Chapter 83 Appendix I)

Sender: Commander of the Sixth Army (written by an officer) Location: Gumenrak Time: November 24th Recipient: Field Marshal Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Don Under the Marshal: I have received a call on the 24th, and I deeply appreciate your assistance and concern.In order to help you understand my situation, the report is as follows: 1. When the Russian army launched a large-scale attack on our army's neighbors on the left and right sides on November 19, both sides of me were exposed within two days and were quickly overwhelmed by Russian mobile forces. penetrating.As our own mobile forces (XIV Panzer Corps) advanced west across the Don, their spearheads also encountered superior enemy forces on the west bank of the river.This puts them in an extremely difficult situation.Especially due to the lack of fuel, their movement is greatly restricted.At the same time, the enemy also entered the rear of Eleventh Corps, which, in accordance with orders, had held its positions to the north.Since it was no longer possible to draw any troops from the front to meet this danger, I had to turn the left flank of the XI Corps back south, and then ordered the corps to retreat to a bridgehead west of the Don River, so as not to be caught on the other side of the river. The troops above are separated from the main force.

While these measures were being taken, orders were suddenly received from the Führer to attack Doblinskaya with the left flank of the Fourteenth Panzer Corps.Due to the facts, this order cannot be carried out. 2. On November 22, the Fourth Army, which originally belonged to the Fourth Armored Army, was changed to my command.Its right wing is retreating from south to north through Buzinovka, in the sense that the entire south and south-west is exposed.In order to prevent the Russian army from going straight to Stalingrad through the rear of the army group, I had to draw troops from the city and the northern defense line.It is possible for these troops to catch up, but if they are drawn from the area west of the Don River, they may not be able to catch up.

With the support of troops drawn from the Stalingrad front, Fourth Army finally established a weak southern defense line, whose western flank was located at Marinovka.However, on November 23, it was penetrated by the enemy several times, and the result is difficult to determine.On the afternoon of the 23rd, a powerful armored force of the enemy was found in the area west of Malirovka, with as many as 100 tanks.In the entire area between Malirovka and the Don, only the remnants of the German army formed a weak barrier.For Russian tank and motorized forces, the road to Stalingrad was clear, as was the bridge to the Don River in the direction of Pestkovaltka.

During the past thirty-six hours, I have received no orders or information from my superiors.Within a few hours, I will be faced with the following situation: (a) I should maintain my position on the south-west and north, and soon see the enemy coming from behind (in this case, I am fully obeying the orders of my superiors), or: (b) I should decide to concentrate all my efforts against the enemy attacking from the rear. In this case, the defense lines on the north-east and north-east were obviously unable to hold, so I had to break through to the southwest. I think the second case is correct as the case may be, but to do so would be to commit the crime of disobedience again.

3. In such a difficult situation, I have asked the Führer to grant me the freedom to make final decisions if necessary.I am making this request out of fear that it will be too late for this final order. I can't prove that I only issue such orders in the most urgent cases, so I ask you to trust my word. I have not received a direct answer to this telegram.On the contrary, I received two telegrams from the Army Headquarters today (as attached [Author's Note: It has been lost.]), and the restrictions on me were even stricter.Based on this, I and my commanders at all levels are determined to stick to the end.But because my responsibility to the Führer is at stake with the lives of 300,000 people, I am asked to be granted the right to take appropriate action at the last moment.This situation can happen anytime, anywhere.

See attached picture for today's situation.Even if it is possible to transfer more troops to the southwest, the situation is still extremely critical.Although the Fourth Army has consolidated the southern defense line and repelled the enemy's strong attack in the past few days, our own losses are also considerable, and the ammunition consumption is extremely serious. The Stalingrad defense line resists the oppression of a powerful enemy every day.On the northern front, difficulties were encountered with the 94th Infantry Division on the northeast corner and the 76th Infantry Division on the western flank.But, as far as I can see, the main assault to the north is still to come, since the enemy has roads and railroads in this direction, which are sufficient for reinforcements in large numbers.My main problem for the next few days will be to send reinforcements from the west to the north.

Airfreight over the past three days has only met the expected minimum (600 tons per day, or 300 sorties).In the next few days, the supply could cause a crisis of the utmost seriousness. However, I still believe that our army can hold out for a while.On the contrary, even if a corridor could be cut through me, the Stalingrad area could not be held for long because of the weakening force and the lack of camps and wood for building and heating. I am anxious about future problems every day. If I can get a little more information to strengthen the confidence of the troops, that is what I look forward to.

Marshal, I consider your leadership a guarantee.All my officers and men will make every effort to live up to your trust. Sincerely, Paulus