Chapter 76 The Second Battle of the Dnieper Bend

While the frontal fighting of 4th Panzer Army was still going on, the enemy also recovered from the wounds he had received at Kryfrog by mid-November.With the assistance of fresh troops, they launched another large-scale attack on the northern face of the 1st Panzer Army and the adjacent right flank (facing east) of the 8th Army in the bend of the Dnieper River.On the eastern front of the 1st Panzer Army, they also attempted to cross the river south of Chaporozzi and attacked the Dnieper front of the 8th Army from both sides of Tirkasai.Later they extended their offensive even further, launching an attack on the bridgehead of Nicop from the south. (A corps of the Sixth Army here has been placed under the command of the First Panzer Army.) The enemy's intention is now clearly to encircle and destroy the First Panzer Army in the eastern sector of the Dnieper Bend.

Developments in late November forced the Army Group to submit its new proposals to Army Headquarters for further operational direction. Our memorandum of January 20 was based on the assumption that, despite the large concentration of the enemy's forces in front of the army group, they still had a strong strategic reserve at their disposal.We point out that, according to the available information, Russia organized forty-four infantry divisions and a large number of armored brigades in 1943, none of which have yet participated in combat.In addition, it can be assumed that thirty-three infantry divisions and eleven tank or mechanized corps are resting and replenishing behind the enemy's front.Therefore, throughout the winter, the enemy may continue to launch their offensives on the southern flank of the Eastern Front, and put the main pressure on the northern flank of the Southern Army Group.Even if our counterattack in the Fourth Panzer Army area turned the situation in our favor, the enemy was still able to maintain a suitable staging area west of the Dnieper and continue the attack from there.For this reason, it was absolutely impossible to draw troops from the operationally decisive northern flank of the Army Group to support the fighting in the Dnieper Bend.

Even if we were able to repel the enemy's offensive in the latter areas on the one hand and at the same time stabilize the situation in the area of ​​​​the 4th Panzer Army on the other hand, the situation may still develop along the following lines. In this winter, the frontal length to be defended by the army group far exceeds its capability limit, and all its divisions have been exhausted.It also does not have enough reserves to act effectively against any large-scale enemy attack, especially if several places are alerted at the same time. So in terms of combat, the army group will be completely at the mercy of the enemy because the combat effectiveness of our troops has dropped sharply, so it is especially dangerous.Such fighting cannot bring about a decisive reduction in the effectiveness of the enemy's offensive capabilities.The Russians will always be in the active position, making all our actions under their control, and since we cannot form reserves to counter their blows, the loss of ground, weapons, and manpower will be unbearable.

To make this battle a success, its prerequisite is to have enough strong reserves.If it is not possible to draw forces from other battlefields, then the front of the southern flank must be shortened (including the withdrawal of the Seventeenth Army from the Crimea by sea).If there is no reserve team, it is impossible for this army group to survive this winter. Until the end of November, the situation on the southern flank of the Eastern Front developed as follows: south of the lower Dnieper (Army Group A), the right flank of the Sixth Army had retreated across the lower reaches of the river, leaving only Kherson A narrow bridgehead position was established.The Seventeenth Army was isolated on the Crimean peninsula.But on the contrary, it can still maintain the complete bridgehead position in front of Nikop.Although the Russian unit in charge to the south, the 4th Ukrainian Front, had mobilized its main force of eighteen divisions and strong armored forces to attack here.For the time being, enemy attacks on the lower Dnieper and the neck of Crimea have been suspended.In the bend of the Dnieper, south of Chaporozzi, the enemy had crossed the river with a narrow front and formed a small bridgehead position.In addition, the defensive tactics of the First Panzer Army can be regarded as a complete success, because at certain points, due to the continuous attacks of the enemy, although they have already been forced to retreat, but on the entire front, the enemy has never achieved a breakthrough. Purpose.But these battles had forced the army to use up its last reserves.At the end of November, it also held a continuous front from the north of Chaporozzi to the northwest of Kryfrog, and then turned north to join the Eighth Army.

The Eighth Army itself was in a difficult position, partly because, of course, it had handed over an infantry division and four mechanized divisions to the Fourth Panzer Army to meet the crisis in Kiev in early November.The enemy has also established a solid base south of the Dnieper in the Klimenchog area and has taken control of the Klemenchog ferry.In addition, southwest of the city, they also broke through a hole in the army's eastward front, although it is still small.On the northern front of the Eighth Army on the banks of the Dnieper River, the enemy has also successfully crossed the river on both sides of Tirkasai.Since there was no longer any reserves to mobilize, the army was forced to abandon more than sixty miles of river banks and set up a pole line behind a swampy waterway (parallel to the Dnieper River, about thirty miles south of it). A thin line of defense.

Although the Army Group Headquarters withdrew two mechanized units from the First and Fourth Armored Armies to the Eighth Army as soon as the situation permitted, but whether the Army Group can fill the gap and Re-controlling the situation in Zilkasai, from here we can also see how the headquarters of the army group mobilized its armored forces to run around.Whenever an attempt is made at a point to restore the situation with mobile forces, another crisis may arise in the area from which it was originally drawn. By the end of November, the entire line of the Dnieper, from Tzaporoche to the west of Tirkasai, and from Kiev to the Army Group Center area, was completely in the hands of the enemy.On the northern flank of the Southern Army Group, since the successful counterattack of the 48th Panzer Army, the area of ​​​​the Fourth Panzer Army has been temporarily calm.But there is no doubt that the enemy will definitely gather new fresh troops there, and then make a decisive assault on the depth and flank of our army group.Nevertheless, due to the renewed fighting in the Dnieper Bend, it was necessary to return the above-mentioned two mobile units to the Eighth Army.

At the beginning of December, the right flank of the Fourth Panzer Army was still on the Dnieper River, and its Twenty-fourth Panzer Corps (at this time our Panzer Army was no longer entirely composed of armored divisions, but a random patchwork organization) Engaged with Eighth Army's left flank upstream of Kanif's Ferry.Thirty miles south of Kiev, the front turned abruptly away from the river bank and turned westward, extending as far as the area north of Zhitomyr (48th, 7th Panzer Corps, and 11th Corps).At a considerable distance, facing east, there was the Fifty-ninth Army near Crosston.