Chapter 77 battle along the lines

Throughout December, the Russian army continued to seek a decision in the Dnieper Bend.Apart from occasional lulls for a change of troops, the enemy's incessant attacks on our eastern fortress undoubtedly took very heavy losses on their own. In the actual bend of the river, the 3rd Ukrainian Front repeatedly attacked the northern front of the 1st Panzer Army (30th and 57th Panzer Corps), but despite its enormous numerical superiority, failed to gain Any success worth mentioning. At the same time, the Second Ukrainian Front (formerly known as the Steppe Front) also concentrated six infantry armies and one tank army in order to crush the left flank of the First Panzer Army and the eastward front of the Eighth Army.The enemy's intentions are obvious, using a large number of concentrated armored forces to break through to the southwest in the northwest of Kryfrog, which is also the dividing line between our two armies.Once this had been achieved, they could go straight down the river to encircle the 1st Panzer Army on the east bank of the Dnieper.The second focus of this offensive appears to have been the northern part of Eighth Army's eastward front south of the Dnieper.The enemy's attempt in this direction was to simultaneously attack suddenly from the bridgehead position he had won at Zilkasse in order to encircle the Eighth Army on both sides.

At the same time, the three armies of the 4th Ukrainian Front also attacked the bridgehead of Nikop from the south, which naturally included the rear of the 1st Panzer Army. Although these attacks were repulsed, the overwhelming force of the Second Ukrainian Front on the left flank of the First Panzer Army must have given it some success against the Eighth Army.Twice the enemy broke through to a considerable depth at the above-mentioned main attack point.As a result, our front gradually retreated between Kryfrog (still defensible) and the Dnieper. In both cases, the army group headquarters still reluctantly concentrated the strength of a panzer corps at a dangerous point and counterattacked in order to prevent the enemy's breakthrough and prevent it from affecting the overall operation.Of course, in the remaining areas where the threat is temporarily low, the defensive force is even weaker.In such a bitter battle, the German army inevitably showed exhaustion.The infantry division has not had a minute's rest, and the armored division is more like a fire brigade, rushing from one area to another.Although the enemy's losses are several times greater than ours, they still have ways to replenish.Army Group, on the contrary, tried to convince High Command that sinking our forces in the Dnieper was unreasonable, but it failed to produce any real results.The Army Headquarters could not find the necessary manpower and materials to supplement the loss of combat power, but Hitler refused to agree to withdraw from this area in a timely manner so that troops could be used on the northern flank, which was far more valuable in combat.Hitler ignored our repeated warnings that holding the Dnieper Bend would not be enough to save First Panzer Army from the final threat of encirclement as long as the enemy continued to reinforce.We also pointed out that the front must be shortened in order to establish a reserve force on the southern flank, which was equally ineffective.On the contrary, we had no choice but to draw two divisions from the northern flank of the army group and throw them in the Dnieper Bend. In fact, these two divisions were more useful on the northern flank.There must be a serious crisis on the northern flank before Hitler would grudgingly acknowledge the need for such operations.

The reason Hitler continued to cling to the Dnieper Bend was because he considered Nikop and the Crimea to be of great importance to our war effort.Even now he has not given up the hope that, once the enemy's attack in the Dnieper Bend has been repulsed, we will be able to strike another blow southward to save the Crimea.He also believed that as long as every inch of land survived, as he had done outside Moscow in 1941, the enemy would eventually bleed to death.Whenever we suggested shortening the lines of battle, he no doubt retorted that this would also give the enemy more troops.What Hitler did not understand was that a proper defense was necessary to consume the enemy.

On the northern flank of the army group, the blows of the 48th Panzer Corps of the Fourth Panzer Army have certainly created a breathing room, but there is no doubt that as long as the enemy has replenished its losses, it will still be defeated. Launch the offensive again.The task of the Fourth Panzer Army is to weaken the opponent as much as possible to delay time.Moreover, since the main body of this army now occupies a front between the Dnieper and the area north of Zhytomyr and faces north, the danger is even greater if the enemy tries to turn around its western flank and isolate itself in Kokomo. Roston's Fifty-Ninth Army was powerless to stop it.

Although the strength of the Fourth Armored Army is not enough to launch an offensive to Kiev in any case, in order to completely eliminate the enemy on the west bank of the Dnieper River.But Army Group Headquarters felt that at least a margin of safety should be created for the Army's western flank to attempt.Therefore, the longer the initiative regained by the 48th Panzer Corps can be maintained, the better. The 4th Panzer Army was then ordered to expand the situation, and it was now time to launch a further offensive with limited objectives on the open western flank in the Zhytomyr-Korostun area.According to the instructions of the army group, the 48th Panzer Corps pulled out from the northern front, and by means of camouflage and deception, took advantage of the darkness to drive into the open west flank of the enemy's 60th Army Group north of Zhytomyr.In a surprise attack, the latter was rolled up from the west end.Then the army launched another strike against the enemy army, which was gathering southeast of Korostun, and at least three more mechanized corps of the enemy were severely damaged.

In the end, not only did the enemy's new force suffer considerable damage, but it also allowed our army to regain some degree of control over the area facing the left wing of the Fourth Panzer Army.However, this did not prevent the enemy from launching a new offensive in the same area, which began on December 24th. While I was inspecting the 20th Armored Rifle Division, I received the first reports that the enemy had launched an offensive on both sides of the Kiev-Zhytomyr road.The division was serving as reserve behind this threatened front.I was there for their various Christmas celebrations.At first the news didn't seem too serious, the only area feeling the pinch was the 25th Armored Division south of the road.However, when I returned to the Vinnytsia headquarters at night, it could already be seen from the situation report that the enemy was trying to make a large-scale breakthrough to Zhytomyr.

In the next few days, the information received was as follows: the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Kiev region had concentrated an extremely strong force west of the city and was attempting to launch an attack along the Zhytomyr road and south of it. Broad breakthrough.Its main forces are the 38th, 1st Guards, and 1st Tank Armies, which contain more than 18 infantry divisions and six tank or mechanized armies.Within a few days, the designation of its Eighteenth Army was discovered.This main offensive was extended southward by its Fortieth Army south of Fastov. On the northern flank of the attack front, the Sixtieth Army, which was recently defeated by our army, has regained its strength. In addition, the Thirteenth Army in the north is advancing towards Korostun. There are at least fourteen infantry divisions and one cavalry corps.Although some of these units have been greatly weakened by the attacks of our 48th Panzer Corps in the past, behind them the 3rd Guards Tank Army is busy concentrating its forces at no less than six. tank or mechanized army.Although perhaps three or four of these corps had also suffered heavy losses in recent fighting, they were quickly replenished.In any case, the concentration of these mobile forces is enough to imply that the enemy intends to make a major detour through Korostun in addition to breaking through to Zhytomyr.

It is true that behind the most dangerous frontal section currently commanded by the 42nd Army, the 48th Armored Army is concentrated near Zhytomyr on standby. It includes two armored divisions, the 100th Armored Army 68th Infantry Division and 18th Artillery Division (recently formed in the Army Group area).But because the enemy's military strength is several times stronger, it is really doubtful whether this force can stop the enemy's assault.And even if this could be done, its strength would not be enough to cope with the enemy's enveloping movement through Korosten and on to the northern flank of the army group.

Therefore, on December 25, the Army Group Headquarters sent a report to the Army Headquarters, explaining the current relative situation between the enemy and ourselves, and pointing out the appropriate countermeasures.With the current strength, it is impossible for the Fourth Panzer Army to stop the enemy's offensive. In other words, it cannot complete its task of covering the deep flanks of Army Group South and Army Group A.Therefore, this group army must be thoroughly strengthened.If Army Headquarters had no troops available for this purpose, the Army Group would be obliged to draw at least five to six divisions from its right flank.In this way, the latter will inevitably not be able to maintain its current position in the Dnieper Bend, so we must demand the freedom of action that is given to us.

At the same time, we also instructed the 4th Panzer Army to immediately use all its available forces to stop the main attacking Russian army and prevent them from reaching the goal of breaking through to Zhytomir in the area of ​​​​the 42nd Army.Its northern flank (thirteenth and fifty-ninth armies) should try to prevent the enemy's detour towards Zhytomyr.The 17th Armored Division, which had already been withdrawn from the Sixth Army, was temporarily under the control of the Army Group Headquarters, and was now also ordered to join the Fourth Armored Army immediately. Due to Hitler's insistence, the instructions of the Army Headquarters still attempted to make a compromise solution in the Dnieper Bend.We report again that the time has long passed for isolated measures, such as mobilizing a division or two, to control the situation on the northern flank of the Army Group!

From the amount of force the enemy has already employed there, we think that even if their advance could be stopped for a while, the result would be the same, especially since they must continue to throw fresh reserves into the battle.In fact, developments in the area south of Korosten|Zhytomyr|Berdiziv|Fenista|Kiev in the coming weeks will be sufficient to determine whether the southern flank of the German Army on the Eastern Front will be cut off and forced to The problem of retreating to the southwest. The drastic measures necessary to meet this danger were again similar to those faced by our army group in the winter of 1942, simply because it was possible to leapfrog the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies from the right flank to the On the left, it was only then that the tide was turned.The countermeasure that should be taken now is to withdraw the First Panzer Army from the Dnieper Bend and transfer it to Berdiziv together with at least five or six divisions.This again necessitated the abandonment of the eastern part of the Dnieper Bend and the withdrawal of the front to the established fortified line from the knee of the Dnieper west of Nikop to Kryfrog. We explained that if the front could be shortened in this way, the strength of twelve divisions could be released, six of which, as already mentioned, should be assigned to the First Panzer Army, and the remaining six divisions would be reserved for the Sixth Army. After that, it should replace the position of the First Panzer Army and establish a line of defense on the Lower Dnieper River. The forces sent to reinforce the northern flank of the Army Group should try to move eastward to intercept the enemy's spearheads approaching Zhytomyr.In addition, Army Headquarters should deploy additional troops to intercept the enemy's devious movement.If possible in the future, this force should cooperate with the First Armored Army to attack the enemy's main force from the west. At the same time, we also pointed out that although the enemy's attack has been suspended in the Dnieper Bend, the situation seems to have eased, and our army can be allowed to mobilize our troops without any great danger. However, if we do not retreat early, if the enemy When they attack again, they are about to be in trouble.Based on the above analysis, our conclusion is that the Supreme Command must make a quick decision. Despite our urging, until December 28, the Supreme Command was still unable to make a thorough decision on our proposal, and only allowed one or two divisions to be given to the Fourth Panzer Army.On December 29, Army Group Headquarters issued what it considered appropriate: the headquarters of the First Panzer Army should hand over its existing areas to the Sixth Army on January 1, and no later than January 3 On the 1st, the 4th Panzer Army was to take over the front from the Dnieper to a point about 27 miles southeast of Berdiziv (that is, belonging to the 24th Panzer Corps and the 7th Armies).Behind the left flank of this front, the Third Panzer Corps was ordered to gather four divisions drawn from the Dnieper Bend or the Sixth Army, the Sixth and Seventeenth Armored Divisions, the Sixteenth Armored Infantry Division, and the Sixteenth Armored Infantry Division. One hundred and one light divisions.The other divisions will continue to be mobilized.The reason why the transfer of the First Armored Army cannot be done on a larger scale is that it is limited by means of transportation.In addition, the Army Group could not order to withdraw from the eastern part of the Dnieper Bend without Hitler's consent, because this would have a direct impact on the status of Army Group A.Unfortunately, even at the level of the army groups, there are limits to such independent decision-making powers. For the remaining front of the 4th Panzer Army, it should be reinforced by the troops provided by the Army Headquarters, namely the 16th Panzer Corps, 1st Infantry Division and 4th Mountain Division under the command of the 46th Army Command.However, it is still doubtful whether these forces can complete the counterattack against the enemy's flank.In any case the first thing is to stop the enemy's advance. On December 30, the Army Group reported the steps it had taken to Army Headquarters. Hitler reluctantly agreed the next day, but he continued to refuse to admit that there was any possibility of abandoning the eastern Dnieper Bend and the Nikop bridgehead. urgent need. While the order of the army group to mobilize troops was being implemented, the situation in the area of ​​​​the Fourth Panzer Army became worse and worse on December 31.The main enemy assault group had made a wide breakthrough to the southwest in the direction of Vinnytsia.Apparently the army's front south of Kiev was still holding (24th Panzer Corps and 7th Corps), but its western flank was forced to bend back.In addition, in the area where the Third Panzer Army was going to concentrate, there was also a gap as wide as 50 miles. It was not until a point less than 30 miles southeast of Beldizif that another line belonging to the Fourth Panzer Army began. However, this line of defense was interrupted again east of the road from Beldiziv to Zhytomyr.Fighting near Zhytomyr, facing east and north is the Thirteenth Army, the Fifty-Ninth Army has now been forced to retreat west of Korostun, and between it and the Fifty-Ninth Army has opened up again. Another fifty-mile-wide gap, some distance behind which the Twenty-sixth Panzer Corps was concentrating. Fortunately, for the time being, the enemy forces were still fighting separately with the units of the Fourth Panzer Army, ignoring the gaps in between, so they completely missed the opportunity to use their mobile forces to go directly to the rear area of ​​​​the army group, or to encircle the Fourth Panzer Army. At the beginning of January, the position of our Army Group as a whole became worse and worse.In the Dnieper Bend (including the Nikop bridgehead), the enemy was preparing to launch a new offensive against the Sixth and Eighth Armies.Had this offensive been launched before the Army Group's demanded withdrawal had occurred in the eastern part of the bend, the situation on this wing would have become extremely serious.Worst of all, those armored divisions that had already been ordered to move to the northern flank with the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army as the second wave would not be able to escape.On January 3, the enemy actually launched a large-scale attack east of Kirovograd, and the two divisions there were temporarily trapped. Replenishment was now even more necessary on the northern flank, as the enemy had recognized the great opportunity afforded by the torn front of Fourth Panzer Army.In the area taken over by the 1st Panzer Army (which has assumed command in the areas south and southwest of Kiev since 3 January.) the enemy advances south to a point thirty miles north of Uman at a point where it was temporarily held back by advancing units of the Third Panzer Corps. A particularly serious situation arose on the side of Fourth Panzer Army, which, fearing the danger of being turned around on both flanks, was compelled on January 4 to retreat to the following line, not far east of Vinnytsia. From a point at forty miles, headed north toward Berdiziv (where the fighting was still going on), and finally ended at a point on the former Polish-Russian border about forty miles west of the town. In the wide gap between ourselves and Army Group Center, the 59th Corps withdrew over the old Russian-Polish frontier along the road and north of the road from Zhitomir to Rovno. The developments in the first few days of January forced me to fly to Hitler's headquarters on January 4 to try to persuade him of the need to transfer troops from the right to the left of Army Group.I began by describing the new threats in the Dnieper Bend and the seriousness of the situation in the 4th Panzer Army area.Then I will explain our plan in detail. We plan to use the Third Panzer Corps of the First Panzer Army from the east, and the 26th Panzer Corps, which is now reaching the rear of the northern flank of the Fourth Panzer Army, from the northwest. side of the enemy. (Hitler showed his judgment here again, because he doubted our ability to counterattack. It turned out that he was not bad.) At the same time, I also informed Hitler that the counterattack in this plan could only be temporary at best It is only an emergency, and from a long-term point of view, it does not provide any real solution to the situation on the northern flank of the army group.If the situation here cannot be resolved fundamentally, the entire southern flank of the German Army on the Eastern Front will suffer a fatal blow.Then Army Group South and Army Group A would be doomed to be wiped out in Romania or on the Black Sea.Therefore, if the Supreme Command has been unable to provide sufficient reinforcements, in order to draw troops to save the decisive northern flank, the retreat of the army group's southern flank must not be delayed any longer.In other words, Nikop and Crimea were abandoned. I should point out that at this stage the Army Group headquarters considered the retreat east of the Dnieper Bend to be only the first step towards saving the whole area.For the sake of reorganizing the forces, it was necessary to shorten the front on the southern flank still further.For this reason, the Army Group had already scouted and developed a defensive line farther west as a preparatory measure. Hitler was of course aware of this fact.Take advantage of the favorable situation of the river.This line of defense extends roughly north or northwest from the lower reaches of the Bug River until the northern wing of the Army Group is now at the southern end of the hard-fought area.To capture this line would have cut in about half the length of the fronts held by the Sixth and Eighth Armies which now stretch along the bend of the Dnieper to about 560 miles.If the length of the front is greatly shortened in this way, a lot of troops can be saved (plus the Seventeenth Army that has withdrawn from the Crimea), so that we can finally move our main force to the northern flank, and at the same time Sufficient troops can also be left on the southern flank to hold this shortened line of defense against the far superior enemy.Moreover, since we have completely destroyed the enemy's railway network, the enemy may not be able to match our forces in speed and numbers when he moves from his southern flank to the area west of Kiev. The basis for this complete retreat of the German southern flank was, of course, the withdrawal from the Dnieper Bend first.Because we are well aware of Hitler's attitude, we believe that if this request is made directly, the result may hit a snag, because he has no idea that such a remote combat policy is needed. On the contrary, Hitler is even now opposed to withdrawing from the Dnieper Bend or abandoning Nykop.Because he believes that the loss of Crimea will prompt Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania to change their attitudes.He also announced that he could no longer send us any further forces to reinforce the northern flank, since these could only be drawn from Army Group North, which must also be withdrawn to Lake Papus.If so, Finland might withdraw from the war and cost us our claim to the Baltic Sea.We would lose access to iron ore from Sweden, and our submarines would lose a major training ground. As to the question of drawing troops from the Western Front, Hitler also said that he would not be able to do so unless the enemy's landing was first repulsed, or the British could really contain their forces in Portugal as he hoped.All he wants now is to stall for time and wait for the situation in the West to be clarified and our new units to complete preparations.In addition, submarine warfare will also begin to show its effectiveness from May onwards.Hitler also said that the enemy has already had many differences, so this alliance is destined to collapse one day, so buying time is the most important thing. He was as anxious as I was about the threat to the Army Group, but he decided to take the risk here until he had no more troops at his disposal.It was useless to argue with Hitler, because he, as usual, accused me of lack of knowledge of the universe.All I can do is to reiterate the seriousness of the situation on our northern flank and to stress that the countermeasures Army Group itself is taking do not provide a fundamental solution.So in any case, it is absolutely necessary to quickly transfer a new army group to the rear of the northern wing of the army group, roughly in the area of ​​​​Rivne, in order to deal with the threat of a large encirclement by the enemy. Since there were so many people present at the daily briefings, it was inconvenient to argue further with Hitler, so I asked to speak with him alone, leaving only the Chief of the General Staff with me.Hitler was very surprised that I made this request at this time, but he reluctantly agreed, and the dignitaries of the High Command, Göring and other members of the entourage all got up and retreated. (Usually the stenographers in this type of debriefing would take down everything that was said, but they don't have a map in front of them, so they often don't understand what we're talking about.) Before I flew to the base camp, I had already made a firm determination to raise the issue of the highest military leadership again in addition to discussing the status of my army group.When all had departed except General Zeisler, I asked permission to speak frankly. Hitler said: Please speak!Although his attitude was not cold, it was at least very distant. I began: one thing must be clear to us, that the grave situation we have is not entirely attributable to the enemy's superiority, great though it is.How we lead should also be accountable. When I said these words, Hitler's expression hardened.He stared at me with his eyes, as if he wanted to crush my will. I have never seen such strong willpower in other people's eyes.Hateful as his face was, perhaps the only attractive part of it was the eyes, and now he wanted to use that magic to bring me to my knees.Many people have been conquered by this magic.But I continued to talk and told him frankly that this kind of leadership cannot continue.I said I should repeat what I had suggested to him twice in the past.In order to deal with questions of grand strategy, he needed a fully responsible Chief of the General Staff, on whose advice he alone should rely in all matters of military policy.The logical consequence of this arrangement on the Eastern Front is to assign a commander-in-chief, which has already been done in Italy and on the Western Front, who, within the framework of grand strategy, should enjoy complete independent command. Again, as on the last two occasions, when I persuaded Hitler to make a radical change in his approach to military matters (indeed, to ask him to unofficially relinquish command), his reaction was always Quite negatively, he believed that he alone could determine the strength of forces required and the attacks to pursue in the various theaters of operation.In any case, he added, Goering would never obey anyone else's orders. As for the appointment of a commander-in-chief on the Eastern Front, Hitler thought it impossible for anyone to have the same authority as he.He cried aloud: Even I cannot make these marshals obey me!Do you think they will obey you more?I can also remove them if necessary.No one else has such great authority. I replied that my orders were always fully carried out, and he concluded the conversation without further words. My efforts failed again.Perhaps the reason why Hitler was unwilling to give command to a soldier was that he had too much self-esteem and too much confidence in his own power.Even in private he never admitted his faults and the need for a military adviser.Another reason may be the psychology of distrust. The dictator must control the army in his own hands to prevent accidents. On the contrary, I am fully aware that any attempt to solve this problem by force (i.e., stage a coup d'état) would completely break down my field army still in the field.The Russians wanted to invade Germany, just as Britain and the United States demanded unconditional surrender, so that resorting to such violent means was out of the question. So I had to go back to my headquarters empty-handed, neither improving the status of the army group nor getting a reasonable reorganization of the high command.But we never gave up our efforts to gain freedom of movement for our right flank on the Dnieper and strengthen our northern (left) flank. Since the talks in Hitler's base camp were fruitless, the army group had to continue the bitter battle in the Dnieper River.On the northern flank, the principle is to prevent the enemy from encircling the Fourth Panzer Army and breaking through to the south as much as possible, because this is enough to cut off the rear communication line of the entire southern flank. Throughout January, the enemy forces in the Dnieper Bend continued to attack with all their strength the positions we still held.They were especially violent against the eastern front of the Eighth Army, although the Sixth Army's area also had to constantly defeat the enemy's attacks.The latter attacked not only the north-facing front within the bend of the river, but also the Nikop bridgehead from the south. Thanks to the valor of the German troops and the many contingencies employed by the two army commanders, the enemy in this theater of operations, although several times stronger than we were in numbers and material, still achieved only limited success.Although the front of the Eighth Army was forced to retreat a little distance to the west, and Kirofograd was abandoned, the enemy was still unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough to encircle our forces in the Dnieper Bend. Target. On the left wing of Army Group, by contrast, the situation became increasingly difficult.The Fourth Panzer Army could not withstand the strong pressure of the enemy. In order to keep the main part of its front continuous at a minimum, it was forced to abandon Berdizif and retreat west and southwest, but this is not the worst matter.The greater danger was that around January 6 the enemy again began to recognize the gaps that existed between the 1st Panzer Army and the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army, and between the 4th Panzer Army and the Army Group Center. What kind of opportunities can be given to us.In the hollow mentioned later, a weak and isolated Fifty-ninth Army was making a fighting retreat towards Rivne. It has now been shown that the enemy has stalled on the front of Fourth Panzer Army in order to expand his opportunities on its exposed flank.On the one hand, it was preparing to use three armies (18th, 1st Guards, and 1st Guards Tanks) to destroy the northern flank of the 4th Panzer Army, and on the other hand, it sent its 60th and 13th armies to attack Rove Connaught to the north to pursue.At the same time the strong Russian forces (1st Tank and 42nd Armies) also moved south into the gap between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies.Their spearheads had reached about twenty miles north of the supply base of the 1st Panzer Army in Uman, and approached Vinnytsia, where the army group headquarters had formerly been located.The headquarters had been moved to Proskurov a few days earlier, having been cut off from communications with the right wing by a sudden Russian advance.In the end, enemy armor even temporarily blocked the railway supply line of Army Group at Zhmerinka.The railway line going further south will pass through Romania, and the efficiency is even worse. In this case, the army group headquarters must choose one of two routes.Should we deal with the enemy attack on the almost completely exposed north flank first?Or should we stop the enemy's breakthrough between the first and fourth armored armies first?We don't have enough troops to handle both tasks at the same time.We decided to tackle the second danger first, as it was the more pressing of the two.If the enemy were allowed to drive through this gap with all his strength and head south toward the Bug River, the Eighth and Sixth Armies threatened to be cut off immediately. On the contrary, the enemy's continued advance on the northern flank of the Army Group will not pose a direct threat to our existence in the near future.And Hitler sooner or later had to deploy troops to rescue this danger.But if the two armies on the southern flank were cut off, there would be no possibility of rescuing them.As for the only correct solution, which is to completely withdraw the southern flank of the army group to gain strength to overcome the crisis on the northern flank, it was still vetoed by Hitler. Based on this consideration, I decided to first concentrate all forces to prevent the enemy's southward attack through the gap between the two panzer armies.The situation was made even more dangerous by the fact that the enemy's breakthrough in the direction of Uman had already forced First Panzer Army to fold its western flank southward in the area southwest of Kiev.Now the First Panzer Army and the Eighth Army are standing back to back, the latter facing east in the Dnieper Bend.Because the inner wings of the two armies were still guarding the line of the Dnieper River on both sides of Kanif, the German position formed a pocket shape, the apex of which hooked the Dnieper River in the north, and its two sides were the fronts of the above-mentioned two armies. , to the east and west, respectively.Had the enemy succeeded in the hollow north of Uman, he would have been too easy to isolate the pocket to the south.Of course, the most logical way is to withdraw it, because it is very disadvantageous to use forces in this defense.But Hitler was still unwilling to voluntarily give up the banks of the Dnieper here.He still hopes to use this eminence as a springboard to one day retake the eastern part of the Dnieper Bend.So that pocket continues to exist.Before long, it became the Zilkasai pocket. The intention of the army group is to prepare to use a three-way attack to attack the enemy attacking in this crack.From the east, advancing from the area of ​​the 1st Panzer Army, the 7th Army was supposed to break into the enemy's flank.On the orders of the army group headquarters, it was withdrawn from the above-mentioned prominent place, leaving only a weak defensive barrier on the Dnieper River.The fact that the corps was not subsequently besieged in the Zilkasy Pocket is a sufficient indication of the worthiness of this measure.From the west, the 46th Panzer Corps, which was still on its way from France to the Eastern Front, would attack on the other flank.From the south, the Third Panzer Corps, brought in from the Dnieper Bend, was used to meet the enemy. Its task was to contain the enemy with mobile combat until the other two armies were ready to attack. By the second half of January, the preparations for this counterattack were ready.However, because the number of troops is too small, it must be divided into two stages, and the gap between the fourth and first two armored armies has widened to forty-five miles at this time. In the first phase, Seventh Army and Third Panzer Corps defeated the Russian Fortieth Army in the hollow east.Then in the second phase, as a result of another concentric attack by the 3rd and 46th Panzer Corps, the 1st Infantry Division, the 4th Mountain Division and the 18th Artillery Division all made significant contributions. The empty west encircled and wiped out a considerable part of the enemy's First Tank Army.第一階段的數字，我已經找不到了，在第二階段中，俄軍被殺死的約為五萬人，但被俘者卻只有五千五百人，此外敵人也喪失了七百輛坦克、二百多門野炮和五百門左右的反坦克炮。一共有十四個俄國的步兵師和五個坦克或機械化軍曾經受到了兩次打擊的影響，但毫無疑問，敵軍至少有一部分逃出了包圍圈。 當然，當這個作戰還正在進行之際，集團軍群與陸軍總部之間有關未來作戰問題的爭論也仍在繼續發展中。我們一再強調應給我們右翼以行動自由，並放棄對第聶伯河灣的戀棧之必要，從作戰的觀點來看，這早就已經是一個不適當的政策。在一封由總參謀長轉呈的信中，我又告訴希特勒說，決定土耳其、保加利亞和羅馬尼亞的態度者，不是克里米亞的存亡，而是德軍在後述兩國的東疆之前能夠維持一個完整的南翼。 集團軍群總部同時也強調整個德軍南翼的前途，最後就要看我們是否能在集團軍群左翼後方羅夫諾周圍適合時機的集中一支強大的兵力要達到這個目的，則必須縮短右翼的正面，從北面集團軍群方面抽調兵力和從克里米亞撤回第十七集團軍。除非我們能夠趕緊在羅夫諾周圍集中這個集團軍，否則敵人即將在我們的北側面執行一個大迂迴運動，迫使我們整個南翼向羅馬尼亞退卻。儘管總參謀長完全同意我們的意見，並且也一再努力的說希特勒聽信它們，可是後者卻仍然固執其死守不動的原則。我們不可能獲得其對於長期作戰觀念的任何指示，除了再堅守下去以外。 甚至於事實上，陸軍總部也相信敵人尚有強大的戰略預備隊可供運用。這是遲早都會動用的，所以更使這種領導方式顯得不合理。希特勒既不將其對於作戰前途的一般看法告訴這些集團軍群總司令，那麼任何人又如何可以在戰場上作適當的指揮呢？敵人既然有預備兵力的存在，那麼又怎樣能夠不作較遠端的估計呢？我在下述的信件中，對於這種情況曾加強分析如下： 假使任何領導要想成功，其基礎就是在所有各階層上，一切政策都應有和諧的協調，這又有賴於上級應作明白的指示，並且對於從敵方獲得的情況報告，應有一致的研判。集團軍群不可以僅僅只從今天想到明天。它不可以只是奉命死守，而不考慮到敵人正在準備中的迂迴運動。 所以我要要求陸軍總部或者是採納集團軍群所早已呈報的情況研判，或者是明白的否決它，而把其自己對於前途的看法告訴下級。 假使最高統帥部對於集團軍群在其自己有限的活動範圍之內所作成的結論，故意裝聾作啞，那麼一個協調的政策也就完全不在考慮之列了。 當這一封信又不曾獲得答覆之後，我就又寫了一封給希特勒私人的長信。我又再度說明集團軍群的情況，敵人所具有的作戰可能性，和我方部隊的狀況。我認為假使不依照集團軍群的建議採取行動，則全盤情況將如何發展，那將是毫無疑問的。我又特別指出，應趕緊把兵力集中在集團軍群北翼的後方，對抗敵人的迂迴企圖。這是至為迫切的，所以我的結論是說：我的元首，讓我這樣的作結論吧，專就我們而言，問題不是逃避一個危險，而是要採取步驟克服我們不久即可能要被迫面臨的危險。 幾天之後，這封信對於我與希特勒之間所發生的一次衝突中，也發生相當的關係。 一月二十七日，他召集在東線上的全部集團軍群和集團軍指揮官，加上其他大批的高級軍官，到大本營中來聽訓。他要親自向我們說明在軍隊推行納粹黨化教育之需要。他認為軍事情況愈困難，則信心愈是獲得勝利的重要保證。他又認為高級軍官的選擇也就應以此為標準。 甚至於在訓話前的簡單會餐中，我就可以從他的致詞中感覺到他是並未忘記我在一月四日所作的批評。於是他在正式訓話的時候，他甚至於當著那些勞苦功高的陸軍將領們這樣的說著：假使有一天末日來到了，最後保護國旗的人應該真正是這些元帥和將軍們。 我從來不曾受過這樣的侮辱，而且希特勒的話也是故意侮辱所有的軍人。因為大家都是慣於沉默的聽訓，所以沒有人開口。但是我個人卻感覺到這種侮辱實在是太強烈，所以血液遂向我的頭上沖，因此當希特勒為了強調起見再度說出這句話時，我就衝口而出的喊著說：他們將會如此的，我的元首！ 我這種表示自然與我對納粹黨的態度無關。我只是表示我們不願意接受任何人的侮辱，包括希特勒在內。以後我的同僚們也告訴我，他們心中的怒火正是像我一樣的高，所以當我開口說話時，他們都嘆了一口氣有如釋重負之感。 不過希特勒在以一國元首身份致詞時，也許從來不曾有過這樣被人打斷話頭的經驗。他很明顯吃了一驚，用冷冰冰的眼光朝我看去，喊著我說：謝謝你，曼施坦因元帥！於是他匆匆的結束了他的演講。 當我正在與柴茲勒爾一同吃茶的時候，有一個電話來說希特勒要當著凱特爾的面前召見我。當我走入室內時，他向我說：元帥，當我向將領們致詞時，我不能容許你中途打斷我的話頭。假使你自己的下級如此，你也是一樣的不能容忍。 這是無從答辯的，所以我不作聲。於是希特勒在盛怒之下又犯了一個錯誤。他說：幾天之前，你送了一份情況報告書。我想你的目的是為了在戰爭日記上來證明你的看法正確。 這的確是已經太過分了。我回答說：我寫給你的信是私人性的，並不曾列入戰爭日記之中。你應該原諒我在這裡要用一句英國人的講法，我對於我的動機所能作的解釋就是我是一個君子（Gentleman）。 Silent.希特勒停了一會才說：多謝你。 在晚間彙報中，我又特別的被召出席，希特勒對我的態度又變得非常的溫和。他甚至於與我商討防禦克里米亞的可能性。當然，我知道他不會忘記我上午對於他的頂撞。但是除了我與最高統帥的私人關係以外，我還有更多的事情要煩惱。 在一｜二月間，有三個地區尤其成為新聞中的重要標題。它們的名稱即為尼柯普、齊爾卡賽和羅夫諾。