Chapter 74 Battle of the Dnieper Bend

Army Group Headquarters has always considered its northern flank to be the most decisive, because if the enemy breaks through this point, he will be free to carry out a large roundabout movement against Army Group South and Army Group A.In fact, however, the enemy concentrated his main forces in October to achieve a success in the Dnieper Bend.At the same time, Hitler also insisted on defending Crimea for economic and political reasons, so the army group must accept a decisive battle there. During October, the headquarters of the Steppe Front seemed to be the most active on the enemy's side, sending its forces into the bridgehead positions on the south bank of the Dnieper River, on the boundary between the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Armies.By the end of October, there were a total of more than five armies (one of which was fully armored), a total of sixty-one infantry divisions and seven tank or mechanized corps, and the total number of armored combat vehicles was estimated to be more than 900.The two wings of the German army could not withstand such a huge pressure, and retreated to the east and west respectively.Thus a huge gap opened between the two armies, and the enemy was free to penetrate the bend of the Dnieper, towards Krivoi Rog and Nikopol, which Hitler had considered Continuation was necessary for the German war effort.

Worst of all, if the enemy made any further advances, the 1st Panzer Army east of the Dieper Bay was in danger of being isolated.From the point of view of the army group headquarters, this is the most serious problem, because under no circumstances can this army be encircled. By this time, our constant demands for reinforcements had at least forced Army Headquarters to assign us two refurbished armored divisions (14th and 24th) and one infantry division.In addition, three more armored divisions were promised (the two divisions of the 1st and Führer's Guards are resting in the rear, plus the new 25th Panzer Division), although their final allocation and arrival dates are still uncertain.

Had these five armored divisions been available to the army group four weeks earlier, the situation would have been very different!Even if they cannot be reached for the time being due to replenishment, if the headquarters of the army group knew in advance that these troops were available for deployment and enjoyed freedom of movement on its southern flank, the result would be completely different! However, judging from the current situation, even we cannot wait for the arrival of all five armored divisions, because by then the fate of the First Panzer Army may have already been decided.So we have to change the plan and launch a counterattack immediately with the forces we have now, the 2nd Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division.Under the command of the 40th Panzer Corps, advancing from the area where the 8th Army had withdrawn, it struck from the west on the flank and rear of the enemy advancing towards Kryfrog.The First Panzer Army itself should throw all its available armor and infantry in order to keep its main line of communication through Kryfrog open.In order to achieve this task, the army group has ordered the army to leave only a small number of guard troops in the area of ​​​​the XXX Army (defending the river banks on both sides of Dnepropetrovsk).The main body of the corps shortened its front, from north of Chaporozzi to north of Kryfrog, in order to squeeze out forces for the decisive point of battle.Whether he wanted it or not, Hitler had no choice but to acquiesce in the abandonment of this section of the river bank.

Thanks to the seamless cooperation of the two armies (Fortieth Corps was transferred to the command of the 1st Panzer Army in the course of the operation), the counterattack north of Kriver Rog at the end of October turned out to be a pure success.The enemy had already entered the gate of the city, and now instead of being able to cut off the First Panzer Army in the east of the Dnieper Bend, it was severely defeated.According to the report of the group army, about 10,000 enemies were killed. In addition to 350 tanks, more artillery and 5,000 prisoners fell into our hands.These figures, if compared with the records of material and personnel captured in the past, are sufficient to prove that the ratio of material equipment to manpower of the Russian army has greatly increased.In any case, it can be assumed that two or three tank or mechanized divisions and eight infantry divisions have been severely hit, and a few more divisions have suffered heavy losses.In addition, a continuous front has been rebuilt between the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army.But as we were still outnumbered, we could not drive the enemy back to the north shore.This wish cannot be achieved until the three armored divisions that have been allowed to us have been achieved, but on the assumption that no new crises arise in other areas.But in fact, it happened again almost immediately.

While the immediate threat of First Panzer Army was now relieved, a new and greater crisis arose in its rear.On October 28, a far superior enemy force had begun to attack the Sixth Army, which was holding the front between the Dnieper River and the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov in the Army Group A area.The penetration depth is quite impressive.With astonishing vigilance, the Sixth Army retreated westward.During this phase, its northern flank (4th and 29th Armies) rotated back into a wide bridgehead on the south bank of the Dnieper, which meant that the rear of First Panzer Army and Nikop area, at least temporarily, for cover.The rest of the Army Group retreated further west in the direction of the Dnieper crossing at Berislav and the lower reaches of the river. Despite the fact that the Nogaisk steppe could not provide the basis for quickly forming a new front.

Such developments in the area of ​​the Sixth Army constituted a serious threat to the First Panzer Army in the east of the Dnieper Bay, because the counterattack of the Fortieth Panzer Army temporarily stabilized its position, but the enemy The army was not decisively defeated.The main attack planned by the Army Group here will not be possible before mid-November, since the three armored divisions will not be able to reach it until then at the earliest.By this time, the southern flank of the Sixth Army would have retreated to the rear of the lower Dnieper River, the Seventh Army in the Crimea would have been cut off, and the enemy might be approaching the rear of the First Panzer Army from the south. Crossing the Dnieper on both sides of Nikop.The position of the 1st Panzer Army is now limited to a narrow horseshoe-shaped area, its eastern end reaches Chaporozzi, and its front faces north and east, so its situation will become increasingly difficult.If this development could not be stopped, the First Panzer Army had to be withdrawn westward from the east of the Dnieper Bend.This is more or less tantamount to abandoning the above-mentioned areas. In any case, Nikop and its accumulated manganese ore are lost, and Crimea has to resign itself to fate.

In order to prevent any development of this kind, and especially to relieve any threat in the rear of First Panzer Army, I recommend that Army Headquarters take the following measures: Immediately after getting rid of the fighting north of Kriveroog, Fortieth Panzer Corps should employ two armored divisions (preferably three if possible) to draw from the area at Nykop, which Sixth Army still held. From the bridgehead position to the south, a surprise attack was launched into the flank of the pursuing Sixth Army, which was retreating down the Dnieper River through the Rugosk steppe.The goal of this attack was to enable the Sixth Army to form a new front on the Dnieper and establish contact with the Seventeenth Army in the Crimea.At the same time, the threat to the rear of the First Panzer Army can also be eliminated.

By November 12 at the latest, the Fortieth Army, together with the three armored divisions expected to arrive, should launch the planned attack in the area of ​​​​the First Panzer Army.If it achieves the decisive success we hope, it may even enable the Sixth Army to regain the Melitopol-Dnieper line.This proposal was naturally enthusiastically approved by Hitler, as it gave him hope of keeping Nikop and the Crimea. Even so, the plan never materialized.Sixth Army was retreating too quickly, so that the attack of Fortieth Panzer Corps from the bridgehead at Nikopp had no hope of success.Later, the development of the army group's northern flank also rendered the three en route armored divisions even more useless in the Dnieper Bend.

It would be meaningless to mention this project here if it did not teach one vital lesson, namely, that even when forced to take emergency measures, one's own basic operational concepts But still can't forget for a moment. Army Group has emphasized the decisive importance of its northern flank, where the enemy is likely to launch another large-scale attack in the near future.So our general idea is to take steps to prevent the enemy from having any success at this point.For this purpose, XXX Panzer Corps should be withdrawn from the Dnieper Bend after its successful strike at Kryverog and transferred to the rear of the army group's northern flank.The three armored divisions in motion should also be prepared for use here.However, judging from the trend in the Sixth Army area, the First Panzer Army must finally withdraw from the eastern part of the Dnieper Bend, and then it must abandon Nikop and withdraw from Crimea.

It can be concluded that Hitler wanted to restore the situation in the Dnieper Bend, so he was willing to increase the strength of the army group by five armored divisions, so he would never agree to this plan.He will definitely continue to hold on to the Dnieper Bend and Crimea.In spite of this, in fact, the army group should still act in the above-mentioned manner. The proposal I made was reasonable as far as the threat to the 1st Panzer Army was concerned, but it was a mistake as far as the entire conception of operations of the Army Group was concerned.As a result, the Fortieth Panzer Army was finally crucified within the Dnieper Bend.

There are two reasons why I should go against my own basic idea: first, if it is possible to occupy the line of the Dnieper on both sides of Nikop, then it is hoped that on both sides of the river a rapid succession will be given. If the enemy's surprise attack is successful again, the situation on the entire southern flank may be restored.The second point is that if we do not take such a risk, we will definitely be forced to abandon Crimea. Because we ourselves have commanded the Eleventh Army and fought so hard for this peninsula, we feel even more reluctant.However, from the point of view of operations, it seems more correct not to ignore the principle that the northern flank of the army group is the focus of operations.