Chapter 82 Continue to struggle in the mud

Although the weather prevented our aircraft from reconnaissance, we could not know the details of the enemy's movement and concentration.By the end of February, the army group was still able to make the following judgments about the enemy's intentions: The recently discovered 1st Belorussian Front was to be concentrated in the Rivne region to encircle the western flank of Army Group. The 1st Ukrainian Front will attack the northwestern front on both sides of Proskurov, which is now commanded by our 1st Panzer Army. The Second Ukrainian Front will continue to attack the right flanks of the Eighth Army and the First Panzer Army, and if they can cross the Bug River, they will advance towards Czernowitz.

The 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts would continue their attempts to crush the right flanks of the 6th and 8th armies. On March 3, in the areas of the 4th and 1st Panzer Armies on the left flank of the Army Group, the enemy began to attack.A superior enemy force, including a tank corps, surrounded XIII Corps around Dubro.The main force of the enemy's attack was borne by the two tank armies plus the 60th Army. As long as the weather permits, the important line of communication will continue to cross Nest.At the same time, the Eighteenth Army of the Russian Army was also trying to force the right wing of the First Armored Army to retreat to the southeast.

The following table solution can roughly show the relative strength of this stage: The enemy's army on March 9th, our army on February 29th, the area where our army is defending Facing the Sixth Army (belonging to Army Group A), 62 infantry divisions, 3 tank or mechanized corps, 1 cavalry corps, 1 tank corps (resting), 18 infantry divisions (approximately), 3 armored divisions Facing Eighth Army fifty-seven infantry divisions, eleven tank or mechanized corps five infantry divisions, four armored or armored infantry divisions ninety-five miles Facing 1st Panzer Army Thirty-seven｜Forty infantry divisions, eleven tank or mechanized corps Eight infantry divisions, one artillery division, one armored division 112 miles

Facing the Fourth Armored Army, eighteen infantry divisions, five tank or mechanized corps, one cavalry corps, eight infantry divisions, one defense division, one police force, nine-five armored or armored infantry divisions, 320 miles Due to the adjustment of the group army's boundary at the end of February, the strength of the group army group has been adjusted as follows: Frontal length from transferred to troops Thirty-seven miles from the three infantry divisions of the Eighth Army of the First Panzer Army Fourth Armored Army First Armored Army five infantry divisions, three or five armored divisions or armored infantry divisions 125 miles

When I visited the Shipitovka front on March 4, the position of the 59th Army was already very serious.The enemy has penetrated our line of defense on both sides of the place and is preparing to encircle the army with an east-west attack.To eliminate this threat, the army must retreat.It was a success thanks to the determined leadership of the corps commander, General Shirts (my former chief of staff), with the assistance of the 1st Armored Division.But the enemy did not give up his attempt and continued to advance towards Proskurov. The two armored corps, which had been transferred to the rear of this wing, were now also engaged in battle.Third Panzer Corps attacked northwest from Proskurov to break up enemy forces advancing in the gap between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies.The 48th Panzer Corps was ordered to attack the enemy's armored forces approaching Tarrop.

On March 7, the enemy's forces in this area had already used a total of twenty-two to twenty-five infantry divisions and seven tank or mechanized corps. At the beginning of March, the enemy began another attack on the left flank of the Eighth Army, and within two weeks they had replaced the losses suffered at Chirkasai.As soon as we transferred the two armies from this area to the rear of the left flank of the army group, the enemy began to attack in the direction of Uman.The enemy's breakthrough, involving twenty infantry divisions, finally defeated our Seventh Army, and by March 9 they were outside the gates of the city.

In the area of ​​​​Army Group A (Sixth Army), the enemy also continued to attack and reached the goal of a breakthrough towards Nikolayev on the mouth of the Bug River. In the situation report sent to the Army Headquarters on March 7, the Army Group Headquarters stated that they had to fight hard until the mud stopped the enemy's actions automatically.At the same time, however, we emphasized the decisive importance of gathering a sufficient force in the Talrop-Nak-Lwow area when the mud season was over.This prevents the enemy from advancing into Lvov, or threatens its flank if the enemy attempts to attack south from Talrop.Therefore, the main consideration of the army group at present is to buy time, and before the mud forces the enemy to stop advancing, it should strive to keep its troops fighting, and even give up a little more land.Unfortunately, much time had been wasted before that.

At this stage of the operation, Hitler again thought he had found a new way to stop the enemy's advance.He declared certain railway or highway cores to be strongholds.For each stronghold, designate an officer to be responsible for defending it, and ask them to issue a military order.Hitler believed that as long as these points were blocked, it would be enough to delay the enemy's advance.In fact.But it has been proven from the beginning that this is completely delusional.Such a stronghold, without proper fortifications and garrisons, must sooner or later be taken, and the object for which it was intended cannot be attained.Army group headquarters each time managed to abandon them before they were surrounded.Only one exception was Talrop, and only a few remnants broke out.Later in 1944, Hitler's method caused us to suffer even more considerable losses.

In order to carry out the policy of gaining time and keeping the troops out of encirclement, the Army Group ordered the Eighth Army's immediate retreat on March 11 when the enemy had penetrated the left flank of the Eighth Army's front.Two days later, for the same reason, the right wing of the 1st Panzer Army also retreated to the rear of the Bug River.On its left flank, 1st Panzer Army had to continue fighting in the Proskurov area to re-establish its contact with 4th Panzer Army and relieve pressure on its right flank.The task of the Fourth Panzer Army was to prevent the enemy's armored forces east of Talrop from going southward to the Nester River and force the First Panzer Army to retreat southeast.At the same time, the three divisions provided by the Army Headquarters were also put into battle to clear the line of communication from Lvov through Tarrop to Proskurov.

Since then, however, things have evolved even more rapidly.By March 15, the enemy had almost completely destroyed the Eighth Army's left flank, leaving a gap between Uman and the 1st Panzer Army in Vinnytsia.The enemy continued to advance to the southwest and had already sent the vanguard of five armies (including a panzer army) across the Bug River in the area of ​​the Eighth Army.Although the latter has transferred all available forces from the right to the left to attack the enemy who has now crossed the river, it is obvious that it can no longer use the Bug River as a line of defense, nor can it restore its cooperation with the First Panzer Army. contact between.Conversely, a strong enemy force crossing the river could force the Eighth Army to retreat southward and reach the Nester River ahead of it.On the right flank of the 1st Panzer Army, the enemy also advanced as far as the Bug River south of Vinnytsia.Although Hitler immediately declared the town a stronghold, in fact it could not be held for a long time, because it would require at least three divisions. Where can this be found?On the army's left flank, west of Proskurov, the enemy used the 3rd Guards Tank Army to make a detour, which commanded a total of three tank corps.

In the 4th Panzer Army area, the infantry divisions provided by the Army Headquarters made a successful attack, which now stabilizes the situation in the Talrop area.In contrast, when the Thirteenth Army retreated in the direction of Brody, it was again threatened by encirclement. From the perspective of the whole area, it is clear that there is no possibility of defending the Bug River on the right wing of the army group.As early as March 16, the enemy army, which had already crossed the Bug River, headed westward to the nearest Nester River crossing with the strength of a tank army.Three other armies, one of which was armored, were turning south to strike Eighth Army's northern flank.At the same time, both flanks of the First Panzer Army were in danger of being encircled.Despite one success at Talrop, in the long run Fourth Panzer Army was powerless to prevent the enemy from advancing to Lviv or turning south. In this grave situation I was again called to Obersalzberg.A few days ago, General Schmund, Hitler's chief bodyguard, visited me and asked me to sign a very strange document.This is a document signed by all the field marshals to pledge allegiance to Hitler to counter the propaganda issued by General V. Seydlitz who was captured in Stalingrad.This concept may have been invented by Schmund himself. He may have thought that it would increase Hitler's confidence in the army.Since all the marshals had signed it except me, I was of course obliged to do so. (It is worth noting that Schmund had already included Mödel on the list, even though he was still an admiral at the time.) My refusal would be to imply my sympathy for Schidlitz's activities.But I told Schmund that, from a military point of view, this was really unnecessary, since no German soldier would bother with such propaganda.On March 19, the document was presented to Hitler on behalf of Field Marshal Rundst, and many senior generals of the three services were present to watch the ceremony.Hitler seemed moved at the time.But this is too contrary to the tradition of the military! Since Hitler repeatedly rejected my proposals and refused to acknowledge reality, this show of allegiance made me ask myself whether I should still stick to it.As far as the military is concerned, I really cannot deny that Hitler was wrong in his leadership.As much as I would like to be able to retire, I cannot go away for various reasons.Many times, when Hitler did not listen to my advice, or tried to interfere with my work, I told the Chief of the General Staff to ask him to pass on Hitler to another wise man.But every time, because of the sense of responsibility, he gave up his resignation.Because of my departure, its significance is not only the departure or stay of a commander-in-chief of the army group.Conscience makes me feel that I have no right to abandon my own troops.However, sometimes in order to force Hitler to make concessions, he had to resort to resignation as the last threat. The Obersalzburg meeting gave me an opportunity to persuade Hitler to reflect on the growing situation.My suggestion is as follows: 1. Immediately withdraw the Sixth Army to the back of the Nestor River.This army group is still in a prominent position east of the lower Bug River and needs too many troops. Marshal Kleist, commander-in-chief of Army Group A, himself had already made this suggestion. 2. Quickly transfer the strong forces saved from the Sixth Army to the area between the Nestor River and the Pruth River (the latter is the old Romanian border) to prevent the Eighth Army Forced to retreat southeast from the Nestor River. 3. Army Group A shall be jointly responsible with Romanian forces for the protection of Romania, either at the Nestor or at the Prut River. 4. Quickly reinforce the northern flank of Army Group South in order to prevent the enemy from forcing it back into the Carpathians, or towards Lvov. I added that this solution would temporarily create a gap between Army Group A and Army Group South.But if the enemy tries to advance through Hungary to the Balkans through this gap, we will be able to attack the enemy's rear from the north when we receive the reinforcements that Hitler has allowed us to send in May. Hitler, however, refused to consider any such remote notions.He still decided that Army Group A should remain on the Bug River, and announced that only small-scale assistance would be given to the northern flank of Army Group South. On March 22, I sent a detailed situation study and judgment report to General Chaisler, and made the above-mentioned suggestion again for two reasons: 1. The current situation of the combat troops.2. The current situation has made it impossible to connect the fronts between the Eighth Army and the First Panzer Army.So I say that the most important thing now is that Army Group A (to which the Eighth Army should be assigned) should cover Romania, while Army Group South should prevent the enemy from entering the area north of the Carpathians westward.In order to achieve this goal, the Fourth Panzer Army should maintain its existing position, in other words, it must be reinforced at any cost.The main body of the 1st Panzer Army should be united with the 4th Panzer Army in case it is itself forced to move south.The pass in the Carpathian Mountains between the two army groups should be guarded by Hungarian troops. The Hungarians were more or less forced into the war, their eyes still fixed on Siebenburgen, ceded to Romania in 1918.Romania and Hungary, though both our allies, are at odds with each other, and they each keep their best troops in case they need it.After the defeat at the Don River in the winter of 1942-1943, two Romanian armies and one Hungarian army also withdrew from the front. However, Marshal Antonescu soon again provided troops to take on the coastal defense of the Sea of ​​Azov.He also allowed Romanian units to form part of the Seventeenth Army, first to remain in the Kuban bridgehead and later to retreat into the Crimea.Now he has provided new troops to join Army Group A. After withdrawing their army group from the front line, the Hungarians left only a few divisions in Ukraine.They also clearly requested that these troops not be allowed to fight any battles with the Russian army, so whenever the front line approached, we quickly ordered them to retreat.Their tasks were limited to defending roads and railways in the traffic zone against guerrillas. But the current situation is equally urgent for Hungary.For the defense of the Carpathian Mountains and the area up to the Nestor we must employ the forces which remain intact in the country.But the attitude of the Hungarian government has become more problematic.On March 15th General Lindemann came from Army Headquarters with a secret order that the Hungarian troops should be immediately disarmed in the event of a Hungarian rebellion.By luck, we were spared the need to carry out this mission.After Horthy (Hungarian Regent) visited Obersalzburg, the 1st Hungarian Army was placed under our command on March 23.The two corps under its jurisdiction consisted of one motorized and four infantry divisions, but both of them had yet to be mobilized!In addition, the number and quality of Hungarian weapons are not enough to fight against the Russian armored forces.Even so, the presence of these forces in the Carpathians to hold back the advance of the Russians had the potential to succeed, since it was difficult for the Russians to use their armored forces in the mountains.In the First World War, the Russian army suffered a big loss in this mountainous area.Of course, everything depends on whether the Hungarians have a strong leadership. In this regard, the following facts make me feel less optimistic.On March 28, Gen. Lakatos, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, and the commander of his First Army came to visit us.Their response to our demands was simply to tell how unprepared their troops were and how they lacked anti-tank weapons.So we can't help but get the impression that certain senior figures in the Hungarian Army were not serious about defending the homeland.They don't know what is the benefit of the Russians coming? On March 19th, I received a report on the situation in Obersalzburg, and learned that the situation in our army group had become worse again.Although the Eighth Army has used all available armored forces on the left flank, it still cannot prevent the latter from being turned around in the west and forced to retreat southward.Since Hitler did not agree with our proposed solution (i.e., to draw troops from the Sixth Army to throw at this point and withdraw the latter at the same time), we had to persuade Field Marshal Antonescu to put his troops at our disposal in advance, so that The front of the Eighth Army extended to the northwest.In fact, Antonescu would have only agreed to use them for the defense of the Pruss. In addition to the crisis in the Eighth Army, the situation on the northern flank of the Army Group was developing particularly badly.Now unable to maintain its right flank on the Bug, 1st Panzer Army now held a front facing the northeast, extending roughly from the Nester to the Zbrucz, which also formed the border of Poland.To the west, as already mentioned, Fourth Panzer Army had stabilized the situation east of Talrop with a counterattack. However, on March 20, the enemy used two more tank armies (1st and 4th) to break through on both sides of the boundary line between our two armies, and attacked southward towards the Nester River.On March 23, the spearheads of the two Russian tank armies had already approached the Nestor ferry north of Terovets and south of Kamenik and Purdosk.This also allowed the enemy to straddle the line of communication of the First Panzer Army.The crisis has become very obvious, and the army group has also ordered the army to shorten the front line in order to mobilize troops to clear its rear.A combat group in the Fourth Panzer Army, commanded by Gen. Mauss, was also transferred to the First Panzer Army. When all other forces were driven off by the two enemy armies, this group It stands like a mainstay behind the First Armored Army.The task of this force is to stop the main force following the enemy's armored spearhead and cut off the former's supply line. Obviously, these measures could not restore the situation on the northern flank of Army Group.Although as far as it is concerned, it is just an armored force that has penetrated into the rear of the First Armored Army, but judging from various signs, this army has been surrounded.To establish a permanent line of defense north of the Carpathians, the First Panzer Army had to withdraw. On March 23, the Army Group Headquarters asked the Army Headquarters to provide troops to clear the rear communication lines of the First Armored Army.We think these forces can be drawn from Hungary since it is already occupied.On March 24 we received a reply not only to hold its existing broad front, but also to extend westward as far as Talrop, and to clear its communication areas of the enemy. Therefore, the Army Group submitted another report at noon on the same day, saying that if it had not received a satisfactory answer to the previous request by 15:00, it would have to order the First Panzer Army to break through to the west.At 16:00, we received another Solomon-style answer. On the one hand, Hitler agreed with the basic concept of the First Panzer Army to clear its line of communication to the west, but on the other hand, he still insisted on continuing to defend its positions on the Nester and Tallo. between the existing frontages.But where this group army can find so many troops is a riddle.This is exactly what happened at Stalingrad in December 1942.At that time, Hitler allowed the Sixth Army to protrude in the direction of the Fourth Panzer Army on the one hand, but on the other hand he demanded that the city be held and not give up, in other words, that the Sixth Army was not allowed to concentrate the necessary forces. When I pointed out to General Zeisler over the telephone how Hitler's demands were impossible, he replied that the latter had never understood the seriousness of the situation.Even so, at dusk that day, I was ordered to go to the base camp for a meeting the next day. At this moment, a conflict arose between me and Gen. Hube, the commander of the First Panzer Army.Although Hubie also admitted that the status of this group army could no longer be retained, he was unwilling to break through to the west, but only wanted to retreat south to the Nester River.At the time, it was certainly an easier route.For going west would have to push through two Russian tank armies, whereas fleeing to the Nestor would hardly require any serious fighting. But I can't accept Hubie's opinion.First, the 1st Panzer Army must re-establish contact with the 4th Panzer Army in the west, otherwise it will be impossible to prevent the enemy from breaking into Grisia north of the Carpathians.If the retreat route to the south is adopted, the army group would be better off retreating into the mountains, and even this is not sure.On the face of it, the route across the Nester appears to be less dangerous.But if you look closely, you can see that it is enough to cause disaster.The army lacked bridging materials to cross the river across the broad front.If the river is crossed only by the existing bridges, it will be exposed to the attack of the enemy air force and will lose most of its heavy equipment.To make matters worse, the enemy had already advanced south of the Dnieper River, so sooner or later the 1st Panzer Army would be surrounded. So I told General Hubie that the army group would not allow his army to retreat to the south bank of the Nestor, but had to order it to break out to the west.Even before I flew to Obersalzburg, I had warned him to attack westward immediately and join up with the battle group on the Zeebruck River first. On the morning of March 25th, I took off from Lviv and arrived at Berghof as scheduled to attend the midday meeting.When explaining the situation of the First Panzer Army to Hitler, I emphasized that both its northeastern sides were already under strong enemy pressure. Resupply by air was also inappropriate.I would add that on the deep western flank of the army the enemy has cut off its rear lines of communication, and south of the Nestor the enemy threatens its rear.I said that in this case, there was really no other way than ordering the army's tank units to break through westward, clearing its supply lines and re-establishing contact with the Fourth Panzer Army.Using such tactics, it was even possible to cut off the communication lines of the two enemy armies fighting in the rear of the 1st Panzer Army.The rest of the army was to cover this westward assault to the east and northeast, and the southern flank of the army was to remain on the Nester.So I said again that I could not agree with General Hubie's opinion of withdrawing this army to the south bank of the Nestor under any circumstances.First, operational reasons necessitated the concentration of the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies in the area north of the Carpathians.The second point, because any retreat to the south bank of the river may end up encircling and destroying the First Panzer Army.In addition, I said that the success of this breakthrough depended on the simultaneous attack of the Fourth Panzer Army from the west, and that the latter must be reinforced immediately. Hitler replied that he could not marshal the forces to achieve this goal.As long as he waited for the enemy to invade Western Europe, he could not draw troops from that field.Likewise, for political reasons, the forces in Hungary cannot be withdrawn.In addition, he refused to consider shortening the eastern front of the First Panzer Army to concentrate its forces to break through to the west. A heated debate then began between Hitler and myself, who said I was responsible for the disadvantaged position Army Group is in today.Zeisler told me the other day that Hitler accused us of wasting a lot of our troops.I had asked Zeisler to tell Hitler that, since these forces were thrown into battle piecemeal and always too late, that was the only way army groups could use these divisions.If Hitler had given us the strength we demanded, or given us freedom of movement on the southern flank, he would have had nothing to complain about today!Chaisler also fully agrees with me.In fact, since the Battle of the Acropolis, almost all the evolution of the situation has been affected by this factor. Now Hitler asserts that we are all playing grand tactics.He said that last fall, we told him that he should hold the line of the Dnieper River.When at last he reluctantly approved a retreat behind the river, we then announced that another retreat was necessary because of the enemy's breakthrough at Kiev.I told him it was inevitable.Because it was Hitler himself who told us to spread our forces to hold the Donets and Dnieper areas on the southern flank and not to strengthen the northern flank. Then Hitler announced that according to the report of the Air Force, only a very small number of enemy tanks were seen, while the entire German army was running in front of them, so the front continued to retreat.Since the Air Force reports received by Hitler were all provided by Goering, it is conceivable that he was provoking them. I replied that if the combat troops were no longer able to fight, it would be due to exhaustion, fatigue, and insufficient strength.This is no one's fault, especially those senior commanders who are actually brave and experienced soldiers, but no one can stop the collapse of the army's resistance.This has been mentioned repeatedly in our reports. Since these debates have no conclusions, I just want to focus on one important point: firmly demand that the First Panzer Army concentrate its armored forces to break westward in order to join the Fourth Panzer Army.I insisted that the order must be given on this day, and that there was no chance of success unless Fourth Panzer Army could also attack from the west. But Hitler refused this request and ordered the discussion to continue in the evening report.Although the opinions of the two parties are extremely far apart, he has always maintained normal courtesy.On leaving the meeting, I sent General Schmund a note saying that I wanted to go out with him.I asked him to tell Hitler that, unless he accepted my proposal, I thought there was no need for love.I hope he considers a replacement. In the afternoon my chief of staff, General Bush, called to say that Hubie had renewed his urgent request to retreat south across the Nester instead of breaking out west.At dusk, the group army called directly to say that it was impossible to break through to the west, and insisted that the correct solution was to go south.General Bush has long since rejected the first request and is now asking me to make the final decision.I immediately ordered that the original instructions should be followed to immediately break out to the west. When I attended the evening debriefing, Hitler's attitude changed completely.He said: I have considered it and decided to agree with your plan to order the First Panzer Army to break through to the west.At the same time, it was also decided to use an SS Panzer Corps (under the jurisdiction of the 9th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions) plus the 100th Light Division and the 367th Infantry Division for the Fourth Panzer Army Used as an assault force. I reported to him that I had just rejected Hubie's new request and ordered him to break west immediately.I believe this can be done, since both enemy tank armies seem to have spread their forces in the direction of the Nestor Ferry.Then, my combat officer, Lt. Col. Schulz|Buttger, read the full text of my combat order to the First Panzer Army. Due to the sudden change in Hitler's attitude, I will continue to put forward my views on future combat guidance.I believe that the task of Army Group South is to establish a stable front between the Carpathian Mountains and the Pripet Marshes, while the 1st Hungarian Army should defend the hills between the mountains and the Nester River area.I went on to say that the Eighth Army should henceforth be under the command of Army Group A, whose main responsibility was to protect Romania.As for the gap between the two army groups, we must temporarily accept the fact that it can be blocked by using the troops still in Hungary. I then suggested that there should be a unified command of all forces on the southern flank, including the Allies.As for the defense of Romania, I think that Marshal Antonescu should be employed, supplemented by a German chief of staff.But Hitler disagreed, saying only that the field marshal was unacceptable for political reasons.The atmosphere of this report was far more harmonious than that in the morning. After the meeting, Hitler entertained us with dinner. In the early morning of March 26, I flew back to the headquarters of the Army Group.At this time, the Eighth Army has also been transferred to the command of Army Group A.The next day I went to the 4th Panzer Army to discuss the assault of the 1st Panzer Army.General Rolls was confident that he could make contact with First Panzer Army, but he was not entirely optimistic about the situation on his own front.Talrop was surrounded, and on the left flank of the Army Group, the Thirteenth Army was similarly threatened at Brody, but was able to escape. Now that Hitler has accepted our demands, I think the plan to rescue 1st Panzer Army and concentrate it with 4th Panzer Army north of the Carpathians is absolutely certain.However, although the meeting on March 25 saved the First Panzer Army, it also made Hitler feel that he did not dare to learn from me.The same was true of Field Marshal Kleist, who had also been there two days after I had gone to Obersalzburg to argue with Hitler on the question of withdrawing his Army Group to the Nestor. On the morning of March 30th, I was woken up by the shocking news that Hitler's plane had picked up Field Marshal Kleist from the headquarters of Army Group A, and he was about to land in Lviv soon, and he would pick me up together. Salzburg.While I was waiting for the plane, my chief of staff was on the phone with Chazelle.The latter told us that Hitler was going to remove both of us, which we had already guessed. After arriving in Berchtesgaden, we first talked with Chaisler.He told us that since the last meeting, Goering, Himmler and Keitel had tried to speak ill of me, which is why Hitler decided to remove me and Kleist.When Hitler told Zeisler of this intention, Zeisler immediately said that he should also resign, because he has always fully agreed with me, so we must advance and retreat together.Then he proposed in writing, but Hitler refused.Chaisler's integrity is admirable. In order to describe my last meeting with Hitler, I am going to quote the diary entry of the next day as follows.Because my memory at that time was still fresh: Meet the Führer at dusk.After attaching the sword to my Knight's Cross, he announced his decision to put the Army Group in command of another man (Model), since the days of large-scale operations on the Eastern Front were past and he thought it was me most suitable.He said that now he just asked to stick to it.Therefore, in order to symbolize this new leadership, he not only changed a new man, but also changed the name of this army group. He also stated that he had never misunderstood me and still fully trusted me.But after a year and a half, I'm tired enough, and I should take a break.He knows that I am one of his ablest commanders, so there will be new appointments before long.But at present, the Eastern Front no longer needs my talents.The present task was more suitable for Model, since he had recently prevented the difficult retreat of Army Group North.After reassuring me that he never mistrusted me, the Führer added that he had never forgotten that I was the only person who had persuaded him to make a breakthrough at Sedan before the campaign for the Western Front began. I told the Führer that if he thought that in the present situation a different commander in chief of an army group would do the job better, of course I would not object.I also said that the current work of the army group seems to have come to an end, so there is no inconvenience for Model to take over at this time.The future work is just to help the combat troops and give them moral support, which is what Model is better than. The Fuehrer particularly agreed that Model was a particularly suitable man for this, and that he would drive the troops to do their best.I replied that under my command, the divisions of our army group had already done their best, and no one could make them go any further. Whatever Hitler was inside, his outside was polite and thoughtful.Of course, Goering and Himmler have long wanted to squeeze me out, and I already knew that.But the main reason may still be the meeting on March 25, because he had already rejected my proposal in front of everyone, and then he gave in.When I shook his hand before leaving, I said: My Fuehrer, I am sure that the steps you have taken today will have no adverse consequences. Then behind me, Marshal Kleist was likewise dismissed.When we left, our successors were already waiting outside the door.Admiral Model took over the Army Group South and renamed it Army Group North Ukraine.Gen. Schorner replaced Kleist. I flew back to Lviv the next morning.My successor was stopped by a blizzard and landed in Cracow, which gave me the opportunity to issue a final order for the army group, ordering the two panzer armies to ensure cooperation in the breakthrough operations that had now begun.當天下午我去觀察第四裝甲集團軍，並與該集團軍司令討論對於黨衛軍裝甲軍的使用方式和向他道別。對於其他的集團軍司令，我只好用書面告別。 四月二日，我把職務移交給後任。儘管苦戰尚在進行中，但救出第一裝甲集團軍和集中兵力在喀爾巴阡山脈和普里配特沼澤之間的計畫卻已經有了成功的保障。這對於全域而言也是具有決定性的。四月五日，第四裝甲集團軍開始向東進攻，到了四月九日，第一裝甲集團軍獲得了自由。 我還要向我的僚屬告別，這是令人感到黯然神傷的。這些夥伴們曾經與我同生死，共患難達幾年之久。對於那些集團軍司令而言也是一樣的。我的幕僚們對於我的去職都大感震驚。他們都提出辭呈，也都一律獲得了批准。只有參謀長布希將軍還得暫留一段時間，以便使業務能夠銜接。 對於我個人而言，去職之後反有無官一身輕之感，因為責任是一天比一天重，幾乎無法擔負了。我們與希特勒之間的拉鋸戰已經使我感到心力交瘁。這是兩種基本觀念的衝突。一、希特勒的個性和意見，早已見第十一章。二、南面集團軍群的意見則以德國總參謀部的傳統原則和觀點為基礎。 這位獨裁者是相信他的意志力不僅可以使其軍隊屹立不動，而且甚至於還能擋住敵軍。但是他卻又不敢冒險，因為他害怕其威望受到損失。他固然有一切的天才，但卻缺乏真正的軍事能力基礎。相反，軍事領袖們根據他們的教育和訓練基礎，卻仍然深信戰爭是一種藝術，而敏銳的思考和果敢的決定也是必要的因素。只有在機動的作戰中，這種藝術才能獲得成功。因為只有在此種環境中，德國將領和部隊的優秀水準才能發揮充分的效力。 不過這也是持平之論，若採取集團軍群所建議的作戰方式，則將會迫使希特勒在其他戰場上和東線其他地區中接受相當的冒險，甚至於在政治和經濟領域中也可能會有嚴重的弊害。雖然如此，這也許是在一九四三年中能使俄國攻勢能力歸於潰竭的唯一方法，於是這樣才能在東線上形成一個政治上的僵局。 雖然集團軍群想要執行一種不同的作戰政策，這種奮鬥大致說來並未成功，但是他們的成就卻還是不錯的。敵人以巨大優勢的兵力，仍然未能圍殲南面集團軍群。這個集團軍群雖然飽受損失，但卻仍然屹立在戰場上！使我們最感到滿足的，面對著遠較優越的敵人，我們仍能阻止我們所指揮的任何兵力免受史達林格勒式的命運。我去職時最感到難過的一件事就是我不能再幫助這些部隊了，他們對於集團軍群的領導是一向深具信心的。 一九四四年四月三日，我離開了在利沃夫的集團軍群總司令部。我所有的同僚都在火車站上送別。當列車已經開動時，有一個人喊我，他是我的座機駕駛員，南格爾中尉（Lt‧Langer）在各種意想不到的惡劣天氣中，他都曾經安全的使我在空中飛行。現在他已經志願投效戰鬥機部隊，不久就一定會捐軀殉國。對於我而言，他的話也就代表我的僚屬們對我的最後敬禮。 他高聲喊著說：元帥，今天我已經把我們的勝利象徵，克里米亞之盾，從飛機上取下來了！