Chapter 81 settlement day

The Supreme Command has never been willing to give up anything in order to obtain a stronger force than the enemy at a decisive point.It was a colossal mistake, and by March 1944 the check had expired.What we have to pay, first and foremost, is that in 1943 the German army did not devote all its strength to a showdown on the Eastern Front, in order to at least create a stalemate, or before the real second front in the West was opened, The offensive power of the Russian army was attrition. The second big mistake was to stick to the end so that the southern flank of the Eastern Front held on to the eastern fortresses, first in the Donets Basin and the Kuban Peninsula, then in the Dnieper Bay and Crimea, All give the enemy the opportunity to cut them off.The High Command ignored that it was not for these areas that would decide the final outcome, but on the northern flank, since from there the enemy could encircle the entire southern flank of the German army on the Black Sea and on Romanian territory.This has been the deciding point since the Battle of the Acropolis.

It is too late now!1943 has slipped away without any success.Whether a stalemate can still form in the future will depend on the outcome of the invasion of the Western Allies in 1944.But the first thing to check out is the south wing of the Eastern Front!Hitler's hope that the weakening of the Russian army and the onset of the mud season by the end of February would stop the enemy's advance has now at least proved to be in vain. While this is true, thanks to the heroism of the German troops, the enemy's gains were hard won, at the cost of enormous sacrifices.The quality of their infantry units has apparently plummeted, as they have forcibly conscripted all the strong men in the recovered areas.But the obvious fact is that they still have plenty of fresh troops to call on.Although the number of tanks or mechanized army tanks has been reduced due to heavy losses, it is several times more than the German armored divisions.On the German side, despite the search for manpower from rear units, it was not enough to fill the gap.We have already recruited a large number of local volunteers in the B echelon unit and the supply column, mainly Ukrainians and Caucasians. The policy implemented by the party bureau in the occupied areas is so bad).

In early March, mud season finally arrived.But at first it was more unfavorable for our side than for the Russian army.As mentioned above, due to their wide tracks, Russian tanks have greater mobility in snow and mud.And at the same time, the enemy already has a large number of American trucks.They are off-road capable, while our trucks are limited to a few solid roads, so enemy tanks and infantry units in mechanized corps can also move quickly.Therefore, our mobile troops have to travel a long distance and delay for a considerable time, so naturally they are not an opponent of a more mobile enemy.

Unless the mud had temporarily halted the enemy's advance, it would still be necessary for the Army Group to maintain a strong northern flank, and fighting might still continue before long. Of course, the enemy also continued to attack Army Group A (Sixth Army) and our own Eighth Army.This wing still protrudes to the east, so it is often possible to be smashed by the enemy.This would also give the Russians the opportunity to retake Bessarabia and enter Romania and other Balkan countries: this is the gift Roosevelt was eager to give to Uncle Joe. Nevertheless, the German army was still able to retreat flexibly on this wing. When the front of the Sixth Army was greatly shortened, considerable troops could be saved in the army.It was still possible to form a suitable line of defense on the lower Bug or Nester, preventing the enemy from getting beyond.

As early as February 22, we noticed that facing the enemy on the southern flank of the Eighth Army, they were already preparing for a new offensive. The army group demanded that the army should have the freedom to do evasive actions.Because the left wing needs more troops, we can't reinforce this side.But whether the Eighth Army can adopt such a flexible tactic depends, of course, on whether the Sixth Army to the south can cooperate.So this is also the reason why we have to obtain the consent of the Army Headquarters in advance. Not surprisingly, Hitler would not have agreed.Conversely, when new setbacks occurred on Sixth Army's long line of defense, the Army Group was also forced to send more troops (the 3rd and 24th Panzer Divisions) to attack in support of them.

From an operational point of view, however, an attack on Army Group A along the Darkshore is far less likely to be decisively successful than on the northern flank.Had the enemy concentrated the greatest number of forces on this front, they would have been able to break through the front of the 4th Panzer Army, perhaps before the mud season began, and they would have been able to occupy the southern part of Ukraine from Lvov through Zhmerinka railway line.This was also the main supply line for the entire southern flank of the German army.Then if you continue to advance south, the enemy can also reach the deep side and rear of the southern flank.

Obviously, the enemy will definitely use the gap between the northern wing of the Southern Army Group and the southern wing of the Central Army Group to assemble another powerful assault force.Its task was to bypass the left flank of the army group, or, as General Zeisler said, go straight to Lvov.The appearance of the headquarters of the Russian Belarusian Front in the region at the end of February is a clear indicator of this intention.When the left flank of our army group has been turned in this way, we must be forced to retreat to the south.On the contrary, the Russian army can freely enter Grisia or Poland through Lviv.Such developments must be prevented at all costs.

When the fighting to free the two corps near Circasy was over, and contact between the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Army had been reestablished in the area, Army Group Headquarters had ordered a complete redeployment of its forces to the left.In the area of ​​​​the 1st Panzer Army and the 8th Armies, the corps of the 3rd Panzer Army and the 1st, 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were drawn.Then there may be the 17th Armored Division and the Artillery Division, which will follow behind and go to the assembly area near Proskurov behind the Fourth Army Group.The 7th Armored Division, the Führer's Guards Division and a heavy tank battalion (305th) were also transferred from the 4th Panzer Army.These units were concentrated near Tarrop and were commanded by the 48th Panzer Corps.The task of the 3rd Panzer Corps was to prevent the enemy's frontal breakthrough north of Proskurov, and the 48th Panzer Corps was to prevent the enemy's encirclement of the western flank by way of Tarrop.The three infantry divisions (68th, 357th, and 359th) allowed by Army Headquarters should also move into the 4th Panzer Army area.The mobilization of these divisions naturally takes time.Especially the conditions of the roads and means of transport do not allow any rapid movement.It turned out that they could not reach their designated destination until mid-March.

At the beginning of that month, Army Group also ordered its army area to advance to the left.Its purpose was to enable Fourth Panzer Army to take care of the area between Thalrop and Dubro which had now acquired special importance.This army handed over its existing front, which terminated at Shipitovka, to 1st Panzer Army and took over the area from the east of Tarrop to Dubro.However, the only forces available at this time were the 48th Panzer Corps, which was engaged in concentration work near Talrop; the 13th Armored Corps, which was fighting near Dubro; There are also some police units.The First Panzer Army handed over the area north of Uman to the Eighth Army.According to the order of the Army Headquarters, the corps on the right flank of the army were handed over to the Sixth Army to take over.

At the beginning of March, Army Group headquarters were moved first to Kamenik-Prdosk and then to Lvov so as to be positioned behind this main left flank.We were ordered by Hitler not to enter Romania. Whether the above-mentioned measures will prevent any enemy attack before the mud season is still open to debate.We have repeatedly emphasized to the Army Headquarters that the equivalent of two armies (that is, fifteen to twenty divisions) must be brought to Lvov as soon as possible.Only in this way can the left flank of the army group be prevented from being turned around on a large scale. (However, assuming that the new army mentioned by Hitler is not suitable for this goal. To draw troops, it is necessary to shorten the front of the Northern Army Group and the Sixth Army and withdraw from Crimea.)

Needless to say, if such a huge convulsion of forces is made in the area where the army group is free, it will be a huge risk for the 8th and 1st Panzer Armies, because as long as the ground and the weather allow him to have If there is such an opportunity, the enemy will continue to attack them.The enemy's objective here was to break through to the middle reaches of the Bug River and capture the crossings at Vinnytsia and Vozhessensk. But the matter has come to this point, the army group must choose the lesser of two evils.Viewed from the whole area, there is no doubt that the enemy's attack from the right flank of the 1st Panzer Army and the area facing the 8th Army would be less harmful.A retreat of the Sixth Army behind the Bug, or at worst the Nestr, would neutralize the combat effectiveness of this advance.On the contrary, if the enemy achieved a decisive success against the left wing of the army group, the consequences would be irreversible.In order to prevent this development, the operational objective of Army Group South was to do all it could to prevent Russian forces from penetrating into the flanks of Army Group South and Army Group A, or heading straight for Lvov, until the mud season was fully in effect.Therefore, its right wing, and the entirety of Army Group A, will be forced to retreat further west, which is a risk that should be accepted.