Chapter 17 Volume 1, Chapter 13, Germany Armed

1936｜1938 General Strategic Objectives Germany's Arms Expenditures Independent Inquiry 28th July 1936 Conservative Party Delegation to the Prime Minister My Statement on the Matter General Conclusions My Concerns 2nd November 1936 Our second meeting on the 13th May 12th, 1938 Lord Swindon leaves debate in the Air Ministry House Lindemann rejoins Air Defense Research Committee My correspondence with Mr Daladier 1938 French Estimates of the Strength of the Luftwaffe June 1938 My Estimates of the German Army Monsieur Daladier agrees with my estimate of the decline of the French Air Force Casual Islander.

In war, as in foreign policy and other matters, there must be great advantage in grasping the decisive point from among the many alternatives, attractive or unpalatable.American military thinkers coined the name Comprehensive Strategic Objectives.When our officers first heard the name, it was only amused; but later the wisdom of the name became more apparent and accepted.Obviously this is a rule, and other important matters must be placed in a subordinate position.Failure to follow this simple principle can lead to chaotic and futile actions that can even make things worse and worse. Personally, I had no difficulty in following this law long before I heard the name suggested.The terrible Germany I saw and felt in the war of 1914-1918 suddenly regained all its military power, while the narrowly victorious Allies knew nothing but I stared blankly, at a loss, and when I thought about it, I felt uneasy.I have therefore continued, by all means, to use my influence with the House of Commons and individual Ministers at every opportunity to urge our readiness, and to seek allies and partners for a cause which will soon again be our common aim.

One day a friend who worked in top-secret government work came to see me at Chartwell and joined me for a swim in my pool.It was a sunny day and the water in the pool was warm.We only talked about future wars, but he wasn't all convinced that wars were inevitable.When I saw him out, he suddenly turned to me excitedly and said: The Germans spend a billion pounds a year on armaments.I thought then that this fact should be known to Parliament and the British public.So I set out to study the financial situation in Germany.At that time, Germany made a budget every year and announced it.However, judging from a large number of their numbers alone, it is difficult to know the real situation.In April 1936, I myself conducted investigation and research through two channels.The first route was to rely on two Germans who took political asylum in England, who were not only extremely capable but also had a firm purpose.They understand the details of the German budget figures, the value of the mark, etc.At the same time I asked my friend Sir Strakowski if he could ascertain the truth.Strakowski was the master of the firm of the United Company, a firm of solid capital and a staff of extremely capable and dedicated staff.Some of the people at the London-based company have been working on the problem for weeks.Soon they put forward an accurate and detailed report, saying that Germany's annual military expenditure must be around one billion pounds.At the same time, the two German asylum seekers independently came to the same conclusion, using a completely different set of reasoning methods.In 1936 currency, a billion pounds a year!

In this way, I have two sets of data from which to make my claim.The day before the debate, in the Common Room of the House, I spoke to Mr Neville Chamberlain, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer.I said to him: Tomorrow I will ask you whether it is true that Germany spends one billion pounds a year on war preparations, and I will ask you to give a definite answer, either to confirm or to deny it.chamberlain said: I can't deny it, and if you bring this up, I'll confirm it.I must write down what I said: According to the figures published by German official materials, the main account expenditures from the end of March 1933 to the end of June 1935 were: nearly five billion marks in 1933;

In 1934 it was close to 8 billion marks; in 1935 it was close to 11 billion marks, a total of 24 billion marks, or about 2 billion pounds.Look at the numbers, five, eight, eleven in three years.These numbers give you pretty accurately the payout progression that is typical for fully developed arms production. I specifically address the Chancellor: Does he know that Germany's direct and indirect expenditure on war preparations, including the construction of strategic roads, may have amounted to £800 million in the calendar year 1935, and whether this rate of expenditure is still the same in this year.

Mr. Chamberlain: The Government has not received official figures from Germany, but from the information it has received, I see no reason to think that the figures my esteemed friend put forward in his question must be exaggerated no matter what year they apply to, although he himself I will also agree that there is inevitably an element of speculation in this. I changed one billion pounds to eight hundred million pounds for the purpose of covering my secret information, and also for the sake of certainty. I have tried in several ways to make a clear comparison of the armaments of Britain and Germany.I asked for a debate at a conclave, but it was refused.Said it would cause a false alarm.Not many people support me.All secret meetings are frowned upon by the press.Later, on July 20, 1936, I asked the Prime Minister if he would receive a delegation of Privy Councilors and several who would give him the facts as they knew them.Lord Salisbury asked the House of Lords to organize a similar delegation to meet the Prime Minister.The prime minister agreed.

I personally appealed to Mr Attlee and Sir Sinclair, but neither the Labor Party nor the Liberal Party would send a representative.So, on the 28th of July, Mr. Baldwin, Lord Halifax and Sir Inskeep received us in the Prime Minister's Office in the House of Commons.I am joined by the following Conservative MPs and prominent independents. Austin Chamberlain introduces us. delegation the house of commons Sir Austin Chamberlain Mr. Churchill Sir Robert Horne mr amory Sir John Gilmore Captain Gerst Admiral Roger Keyes Earl of Winterton Sir Henry Croft Sir Edward Grieg Viscount Walmer

Moore | Lieutenant Colonel Brabazon Sir Hugh O'Neill House of Lords Marquess of Salisbury Viscount Fitzgerald Viscount Trenchard Lord Lloyd Lord Milne This is a big deal.Never, I think, has there been such a thing in British political life.A remarkable group of men, disinterested and devoted to the cause of the country; they represent a voice of weight in the Conservative Party which cannot be ignored.If the leaders of the two opposition parties, Labor and the Liberals, were to join us, I am afraid that a tense political situation could be created to force the government to take remedial measures.Having seen the Prime Minister for two consecutive days, three or four hours a day, I take it upon myself to say that Mr. Baldwin is a good listener, and indeed he listens with great interest and attention.With him were the staff officers of the Reich Defense Council.On the first day, I spoke for an hour and fifteen minutes, explaining the situation.

I conclude by saying: First, we are now living in the most dangerous and urgent period in our nation's history.In the second place, there is nothing else to do but to unite with the French Republic for the solution of our problems.If the British Fleet and the French Army were combined, with the combined Air Forces of both countries flying close behind the Franco-Belgian frontier, plus all the power shown by the British and French, this would create the deterrent that would save us strength.That's the best hope anyway.In detail, we must eliminate all obstacles to increase our strength.It is impossible to guard against all possible dangers.We must focus our strength on the most important things, and suffer a little bit on other things. When it comes to more specific proposals, we must prioritize the development of our air force.We must train our outstanding youth as pilots at all costs.We must encourage them in every way and in every way, no matter what inducement method is used.We must simplify and speed up the manufacture of aircraft, proceed on the largest scale, and do not hesitate to enter into contracts with the United States or other countries to purchase as many aircraft materials and equipment as possible.We are in a danger such as our country has never encountered, not even at the height of the submarine warfare (1917).

I thought anxiously: Time flies like an arrow.If we do not get our defenses in order for long, we may be prevented by a powerful enemy from completing the work. We are greatly disappointed that the Chancellor of the Exchequer cannot attend.Mr. Baldwin's health is evidently failing, and it is known that he will soon retire.Everyone knows who is his heir.Unfortunately, Neville Chamberlain was enjoying his well-deserved leave of absence and was not present, so he did not have the opportunity to hear directly the facts from Conservative MPs.In this delegation were his elder brother and many valuable friends of his.

Ministers appeared to have given serious consideration to our important comments, but it was not until after Parliament had adjourned on 23 November 1936 that Mr. Baldwin invited us all to hear a well-considered Report on the whole situation.Sir Inskeep made a candid and handsome report; he made no secret of the seriousness of our country's situation.But in essence, what he meant was: Our estimates, and especially what I have said, are too pessimistic about the future; to say that the government is making great efforts (and they are) to remedy it, but that the current situation does not allow the government to The necessity of emergency measures; the necessity of emergency measures which would have to disrupt our industry, cause general panic, and expose existing defects; and within these limits everything that could be done was being done.In response to his remarks, Austin Chamberlain offered our general thoughts: We cannot be satisfied that our anxiety has not been relieved by this.So we said goodbye. I do not think that at this time, that is, at the end of 1936, the situation can be remedied.But if we try hard enough, much more can and should be done anyway.The manifestations and facts of these efforts will have an immeasurable effect on Germany, if not on Hitler.The most important fact remains, however, that Germany is ahead of us in airpower and in the whole field of arms production, even taking into account our smaller needs in land forces and the fact that we can rely on France and The French Army and Air Force, we are still behind.We have been unable to overtake Hitler in our air force or regain air parity.Now no one can prevent Germany from having the most powerful army and air force in Europe.We can improve our situation by doing extraordinary, unconventional efforts.But we cannot make radical changes. These worrying conclusions have not been seriously refuted by the Government; This undoubtedly has an impact on their foreign policy.These conclusions must be fully taken into account if we are to comment correctly on the decisions taken by Mr. Chamberlain as Prime Minister before and during the Munich crisis.At this time I was only a common member of parliament, I held no official office, and I did my best to stimulate the government to make enthusiastic and supernatural efforts to actively prepare for war, even if it caused the world to panic.When I do this, I undoubtedly take things a bit more seriously.My emphasis that we were two years behind and that in October 1938 I proposed a decisive battle with Hitler might well be considered inconsistent.But I still think it was right for me to urge the government in every possible way, and in 1938 we can see right away that if we had gone to war with Hitler then it would have been worse in every way. In 1939 it was more advantageous for us to finally have to go to war.On this issue, there is a more detailed description below. As we mentioned, Neville Chamberlain soon succeeded Baldwin as prime minister, and our narrative must go into 1938.Lord Swindon was an extremely shrewd and capable Air Secretary, and for a long time he had great influence in the cabinet, and could obtain the necessary funds and facilities.Concerns about our country's air defenses continued to grow, reaching a crescendo in May.Lord Swindon, though much valuable and important work was done in the enlargement and improvement of the Air Force, was not quick to produce results, and the whole policy of the government lacked vigor and urgency in every respect.I'm still busy researching the status of our Air Force buildup program.The number of people who support me is increasing day by day.At that time Swindon did one thing wrong: he accepted the knighthood and became a member of the House of Lords.Thus he could not defend himself and his Air Ministry in the House of Commons.Speakers elected from the front benches of government seats could not quell the rising tide of panic and discontent.After an unfortunate debate, it was taken for granted that the Air Secretary must be a member of the House of Commons. One morning (May 12) in the Air Defense Research Committee, all of us, scientists, politicians and officials, were busy working on various technical problems, when the Secretary of the Air Force received a call to come to Downing Street .He asked us to continue the discussion, and he left immediately.He never came back after that.Mr. Chamberlain dismissed him. In the heated debate that followed on the 25th, I tried to distinguish the abilities and efforts of the departed minister from the general discontent with the government: Recent events have affected the credibility of previous statements by the Government.The House of Commons has been lied to about the situation in our Air Force, and the Prime Minister himself has been lied to.He's obviously been fooled all along.Look at his statement in March when he said about our armaments: The sight of the enormous, almost astonishing power which Britain was building up had a calming and stabilizing effect on world opinion. I have often warned the House of Commons that our Air Force plans were falling behind other nations, but I never attacked Lord Swindon.I never thought he was the one to blame and certainly not the only one.Critics of the government often find in ministers who have been forced to resign previously unnoticed virtues, but I may perhaps quote what I said three months ago: Blame any minister for our shortcomings, or Lord Swindon , that's unfair.He is indeed an extremely capable and dedicated man who has worked tirelessly to expand our air force; what he has achieved, if there are no timetables, and if there are no comparisons elsewhere The grave responsibility for the Government's failure to keep the promises it has made to us rests with those who have ruled and led the island nation for the last five years, since the days of Germany's open and fervent rearmament.I will never join others in making too much of Lord Swindon.I was delighted to hear the Prime Minister praise him today.He deserves our sympathy.He had the confidence and friendship of the Prime Minister, he had the support of a huge majority in Parliament; and now he is being forced out at what I consider to be the most unfortunate period in the expansion of the Air Force.We may have produced quite a few aircraft in a few months, but hold him accountable for his record during this period, which was particularly unfortunate for him.A few days ago I read a letter from the great Duke of Marlborough, in which he wrote: The battle is in full swing, and it will be fatal. I turn to our defense: Now we are in the third year of public statements about military expansion.If everything is going so well, how can there be so many shortcomings?Why, for example, do guard drills use hand flags instead of machine guns?Why is our little homeland defense so unhealthy?Did all of this go according to plan?Considering how small our armed forces are, why shouldn't our Home Guard be equipped at the same time as the regular army?This is probably not a difficult task for British industry.British industry, in every field except the production of arms, is more flexible and more productive than German industry. The Secretary of War was asked the other day about the anti-aircraft guns, and the Secretary of War said that the old WWI three-inch guns had been modernized and that the new guns (we have more than one new gun) were running ahead of schedule Manufactured.But what kind of plan is our plan?If the plan stipulates that six, ten, twelve, twenty guns or other possible numbers are produced every month, then this plan is obviously easy to achieve and easy to exceed, but whether such a plan is suitable for What about our needs?A year ago, I reminded the House of Commons of the development of anti-aircraft guns published by Germany. There were thirty regiments of mobile artillery alone, each regiment had twelve squadrons of artillery, totaling about twelve or three hundred guns, in addition to fixed guns. There are three or four thousand guns.All these guns are not 1915 guns, but guns manufactured after 1933. Doesn't this give the House of Commons an idea of ​​the scale of these German advances?Although we do not need to have armies as large as the continental countries, our needs are exactly the same as theirs in terms of air defense.We are just as vulnerable, perhaps more so.Our government thinks that anti-aircraft guns are always counted in hundreds, while the anti-aircraft guns currently possessed by Germany are already counted in thousands. We always consider the production of the land, sea and air forces separately, but in fact, the supply of ordnance for each service has become a common problem of the supply and distribution of technicians, raw materials, workshops, machines and technical equipment.This problem can only be dealt with in a fully coordinated and economical way by a centrally controlled agency. But now we seem to be inefficient and have overlapping agencies, which naturally creates a lot of waste. Why should England's skilled aircraft industry, which requires 90,000 men, produce only half or a third as much as Germany's 110,000 workers?Isn't this an abnormal thing?It's hard to believe we can't build more planes just yet.With a desk, a vacant lot, money and labor, we should have lots of planes in eighteen months, but it's been thirty-four years since Lord Baldwin made the decision to triple the Air Force. It's been a month. The new Air Secretary, Sir Kingsley Wood, asked me to remain on the Air Defense Research Board.The sky is much darker now.I felt very much in need of Lindemann's explanations on some technical issues, his advice and help.So I wrote him a letter saying I needed his help or I couldn't proceed.After my efforts below, Lindemann was placed on the main committee and our cooperation resumed. Until June 1940, when the Armistice was signed in France, I had, both in time of war and in time of peace, in my personal capacity as well as head of government, been in constant contact with the ever-changing Prime Ministers and principal ministers of the French Republic. A relationship of mutual trust.I am very anxious to know the state of the German build-up, and to check the French estimates with my own.I therefore wrote to M. Daladier, who I knew well. Mr. Churchill to Mr. Daladier May 3, 1938 I am very grateful to your predecessors, Mr. Bloom and Mr. Flandin, for providing me with estimates of the strength of the Luftwaffe, especially in recent years.I would be very grateful if you could let me know your current views.I have some information which has always proved reliable, but I would very much like to have information from different sources to be cross-checked. I am very happy that your visit to our country was a great success.I hope that the staff consultations between the two countries will take place.I have urged our ministers to the need for such a conference. In his letter of May 11, 1938, M. Daladier sent me a seventeen-page document which had been thoroughly studied by the French Air Force Staff.I showed this important document to my friends in the relevant British departments, who, after careful study, said that it was consistent in major respects with the independent opinion of the British Air Staff based on their own intelligence.The French estimate of the size of the Luftwaffe is somewhat higher than the British estimate.At the beginning of June, I received a considerable amount of authority, in which case I wrote a letter to M. Daladier. Mr. Churchill to Mr. Daladier June 6, 1938 I am most grateful for the valuable information I received from the French embassy attaché. Rest assured that I will use this information with the utmost care and for our mutual benefit. The general estimate of the present Luftwaffe agrees with what I can personally arrive at.But I am inclined to think that the German aircraft factories produced more aircraft than estimated, and that the figures listed are only for military aircraft supplied to the Luftwaffe, while the aircraft exported and for General Franco Not included.By April 1, 1939, the Luftwaffe might have three hundred squadrons, and by April 1, 1940, four hundred squadrons. I would also like to cross-check my estimates of the German Army with those I can draw from British sources.So I say again: I take the liberty of attaching a very short summary.Here is what I have gathered from various sources about the present and future strength of the German Army.It will be of great convenience to me if I know that this material roughly agrees with your estimates.If you think I've made a mistake, just write down the numbers with a pencil. Summary As of this date, that is, June 1, the German Army has thirty-six regular divisions and four armored divisions, all of which are fully staffed according to the wartime establishment.The non-armored divisions are expanding rapidly, tripling their strength, and possibly doubling it now.The existing more than 70 artillery divisions are obviously not fully equipped.The entire army is short of officers.But by October 1, 1938, we estimate that there will be no less than fifty-six divisions, plus four armored divisions, that is, sixty fully equipped division-level establishments.Behind it is the trained reserve force, equivalent in number to about thirty-six divisions, and already equipped with a skeleton staff, which, if made into a lower standard part of the active army, requires only ordnance, small arms, and a few Cannon.This does not include the strength of Austrian troops.At the highest estimate, Austria could supply twelve unarmed divisions with arms readily available from the pools of the German munitions industry.In addition, there are many non-staff troops and organizations, such as border guards, civil defense teams, etc., which are relatively unarmed. On June 18, 1938, Mr. Daladier wrote me back: I am very pleased to know that the material attached to my letter of June 16 matches yours. The summary attached to your letter of June 6th refers to the situation in the German Army, which also corresponds to what I know.However, it should be pointed out that of the thirty-six regular divisions available for combat in Germany, four divisions have been fully motorized, and two more divisions will soon be fully motorized. In fact, this summary of the situation in the German Army which we had in the summer of 1938 was quite accurate, based on the material we obtained from German sources after the war.This summary was collected privately, and its accuracy is astonishing.This shows that I was by no means uninformed in my long series of struggles for British armies. The book makes several references to the French Air Force.There was a time when France had twice as many air forces as we do, while Germany was not allowed to have an air force at all.Until 1933, the French Air Force occupied a high position in Europe.However, in the year Hitler came to power, France began to show little interest in or support for the Air Force.They are not willing to spend money; let the factory production capacity shrink; do not design modern new aircraft.France operates a forty-hour work week, and its output cannot, of course, be compared with the tense work of Germany in its wartime state.All these events occurred approximately at the same time as the loss of British air balance, which has been specified above.In fact, the Western Allies, who had the right to establish such an air force as they considered necessary to their security, neglected this vital weapon; while Germany, on the other hand, though prohibited by the treaty from establishing an air force, made her The air force becomes a sharp spearhead for diplomatic work and, eventually, offensive. In 1936 and in the years that followed, the French Popular Front government took many measures to prepare the French Army and Navy for combat.But no comparable effort was made on the Air Force side.Appendix (5) of this book contains an embarrassing diagram clearly showing the decline of the French Air Force and the rising of the Luftwaffe, and the crossing of these two lines happened in 1935.It was not until February 1938, when M. Guy Lachambre became Minister of the Air Force, that vigorous steps were taken to revive the French Air Force. But it was only eighteen months before the war broke out.France certainly could not prevent the German Army from growing and maturing year by year to catch up with its own.The strange thing is that they let their air force continue to descend without anyone asking.I cannot, of course, share the responsibility or place blame on the ministers of friendly and allied countries, but when France goes after the criminals, it can very well pursue them in this respect. The whole of England and the newly elected Parliament were buoyed by the looming threat of a German threat, followed by a German-Italian alliance.They now become very willing and even eager to take all the steps which, if they had been taken two years earlier, they could have avoided the difficulties.While their mood has changed, so has the power of their opponents and the enormity of their task.Many people said that after we allowed Germany to take the Rhineland, there was no other way to stop Hitler than war.This may be the judgment of future generations.But we could have done a lot to prepare ourselves and reduce our danger.Who's to say for sure what didn't happen?