Chapter 84 Appendix (2)

Top Secret (Officers Only) December 9th ATTN: Chief of Army General Staff, Operations Division, Army Headquarters Situation study and judgment (1) Enemy situation: The enemy has used stronger forces against our army group in the past ten days.This not only includes the reserve forces predicted in the situation study and judgment on November 28.And also added other troops.The total forces found by our army group are as follows: Eighty-six infantry divisions Infantry Brigade Seventeen Tank Brigade Fifty-Four Motorized Brigade Fourteen cavalry division eleven A total of 182 large units.In addition, we also found thirteen independent tank regiments, tank battalions and anti-tank brigades, etc.

The following is a detailed analysis of the enemy forces: (a) Around the area of ​​the Stalingrad Fortress: Volga front: Sixty-second Army (eight infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, and one tank brigade on the front line; another two infantry brigades, two tank brigades, and two motorized brigades serve as reserves.) Northern Front: Sixty-sixth and Twenty-fourth Armies (seventeen infantry divisions and one motorized brigade in the front line; four infantry brigades and four tank brigades in reserve.) Western Front: Sixty-fifth and Twenty-first armies (ten infantry divisions, seven tank brigades and two motorized brigades, five tank regiments and one anti-tank brigade in the front line; another four Tank brigades serve as reserves.)

South Front: 57th and 64th Armies (seven infantry divisions, six infantry brigades, six tank brigades, six motorized brigades and two tank regiments in the front line; apparently two other Infantry divisions, two infantry brigades, five tank brigades, one motorized brigade, and five motorized regiments serve as reserves.) During the past ten days, the enemy has taken turns attacking the north, west, and south sides.His main force is undoubtedly directed to the west, while his forces in the south are relatively weak. (b) Further south (i.e., the Zir River west of the Don), the Fifth Tank Army is responsible for covering the attack on Stalingrad (the first line is twelve infantry divisions, five cavalry divisions, two Mohua cavalry divisions, four tank brigades, one tank regiment, and two motorized brigades; two infantry divisions, four tank brigades, and one motorized brigade served as reserves.) Immediately to the north, facing Holliday's Army In the center and left flank, there are three other infantry divisions.

The troops covering the southward attack on the east bank of the Don River are the 51st Army (the front line consists of four infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, one tank brigade and one motorized brigade; another tank brigade and one infantry brigade act as reserve team.).Behind this line there was a massing of more motorized forces for unknown reasons. (c) Reconnaissance in the last few days has revealed that enemy forces are dismounting east of Stalingrad, and that troops are moving south across the Don, past Holliday's Army Group East.The Russian army covering the front east of the Don River was generally passive and motionless, probably because the concentration of motorized forces in its rear had not yet been completed.The enemy has also crossed the Zill River and is attacking west of the Zill Bridgehead and Zill Station.Judging from the north-to-south movement of the enemy forces on the front of Holliday's Army, this attack may have extended further west.

(d) The enemy has undoubtedly lost a considerable number of armored forces in recent fighting, but he can replace the shortfall with new tank regiments.The offensive capability of enemy infantry is still very low.The effectiveness of its artillery has increased considerably, especially on the western front of Stalingrad. (2) Our situation (a) Sixth Army: This army has repulsed all enemy attacks so far, albeit with considerable losses.Separate reports detail its current combat capabilities.The following are the main ammunition stocks as of December 5th, expressed as a percentage of the basic allotment (note: the so-called basic allotment is approximately the amount required for three consecutive days of combat.)

Fifty mm cannon fifty-nine percent 75mm cannon 39.4% 100mm cannon 21.6% Light infantry artillery 28% Heavy infantry artillery 25% Light Howitzer 34% Heavy howitzers thirty-six percent 30.8% of the 80mm mortar 150mm mortars 25% The current ration ration has been reduced to 200 grams, bread can only be supported until December 14, lunch until December 20, and dinner until December 19. Despite the great efforts of the Air Force, due to the bad weather, the maximum volume was only 300 tons on 7 December.Of the one hundred and eighty-eight aircraft in use that day, two were shot down and nine were lost.The volume of the other days was as low as 25 tons (November 27) and as high as 150 tons (December 8).The minimum requirement per day is 400 tons.

(b) Fourth Panzer Army: The concentration of the Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps was not completed on 3 December as scheduled, and was delayed until 10 December.The reason for this was that the wheeled units of the 23rd Armored Division were trapped.The 48th Armored Corps (336th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Division, and 3rd Air Force Field Division) had to return to the Zill to restore the situation there. (c) Romanian troops: the fighting is still going on.The Romanian Fourth Army, located north of the 16th Motorized Rifle Division, is still standing.But it could not be hoped that they would hold back a strong attack from the north, especially since Marshal Antonescu had ordered them to avoid being cut off as much as possible.With regard to the Romanian Third Army, except for the relatively complete First Army, which formed part of Holliday's Army, the combat effectiveness of the remnants of the other divisions was no more than one or two battalions, and the artillery was completely wiped out.Reorganization in the rear areas was also ineffective due to lack of weapons.The officers of the Romanian army were also reluctant to give in at all, because they believed that the Germans were responsible for the failure.At present, the entire front of the Romanian Third Army is guarded by various temporary units.Given the lack of artillery and anti-tank guns, should the enemy attack aggressively, especially with armored forces, there should be no illusions about how long they would be able to sustain it.These miscellaneous units must be replaced with appropriate combat units in the short term, and their content and combat efficiency are not enough to shoulder the heavy responsibility.

(3) Our intention: The intention of this army group, as stated in the previous report, is to launch an attack with the Fourth Panzer Army as early as possible in order to gain contact with the Sixth Army.For now, however, the softness of the ground prevented any advance of the Fifty-seventh Panzer Corps.It is still uncertain whether the divisions of the 48th Panzer Corps will be completely withdrawn from the Chill Line by December 11.It was therefore necessary to bring the 17th Armored Division into this attack, and the order had already been issued.Since the enemy may in the short term extend its attack on the Chir in the direction of Molosovskaya, Army Group Holliday should cooperate to relieve the pressure on that line, or to attack Perelasovsky. Attack in the same direction, or borrow a division of German troops.

(4) General conclusions: From the weight of the enemy's forces against Army Group Don, it seems clear that this is where the focus of his efforts lies.As long as he can mobilize forces from other sources, the fighting in this area will continue to develop. Therefore, regardless of how the Sixth Army's own position will develop in the near future, there is still a need for continuous reinforcements for the Don Army Group.The most important thing in this respect is that every effort should be made to hasten the arrival of reinforcements.At our current pace we will always be behind the Russians.In addition, I also believe that all efforts should be made to restore the effectiveness of the Romanian Army, especially its will to fight and its confidence in the German commander.

As to the question of whether the Sixth Army should be able to break out of the encirclement once contact has been re-established, I think the following factors should be considered in detail: (a) Had the army remained in the fortified area, it is absolutely probable that the Russians would still besiege it and gradually wear down their own firepower in futile attacks.At the same time, the Sixth Army continued to live and fight under the unfavorable conditions of this fortress. If the current proportion of troops remained unchanged, it would soon lose contact again.At most it can be assumed that no decisive changes will be made for the next few weeks.

(b) On the contrary, we should also take into account the possibility of appropriate actions by the Russian army: on the one hand, the siege of Stalingrad, on the other hand, it will launch a strong attack on the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, and the Rostov for its goal.If this is the case, our most important forces will either lose their combat mobility in this fortified area, or will be pinned down in order to maintain their communication, while the Russian army enjoys complete freedom along the remaining front of our army group. freedom of movement.If this situation is maintained in winter, it is extremely disadvantageous in my opinion. (c) Any decision to keep the Sixth Army at Stalingrad must therefore be inferred from a decision to carry the battle to a completely decisive conclusion.The necessary conditions are as follows: 1. Supplement the strength of the Sixth Army to maintain its defensive capabilities, and incorporate the Air Force Field Division into its existing forces. 2. Reinforce the adjacent defense lines of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies with German forces, because the remnants and temporary units of the Romanian Army alone are not enough to ensure security. 3. When our forces allow, immediately launch a decisive offensive. It is beyond my power to judge whether the required troops can be obtained and the operation can be started in a short period of time. Field Marshal Manstein, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Don