Chapter 18 Volume 1 Chapter 14 Mr Eden's Ascension to Foreign Secretary and His Resignation

Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister Eden and Sir Chamberlain Vansittart and I on the Spanish Question and the Foreign Secretary's contact at Nyon Conference Our Correspondence British Success Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Disagreement Lord Halifax Visits Hitler in Germany I decline the invitation Eden felt isolated President Roosevelt's proposal Prime Minister's reply was rejected by the President of the United States, deeply disappointed Mr. Chamberlain's serious responsibility for the Rome negotiations Aiden and Chamberlain finally broke up Chartwell's sleepless nights.

In the British cabinet, the foreign secretary occupies a special position.His high and great responsibilities commanded him special respect.But in carrying out his business he was usually under the scrutiny of the whole Cabinet, or at least the leading figures in it.It is his duty to keep them informed of how things are going.According to custom and general practice, he will circulate among his cabinet members his official telegrams, reports from foreign envoys, and records of his conversations with foreign envoys or other important figures.At least, that's always been the case when I was in the cabinet.The prime minister, in particular, retains this right of review, and he has the right to control the main lines of foreign policy either personally or through the cabinet, at least not from him.No foreign secretary can do his job without the constant support of the prime minister.In order to make things go smoothly, not only must the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agree on fundamental principles, but they should also be very harmonious in their views, and even to a certain extent, in their tempers.If the prime minister himself is particularly concerned about foreign affairs, then the cooperation between the two of them is all the more important.

Eden was foreign secretary under Baldwin.Baldwin did not actively interfere in foreign policy, aside from his reputation for a life of peace and quiet.Chamberlain, on the contrary, wanted to exercise strong control over every branch of government.He has a firm opinion on diplomatic issues, and as soon as he took office, he declared that he had the natural right to discuss diplomatic issues with foreign envoys.Therefore, after he took office as Prime Minister, he brought about a very subtle but perceivable change in the position of the Foreign Secretary. Added to this was a deep, though at first unexpressed, difference of spirit and point of view between the two men.The Prime Minister wished to maintain friendly relations with the two dictators of Europe, and thought that the best way was to compromise with them and avoid anything that would offend them.And Eden had gained a reputation in Geneva in the past for calling nations to unite against one of the dictators, and, if he had been left to decide at that time, he might have used measures that were on the fringes of war, or even not just fringes. dictator.He was a great believer in the Anglo-French Entente.

He has just insisted on holding a staff meeting between Britain and France.He was keen to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union; he recognized the danger and threat of Hitler.He was troubled by the weakness of our armaments and our diplomatic response.Perhaps it can also be said that there is almost no difference in opinion between me and him, except, of course, that he is a responsible official.So from the very beginning I saw that if the world situation worsened, differences of opinion between these two important figures in the cabinet were likely to arise. Moreover, the Prime Minister had one among his colleagues who seemed to strongly share his diplomatic views, and that was Lord Halifax.My long and intimate relationship with Halifax began in 1922, when Prime Minister Lloyd George served as my Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office; To the detriment of our personal relations, although there have been very serious and prolonged quarrels between us concerning his policy in the Governorship of India.I believe I know him well, and I am well aware that there is a gulf between us.At the same time, I also felt that there was also this gap, or something like it, between him and Aiden.On the whole, it might be wiser for Mr Chamberlain to appoint Halifax as Foreign Secretary at the outset of his cabinet formation.It would have been more appropriate to have Eden in the War Office or the Admiralty, and the Prime Minister could already have a congenial fellow in the Foreign Office.During the period of cooperation between Eden and Chamberlain, this ominous situation gradually deteriorated.

Until then, and for many troubled years, Sir Vansittart was the chief official of the Foreign Office.His unexpected relationship with the Hall-Laval Treaty has affected the opinion of the new foreign secretary, Mr Eden, and many politicians. At this time, the Prime Minister relied more and more on Sir Wilson, his chief industrial adviser, and consulted with him on all matters, many of which were not within his scope of business.The Chancellor considered Vansittart to be anti-German.In fact he did, because no one more clearly recognized or foresaw the growth of the German threat, and no one was more willing to meet it in order to subordinate all other considerations to this goal.The Foreign Secretary found him to be more comfortable working with Sir Cadogan, who was also a highly respected and able diplomat.So by the end of 1937 Vansittart knew he was going to be transferred, and on January 1, 1938, he was appointed to the special post of chief foreign adviser to the government.This new name is a promotion to the outside world, and it looks like a promotion, but in fact, the entire responsibility of managing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no longer in his hands.He still has the same office, but the Foreign Office cables must now be sent to the Foreign Secretary, together with the Ministry's detailed comments, before he can see them.Vansittart was reluctant to be ambassador to Paris, and continued in this detached position for some time.

Between the summer of 1937 and the end of the year, the differences between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary over methods and objectives gradually widened.The chain of events which led to Mr. Eden's resignation in February 1938 followed logically and gradually. The initial point of disagreement was caused by the relationship between our country and Germany and Italy.Mr. Chamberlain decided to plead with the two dictators.In July 1937 he invited the Italian ambassador, Count Grandi, to the Prime Minister's residence in Downing Street.Mr Eden knew they were having talks, but he did not attend.During the talks, Mr Chamberlain said he wanted to improve Anglo-Italian relations.Count Grandi suggested to him that, as a first step, it might be beneficial to the situation if the Prime Minister could write a letter to Mussolini with a personal appeal.Mr. Chamberlain sat down.It was during this conversation that he wrote such a letter, but sent it without informing the Foreign Secretary, who was at that moment in the Foreign Office a few steps from the Prime Minister's residence.The letter produced no visible results.The relationship between the two countries has deteriorated day by day because of Italy's expanded intervention in Spain.

Mr. Chamberlain believed that he had a personal and special mission to agree with the two dictators, Germany and Germany, to establish friendly relations, and he also believed that he could indeed establish such relations.With Mussolini, Mr. Chamberlain agreed to the recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia as a prerequisite for a full settlement of the dispute between the two countries. As for Hitler, he was prepared to make concessions on the colonial question.At the same time, he was conspicuously unwilling to consider improving the state of British armaments, or close staff-level or political cooperation between Britain and France.Mr. Eden, on the contrary, was convinced that, if any settlement was to be reached with Italy, it must be part of a comprehensive settlement of the Mediterranean question, including that of Spain, and subject to the deep understanding of France on the matter in advance.In negotiating such a comprehensive settlement, our recognition of Italy's place in Abyssinia can obviously be used as an important bargaining chip.From the Foreign Secretary's point of view, it would be unwise to remove this condition before negotiations have taken place, and to appear eager to negotiate.

By the summer of 1937, the differences became even more serious.Mr Chamberlain felt that the Foreign Office had thwarted his attempts to negotiate with Germany and Italy, while Mr Eden thought his chief had been too eager in trying to get closer to the dictator, especially at a time when Britain's armaments were so weak .To tell the truth, there was a deep practical and psychological difference in the views of the two men. For all my differences with the government, I have deep sympathy for the foreign secretary.He seems to me to be the most resolute and courageous man in the Government; and though he has done much of what I have attacked, and still condemns, as State Secretary to the Foreign Secretary and later as Under-Secretary attacking.But I do know that his heart is good, and he has the root of the problem himself.On his part, he always invited me to every banquet held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we often exchanged letters.There is of course nothing wrong with doing so.According to the long-standing habit, the foreign secretary always kept in touch with important political figures of the time and discussed various international issues extensively.Mr. Eden was just following precedent.

I wrote to him on August 7, 1937: The Spanish question interrupted our train of thought.It seems to me that the most important thing at present is to make Bloom as strictly neutral as we are.Even if Germany continues to support the rebel side and the Soviet Union pays the government side, we will still be neutral.If the French government helped one side against the rebels, it would be a godsend for the Germans and pro-Germans.If you have time, please read my article in the Monday Evening Standard. I wrote in this article: The most violent disputes occur only when both parties are right and wrong.In Spain, on one side was the enthusiasm of the impoverished and backward proletariat, which demanded the overthrow of the church, the state, and private property, and the creation of a communist regime.On the other side were the patriotic, religious and bourgeois forces, supported by the peasantry in many provinces, under the leadership of the army, who were gradually establishing a military dictatorship to restore order.With the determination to break the boat, both sides inflicted brutal and merciless slaughter on the other; the chilling hatred was out of control; the interests of the two sides were at odds with each other.All of these make it possible for no matter which side wins, then it is very likely to ruthlessly kill all the activists of the losing side, thus starting a long period of autocratic rule.

By the fall of 1937, Eden and I were on the same page, though in different ways, on the question of opposing active Axis intervention in the Spanish Civil War. I always support him in the House of Commons if he takes firm action, even if it is small.I am well aware that he has had friction in the Cabinet with some of his senior colleagues and the Prime Minister.I knew he could have acted more decisively had he not been restrained.We were in Cannes at the end of August, and we met several times. One day I invited him and Lloyd George to dinner at a restaurant halfway between Cannes and Nice.Our conversation touched on many issues: the conflict in Spain, Mussolini's consistent treachery and interference in the Spanish Civil War.

Finally, of course, there is also the dark scenario of the growing power of Germany.I thought at the time that the three of us were completely on the same page.The Foreign Secretary was, of course, secretive about his relations with his chiefs and colleagues, and did not mention this delicate question in his conversation.His attitude could not have been more correct.I can assert, however, that he was not a happy man in his important position. Tensions soon arose in the Mediterranean.Aiden handled the crisis with determination and deftness, and it was resolved.The course of the settlement of the incident can prove that the line we advocate is correct.The thing is, a convoy of merchant ships was sunk by a so-called Spanish submarine.Actually these submarines are of course not Spanish but Italian.It was sheer piracy, and it immediately inspired action from those who knew about it.On September 10th a meeting of the Mediterranean nations was held at Nyon. The foreign ministers were attended by Vansittart and the First Sea Lord, Lord Chatfield. Mr. Churchill to Mr. Eden September 9, 1937 In your last letter you said you wished to see me and Lloyd George before going to Geneva.We have met today.We hereby present our opinions for your understanding. Now is the time to urge Italy to return to its international obligations.Piracy of submarines has occurred in the Mediterranean region; they have sunk merchant ships of many countries with little regard for the lives of their crews.These atrocities must be stopped.For this purpose, the countries of the Mediterranean should agree to keep their own submarines out of certain prescribed commercial routes.The navies of Britain and France should be responsible for searching for submarines within these routes. If the scouts find any submarines on these routes, they should be regarded as pirates and should be tracked and sunk.We should invite Italy to participate in the most polite manner, but if it does not participate, then we should tell it: we intend to do so. At the same time, since it is also very important to obtain the friendly cooperation of Italy, France should declare that if Italy does not participate in the agreement, it will open the Pyrenees border between France and Spain to allow the import of various weapons.In this way, Italy will face the fact that submarines engaged in piracy on the Mediterranean routes will be eliminated anyway; on the other hand, it will not benefit if it refuses to participate in this agreement, because France will open borders.We believe this to be of the utmost importance.This combined pressure on Italy to join the Mediterranean in action, combined with the fact that it would run great risks for no gain if it persisted, was almost certain to work against Mussolini if ​​he Know that Britain and France really mean it. It seems that Germany does not plan to launch a major war this year. If it wants to establish good relations with Italy in some future matters, then the problem must be solved now.The danger we run into now is that Mussolini thinks that everything can be obtained by blackmail and intimidation, and he thinks that in the end we will only say a few empty words and then retreat.In the interests of peace in Europe, now is the time to put up a strong front.If you feel able to make such an effort, we would like to assure you that, whatever the circumstances may turn out, we will have your back, both in the country and in the House of Commons. Personally, your insistence on holding staff-level talks with France after the demilitarization of the Rhineland was disrupted was an important moment.I think you're now at an equally important moment again.The brave way is the safe way. You are welcome to make use of this letter, privately or publicly, as you feel it will serve the interests of Great Britain and the interests of peace. Also: I have read this letter to Lloyd George, and he fully agrees with what is stated in the letter. The Nyon meeting was brief but successful.The meeting agreed to set up a joint Anglo-French patrol fleet to prevent harassment by submarines.The fleet has definite orders.As long as any submarine encounters them, it will definitely be sunk.As a result, Italy also reluctantly agreed to this provision, and the violence at sea was immediately terminated. Mr. Eden to Mr. Churchill September 14, 1937 You may have seen by now that the course we took at Nyon was at least partly in line with the proposals in your letter.I hope you will agree that the outcome of the meeting is satisfactory.Here, it appears to be so.In fact, the important political fact is that we emphasized in the meeting that the cooperation between Britain and France is effective, and that the two democracies of Western Europe still play a decisive role in European affairs.The plan we finally agreed to was drawn up jointly with France.I must say, they couldn't have worked better with us.We are amazed at the extent of naval cooperation they are prepared to offer.It's fair to say that if you include their air support, we're 50/50. I admit that what we have achieved in this meeting is only one aspect of the Spanish problem.But it has greatly increased our prestige among nations, at a time when we desperately need it.The attitude of the small countries along the Mediterranean Sea is also satisfactory.Under Turkey's almost sympathetic leadership, these small countries have all fared well.Chatfield approached everyone with great success.I feel that the Nyon Conference, just because it was so streamlined and successful, has done a lot to restore our place on the map.I hope you feel the same way. At least this meeting has encouraged the French, and ourselves, to come together to tackle our very difficult work. Mr. Churchill to Mr. Eden September 20, 1937 Thank you for taking the time to write to me.I really should congratulate you, because this is a major achievement.It is indeed a rare opportunity to bring a villain to his knees by severe and forceful measures without risking war. I am sure the House of Commons will be very pleased with the outcome of the meeting. I'm glad to know Chamberlain has had your back and not held you back, as the popular papers say.You will, I hope, be determined to maintain the advantages you have acquired.Mussolini knew only superior force, as he was now encountering in the Mediterranean.The whole naval situation there has been completely changed since the day we were able to make use of the French bases.Italy must not be able to resist a vigorous joint action by England and France.So I hope that Mussolini will be left to find his own way out of the diplomatic embarrassment he has gotten himself into because of his own blunder.The situation in the Mediterranean was brought about by us united against him for the purpose of invulnerability, a situation which he should have tried to avoid. Now he is reaping the consequences.The cooperation between the navies of England and France, which has now begun, I hope will continue indefinitely, and the navies and air forces of the two countries will continue to use each other's equipment.This kind of cooperation will be useful in preventing disputes in the Balearic Islands in the future.Italy's continued fortification of the Mediterranean against us is a great danger to the British Empire which will be dealt with in the future.The more permanent our deployments become now, the less dangerous this situation is. Bernard Baruch called to say he was writing out the results of his conversation with the President of the United States (after our London conversation).I have no doubt that the president's rhetoric against authoritarian countries was influenced by our conversation.I am convinced that the issue of tariffs and currency must also be explored. Mr. Eden to Mr. Churchill September 25, 1937 Thank you for your letter of September 20, and I am very grateful for your encouraging words about the Nyon Conference.You made the following conclusions about the situation at Nyon: It is indeed a rare opportunity to bring a villain to his knees by severe and forceful measures without risking war.I think this conclusion adequately describes the situation.Mussolini stumbled past his head, and he must be punished.Eighty British and French destroyers, together with a powerful brigade of aircraft, patrolled the Mediterranean Sea. This magnificent sight undoubtedly impressed European public opinion deeply. From the reports I have obtained, Germany itself has not lost sight of this fact.This fall, we've had to play the defensive game for the most part.Delbos [1] and I are both relieved that we have been able to preserve the status of our two countries in this way at such a time.There are still many difficulties ahead of us, and militarily, of course, we are still far from being as strong as I hoped, but the Nyon Conference has enabled us to improve our position and thereby achieve more time. [1] Minister of Foreign Affairs of France.translator I wholeheartedly agree with the importance you attach to the Anglo-French co-operation we are now forming in the Mediterranean.The French attitude, on the whole, was of course fundamentally different from that exhibited under Laval.The French Naval Staff did indeed do their best to help.They did make an important contribution to the Combined Fleet.I believe our Admiralty has been impressed with this.Also, your mention that mutual use of each other's bases would benefit both countries is extremely valuable.Italy's participation in this agreement, whatever its final form, cannot affect the substance of the situation. Although the Nyon Conference was an accident, it also proved how strongly the combined power of Britain and France, if it showed confidence and readiness to use force at all, had a strong influence on the psychology and policy of a dictator.At this stage, it cannot be said that this policy will definitely prevent the war from happening, but at least it can postpone the war.The truth is that appeasement in its various forms only encourages aggression and the strengthening of dictators' power over their own peoples; whereas any decisive sign of counterattack by Western democracies can bring about an immediate de-escalation of tensions.This pattern was manifested throughout 1937.After 1937, the situation and conditions were completely different again. In early October 1937, I was invited to attend a banquet hosted by the Foreign Ministry for Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinovich.After the meal, we got up and walked around talking.While I was chatting with Eden, Lord Halifax came over and said excitedly that he had been invited by Goering to go hunting in Germany, and that he hoped to take this opportunity to meet Hitler.He said he had spoken to the Prime Minister about it, and the Prime Minister thought it was a wonderful thing, so he had accepted the invitation.At that time, I had this impression: Aiden was a little surprised and unhappy when he heard it, but everything passed in a happy atmosphere.Halifax therefore visited Germany as an old hunter.The Nazi newspapers hailed him as Lord Halalifax.Harari!It was originally the cry of people hunting on the European continent.After several hunting and entertainments he was indeed finally invited to Berchtesgaden for an informal and modest meeting with the Fuehrer.The meeting did not go well, and it is hard to conceive of a more difficult time for these two to get to know each other.One is a Yorkshire High Church aristocrat and peace-loving man, raised in an environment of smiling faces and goodwill in the old English life.He had been in the war and was a good officer.The other party to meet was a villain born in the abyss of poverty, stimulated by the defeat of the country, full of hatred and revenge, and crazy to make the Germanic race the master of Europe or even the world.The meeting yielded nothing but nonsense and bewilderment. It may be mentioned here that Ribbentrop twice invited me to visit Hitler.A long time ago, in 1907 and 1909, I went to Germany to visit exercises at the invitation of the Kaiser in the capacity of Under-Secretary for Colonial Affairs and Major of the Oxfordshire Yeomanry respectively. different.There is a fierce struggle going on, and I have my place in the struggle.If I had the British state mandate, I would be very happy to meet Hitler.But to meet him personally would put myself and my country at a disadvantage.If I agreed with my dictator host, I was cheating him; if I disagreed, I was sure to make him angry, and I would be accused of destroying Anglo-German relations.So I declined both invitations, or let it pass naturally.All those who visited the Führer during these years were either very embarrassing or they were doing themselves a disservice.Perhaps no one was more thoroughly deceived than Lloyd George.He described his conversation with Hitler so cheerfully that anyone who reads this account today will find it ridiculous. Hitler undoubtedly had a deceptive charm, which could easily make visitors feel inappropriately about him. Power and authority, unless you meet on an equal footing, otherwise it is better to stay away. During the November days, Aiden grew increasingly anxious about the slowness of our armament buildup.On the 11th, he had a meeting with the Prime Minister and wanted to express his concerns.After listening for a while, Mr. Chamberlain refused to listen to him, and advised him: Go back and take an aspirin.When Halifax returned from Berlin, he reported that Hitler had told him that the colonies were the only unresolved issue between Britain and Germany.He believed the Germans were in no hurry and there was no immediate hope of peace talks.His conclusions are negative and his attitude is passive. In February 1938 the Foreign Secretary himself felt almost isolated in the cabinet.The prime minister has strong support against him and against his views.A large number of important cabinet members believed that the foreign ministry's policy was too dangerous and even provocative.On the other hand, some younger cabinet members were keen to know his views, some of whom later complained that Eden had not confided in them.But Aiden had no intention of organizing cliques against the leader.The chiefs of staff could not give him any assistance. In fact, they also advised him to be cautious and to consider the danger of the situation.They do not want to get too close to the French, lest they undertake obligations beyond our power.They believe that Russia's military strength after the purge of the party has little hope.They believed that in dealing with our problems we had to assume that we had three enemies, Germany, Italy and Japan, who might combine to attack us, and that we had little help from others.We may request the use of French air bases, but at the first stage we are not in a position to send troops immediately.Even such an extremely cautious proposal by the General Staff met with strong resistance in the cabinet. But the real rupture was caused by another new problem.On the evening of January 11, 1938, the US Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Wells visited the British Ambassador to the US in Washington.He brought a secret letter from President Roosevelt to Mr. Chamberlain.The President, deeply anxious about the deteriorating international situation, proposed to invite representatives of some governments to Washington to discuss the root causes of the current dispute.Before he takes this step, however, he is willing to consult with His Majesty's Government to find out their opinion of the plan, emphasizing that no other Government should be informed of the nature and facts of the proposal.He asked the British Government to write back to him not later than the seventeenth of January, and stated that his proposals were to be made to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy only with the earnest patronage and full support of His Majesty's Government.It's a big but unpredictable step. The British ambassador, Sir Lindsay, sent the top-secret document to London.He added that: in his personal opinion, the president's plan is indeed a sincere effort to ease international tensions, and if His Majesty's government does not support it, the efforts made by the United Kingdom and the United States to cooperate in the past two years will be in vain .He urged England most earnestly to accept the offer.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received this telegram on the 12th, and sent a copy of it to the prime minister who was resting in the country that night.The next morning the Prime Minister returned to London and sent a reply to the President of the United States on his orders.At this time Mr. Eden was on a short vacation in the south of France.Mr. Chamberlain's reply was to the effect that he was grateful to President Roosevelt for his trust in discussing with him the President's plan to ease tensions in Europe; position, especially on the Italian side.He said: If His Majesty's Government, for its part, felt that Italy really wanted to contribute to the restoration of confidence and friendly relations, we would give legal recognition to the Italian occupation of Abyssinia and, if possible, First obtain the consent of the League of Nations.The cable added that the Prime Minister had brought up these facts so that the President could consider whether his present proposal was in conflict with British efforts.So whether it would be wiser to hold off on proposing the US plan. The President was rather disappointed by this reply.He indicated that he would reply to Mr. Chamberlain on January 17th.On the evening of January 15, the Foreign Secretary returned to England.His return to China was not due to the urging of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister felt that he could still do things in his absence.He was urged to return home by loyal officials in the Foreign Ministry. A vigilant Cadogan awaits him at Dover Docks.Mr. Eden, who had worked long and hard to promote the relations of England and America, was disturbed by this news.He immediately sent a telegram to Sir Lindsay, hoping to lessen the effect of Mr. Chamberlain's cold reply.The president's reply reached London on the morning of October 18.He agreed to hold off on presenting his plan as the British government was considering direct negotiations, the letter said, but said he was seriously concerned by the British government's intention to recognize Italy's place in Abyssinia.He believed that such recognition would have the most harmful effect on Japanese policy in the Far East and on American public opinion.When Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, handed the letter to the British ambassador in Washington, he said more emphatically: "Such an admission will certainly arouse a feeling of disgust and renew or deepen the reluctance to act for others." The worry of taking chestnuts out of the fire.This would be seen as a nasty deal in Europe at the expense of interests in the Far East, which the United States closely cared about. The president's letter was brought up for discussion at several meetings of the cabinet's foreign affairs committee.Mr Eden has achieved a major revision of the cabinet's previous attitude.Most of the cabinet thought he was satisfied, but he did not make it clear to them that he was in fact not.After these discussions, on the evening of January 21, two official letters were sent to Washington.The general idea is that the Prime Minister warmly welcomes the President's proposal, but if the U.S. proposal does not respond well in all aspects, the British government is unwilling to share the responsibility for the failure.Mr. Chamberlain wishes to make clear that we do not accept unreservedly the approach proposed by the President, since it is evident that this approach not only irritates the two dictators in Europe, but also irritates Japan.His Majesty's Government also felt that the President did not fully understand our position on legal recognition.The second letter is actually an explanation of our attitude on this matter.We are willing to grant this recognition only as part of a comprehensive settlement with Italy. The British Ambassador reported to the British Government the conversation he had with Mr. Wells, Under-Secretary of State, on the 22nd of January when he presented these documents to the President of the United States. He said Mr. Wells had told him that the president believed the issue of recognition was a bitter pill that both countries had to swallow, and he hoped we should take it together. President Roosevelt's proposal was to use the influence of the United States to bring the major European countries together to negotiate a possible comprehensive settlement; this would naturally involve the great power of the United States, if only on a trial basis.But this suggestion was rejected by Mr. Chamberlain in this way.His attitude clearly shows that the views of the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are very different.The differences between them were still limited to the cabinet circle for a short period of time, but this rift was fundamental.Mr. Chamberlain's biographer, Professor Feilin, commented on this episode quite interestingly. He wrote: Chamberlain was deeply afraid that the two dictators would ignore this suggestion, or use the democracies to form a front as a pretext for war.But after Aiden returned to England, he expressed that he would rather take such a risk than lose the goodwill of the United States.This was where the first signs of resignation appeared, but a compromise was finally found.Poor England!Day after day, free and untroubled, it wandered, amidst the spouty and suave prattle of Parliament, downhill in the very direction it wanted to avoid.The important articles of the most powerful papers, with some honest and honorable exceptions, continue to soothe hearts; and England acts as if to assume that the whole world is as free, uncalculating, and kind as she is herself. The Foreign Secretary certainly could not offer his resignation over the incident of Mr Chamberlain's refusal of advice from the President of the United States.Mr. Roosevelt's intention to involve the United States in the shadowy arena of Europe really put him at great risk domestically.As long as any part of the telegrams exchanged is leaked, all the isolationist forces in the country will definitely attack the president.On the other hand, the presence of the United States in a European scene filled with hatred and fear would be all the better for delaying or even preventing war.As far as Britain is concerned, it is almost a matter of life and death.現在沒有人在事後能估計出它對奧地利事勢的演變以及對慕尼黑的局勢究竟會發生什麼影響。我們必須認為，這次拒絕了美國的建議事實上確是拒絕了，也就失去了用戰爭以外的方法使世界免於暴政的最後一點點機會。眼光短淺而且對歐洲局勢又不熟悉的張伯倫先生，竟然妄自尊大到如此程度，拒絕了從大西洋彼岸伸過來的援助之手，時至今日，看起來仍令人感到驚訝。一個正直幹練的好心人，負責掌握國家命運和掌握依靠國家的一切人的命運，卻在這個事件中表現得毫無分寸，甚至連自己的觀念也沒有，說起來實在可悲。即使到了現在，人們也很難設想出，當時究竟是什麼心理狀態使他採取那樣的外交姿態。 我在後面還要講到，在慕尼黑危機時對俄國的合作建議的處理經過。當時，我們不僅疏忽了自己的防務，又想方設法去削弱法國的防務，後來我們和這兩個大國的關係搞得逐漸疏遠，而這兩個大國的最大努力，又正是保存我們的生命和他們自己的生命所必需的。假如當時英國人曾知道而且認識到這些事情，恐怕歷史的發展就完全不同了。但當時一天一天都好像過得很順利。在十年以後的今日，就讓過去的教訓作今後的指導吧。 艾登先生在一月二十五日赴巴黎與法國進行磋商。這時他對前途的信心一定已經減弱了。現在一切都以接近意大利是否成功而定了。關於這一點，我們在給美國總統的覆信中曾著重地加以說明。法國政府極力向艾登先生表示，西班牙問題必須列為全面解決對意關係問題的一部分；對於這一點，艾登無須多說就完全同意。二月十日，首相和外交大臣接見格倫迪伯爵。當時格倫迪宣稱意大利原則上準備開始談判。 二月十五日，消息傳來說，奧地利總理許施尼格被迫接受德國的條件，任命納粹主要人物賽斯英誇特為內政部長和公安部長，參加奧地利內閣。這一嚴重事件，並沒有消除張伯倫先生和艾登先生之間的緊張關係。二月十八日，他們再度和格倫迪伯爵會面。這是他們兩人在公務上最後一次合作。 意大利大使既拒絕討論意大利對奧地利的立場，也拒絕考慮英國所提的撤退在西班牙的志願軍，或所謂志願軍（就是指意大利的五個師的正規軍）的計劃。格倫迪要求在羅馬舉行一般性的會談。首相早有此意，而外交大臣則強烈反對這一步驟。 此後就是冗長的磋商和內閣裡的會議。關於這些，現在已經公佈的唯一權威記述，就是《張伯倫先生傳》這本書。據法伊林教授說，首相讓內閣知道，到現在，不是艾登辭職就是他自己辭職。法伊林從獲准利用的若干日記和私人函件中引述首相下面所說的話：我認為必須把話說明白，我不能接受任何意義相反的決定。法伊林寫道：內閣一致同意首相的意見，雖然有一些保留。我們不知道這些話是在什麼時候怎樣在冗長的會議上提出的，但在最後，艾登先生終於很簡單地提出了辭職。理由是他不能同意在這個階段中和在這些情況下舉行羅馬會談。他的同僚們對他提出辭職都感到十分詫異，法伊林先生說他們大為震動。他們不知道外交大臣和首相之間的分歧已經到了非破裂不可的程度。顯然，如果他們知道這件事會牽涉到艾登先生的辭職，那就將成為一個會引起更大和更廣泛的爭論的新問題。然而，他們專門討論了這件引起爭議的事情的是非曲直。那一整天的其餘時間則用來極力使外交大臣改變初衷。張伯倫先生對內閣的苦惱也很難過。看到我的同僚這樣地感到吃驚，我提議休會，明天再繼續舉行。但艾登認為再找什麼表白的話也沒有用。到二十日的午夜，他的辭職最後決定下來。首相說：依我看，他是很光榮的。哈利法克斯立即被任命為外交大臣。 【１】 【１】法伊林，前引書，第三百三十八頁。 外面當然事先也知道內閣發生了嚴重分歧，雖則原因還不清楚。我早已聽到一些消息，但很小心沒有告訴艾登先生。 我希望他在充分確立他的理由之前，無論如何不要辭職，以便他在議會的許多朋友有機會把問題揭露出來。但這時的政府是那麼強大和高高在上，所以這場鬥爭只好在內閣密室中，主要在兩個人之間去解決了。 二月二十日深夜，我坐在恰特韋爾莊園我的那間老房間裡（像我現在常常坐在那裡一樣）。我接到一個電話，告訴我說，艾登已經辭職了。我不得不承認，我的心頓時沉了下來。一時間，我被失望的暗潮所淹沒。在我漫長的一生中，經過多少盛衰榮辱。在不久就到來的戰爭期中，甚至戰時最黑暗的日子裡，我的睡眠從來沒有成過問題。在一九四○年的危機中，那時我身負許多重任，以及在後來五年中，常常遇到令人焦灼和極其棘手的事情，但在一天的工作做完之後，還是能夠一躺下就睡著當然，要是有緊急的事情就叫我起來。我總是睡得很香，醒來神志清爽，沒有什麼感觸，胃口很好，把早上送上來的早點盒裡的東西，不管什麼就狼吞虎嚥地吃掉。 但現在，在一九三八年二月二十日之夜，也只有在這一夜，我睡不著了。從半夜直到天明，我躺在床上，心裡又難過又擔憂。 眼前是一個堅強的年青人，他巍然屹立，頂住那股長長的、憂鬱的、慢吞吞地流過來的潮流。那是一股毫無主見、動不動就屈服的潮流，也是估計錯誤、衝擊微弱的潮流。如果讓我來處理他的事，在許多方面一定會和他不同；但這個時候，在我看來，他代表英國民族的全部希望；而這一個偉大古老的英國民族，曾對人類有過許多貢獻，今後仍將有所貢獻。現在這個人卻離開他的職位了。我凝視著陽光慢慢地穿過窗戶，在我的內心中看到了站在我前面的死神的影像。