Chapter 71 The retreat behind the Dnieper

When I returned to the headquarters, in the order issued on September 15th, it was stipulated that the retreat speed of each group army should be based on the principle of maintaining the combat effectiveness of the troops.It clearly declares that all orders and decisions should be made with particular attention to the principle that as long as units remain intact they can overcome any difficulty, and if units lose their combat effectiveness or stability they are also The order to retreat cannot be carried out.Whenever possible, the armies should try to let the enemy lose his energy in the attack, so as to buy time for retreat.

The Sixth Army was to withdraw its two southern corps to the established positions between Melitopol and the Dnieper bend south of Chaporozzi.A corps to the north should withdraw to the Chaporozzi bridgehead position.The section of this army was then transferred to the First Panzer Army, and the rest of the Sixth Army was transferred to Army Group A; its Seventeenth Army was also withdrawing to the Crimea in the Kuban Peninsula. First Panzer Army should cross the Dnieper at Tzaporochi and Dnepropetrovsk in order to take over the front from Tzaporochi to a certain point twenty miles east of Kremcnchug Wire.Once the East-West crossing was completed, the Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead was to be abandoned, and the Chaporozzi bridgehead had to be held, according to Hitler's orders.The right wing of the Eighth Army should also be withdrawn to Dnipropetrovsk, and the command of the First Panzer Army should be changed.

The army was also ordered to take immediate steps to assemble the 40th Panzer Corps (two panzer divisions, one panzer infantry division and one SS cavalry division) south of the Dnieper for diversion to the left flank of the army group side to go.However, this measure was hindered by Hitler's order to hold the Zaporozzi bridgehead.The consequences are left for further discussion below. The section where the Eighth Army crossed the river was sandwiched between the two bridgehead positions of Klemenchog and Cherkassy, ​​and concentrated a strong armored force on its left flank to defend the crossing described later.Since this army was supposed to hold a line behind the Dnieper up to a certain point twenty miles south of Kiev, it was to assume command of this army as soon as the 24th Panzer Corps, which belonged to the Fourth Panzer Army, had crossed the river.

The task of the Fourth Panzer Army was to enable the twenty-fourth Panzer Corps to cross the river at Kanev, while the main force of its army was to cross the river at Kiev.And after crossing the river, ensure contact between its north and the right wing of Army Group Center. According to this order, all the armies began to move, and moved back to the Melitopol/Dnieper River position, facing a far superior and powerful enemy. The Battle of 1944 was regarded as the most difficult battle for our army group. The progress of the movement was easier in the area of ​​the Sixth Army on the right, since the Army could withdraw its forces directly to the established positions north of Melitopol and to the Chaporozzi bridgehead.The main danger in this area is that the pursuers are too strong, especially the armored corps, and they will take advantage of the opportunity to break in when our army is in motion, which will make us feel very difficult.

On the other hand, in order to get the other three armies to retreat across the river, they encountered infinite difficulties.From a front four hundred and forty miles long, they had to concentrate on five crossings.And once the river had been crossed, a new front had to be formed again, as long and as wide as the original, and its deployment should be completed before the enemy had gained a foothold on the south bank.When each army concentrates its entire force on one or at most two crossings, that gives the enemy the best chance. When the five ferries of Ge, Zilkasai, Kaniv, and Kiev are concentrated, the Russian army can almost do whatever it wants at this stage.

Complicating the retreat was the fact that neither the central elements of the army group, the Eighth Army nor the left flank of the First Panzer Army could retreat along an axis perpendicular to the Dnieper.Instead, they had to take an almost parallel aspect on the north bank of the river until they reached the ford they were supposed to use before changing direction.In fact, the Eighth Army rushed all the way to reach its own ferry, Zilkasai.On the left flank of Army Group there was another danger, namely, the tendency of Fourth Panzer Army to be driven away from Kiev by the development of Army Group Center's southern flank.

Despite many local crises, this extremely difficult retreat was finally successful, which should be attributed to the excellent leadership of the army commanders and the courageous service of all the troops.Such successes can be achieved only when the commanders and staffs at all levels feel themselves vastly superior to their opponents, and only when the troops retreat without feeling themselves defeated.The enemy was not able to prevent our crossing, and despite their strength, they did not take advantage of the concentration of our troops on the point of crossing, and at any other point, rush to cross the river with strong forces, so as to reach the west bank beforehand. As a result, our defense line cannot be deployed.Although they also smuggled in one or two places, they didn't play much role.This will be discussed later.