Chapter 24 Volume 1, Chapter 20, The Mystery of the Soviet Union

Hitler abolished the Anglo-German naval agreement Hitler abolished the German-Polish non-aggression pact The Soviet Union proposed the establishment of the Triple Alliance Border countries were in a dilemma Soviet-German contact increased Litvinov's dismissal Molotov Anglo-Soviet negotiations Debate on May 19 Lloyd ‧Mr. George's speech My speech on the situation in Europe The need to unite with Russia is too late The German-Italian Steel Pact The Soviet Union's diplomatic strategy. All relations between Great Britain and Germany have come to an end. Now of course we all know that there has never been a real friendly relationship between Britain and Germany since Hitler came to power.All Hitler wanted was to persuade or intimidate Britain into allowing him to move freely in Eastern Europe.Mr. Chamberlain wanted to appease him, to influence him, to teach him politeness.But now, the time has come for the final disillusionment of the British Government.The cabinet finally believed that Nazi Germany was going to war.Therefore, the Prime Minister offered guarantees and signed covenants to countries in all directions, as long as they did not refuse, regardless of whether we could provide effective assistance to these countries.As well as guarantees to Poland, guarantees were given to Greece and Romania, followed by an alliance with Turkey.

We shall now return to the ill-fated piece of paper Mr. Chamberlain obtained Hitler's autograph in Munich and waved triumphantly to the crowd as Hurston disembarked.On this paper he had secured two guarantees which he believed to exist between himself and Hitler, and between Great Britain and Germany, the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty.The conquest of Czechoslovakia had destroyed the first guarantee; Hitler was now about to brush off the second. On April 28, Hitler addressed the Reichstag: Today, since the English press and the British authorities maintain the view that Germany must be opposed under all circumstances, and to support this view, pursue what we know as a policy of encircling Germany. In this case, the basis of the naval treaty is no longer exists.I have therefore decided to give the British Government an ultimatum today explaining this decision.It's not an important substantive issue for us yet because I also want to avoid an arms race between us and the UK and it's just an act of pride.But if England is willing to negotiate again with Germany on this question, and if it is still possible to reach a clear and frank understanding between us, then I cannot be more pleased. 【１】

[1] "Hitler Speeches", Volume II, page 1626. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement clearly benefited Hitler at an important juncture in his policy; now he speaks of this treaty as a favor to Withdraw this grace.Hitler told the British government that he was willing to discuss the naval issue further with the British government, perhaps even hoping that those who had been fooled by him before would stick to the policy of appeasement.Now this naval treaty was of no importance to him.He has Italy to cooperate with him, he has air superiority; he also has Austria and Czechoslovakia and everything that those two countries have.He already has the Western Wall.As far as the navy alone was concerned, he had long since set aside any agreement to build submarines as fast as he could.He formally invoked the rights stipulated in the treaty to build the same number of submarines as the United Kingdom, but this did not limit Germany's plan to build submarines in the slightest.As for the larger ships, the Naval Agreement made generous promises to him, but he had more than enough energy to absorb them all.So, with a brazen artifice, he throws the treaty back at the fool who made it.

In the same speech, Hitler also announced the abolition of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. He cited the British guarantee to Poland as an immediate reason.He said the guarantee would allow Poland to take military action against Germany in the event that Germany came into conflict with any other country and England was drawn into the war.This treaty obligation is incompatible with the agreement I concluded with Marshal Pisudski not long ago, so I believe that Poland has unilaterally violated this agreement, which therefore no longer exists.I have sent an ultimatum stating this opinion to the Polish government

At that time, after studying this speech, I wrote in a paper: The eyes of Nazi Germany are now very likely to turn to Poland.Whether or not Herr Hitler's speeches revealed his innermost intentions, it was clear that the main goal of last Friday's scene was to isolate Poland.He said some plausible reasons, launched a violent attack on Poland, and exerted strong pressure on it.The German dictator seems to have thought that the Anglo-Polish agreement could be made impossible if his demands were limited to Danzig and the Corridor.He obviously hoped that those in Britain who used to shout who would fight for Czechoslovakia?People now shout who will fight for Danzig and the Corridor?He does not seem to realize that his treachery of the Munich Agreement had brought about a major change in British public opinion; that his atrocities had brought about a complete change in the policy of the British Government, especially the Prime Minister.

The abolition of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 was a very serious and threatening step.Until January this year, when Ribbentrop visited Warsaw, he also affirmed the agreement again and again.This treaty, like the Anglo-German naval treaty, was negotiated in accordance with Hitler's wishes.It too, like the Naval Treaty, was clearly advantageous to Germany.Both of these agreements made Germany better off when it was still a weak state.The Naval Agreement amounted to a de facto British condolence to Germany for violating the military terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, thus nullifying both the decisions of the Strezza Front and the Executive Council of the League of Nations.The German-Polish Agreement allowed German attention to be concentrated on Austria, and later on Czechoslovakia, which devastated these two unfortunate countries.The German-Polish agreement weakened the relationship between Poland and France for a certain period of time, and prevented the development of solidarity among Eastern European countries.Now, when this agreement had served Germany, it was abandoned by unilateral action.Poland was given the cue that it was now within range of possible aggression.

The British Government urgently needs to consider the practical implications of its guarantees to Poland and Rumania.Neither of these guarantees has any military value unless it is incorporated into a system of comprehensive agreements between Britain and other powers.It was for this purpose that the British ambassador to the Soviet Union and Litvinov finally held talks in Moscow on April 15.Given the way the Soviet government had been treated in the past, little could be expected of them now.However, they made a formal proposal on April 16, calling for a united front of mutual support among Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.The full text of the proposal has not been made public.The Soviet proposal also called for these three countries, plus Poland if possible, to offer guarantees to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe threatened by German aggression.The obstacle to the establishment of this agreement is that these countries on the same border with the Soviet Union are deeply afraid that they will accept the aid of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union will enter the form of large troops to protect them and resist German aggression. into the system of Soviet communism, which they abhor.Poland, Romania, Finland, and the three Baltic countries did not know whether their greatest fear was to be invaded by Germany or to receive aid from the Soviet Union.It was this dire choice that paralyzed British and French policy.

In any case, even with the benefit of hindsight, there is no doubt that Britain and France should have accepted the Soviet Union's proposal and declared the Triple Alliance long ago; to be resolved.Because in that case the mood is very different. Allies in time of war are always inclined to listen to each other's wishes; when the front line is opened and the fighting is fierce, expedient measures that are unacceptable in peacetime will also be popular.In the midst of such a great alliance which might have been established, it would be very difficult for one ally to move its troops into the territory of another ally without an invitation.

However, Mr. Chamberlain and the Foreign Office were bewildered by this difficult problem.At this critical juncture, when the current situation is developing rapidly at such a speed and on such a large scale, the smartest way is to adapt to the situation and take one step at a time.The alliance of Britain, France and the Soviet Union must have greatly disturbed Germany in 1939.Even then, no one could be sure that war was inevitable.There is also a second step that the Allies can use their superior strength to take.They can regain the initiative diplomatically.On the one hand, Hitler could not afford to start a simultaneous East and West war which he had strongly opposed, and on the other hand he could not stop halfway.It is a pity that we did not put him in this embarrassing position then.This situation is likely to cost him his life.The job of a politician is not just to solve easy problems.These problems tend to resolve themselves naturally.It is only when the balance of power is shaken, when the balance of power seems to be obscured in a fog, that the opportunity to make a decision to save the world arises.

Now that we have placed ourselves in the dire predicament of 1939, it is of the utmost importance that we seize better hope.Even now, it is impossible to determine exactly when Stalin decided to abandon the idea of ​​cooperating with Western democracies and consider compromising with Hitler.In fact, there may well be no such time at all.The U.S. State Department edited and published a book called "Nazi-Soviet Relations from 1939 to 1941" based on the large archives captured by the German Foreign Office. The book tells us something that has never been known to people fact.It appears that as early as early February 1939 there were some contacts between the two countries;

But these matters are almost certainly trade and commercial issues, because it is necessary for Germany and the Soviet Union to negotiate these issues due to the influence of Czechoslovakia's status after the Munich incident.In mid-March, Czechoslovakia was annexed to Germany, and the problems arose.Russia once ordered products from the Skoda Arsenal from the Czech government, and now the Skoda factory has become a German arsenal. What about these contracts? The records of Weizsäcker, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office show that the Soviet ambassador who presented his credentials almost a year ago paid him his first visit on April 17.At that time, he asked about the contract of the Skoda factory. Weizsäcker said: Due to rumors that Russia, Britain and France established an air force agreement and similar things, favorable conditions for transporting war materials to the Soviet Union have yet to be created.At this point, the Soviet ambassador immediately changed the topic from trade to politics. He asked the Secretary of State what he thought about German-Soviet relations.Weizsäcker: It seems to me that recently the Soviet newspapers have not been quite as anti-German as the American and some British newspapers.On this point, the Soviet ambassador said: Since ideological differences do not affect the relationship between Russia and Italy, this is not necessarily an obstacle for Germany.The Soviet Union never took advantage of the current friction between Germany and the Western democracies against Germany, nor did it want to.In Russia there is no reason not to get along with Germany on a normal basis, and from normal relations there will be more and more improved relations. We must regard this conversation as extremely important, especially considering that the British ambassador is having talks with Litvinov in Moscow at this time and that on April 16 the Soviet Union formally proposed a Triple Alliance with Britain and France.This is the first obvious move by Russia to step on two boats.Since then, it has carried out step by step the normalization of relations between Russia and Germany on the one hand, and negotiations on the establishment of the Triple Alliance against German aggression on the other. If, say, Mr. Chamberlain, upon receiving a proposal from Russia, replies: Yes, let us three countries unite to break Hitler's back, or say something like that, then the British Parliament will pass it, Stalin will get it, and history will follow a completely different path Conducted. In any case, the road cannot be any worse. On May 4th I commented on the situation in the following words: The most important thing is not to lose the opportunity.Ten or twelve days have passed since the Russian proposal.The English people, having now accepted the principle of conscription at the expense of habits which they had always observed and which were hard to change, had a right, with France, to demand that Poland should not stand in the way of the common cause.Not only must we accept full cooperation with Russia, but we must include the three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, in this grand alliance.These three warlike nations together have an elite force of about 20 divisions.A friendly Russia providing them with arms and other assistance is essential. An Eastern Front against Nazi aggression could not be maintained without the active help of Russia.Preventing Hitler's plot against Eastern Europe is closely related to Russia's interests.It is still possible to unite the nations and peoples from the Baltic to the Black Sea into a solid front against new atrocities or aggressions.If this front is established with a firm belief, it conducts a resolute and efficient military deployment, and if it is united with the forces of Western European countries, it will be sufficient to deal with Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop, The power of Goebbels and his associates can also make the German people reluctant to challenge casually. However, the fact is that the opposite is true. While expedient measures and sensible compromises are being prepared on the one hand, the other has remained silent for a long time.This delay was a fatal blow to Litvinov.His last-ditch effort to bring the problem together with the West has finally failed.Our reputation has been greatly reduced.Russia, for her own security, needs an entirely different foreign policy, and must find a representative of the new policy.On May 3 Moscow issued a communiqué announcing that Mr. Litvinov had been dismissed at his own request from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, which would be concurrently filled by Prime Minister Mr. Molotov.The German chargé d'affaires in Moscow reported to Berlin on May 4 that until May 2 Litvinov had received the British ambassador, and his name was in yesterday's papers and in the list of guests reviewing the parade, it appears that he The removal was an impromptu decision by Stalin. At the most recent party congress, Stalin emphasized caution lest the Soviet Union be drawn into the conflict.Molotov (not Jewish) is considered Stalin's closest comrade-in-arms and closest collaborator.His appointment was clearly intended to ensure that future foreign policy would continue to be strictly in line with Stalin's ideas. The Soviet representative abroad was ordered to inform the government of the host country that the change of candidates did not mean that the Soviet Union would change its foreign policy.Moscow broadcast on May 4, saying that Molotov will continue to implement the Western security policy that Litvinov has been striving for for many years.For a moment the eminent Jew, whom Germany regarded as a thorn in his side, was cast aside like a worn-out tool; He lived on a meager salary and was monitored by the police.Molotov, who was not well known abroad, became the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and maintained the closest ties with Stalin.He was free from all previous declarations, from the opinions of the League of Nations, and could do whatever it took for Russia's self-defense.But in truth, he may only be going one way now.He had always been in favor of a deal with Hitler.From Munich and many other events the Soviet government was convinced that neither Great Britain nor France wanted to fight unless they themselves were attacked, and then it would be of little use.Dark clouds gathered, and a storm loomed.Now Russia must think about its own security. Litvinov's dismissal signifies the end of an era.This shows that the Kremlin has completely lost confidence in the possibility of signing security treaties with Western countries and organizing an Eastern European front against Germany.The comments in the German newspapers at that time were not necessarily accurate, but they were very interesting.On the 4th of May a German newspaper carried a Warsaw dispatch saying that Littvinov had had a violent quarrel with Marshal Voroshilov (whom the bold Russians call a Party pal when they are inadvertent) before resigning. quarrel.Voroshilov, no doubt on the basis of explicit instructions, declared that the Red Army was not prepared to fight for Poland, and in the name of the Russian General Staff blamed too large a military obligation.On May 7, the "Frankfurter Zeitung", which received sufficient information, commented that Litvinov's resignation had severely set back the future of the Anglo-French encirclement policy; Litvinov was drunk by the military burden.All this was true; but for a time such a major shift had to be disguised, and even to the last moment the attitude of the Soviet Union remained elusive.Moreover, Russia had to do both at the same time, otherwise, how would it be able to bargain with Hitler, whom it always hated and feared? The Jew Litvinov's resignation moderated some of Hitler's strongest prejudices.From then on the German government stopped calling its foreign policy anti-Bolshevism and turned to attacking the democratism of the abusive plutocrats.Newspaper articles assure the Russians that Germany's living space does not extend to Russian territory; it does stop in every way as far as the Russian border.Therefore, as long as the Soviet Union does not conclude an encirclement agreement with Britain and France, there is no reason for conflict between Russia and Germany.The German ambassador, Count Schulenburg, was called back to Berlin for detailed discussions before returning to Moscow to propose a long-term credit for goods in Soviet favor. The movement on both sides was towards a covenant. Russian policy has undergone such a drastic and unnatural transformation as only a totalitarian state can achieve.Just two years ago the generals of the Russian army, Tukhachevsky and thousands of the most accomplished officers, were murdered for leaning towards this policy.But now, the few anxious masters in the Kremlin find this policy acceptable again.In those days, Germanism was heresy, conspiracy and treason.And now, overnight, it has become state policy.Those who dared to speak out deserved it, of course, and those who did not change fast enough often suffered the same fate. Of course, there is no one more suitable or better qualified than the new People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to complete the work that is about to begin. This figure, installed by Stalin on the rostrum of Soviet foreign policy, deserves a brief account, and was unknown to the British and French governments at the time.Molotov was a man of outstanding talent, with a ruthless and ruthless character.He, like all Bolshevik leaders, survived many terrible dangers and trials in the years of victorious revolution, but he survived.He had lived and prospered in a society where intrigues of all kinds were constantly present and individuals were constantly in danger of being purged.His cannonball skull, his black moustache, his penetrating eyes, his flat face, his smooth and quick speech, his calm and calm demeanor, all were apt to his character and talents. Appearance. He is better suited than anyone to be an agent or instrument to carry out his policies in the vagaries of the state apparatus.I only met him as an equal in meetings that were sometimes a little humorous, or when he graciously proposed the customary string of pointless toasts.I have never seen a man who more fully represents the modern idea of ​​a robot.However, despite all this, he is still a seemingly reasonable and polished diplomat.As for how he treats people who are inferior to him, I don't know.At the Tehran Conference, Stalin promised to attack Japan immediately after defeating Germany.Since then, Molotov's attitude towards the Japanese ambassador can be seen from his conversation records.In the subsequent barrage of delicate, tentative, and embarrassing conversations, he was always poised to reveal his intentions and maintain polite, formal decorum.There is no flaw to be found in his conversation, and there is absolutely no unnecessary stimulation in it.His Siberian-cool smile, his considered and often wisely spoken words, combined with his courteous demeanor, made him the most perfect Soviet policy in this vicious world. representatives. It was always useless to correspond with him on controversial points, and, if pushed too far, he would inevitably end up with lies or insults.In the book, there are instances of this kind of thing, and only once did I seem to get a natural and human response.It was in the spring of 1942. On his way home from America, his plane landed in England.By that time we had signed the Anglo-Soviet treaty, and he was going to fly back to his own country at great risk.I took his arm at the gate of the garden where we had our secret meetings in Downing Street, and we faced each other and stared at each other.Suddenly he seemed deeply moved.The real person, hidden deep within the external image, emerges.He took my arm with equal strength as an answer.Neither of us said a word, just shook hands tightly.At that time we were united, we lived and died together.All his life, and all around him, there was riot and destruction, and he either threatened himself or threw others into it. The Soviet machine found Molotov, indeed, a capable and typical representative in every respect. He was always a faithful member of the Communist Party and a believer in Communism.I'd be glad if I didn't have to go through the stressful life he suffered until the end of my life.It would have been better not to have been born to live the life he had.If there really is another world after death, and the Bolsheviks are willing to go there, then Mazarin, Talleyrand, and Metternich would certainly welcome him to engage in diplomacy with them. From the day Molotov became Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he pursued a policy of concluding an agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland.It did not take long for France to learn of the situation.The French "Orange Book" contained a very noteworthy telegram from the French ambassador to Berlin on May 7, saying that based on information he had secretly obtained, he concluded that the fourth partition of Poland would become the basis for German-Russian reconciliation.In April 1946, Mr. Daladier wrote: Since May, the Soviet Union has conducted two kinds of negotiations, one with France and the other with Germany.He seemed more willing to partition Poland than to defend it.This is the immediate cause of World War II. [1] But of course there are other reasons. [1] Quoted in Reynolds, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 585. On May 8, the British government finally responded to the Soviet note of April 16.The content of the British reply was not made public, but TASS sent a message on May 9 outlining the main points of the British proposal.On May 10, the official organ "Izvestia" published a communiqué to the effect that: Reuters reported that Britain had put forward a counter-proposal, that is, the Soviet Union must make separate guarantees to each of its neighbors; If involved in the war, Britain must pledge to assist the Soviet Union, but this report is not true.The communiqué stated that the Soviet government had received the British counterproposal of May 8, which did not mention the Soviet Union's obligation to provide guarantees to each of its neighbors separately; If it gets involved in a war with Romania's guarantee, the Soviet Union has the obligation to immediately assist Britain and France.However, the British counter-proposal made no mention of Anglo-French assistance to the Soviet Union should the Soviet Union be involved in a war as a result of fulfilling its obligations to any country in Eastern Europe. Later that same day, Mr. Chamberlain said that the government had assumed new obligations to Eastern Europe, but had not invited the Soviet Union to participate directly because of various difficulties.The British Government had proposed that the Soviet Union itself should make the same statement, offering assistance to countries that might become targets of aggression and being prepared to protect their independence if they were willing to accept it. At about the same time the Soviet government presented a broader and more stringent program.The British Government considers that, notwithstanding its possible other advantages, this scheme entails the difficulties which the British Government proposes to avoid.They therefore pointed out the difficulties to the Soviet government.At the same time, they made some changes to their original proposal.They (the British government) made it very clear that if the Soviet government wanted their intervention to be contingent on British and French intervention, the British government would not object. It is a pity that this statement was not clearly announced two weeks ago. It should be mentioned here that on May 12 the Turkish Parliament formally ratified the Anglo-Turkish agreement.We hope that, by assuming this new obligation, we will be able to strengthen our position in the Mediterranean in times of crisis.This is our answer to the Italian occupation of Albania.Just as our period of negotiations with Germany has come to an end, so we have now virtually reached the same impasse with Italy. Our negotiations with the Russians are still going nowhere.On May 19th the whole question was brought up in the House of Commons.The debate was short and serious, with speakers limited almost exclusively to party leaders and important former cabinet ministers.Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Eden, and I urged the Government to conclude immediately and on equal terms the broadest agreement with Russia.Mr. Lloyd George, speaking first, painted a dark and dangerous picture in dismal tones: The present situation reminds me deeply of the feelings that prevailed in the early spring of 1918.At that time we learned that Germany was about to launch a major offensive, but no one knew where it was going.I remember when the French thought their front would bear the brunt; our generals thought it would attack us.The French generals did not even agree on which part of their front line would be attacked first; our generals were equally divided.All we know is that one place is about to be attacked by an extremely powerful one anyway.The whole atmosphere was one of uneasiness, if not fear.At that time we could see the extreme activity behind the German lines and we knew they were preparing.In my opinion, these are somewhat similar to the current situation and we are all very anxious; The whole world felt that the aggressors were preparing for another attack.It is not clear where this attack will break out.We can know that they are expanding their armaments at an unprecedented speed, especially the expansion of offensive weapons tanks, bombers, submarines.We know that they are occupying and forming new positions which will give them a strategic advantage in their war against France and our country. They are observing and investigating all situations which may be of importance in their war from Libya to the North Sea.Operations behind the lines have an extremely ominous secrecy. There was also such a secret in 1918, in order to keep us elusive about their purpose.They are not preparing for defense they are not preparing for attack from France, England or Russia.They were never threatened. Nor have I heard any hint or proposal, private or public, that we were contemplating an attack on any point in Italy or Germany; and they knew that very well.Therefore, all these preparations are not for defense.This is to carry out some established offensive plan, to attack a certain country with which we have an interest. Mr. Lloyd George went on to say something very brilliant: The main military purpose and plan of the two dictators is to strive for a quick victory and avoid a long-term war.Protracted war is always inappropriate for a dictator.A long war like the Iberian War[1] would wear them down.The strong defense of Russia, though without any great victories, finally defeated Napoleon. The German ideal is, and always has been, to fight a quick war. The war against Austria in 1866 was fought for only a few weeks; the war against France in 1870 actually came to an end after a month or two of fighting.The campaign plan for 1914 was intended to achieve the same end, and it was almost successful; if it were not for Russia, they might have succeeded.But as long as they don't win quickly, it's all over.You can take my word for it, the great military thinkers of Germany have been working on the question: what went wrong in 1914?What is missing?How can they remedy these deficiencies, correct or avoid these serious mistakes in the next major war? [1] Refers to 1808 | 1814 Spanish War of Independence against France.translator Mr. Lloyd George moved from fact to imagination, and went on to say that the Germans already had 20,000 tanks and thousands of bombers.These words far outstripped the facts and unduly evoked fear.Over the years, a small group of us have been running around calling out and repeatedly emphasizing the need for rearmament. Why doesn't he work with us?His words chilled the whole house.Two years ago, or rather three years ago, such remarks and all the pessimism in speeches would have been ridiculed and ridiculed.But there was plenty of time then, and now, whether those numbers are accurate or not, it is too late to say those words. In his reply the Prime Minister revealed to us for the first time his opinion on the Soviet proposal. His attitude to the suggestion was of course indifferent, and indeed contemptuous.He said: If we can think of a way to get the cooperation and assistance of the Soviet Union to establish a peace front, we welcome it.We need it too, and value it.It is nonsense to say that we underestimate Soviet assistance.As to how to accurately estimate the strength of the Russian army, or how to make the Russian army fully play its role, since we do not accept any unproven opinions, no one is so foolish as to think that this great country with a vast territory, a large population, and rich resources is in the Insignificant factors in the situation we are now facing. There was the same lack of proportion in this statement as we had seen him reject President Roosevelt's proposal a year earlier. So I went on to address this issue: I have never been able to comprehend what was preventing an agreement with Russia.The Prime Minister professed that he would very much like to do this, and that it should be carried out in the broad and simple form proposed by the Soviet government. There is no doubt that the proposal put forward by the Russian government is to form an anti-aggression Anglo-French-Russian Triple Alliance. If other countries want to benefit from this alliance, this alliance can also expand the scope of its mutual assistance.The purpose of the alliance is only to resist future aggression and protect the country being invaded. I don't see anything bad about the Soviet suggestion.What's so bad about this simple advice?Someone said: Can you trust the Soviet government?I think they will say in Moscow: Can we trust Chamberlain?I hope we can say that the answer to both questions is yes.i sincerely hope so This generally accepted Turkish proposal is a great force for unity and stability for the entire Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean region.Turkey, with whom we have concluded this agreement, maintains the closest friendly relations with Russia.It is also close and friendly with Romania.Collectively, these countries are defending each other's vital interests. There is a great unity of interest between Great Britain and the united nations of Southern Europe, but is there not the same unity of interest in Northern Europe?In the case of the Baltic states, Peter the Great fought for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.Now, keeping these countries from falling into the hands of Nazi Germany is a matter of utmost concern to Russia and a major interest of Northern Europe.I also don't need to go into details about the (German attack on) Ukraine, because that would mean an attack on the Russian mainland.你們可以看到，沿著整個東線，確實和俄國的主要利益都有關連，因此，我們似乎可以斷定，他們是會把他們的利益與受到同樣影響的其他國家聯繫在一起的。 如果你準備在戰爭中和俄國結盟（這是最大的考驗和最重大的事件）；如果你準備在保衛我們曾給予保證的波蘭和羅馬尼亞時與俄國結盟，那麼，你為什麼又害怕現在就同俄國結盟呢？在這時候結盟這一事實本身就可以防止戰爭的爆發。 我不懂得所有這些外交上的謹言慎行和遲延不決有什麼意義。如果不幸發生最惡劣的形勢，我們和他們一起捲入這種局面之中，還必須盡最大努力和他們一起奮鬥。如果困難不至於發生，那很好，我們也可以在最初階段獲得安全。 英國政府對波蘭提出過保證。我聽到政府提出這個保證時，我感到震驚。我現在還擁護這個保證，但我在聽到時確實震驚。因為在這之前所發生的事情都沒有使人感到將會採取這一步驟。我請求委員會注意，勞合‧喬治先生在十天前和今天一再提出的問題還沒有得到答覆。這個問題是：在保證提出之前有沒有同參謀部商量過，諸如提出這種保證是否妥當，是否切實可行，是否有實現這項保證的方法。全國都知道問題已經提出了，但問題始終沒有得到答覆。這真使人惶惑不安。 顯然，俄國除非得到平等的待遇，其實不只是平等待遇，而且還能使他相信盟國和平陣線所採用的辦法很有成功的希望，否則俄國是不準備參加協定的。誰都不願意同猶疑不決的領導人和搖擺不定的政策合作的。政府也須認清，所有這些東歐國家，除非背後有一個與西方各國聯合起來的友好的俄國給予他們以巨大而堅強的支持，它們是無法單靠自己的力量來支持大約一年的戰爭的。我基本上同意勞合‧喬治先生這個意見：如果要建立一條強有力的東線一條東部的和平陣線，或者，如果戰爭發生的話，則變為作戰的戰線那麼，只有獲得在東歐國家背後的友好的蘇聯的強大支持才有可能。 除非建立東線，否則在西線的國家會發生什麼情況呢？像比利時、荷蘭、丹麥、瑞士這些國家，即使我們還沒有對他們提出保證，一般也認為我們有義務援助他們，他們又會發生什麼情況呢？讓我們回顧一下我們在一九一七年的經驗吧。在一九一七年，俄國的戰線已被擊潰，士氣渙散。革命和兵變使那支有紀律的龐大的軍隊逐漸喪失了鬥志，前線上的情況亂得難以形容；然而，儘管如此，直至和約訂立和把戰線結束時為止，即使它在毫無戰鬥力和極其不幸的情況下，還吸住一百五十萬以上的德國軍隊。後來那條戰線一旦結束，德國的一百萬大軍和五千門大炮就立即調到西線來了。在戰爭的最後時刻，這幾乎扭轉了戰爭的發展形勢，並要迫使我們接受一個災難性的和平。 東線的問題，是一件非同小可的事情。現在沒有人更多關注這件事，使我感到十分詫異。當然我不是說要討好蘇聯。 現在不是向什麼國家討好的時候。這裡有一個建議，公平的建議，而且照我看來，這個建議的條件，比政府自己所要求的還要好些；這是一個更為簡單、更為直截了當和更為有力的建議。讓我們不要把它扔在一旁，不了了之。我請求政府在腦子裡記住這些無情的真理。沒有強大的東戰線，我們在西歐的利益就不能有令人滿意的防衛；而沒有俄國，也就不能有強大的東戰線。政府既曾長期忽略了我們的國防，又已經丟掉了捷克斯洛伐克和它的全部軍事力量所包含的一切，現在對技術問題不加考慮就承擔了保衛波蘭和羅馬尼亞的義務，在這種情況下，現在又拒絕和丟掉俄國的不可缺少的援助，這將使我們在最惡劣的情況下捲入形勢最壞的戰爭之中，那麼他們就辜負了國民的信任，而且，我還要加上一句，也辜負了國民對他們的寬容。 所有這一切現在無疑已嫌太遲了。艾德禮、辛克萊和艾登的發言，概括地說明危險迫在眉睫和與俄國結盟的必要。工黨和自由黨的領袖，在幾星期以前還領導他們的黨員投票反對全國徵兵制度，使他們的地位大受削弱。他們所經常提出的辯解，是因為對外交政策不滿，但他們的辯解是站不住腳的；因為如果沒有足夠的實力為後盾；如果全國人民不準備為了產生這種實力而接受必要的犧牲，那麼，不管什麼外交政策都不能有什麼效果。 當西方國家為了建立抵抗德國的防禦陣線而作出種種努力的時候，對方也在進行同樣的活動。里賓特洛甫與齊亞諾於五月初在科莫舉行會談，獲得了所謂鋼鐵盟約的正式的和公開的結果，並在五月二十二日由兩國外交部長在柏林簽字。這是對英國給東歐各國提供脆弱的保證的挑戰性的答覆。 在齊亞諾的日記中，記錄了在簽訂這個盟約時和希特勒的一段談話： 希特勒說他對這個盟約非常滿意，而且確認地中海政策將由意大利主持。他對阿爾巴尼亞很感興趣，對我們要把阿爾巴尼亞變成控制巴爾幹的堅強要塞的計劃，表示熱烈的贊成。 【１】 【１】《齊亞諾日記》，第九十頁。 在簽訂鋼鐵盟約的第二天，即五月二十三日，希特勒同參謀長們舉行會議。他在會上更明顯地表露出洋洋自得的情緒。這次談話的秘密紀要記錄在這裡： 我們現在正處於愛國主義的熱潮之中，另外有兩個國家也是一樣，這就是意大利和日本。我們對自己過去那段時期的確是很好地加以利用了。我們所採取的步驟，都是按照目標有條不紊地進行的。波蘭不是一個候補敵人。波蘭將總是站在我們的敵人一邊的。雖然訂立過友好協定，但波蘭卻總是暗中存心想利用每一個機會來害我們。但澤根本不是爭論的主題。這是一個我們在東方擴大生存空間和保障糧食供應的問題。因此，毫無問題我們絕對不能饒了波蘭，我們不得不決定，一遇適當的機會就進攻波蘭。我們不能期望捷克事件的重演。仗是一定要打的。我們的任務是孤立波蘭。成功地孤立波蘭將是決定性的一著。 如果不能斷定德波衝突不至於引起西線的戰爭，那麼戰爭將主要是對付法國和英國。如果法國、英國、俄國成立反對德國、意大利和日本的聯盟，那我就不得不對英法兩國給予幾次殲滅性的打擊。我對於同英國達成和平解決的可能性表示懷疑。我們必須準備打仗。英國把我們的發展看成是將會削弱它的地位的一種霸權的基礎，所以英國是我們的敵人。 和英國的衝突，將是生死存亡的戰爭。荷蘭和比利時的空軍基地，必須由武裝部隊加以佔領。對他們的中立宣言，可以不予理會。 如果英國有干涉波蘭戰爭的意向，我們就必須以閃電的速度來佔領荷蘭。我們必須致力於奪取從荷蘭到須德海的新防線。以為我們可以順順當當取得成功，這種想法是很危險的；根本不存在這種可能性。我們必須破釜沉舟。現在已不是正義與不正義的問題，而是八千萬人民的生死存亡的問題。 每一個國家的武裝部隊或政府，都必須以速戰速決為目標。不過政府也必須準備打十年或十五年的戰爭。 英國知道，戰爭的失敗就是它的世界霸權的結束。英國是反對德國的推動力量。 英國人是驕傲的、勇敢的、頑強的，有堅強的抵抗力和具有組織才能。他們知道怎麼去利用每一個新的進展。他們具有愛好冒險和北歐種族的勇敢精神，但一般德國人比他們高出一籌。我們在第一次大戰中，如果我們擁有多兩艘戰列艦和兩艘巡洋艦，又如果日德蘭的海戰在早上開始，英國艦隊就會被擊敗，【１】而英國也就屈膝投降了。我們除了準備進行突然襲擊之外，也必須作長期戰爭的準備。同時，我們必須排除英國在歐洲大陸上的機會。陸軍必須堅守我們的海軍和空軍所必需的基地。如果成功地佔領並守住了荷蘭和比利時，如果擊敗了法國，那麼打敗英國的基本條件也就具備了。【２】五月三十日，德國外交部發給駐莫斯科大使如下訓令：與我們過去計劃的政策相反，現在我們已經決定和蘇聯進行明確的談判。在軸心國家的軍隊集結和進行軍事部署的同時，西方國家和蘇聯的重要聯繫已經完結了。五月三十日外交人民委員莫洛托夫發表演說，對張伯倫先生五月十九日在下院的演說給予答覆，從這裡我們可以看得出兩方見解的根本分歧。 （他說）遠在四月中旬，蘇維埃政府與英法政府進行談判，討論要採取的必要措施。那時開始的談判，至今尚未結束。事情早就很清楚，如果對成立一條由和平國家組成的強有力的反侵略陣線具有任何真誠的願望，則下列最低限度的條件是必需的： 【１】《紐倫堡文件》第一編，第一百六十七｜一百六十八頁。希特勒顯然對日德蘭海戰的事實一無所知。在這次海戰中，英國艦隊從頭到尾都想把德國艦隊引出來進行大決戰而未成，如果進行了大決戰，則英國艦隊的壓倒優勢的火力，一定會很快就發生決定性作用。 【２】《納粹｜蘇聯的關係》，第十五頁。 由英法蘇三國締結一個純粹是防禦性的、強有力的反侵略互助公約。 由英法蘇方面，向中歐和東歐國家，毫無例外地包括蘇聯近鄰的一切歐洲國家提出保證，抵抗侵略者的進攻。 英法蘇三國締結明確的協定，規定一旦侵略者發動進攻，三國彼此之間互相進行直接的有力的支援以及規定對被保證國家提供直接的和有力的援助的方式和範圍。 談判到了一個看來已無法打開的僵局。波蘭和羅馬尼亞政府雖然接受英國的保證，卻不打算接受俄國政府同樣方式的保證。在另一個有著重要戰略價值的地區波羅的海各國，也抱有同樣的態度。蘇聯政府明白表示，蘇聯所主張的互助公約，必須是把芬蘭和波羅的海國家包括在全面保證之內。現在這四個國家都拒絕了這個條件，也許它們由於害怕早就會拒絕這個條件的。芬蘭和愛沙尼亞甚至聲明，如果沒有得到他們的同意而向它們提出保證，它們將把它看作侵略行為。六月七日，愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞同德國簽訂了互不侵犯條約。這樣，希特勒就輕易地把那條反對他的遲延不決的聯盟的最後防線突破了。