land in the Balkans was not only impossible but also unimportant.

Unfortunately, the Russians ignored this trick.They kept attacking, and the situation became more and more urgent.The Sixth Army had been penetrated, and the troops fighting on the coast were in danger of being surrounded by the enemy.Because the troops transferred by the Army Headquarters to the Donets area were not enough to restore the situation there, the Army Group issued an order on August 31 to withdraw the Sixth Army to the established position called Testudo in the rear. . (The move to send troops to the Donets area is opposed by the headquarters of the army group, because this force is needed on the northern flank.) This means that the withdrawal of the Donets area has taken the first step .That same night, Hitler finally gave the Army Group headquarters the freedom to gradually withdraw the right flanks of the Sixth Army and the First Panzer Army, but he added that this must be the case and there was no other way.At the same time, it also ordered the destruction of all facilities of military importance in the Donets region.

Had this freedom of movement been granted a few weeks earlier, the Army Group would have been able to fight the battle on the southern flank more economically.It could not only mobilize forces for use on the northern flank, but also shorten the front to stop the enemy's advance, and it might even stand still in front of the Dnieper River.It was too late now, but it still saved its southern flank from destruction.However, it is doubtful whether a front can be established in front of the Dnieper River. As for the First Panzer Army, except that its right wing had been withdrawn in order to cooperate with the retreat of the Sixth Army, the rest of the forces could still continue to hold the middle section of the Donets River.However, the situation on the northern flank of the army group deteriorated again.

The Eighth Army, in the area south of Kharkov, was attacked simultaneously from the north and the east, and only after a narrow retreat and a shortened front prevented the enemy's breakthrough. The left wing of Fourth Panzer Army was also forced to bend back due to the retreat of its northern neighbor, the Second Army of Army Group Center.This again makes its front side stretch longer, which is already thin enough.Later, due to the misdirection of the southernmost corps (13th) of the Second Army, it retreated into the area of ​​​​the Fourth Panzer Army, so that the latter not only took over four crippled divisions, but also added fifty-six miles. The long frontage, which is facing north.Although the enemy's attack power has temporarily slumped, we can predict that once the enemy reorganizes its offensive, this group army will be difficult to sustain for a long time.This danger was increased by the new threat on the army's northern flank.

The situation was getting worse, and Hitler still hadn't made any decision on reinforcements, so I had to fly to the headquarters in East Prussia to visit Hitler on September 3. I asked Field Marshal Kruger to go with me, because I hoped Take joint action with him so that our forces may be properly distributed.At the same time, it is also more hoped that the overall leadership problem can be solved reasonably: for example, the duplication between the Supreme Command and the Army Headquarters on the Eastern Front will be cancelled.The day before I had written another letter to General Chaisler, demanding that some action must at last be taken in order to make a really concentrated effort on the decisive point on the Eastern Front.Judging by the developments on the connecting flanks of the Southern and Central Army Groups, it seems to me that a strong force should be concentrated in front of Kiev as a precaution.If the decision on reinforcements had to wait until the Western Allies had landed in Europe, it would probably be too late on the Eastern Front.And in any case, it is not too difficult to guess its general intentions from the distribution of naval forces and shipping transportation of Western countries.When he presented the letter to Hitler, Zeisler told me, Hitler flew into a rage, thinking that I was trying to be clever and gain a position in the war diaries.I think this is really a naive idea.

Kruger and I paid a visit to Hitler and got nothing.Hitler announced that no reinforcements were available from other battlefields or from Army Group North.He also reacted extremely badly to the proposal to establish a unified command system, with the Chief of General Staff assuming overall responsibility for all the battlefields.He believes that such a reorganization immediately will not necessarily improve the overall guidance of the war too much.Hitler, of course, knew that the ultimate purpose of proposing a chief of the general staff to take full responsibility was to keep him from directing operations himself, although he still retained the final decision-making power.His objection to such a proposal was the same as his reluctance to appoint a real commander-in-chief on the Eastern Front.

Because in the next few days, the Army Headquarters still failed to take any action regarding the situation of the Army Group in the South, so I sent another telegram on September 7, repeating the situation of the Army Group .I pointed out that the enemy had deployed against us fifty-five infantry divisions, two tank corps, etc., not only in reserves but mostly drawn from other parts of the Eastern Front.More troops are also on the way.So I insist once again: If the army group is to control the current situation, it must take decisive action quickly. The result of this artillery was that the next day, Hitler came to our headquarters in Chaporozzi. At the same time, he also summoned the commander-in-chief of Army Group A, Field Marshal Kleist and the commander of the Seventeenth Army who was still in the Kuban area. Gen Ruoff.

All I could do in this meeting was to stress over and over the seriousness of Army Group's situation, the exhaustion of the troops, and the consequences not only for ourselves but for Army Group A if our northern flank were defeated. I also emphasized that the right wing of Army Group was no longer able to recover its position in front of the Dnieper.On the North Hebei of the Sixth Army, the enemy has torn a gap twenty-eight miles wide in our front, where only the remnants of two divisions are still fighting hard.Since we have only a very small amount of armor at our disposal, the counter-offensive that has been launched has no hope of filling the gap.Whether we want to or not, we will all be forced to retreat to the rear of the Dnieper.In particular, the situation on the northern flank of the army group is already extremely dangerous.

In order to find the necessary forces to support this northern flank, I suggest that the front of Army Group Center should withdraw to the line of the Niepr River in one go.This would shorten its front by a third, and the troops saved could be diverted to at least the main points on the Eastern Front. Hitler now recognized in principle the need for the army group's right wing to withdraw to the Melitopol-Dnieper line, although he still hoped that the new battalion of self-propelled assault guns would reverse the situation enough to avoid such a retreat.As usual, he always thought that the use of technical resources was enough to prevent a certain development, but in fact, the strength of several divisions was necessary. As for the proposal to withdraw the Central Army Group to the Dnieper River to mobilize troops, Hitler believed that it was impossible to retreat such a long distance in a short period of time.Before this massive movement is complete the mud season will catch up with us, as would the retreat in the Arnell Prominence, where too much equipment would be lost.Therefore, he believes that at best, he can only hope to retreat to a median line.That of course falls short of the manpower we want to achieve. It is all a question of operational flexibility, and our opinion (based on the experience of the Crimea and the winter campaign of 1942) and that of the Army Headquarters, or even that of other Army Group Headquarters, is fundamental difference.In those campaigns we always had to act quickly and maneuverably, and there was not enough time for long-term planning and preparation.Hitler and other army groups thought it impossible to execute such a large-scale movement so quickly.Indeed, because Hitler once ordered all the armies to accumulate rations and ammunition for three months, so that they can still stand still when supplies are temporarily cut off, so for this already static front, it is of course necessary to retreat quickly. more difficult. Regarding such a drastic proposal as shortening the front of Army Group Center, Hitler admitted that he was difficult to approve, but he also admitted that there was a need for a decisive strengthening of Army Group South.On the suggestion of the Chief of General Staff, he ordered the Central Army Group to immediately concentrate the strength of an army on the dividing line between it and the Fourth Panzer Army, a total of two armored divisions and two infantry divisions.The object of this measure is to prevent our northern flank from being encircled. In addition, when I asked that more divisions should be sent in order to secure the crossing of the Dnieper, he allowed to try to accommodate my request.In the end, in order to obtain more troops, he decided to retreat to the Kuban bridgehead position, which had no longer any combat value.According to Marshal Kleist, this operation will be completed by October 12th. Unfortunately, we were unable to get Hitler to issue the appropriate orders immediately, directly from my headquarters.But when I was on the side of the runway to send Hitler off, he reiterated his promise of reinforcements before boarding the plane for takeoff. In the afternoon of the same day, we ordered the Sixth Army and the First Panzer Army to adopt a mobile defense method. The purpose was to maintain the stability of the troops on the one hand, and on the other hand, to buy as much time as possible during the retreat. As for the Fourth Panzer Army and the Eighth Panzer Army, we hope that once Hitler's promise is fulfilled, the corps assigned to us by the Central Army Group can be used to launch a counterattack to stabilize the situation on the northern flank of the Fourth Panzer Army.We should also be able to use the divisions now moving towards the Dnieper as pillars of this front.Then there was also the possibility of stopping the enemy ahead of the river, roughly in the vicinity of Poltava. Unfortunately, the next day disappointed us again.When Hitler was about to leave, he firmly stated that he would immediately order four divisions to reinforce the front line of the Dnieper River, but this order was never issued.In addition, Army Group Center had already experienced delays in gathering a corps on the right flank.Whether these forces could be used, when they could be used, and how large there seemed to be no doubt. I asked the Chief of the General Staff to convey to Hitler that in these circumstances we must admit the possibility of the enemy breaking through to the crossings of the Dnieper, including the one at Kiev.Because the decisions of the High Command were often changed, and the promises were often broken, it was considered necessary to protest to Hitler, because the words were too blunt, and had to be expressed in writing.The reason I am still quoting it here is that it sufficiently expresses the differences between the Supreme Command and Army Group South. Since the end of the Winter Campaign, the Army Group has reported that it cannot defend its front with its existing forces, and has repeatedly called for a complete adjustment of its forces within the Eastern Front, or between the Eastern Front and other battlefields. Intercrops were similarly adjusted, but never with success.Because the area defended by the Southern Army Group is so important, and it is an obvious and predictable fact that the main force of the Russian offensive will be on this side, so this adjustment is absolutely necessary. On the contrary, since the battle of the Acropolis, the strength of our army group has only been dwindling day by day, and whenever a crisis occurs, it has never been able to receive proper and timely reinforcements. The reason why I made the above statement is not to determine the responsibility for the development of the Eastern Front afterwards, but to take necessary actions in the future without losing the opportunity. But Hitler still could not accept what we now consider to be an inevitable proposal to withdraw Army Group Center to the line of the Dnieper River, so that enough troops could be drawn to control the situation on the southern flank.The appeal of the Chief of Staff and the protests of Army Group South were not enough to move him.In the last memorandum we stated that the impending attack on Army Group Center by the Russians, which Hitler feared, had no other purpose than to prevent us from concentrating our forces.We have further stated that the retreat of Army Group Center to the line of the Dnieper River will have no serious impact, no matter from the standpoint of combat or war economy. High Command still did not take action to allow Army Group Center to concentrate its forces on our northern flank as promised, and the enemy kept mobilizing new troops, so Fourth Panzer Army was encircled from the north and moved from the north. Kiev was in danger of being forced to retreat south.Such a development not only prevented us from establishing a new line of defense behind the Dnieper, but also put our army group in immediate danger of being encircled. In a report to Army Headquarters, the Army Group announced on September 14 that it was obliged the next day to order its northern wing to retreat behind the Dnieper on both sides of Kiev.The Eighth Army had already been ordered to adopt maneuvering tactics.The idea of ​​shortening the front in front of the Dnieper, roughly in the vicinity of Poltava, to stop the advance of the enemy finally came to naught because of Hitler's delays. The Army Headquarters replied to me that please hold off on issuing orders until Hitler has another meeting with me on September 15 before making a decision.I replied that unless I could have a private conversation with him, with only the quasi-chief of the general staff present, any meeting would be meaningless. At this meeting I again told Hitler that the situation had changed considerably since his last visit to our headquarters, and emphasized that a crisis on our northern flank might not only wipe out the entire army group, but And the entire battlefield will also die together.I would add that this crisis is the consequence of Army Group Center's refusal to hand over its forces to us.Because in fact, the South Army Group has always faithfully obeyed the orders of the Army Headquarters, so we don't understand why the other Army Groups should not do this Still not enough to help Army Group Center hold its front.I said that, in my opinion, it was really intolerable that orders which the High Command considered urgent and necessary should not be carried out.If all the armies and groups dare to disobey orders, then it's okay!In any case, I am sure that my order can be carried out! (Hitler failed to get Army Group Center to carry out his orders for two reasons: 1. He did not give due consideration to the need to shorten the front. 2. He did not demand immediate execution in spite of all objections.) My conclusion is that it is already quite doubtful whether the Fourth Panzer Army can retreat across the Dnieper River.The Army Group will, of course, do its best to make the operation go smoothly, but we insist that all four railway lines must be used simultaneously so that the four divisions can be quickly rushed to our northern flank from the Army Group Center. That way there might be time to restore the situation there. (This will inevitably require the Central Army Group to withdraw to the Dnieper River.) I say that the fate of the entire Eastern Front is determined at this point, and the only way is to send a strong force to the Kiev area. Although Hitler accepted my implied criticism of his leadership calmly, there is no doubt that he was not satisfied with the meeting.Nevertheless, the result of this meeting was that he immediately ordered Army Group Center to transfer the strength of four divisions to Army Group South with the highest speed, starting on September 17, and immediately using all four railway lines.At the same time, infantry units were also allowed to be drawn from the Western Front to supplement our divisions with a total of thirty-two battalions. As soon as I returned to the headquarters of the army group, I ordered all our armies to start from Melitopol at dusk on September 15, along the Dnieper River to a point above Kiev, and then Then retreat along the line taken by the Desna River. Readers may get the impression that while the troops of the Army Group were fighting hard in front of the Dnieper River, the staff at its headquarters spent most of their time arguing with Hitler.It is true that we expended a great deal of nerves and energy in order to persuade the High Command to take the necessary measures immediately and decisively, before it was too late again.Our staff is accustomed to making snap decisions, and I am personally weary of repeating the obvious.Yet this struggle was the decisive factor in the campaign on the Eastern Front between 1943 and 1944.