Chapter 73 Battle of the Dnieper Line

After crossing the Dnieper, the Army Group had undoubtedly established a strong natural barrier between itself and the enemy, at least in summer.However, this reduction in tension cannot be expected to last for too long. We firmly believe that the enemy is on the Eastern Front and will continue to seek opportunities for a showdown in this area.Because that's where the jackpot falls, whether for combat, economic, or political purposes.Therefore, they will definitely maximize the supply potential of their southern flank, so that the new force will continue to be invested in the struggle against the southern army group.They were, of course, capable of launching diversionary or limited offensives on other parts of the Eastern Front, but even if they produced partial successes, they were not of decisive importance compared with the situation on the southern flank.

Does Army Group South have any hope of holding its positions?When the enemy attacked the front line of the Dnieper River, would they automatically give up because of excessive bloodshed?If a strong fortification system had already been established along the Dnieper River, then in the autumn of 1943, the answers to these questions could have been more confident.Unfortunately, that's not the case. Indeed, as early as in the winter between 1942 and 1943, the headquarters of the Army Group requested the Army Headquarters to expedite the construction of the fortifications along the Dnieper River without any delay.We could not get to work ourselves because the crossing was outside our area of ​​operation.But Hitler vetoed this request. On the one hand, he had always opposed the construction of rear fortifications in principle, thinking that it would be enough to encourage retreat. On the other hand, he also hoped to use all labor and materials on the Great Atlantic Wall.At the beginning of 1943, as the fighting approached the Dnieper, our army group automatically took the step of converting Chaporozzi, Dnepropetrovsk, Klemenchog and Kiev into The bridgehead position, in case the enemy stalks, cut off the communication line behind us at these important ferry crossings.When the battle for the Acropolis was over and finally shifted to defensive warfare, we began to expand and extend the fortifications on the Dnieper River using local conscripts.Even then, only light field fortifications could be erected, since the Army Group depended on the Army Headquarters for machinery, cement, steel, barbed wire, and mines, and on the occupying authorities in Ukraine for timber, while Hitler was still Giving high priority to the Great Atlantic Wall.Of course, before it freezes, the Dnieper River can be used as a huge obstacle.But there must also be sufficient defensive forces to compensate for the weakness of its fortifications.

But this is where our weakness lies.After two and a half months of bitter fighting, the strength of the German troops had been eroded to a terrible degree.All personnel, weapons, and especially the replenishment of tanks are not enough to fill this void.This was mainly due to Hitler's stubbornness and insisted on forming new divisions in the domestic rear. Even before the retreat was completed, the Army Group Headquarters had frankly told the Army Headquarters about the strength of its troops that it seemed doubtful how long the Dnieper Line would be able to defend with the current strength.We also pointed out that the defense of the river itself must use infantry divisions, and that armored forces should be kept as a mobile reserve, which can only be used to intercept the enemy's attempt to cross the river in large numbers.

We also explained that in order to immediately defend the front of the 440-mile-long Dnieper River, the three armies under the jurisdiction of our army group, a total of only 37 infantry divisions can be mobilized. (Including three divisions already on the move towards us, and another five divisions that were completely exhausted and had to be incorporated into other units.) In other words, each division would be responsible for a twelve-mile front.The average number of soldiers in each division that can be used for front-line combat missions is only about 1,000 at present, and even if the supplementary personnel allowed by the headquarters can arrive, this number will not increase to more than 2,000.It is obvious that, even behind the Dnieper, a decisive defense cannot be made on the basis of such forces.

As for the seventeen armored or armored infantry divisions in the army group, it can be said that none of the divisions can retain a real strike force, and the number of tanks and the manpower of the armored infantry regiment have also declined sharply. Therefore, the headquarters of the army group requested that in addition to the three infantry divisions already on the way, more infantry divisions should be sent.Since the front of Army Group Center has been shortened by one-third after withdrawing to the Dnieper River, we feel that this request is more reasonable.And Army Group Center (at least its southern flank) will never be the target of any decisive offensive, because in the course of the attack, the enemy will be plunged into the Pinsk Marsh (Pinsk Marshs).

On the contrary, we also emphasize the importance of giving priority to Army Group South in terms of replenishment of personnel and equipment, because they will continue to bear the main responsibility for fighting on the Eastern Front.At the same time, there can no longer be a lack of ammunition like in the retreat period.We conclude that the defeat of the enemy's offensive in the scramble for the Battle of the Dnieper depends entirely on the fulfillment of these requirements. Finally, there is still a question, is whether the German High Command still has enough troops and tools to win this duel?At this time it is not possible to say that, owing to the overall superiority of Russian forces, the situation is hopeless.Even if the enemy were willing to risk everything for a decisive victory on the southern flank during the year, his supply problems would still limit the number of troops he could use on this front.Therefore, for the German High Command, the most important thing is to be able to anticipate where the enemy may launch an attack, and to gather appropriate forces in the same area without losing the opportunity to deal with it.Obviously, this in turn required a determination to take considerable risks in other parts of the Eastern Front, as well as on other battlefields.If such an action can be taken, after the Russian army's attack on the southern army group fails, it may wear down the enemy's offensive ability to a decisive degree. Such success may have a decisive impact on the future course of the war.

How to provide appropriate and timely support to the German southern flank continued to be the focus of disputes between Army Group South and the German High Command.I don't want to go into details of these innumerable debates, but I must say that the Chief of the General Staff and the Operations Department fully agree with us.For example, on October 3, General Hussinger (Gen‧Heusinger) told me that he had suggested withdrawing from Crimea and withdrawing the Army Group North (shortening the line of defense) in order to redeploy troops for use by Army Group South.In addition, he once suggested building a proper Eastern Great Wall (Ostwall) in the far rear. (Hitler had also recently used the term Great Wall on the Eastern Front to describe the defense of the Dnieper, which had been built against his will.) But the Führer rejected both proposals.Hussinger also said that although he had considered the issue of drawing troops from other battlefields, it was only a few divisions at most.

Let us now return to the situation on the Dnieper. By the end of September, it became clear how the enemy was going to cross the river and attack.When the Sixth Army retreated to the Melitopol-Dnieper line (since mid-month it was under the command of Army Group A), the enemy's strong forces followed.The enemy's three armies (two in front and one in reserve), with a total strength of 20 infantry divisions and two tank mechanized corps, are chasing the 1st Panzer Army retreating to the Chaporozzi bridgehead.The two armies consisted of fifteen divisions, followed by a tank army with three corps, and were advancing towards the Dnieper River between Dnepropetrovsk and Klemenchog.The two armies consisted of about twelve infantry divisions, two tanks and a mechanized corps, followed by a tank army with more than three armies. Advance on the river bank.

On the other hand, the enemy advancing towards Kiev and the river bank north of the city found only the designations of three infantry corps and one mechanized corps.Obviously, the main force of the enemy's combat was first directed at the Dnieper Bend.In fact, in the riverbank areas on the north and south sides of Kiev, it is the shortcut for mobilizing troops from the center. Although the army group was already under extremely difficult conditions, by September 30 it had completed its task of withdrawing all its troops across the Dnieper River.But it still could not prevent the enemy from gaining two footholds on the south bank.

At the midpoint between Dnipropetorovsk and Klimenchog, using the islands there, the enemy crossed the river on both sides of the dividing line between the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army.The defenders on the opposite bank were too weak to stop them.Unfortunately, although the 40th Panzer Corps had been ordered by the Army Group to gather south of the Dnieper River and use it as a mobile reserve, it was unable to launch an immediate counterattack to drive the enemy across the river at this time.It is also stuck in the bridgehead position of Chaporozzi. As mentioned above, during the retreat, Hitler ordered that the bridgeheads of Chaporozzi, Dnipropetorovsk, Klemenchog and Kiev must be defended. position.If our army group still had sufficient strength, it would, of course, not object to such a measure.However, due to the lack of troops in fact, we advocate that these bridgehead positions should be withdrawn after the completion of the river crossing. Hitler has finally reluctantly acquiesced to the latter three.But in spite of all opposition he had ordered that the Zaporozzi bridgehead must be preserved and even further expanded.In addition to thinking that it is necessary to control the Dnieper River Dam and its power plant, he also pointed out that as long as we can hold this bridgehead position, the enemy will not dare to attack the Sixth Army's Melitopol front.From a combat standpoint, this latter point of view is not bad at all, except that Hitler made another old mistake of pursuing too many goals at the same time.As a result of being ordered to stick to the release of Chaporozzi, the First Armored Army was unable to release the Fortieth Armored Army as scheduled.This made it impossible to launch an immediate counter-offensive, and allowed the enemy to establish a wide bridgehead between Dnepropetrovsk and Klemenchoge.

At the end of September the enemy also crossed the Dnieper, taking advantage of the narrow stream of the Dnieper south of Pereyaslavl (west of the Kaniv Bridge).Obviously, the enemy wants to cross the river on a large scale at this point, because in the areas on both sides, they can no longer concentrate the strength of four tank corps and one mechanized corps.South of the Dnieper, several more paratrooper brigades were thrown.So soon there were eight infantry divisions and one tank corps in Gulfstream. At the extreme north of the army group, another crisis also occurred.Here, on the boundary between the Fourth Panzer Army and the Central Army Group, the enemy has been able to cross the Desna River, which should have been fortified.According to the orders issued by the Army Headquarters in the past, the Second Army should concentrate its forces to deal with this crisis, but it has not been done. In mid-September, the headquarters of the Army Group had been moved from Chaporozzi to Kirovograd, a rather important town located in the center of the industrial area of ​​the Dnieper Bend.From there I have personally visited points of crisis in the areas defended by the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army, as well as on the Kiev front.The impression I got at this point was that the front of the Fourth Panzer Army might still be defended, but that the crisis on the boundary between the other two armies seemed difficult to completely overcome. At the beginning of October, the headquarters of the army group had moved into the building where the base camp used to be in Vinnytsia. This is a more suitable position for commanding overall operations.It is located in a forest. In the past, it took a lot of effort to provide water and electricity for the base camp, but now we are enjoying it.Although the offices and dormitories are simple wooden houses, the furniture and equipment are excellent.The strangest thing is that there is an underground warning net all over the forest.It was obvious that Hitler needed protection on the one hand, but on the other hand he didn't want it to be known.Luckily, we don't need to take this security measure.Vinnytsia is a large health resort located in the picturesque surroundings of the Bug River.All the other hotels and other houses have now been turned into military hospitals, and I always find time to visit these hospitals whenever my work permits. In October 1943, we discovered that Army Group South had already been involved in a decisive struggle along the Dnieper River.In the northern part of the Eastern Front, there must be a period of heavy rain and mud every late autumn, making it difficult for the Russians to carry out any large-scale offensive operations.But the situation in the south was not the same, and the fighting continued. According to the enemy's order of battle which we had discovered at the end of September, the enemy's pressure in the area of ​​our army group appeared to be directed at four main objectives: 1. The Chaporozzi bridgehead, which the enemy apparently considered clearing as a prerequisite for continuing the offensive against Sixth Army to the south. 2 and 3. Two Dnieper areas, the enemy has gained a foothold on the south bank. 4. North of Kiev, on the northern flank of Fourth Panzer Army. Although the Chaporozzi bridgehead position was able to repel a strong Russian attack in early October, (of course, this means that the Fortieth Panzer Corps could not be drawn out immediately to destroy Dnepropetrovsk and Klimen The enemy's bridgehead position between Qiaoge.) But the enemy just paused, waiting for reinforcements to arrive, and then launched an attack again.The volley fire of the Russian army is so powerful that we have never seen before (this is the first time that the artillery of the whole division has appeared), and the force dropped by no less than ten divisions, coupled with the support of powerful armored forces, they finally broke into the The bridgehead position.After hard fighting, our army was forced to abandon its position. Although we were still able to withdraw the defenders across the river and blow up the dams, roads and railway bridges that we had just repaired in a few months, the divisions fighting hard in the bridgehead position , but has been seriously weakened, whether it can still defend the river itself is doubtful.In any case, Hitler's insistence on holding this bridgehead has cost us dearly. After mobilizing the mobile reserves of the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army, although it was possible to halt the enemy's advance in the area between Dnepropetrovsk and Klemenchog, it was not possible. Clearing the south bank of the enemy, their reinforcements were crossing the river to expand their bridgehead positions.about the development of the area.It will be mentioned again below because it will have a decisive impact on future operations in the Dnieper Bend. At the same time, the enemy also made every effort to expand its bridgehead at Pirias Lavre (the left flank of the Eighth Army).However, mobile forces drawn from the 4th and 8th Panzer armies were able to prevent their attempts to cross the river with a wide front and destroy the forces that had already crossed.The Russian parachute brigades that landed here and in the southwest of Zilkasse suffered the same fate.Therefore, the enemy in the narrow bridgehead position south of Pirias Lavre is quite difficult to stand out and is generally under our control. In the area of ​​the Fourth Panzer Army, the enemy had also established a foothold during October on the west bank of the Dnieper, just north of Kiev.At the same time, after repelling the right flank of the Second Army, it was also possible to face the northernmost corps of the army and cross the river with a wide front.Because this point was the dividing line between the two armies, a new crisis arose.Again, as in the past, the army group's attempt to restore the situation here had failed because the Second Army had failed to muster and expend the necessary forces in disobedience to the orders of the Army Headquarters.Even after I lodged a serious protest with Army Headquarters, it was unable to carry out its orders.Nevertheless, Fourth Panzer Army held a ridge a few miles west of the Dnieper in the area of ​​two corps north of Kiev.but.The situation is still very dangerous, because we can expect that once the enemy gets reinforcements, they will definitely bypass the city of Kiev from the north. The most astonishing thing is that all the mechanized units of the army group have already been mobilized in this initial battle.The erosion of their combat effectiveness is as terrifying as the infantry divisions on the front line.This made it more difficult for us to find new mobile reserves, and so the need for reinforcements was all the more urgent.