Chapter 29 Volume 1, Chapter 25, Questions of the War Cabinet

Our daily meetings to build an army of fifty-five divisions for England Our heavy artillery My letter to the Prime Minister September 10th September 10th to the Minister of Munitions and his reply Need a Shipping Department I September 15th Letter to the Prime Minister His reply dated 16th September Other letters concerning armaments and manpower My letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 24th September Austerity Campaign seeks a naval offensive Baltic Empress Catherine's plan to force passage into the Baltic Sea Plan technology and Aspects of Tactics Spoils of War First Sea Lord's Opinion Lord Cork's Appointment Planned Progress Air Force Veto New Shipbuilding Plans Cruisers Destroyers Number and Size Long-term vs. Short-term Policy Acceleration Plan Implementation Needs Anti-Air Defense Battleship Squadron HMS Royal I set up my own statistics office for the waste of warships of the same class.

The first meeting of the War Cabinet and its additional members, together with the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Air Force and Navy, and several secretaries was held on September 4th.Since then we have met daily, sometimes twice a day.I can't think of any time when it was this hot and I made a black alpaca top with just a linen shirt underneath.This was really the climate Hitler needed when he invaded Poland.The great rivers on which the Poles relied in their defense schemes were fordable almost everywhere, and the ground was hard and solid for tanks and vehicles of all kinds.Every morning, General Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, stood before the map and made long reports and evaluations, and soon we all knew in our hearts that Polish resistance would soon be crushed.I made a daily report to the Cabinet on the Admiralty side, usually a list of British merchant ships sunk by German U-boats.The British Expeditionary Force, with four divisions, began to move towards France, and the Air Ministry regretted that it was not allowed to bomb German military targets.In other respects, most of the work dealt with was on domestic defence, and of course there were lengthy discussions on foreign affairs, especially concerning the attitude of the Soviet Union and Italy and the policy to be adopted in the Balkans.

The most important step was the establishment of the Land Forces Committee, chaired by the then Lord Seal, Sir Samuel Hall, whose task was to advise the War Cabinet on the size and organization of the army we should have.I'm a member of this small body that meets at the Home Office.After listening to the generals on a single sweltering afternoon, we agreed that the formation of an army of fifty-five divisions should begin immediately, and that munitions factories of all kinds, factories of all kinds, and supplies for the support of the army should be immediately set up. All kinds of military supplies necessary for combat.It was hoped that by the eighteenth month two-thirds of the above-mentioned plan, that is, a rather large army, would have been sent to France, or at least be fit for war.In this respect Sir Samuel Hall was very discerning and active in all activities, and I have always supported him.On the other hand, the Ministry of the Air Force fears that such a large army and its supplies will take up too much of our skilled workers and manpower, so as to prevent them from carrying out their mission to establish a powerful and absolutely dominant air force within two or three years. and a huge plan.The Prime Minister, deeply influenced by Sir Kingsley Wood's arguments, hesitated to agree to such a large army, and the conditions necessary for it.The War Cabinet was divided on this question, and it was not until more than a week later that a decision was taken to adopt the opinion of the Ground Forces Committee for an army of fifty-five divisions, or rather the object.

I felt that since I was a member of the War Cabinet I had to take a holistic view and therefore always subordinate the needs of my own administration to the main plan.Eager to establish a broad base of positions in agreement with the Prime Minister, and to make available to him the knowledge I had accumulated in the field in which I had previously experienced myself; When the problem happened, I wrote many letters to him.I would prefer not to argue with him in a Cabinet meeting, and have always preferred to submit my opinion in writing.We were on the same page in almost all cases, and while he initially gave me the impression that he was wary of me, I'm happy to say that as the months and months passed, his trust in me And the goodwill seems to be increasing day by day.His biographer has attested to this point.In addition, I wrote to other members of the War Cabinet, and to other ministers with whom I had intercourse in ministerial or other matters.The war cabinet seldom met alone, and was always attended by secretaries or military experts, so its work was inevitably hindered.The War Cabinet was a conscientious and effective institution.Everyone is closely united for a common task, and they discuss freely with each other without formality or record.The benefits in this regard are indeed great.This kind of meeting plays an important supporting role for the official meeting. At the official meeting, all affairs are dealt with, and the resolutions are recorded as the yardstick for action.Both procedures are indispensable in dealing with extremely difficult affairs.

When I was Minister of Munitions during the last war, I built a large number of heavy guns, and I am very concerned about their fate.Such weapons take a year and a half to manufacture, but it is of great help to an army to have a large number of heavy artillery at its disposal, whether for defense or offense.I remember Mr. Lloyd George's quarrel with the War Office in 1915, and I also remember all the political turmoil over the question of creating a preponderant battery of very heavy artillery, and how events ensued proved his opinion correct.The nature of the land war, when it finally emerged eight months later, in 1940, proved to be quite different from that of the land war of 1914-1918.But it will be seen hereafter that these guns fulfilled a great need in the defense of the homeland.At this moment, I thought of this buried treasure house.It would be foolish of us to forget about it.

On this and other matters I write to the Prime Minister: Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister September 10, 1939 I have a few comments that I would like to raise with you privately, and I hope you don't mind. (1) I still think that we should not be the first to bomb, but not in the immediate theater of operations where the French troops operate, since of course we must assist the French troops in that theater of operations.It is in our interest that we conduct war in such a way that it conforms to a more humane conception of war; in intensifying the harsh and drastic means of warfare, though this process is undoubtedly inevitable, we must not precede Germany before Germany. To carry it out, we must wait for it to be done before we do it.Every day that passes brings more shelter to the inhabitants of London and other great cities, and in a fortnight or so we will surely have many more shelters than we have at present.

(2) You should be aware of the criticisms that have been made of us about the state of our small expeditionary forces, that they lack tanks, and lack trained trench artillery, especially heavy artillery.If it turns out that we really lack heavy artillery, then the criticism is justified. When I was Secretary of State for War after the war ceased in 1919, I ordered a large number of heavy artillery to be stored, oiled and secured. I also recall that in 1918, at the request of General Headquarters, two twelve-inch howitzers were built in support of the army's entry into Germany in 1919.These two guns have never been used, but they were indeed the best weapons at the time.They are not something to lose easily. I think the most important thing is, first, to see what is left in our house; second, to repair it immediately and make new shells.

My presence at the Admiralty may be of use in this heavy weaponry, for we are of course the most competent and pleasant of all heavy things. (3) You may wish to know the principles upon which I am revising the Navy's newbuilding program.I propose that all but the first three or four new battleships be halted, and that ships not in operation before 1942 be abandoned now.This decision should be reconsidered after six months.Because of this change, I have the resources to help the Army.On the other hand, I should try to promote work on building a smaller anti-submarine fleet.The number of ships of this type is extremely important.There are many ships that could be completed in 1940, but these numbers are definitely not enough when one considers that we may be attacked by 200 to 300 submarines in the summer of 1940.

(4) Regarding the supply of the army and its relationship with the Air Force, please forgive me for giving you the experience and knowledge that I have paid a lot of money for, not the experience and knowledge taught by the teacher.The Minister of Quarters is now drawing up plans on the basis of fifty-five divisions, which will not disadvantage the Air Ministry or the Admiralty, because (1) the preparatory work of establishing foundations and building factories does not require skilled workers Many months; during these months, only ordinary construction workers will do the work of digging foundations, laying concrete, laying brick walls, plastering, laying sewers, etc.;

(2) Even if you cannot form an army of fifty-five divisions within twenty-four months due to other requirements, you can change the time to thirty-six months or even longer without changing original size.On the other hand, if the Commissars Minister does not start out with great plans, there will be troublesome delays when the existing factories have to be enlarged.It is better to let him make large-scale plans, and at the same time use the method of changing the time factor to meet the needs of the Air Force and Army.Once a factory is built, it can be left unused when it is not needed, but if the factory does not exist, then when you need to make further efforts, you will be helpless.Only when these big factories are in operation can you get the full effect.

(5) As of now (noon), there have been no new reports of ships being sunk by submarines, in other words, we have had no losses in the last thirty-six hours. Maybe the subs are gone for the weekend!But I wasted my time getting ready to be beaten. However, I am convinced that everything will be fine. I also wrote to Dr. Birkin: secretary of the navy to secretary of armaments September 10, 1939 When I was at the War Office in 1919, I issued detailed instructions for the oiling and storage of large quantities of heavy artillery.Now it seems that these heavy guns have been discovered.It seems to me that the first thing you should do is to get hold of these supplies and give priority to repairing them and making heavy shells.In heavy shells the Admiralty might be able to help.If you need help, please ask directly. His reply to me made me very satisfied: Minister of Munitions to Secretary of the Navy September 11, 1939 Since the crisis of September 1938, the War Department has been concerned with the super-heavy artillery mentioned in your letter and is prepared to make use of it.Repairs to the barrels and mounts of the 9.2-inch cannon and the 12-inch howitzer actually began in January. The heavy guns were carefully worked upon in storage in 1919, and they turned out to be in general good condition.However, some of the accessories have been damaged and must be replaced with new ones, and this work has continued during the year.In this month, we will definitely be able to repair part of the heavy artillery. Of course, I will give the highest priority to this work I am very grateful for your letter.You will be glad to know that a lot has been done based on your suggestions. Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister September 11, 1939 Everyone says there should be a shipping department.When we had a meeting with the shipowners today, the president of the Chamber of Ships pressed me hard for such a department.The Secretary of Trade asked me to file a joint application with him, which would, of course, reduce his own tasks.I can bet that there will be strong demands of this kind in Parliament.In addition, I also think this program is extremely valuable.It works in three ways: (1) To maximize the effectiveness and economy of shipping in accordance with the war policy of the Cabinet and the urgency of the situation. (2) To formulate and organize a large-scale shipbuilding program.In the summer of 1940 there may be a submarine attack and we expect to lose a great deal of tonnage, so a large shipbuilding program is a necessary precaution.This should of course include research on building concrete ships so that during times of scarcity our need for steel can be reduced. (3) Care, condolence and encouragement to merchant mariners.After they were rescued from torpedo attacks, they had to continue to go to sea to work.These merchant mariners were a very important, and possibly very powerful, element in this kind of warfare. The Secretary of Trade has told you that it would take two or three weeks to separate the relevant departments from the department in charge of which he was in charge and establish the Department of Shipping.I think it's wise to allow this transition period.After the new ministerial candidate is decided and announced, he must also recruit the necessary staff and gradually take over the relevant agencies of the Ministry of Trade.It also seems important that the Government should take the necessary steps to establish a Ministry of Shipping before it comes under pressure from Parliament or from the shipping world, and hears plausible opposition to the present system. After a month of discussions, this ministry was established and announced on October 13th.Mr Chamberlain chose Sir Gilmore as first Minister.The general criticism is that this choice is quite inappropriate.Gilmore was a very affable Scot, and a well-known MP.He served as a cabinet member in both the governments of Mr Baldwin and Mr Chamberlain.His health was failing, and he died within a few months of his tenure, and was succeeded by Mr. Ronald Cross. Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister September 15, 1939 I'm out on business and won't be back until next Monday.I would like to give you my current view on the main situation for your reference. I don't think the Germans will ever attempt an offensive on the Western Front later in the season. It's safe to say his plan is obviously to keep pushing into Poland, Hungary, and Romania, as far as the Black Sea. He may have been with the Russians. Get some sort of understanding whereby Russia can take part of Poland and regain Bessarabia. During these winter months, Hitler's wisest plan seemed to be to ally with his eastern neighbor and obtain reliable supplies, so that his people could see the spectacle of continuous victory and be convinced that our blockade had been weakened.So I don't think he will attack on the Western Front until he has taken the easy spoils of the Eastern Front.Nevertheless, I still urge that we prepare everything on the Western Front for self-defense.Every effort should be made to enable Belgium to take the necessary vigilance, together with the French and British armies.At the same time, on the French frontier behind Belgium, fortifications should be built day and night with all possible resources.In this defense-in-depth system, special attention should be paid to obstacles defending tanks, such as: Erect railway tracks, dig deep trenches, erect concrete piles, and in some places, lay mines and prepare floods that can instantly submerge the enemy, etc.In the war against Poland, it has been proved that three or four German armored divisions can exert great offensive power. For such offensives, obstacles, coupled with calm troops and strong artillery defense, can be stopped If there are no obstacles, it will be impossible to effectively resist the attack of armored vehicles. In 1919 I had stockpiled a great deal of war-made cannon.They are all now available, to my great relief.Among them were thirty-two twelve-inch, one hundred and forty-five nine-inch, a large number of eight-inch, nearly two hundred six-inch howitzers, and a very large number of munitions; These heavy guns will not only supplement our small expeditionary force, but a large army as well.Some of these heavy guns should be sent to the front as soon as possible, so that, whatever else our army lacks, at least there will be nothing lacking in heavy guns. I hope you will carefully consider what I have said above.I am doing this simply to help you fulfill your responsibilities while also fulfilling my own. In his reply to me on the 16th, the Prime Minister said: I have read all letters carefully and considered them carefully.The only reason why I have not written back is because we see each other every day, and your opinion agrees very well with mine, as far as I can tell.It seems to me that the lesson learned from the Polish campaign is about the power of the air force, which can paralyze the activities on the ground after the air force has achieved full air supremacy. should be given absolute priority, and the extent of our efforts on land should be determined according to the resources we have left after satisfying the expansion of the air force.Of course I must wait for the report of the Ground Forces Committee before I can make a final decision on this point. Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister September 18, 1939 You think the Air Force is our first need, and I wholeheartedly agree, in fact, I sometimes think that it may be the fundamental path to victory.On the other hand, I am studying the Air Department's report, which appears to be too large a request to be fulfilled at this time, and which, if given absolute priority, would necessarily affect other necessary combat efforts.I'm about to make an opinion on this report, and it's enough now to come up with a number that surprises me. If the aviation industry has 360,000 people and can produce nearly 1,000 aircraft a month, it would seem counterintuitive that 1,050,000 people are needed to produce 2,000 aircraft a month.We believe that the increase in output will lead to a considerable reduction in manpower, especially after the implementation of mass production.I don't believe that Germany uses a million people to produce two thousand aircraft a month.Although I generally accept that the production of two thousand aircraft per month should be our goal, I cannot at the present time believe that for this goal it is necessary to make such enormous changes to our combat capabilities as this report suggests. Require. The reason for my urgency to wish that we should build up our army in fifty or fifty-five divisions is because I do not believe that the French will agree to a division of labor which would put us in both sea and air operations, And the bloodshed caused by land combat was almost entirely borne by them.We welcome such an arrangement, of course; but I cannot appreciate the idea of ​​our fighting solely in the air and sea. To give absolute priority to any one department would be very dangerous.During the last war, and especially in the last year when the Admiralty was extremely strong and the United States Navy was at war, the Admiralty abused this prerogative imperiously and selfishly.Now, I am curbing this tendency every day for the common good. In my first letter to you I already said that the plans for the construction of factories for the manufacture of shells, guns and gunpowder, etc., as well as the supply of explosives and steel, would not be the same as those of the aircraft industry in the construction of the various factories mentioned above. There is direct competition between the completely different labor forces required in this area.It's a question of how to fit together skillfully.On the other hand, the supply of mechanical vehicles has a direct competitive nature and must be properly adjusted.It would be best if the Army's munitions factories were built on a large scale first, and then allowed to operate within the limits of our resources and the nature of the war.You can adjust the time factor as the situation changes.But if you don't start building factories now, you no longer have a choice. I think we should better tell the French that we intend to have an army of fifty or fifty-five divisions.But to get there, it will take twenty-four months or thirty or even forty months, and of course the flexibility should be preserved. At the end of the last war we had an army of about ninety divisions on the various fronts, we were producing two thousand aircraft a month, and we maintained a navy much larger than we needed at the time, and a far greater More than what we plan to do now.I do not think, therefore, that the establishment of fifty or fifty-five divisions and the production of 2,000 aircraft per month are incompatible and go hand in hand, although modern divisions and modern aircraft are industrially required , of course far higher than before, and now everything has become very complicated. Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister September 21, 1939 I don't know if you can consider having occasional meetings of the War Cabinet alone to discuss with one another without the presence of secretaries and military experts.In our official meetings the big issues are being thoroughly discussed, but I'm not yet satisfied with that.We have been appointed as ministers to deal with war affairs, and I am convinced that it will be in the public interest if we meet from time to time as a body.Much was now placed on them that did not fall under the purview of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.They have produced many valuable and illuminating reports, which we have used.But I venture to suggest to you that we should sometimes discuss the general situation alone.In many ways, I don't believe we've gotten to the bottom of the matter. I have not mentioned this to any of my colleagues, nor do I know what their opinion is.I offer my opinion to you because it is my duty to do so. On September 24th I wrote to the Chancellor: I often think of you and the problems you are trying to solve, because I used to have a hard time in the Treasury Department.I expect future budgets to be of an austere nature, based on the broad affluent class.But I think you should have a strong anti-waste campaign at the same time, to go with it.I don't think the value of money has ever been so small, given how much we're spending now and getting so little.In 1918 we imposed many unpleasant restrictions in order to avoid waste, but in the end these restrictions had something to do with the victory of the war.This should be emphasized in your statement due on Wednesday.You should endeavor to tell the people what things they should avoid doing.This is not a way to ban spending.Until nothing more is made, everything should be economized, even luxuries.Try to take stationery as an example. This should be restricted immediately in all departments.Used envelopes should be re-glued so they can be reused.Although this may seem like a small matter, it can make every official, and we have millions of them, think of economy. In 1918, we repeatedly exhorted the people at the front to carry out an active economy campaign, and the people began to take pride in practicing economy and regard it as part of the wartime effort.Why not inculcate these ideas at the outset in the British Expeditionary Forces in areas where they have not actually fought? I am trying to eliminate some of the Admiralty's vast naval reform programs that cannot be implemented before 1941, or even, in some cases, before the end of 1940.Take care not to allow these defensive men and other egotists to drain our energies into long-term developmental plans which cannot mature until after the climax which will determine our destiny has passed. I find that the various branches of the economy are still full of laxity and waste after they have been brought under the most severe control.For your imagination, it is better to take your staff to observe these waste phenomena with the eyes of critics, rather than procrastinating. In this time of crisis, do not hinder the actions of the departments; give them the responsibility; but if they fail to economize, they must be reprimanded immediately. I hope you will not be offended by my writing to you on the above subject. I value economy of means as much as I value war effort, for economy of money is indeed an indispensable part of war effort.You can count on my support in all these matters, and at the same time, I am the head of a spending department, and if you need to review, I will definitely obey. In every war the Royal Navy has gained command of the sea at the price of exposing itself to the enemy of its vastness.The various methods of warfare employed by privateers, sea raiding cruisers, and especially submarines have done serious damage to the lifelines of our trade and food supplies.As a result, we are often forced to make defense our primary mission. From this fact there arises the danger that we will be compelled to adopt, or fall back into, a defensive naval strategy and habits of mind.Modern developments have further strengthened this tendency.During my time in charge of the Admiralty during both wars, I was constantly trying to find ways of counter-offensive which would put an end to the obsession with the defensive.As long as the enemy cannot guess where he will be attacked next time, it will greatly facilitate the work of guiding hundreds of merchant fleets and thousands of merchant ships safely into the port.In the First World War I hoped, first by attacking the Dardanelles, and later by attacking Borkum and the other Frisian islands, to regain the initiative and compel the navally weak enemy to devote himself to the study of its own problems, and have no time to ask ours.In 1939 I was put back in charge of the Admiralty, and immediately after the urgent need had been dealt with and the danger averted I felt insatiable with the convoy and blockade policy.I tried my best to find a way to attack Germany with a navy. The Baltic Sea first came to my mind.Control of the Baltic by an English fleet must bring about potentially decisive gains.Once Scandinavia was freed from the threat of German invasion, it would be a natural part of our system of warfare, if not actually a belligerent on our side.After the British Fleet gained command of the sea in the Baltic Sea, it would extend its hand to assist Russia, which may have a decisive impact on the entire Soviet policy and strategy.Among responsible and informed persons there is no dispute as to these facts.Control of the Baltic Sea is obviously the greatest prize not only of the Royal Navy, but of the whole of Great Britain.Can we get this loot?In this new war, the German navy was no obstacle.Our superiority in heavy ships makes us eager to engage them wherever and whenever the opportunity arises.Minefields can be cleared by stronger naval states.And submarines are powerless against a fleet protected by an efficient destroyer fleet.But now, while Germany does not have the great navy of 1914 and 1915, she has an immeasurably powerful air force, which is growing in importance every month. If we had been able to form an alliance with Soviet Russia two or three years ago, we could now control the Baltic Sea by sending a British battle squadron to join the Russian fleet with Kronstadt as our base.I was advocating this scheme among my friends at the time.It is not clear whether such a proposed approach would lead to action.This was certainly one way of keeping Germany in check; but besides, there were other, easier ways which were not taken.Now, in the autumn of 1939, Russia is a hostile neutral country, halfway between hostility and actual combat.Sweden has several good ports from which the British fleet could be based.But we cannot expect Sweden to incur German aggression on its own.We cannot claim the use of Swedish ports if we cannot control the Baltic, and we cannot control the Baltic without Swedish ports.This is an impasse in strategic thinking.Is there any way to break this impasse?Look for a solution, which is always right.It will be seen afterwards that during the war I have forced the Staff to study for long periods of time various plans of operations, and have often convinced me that these plans had better be abandoned temporarily, or would not fit in with the general situation of the campaign.The first of these plans was to gain control of the Baltic Sea. On the fourth day after my arrival at the Admiralty, I asked the Naval Staff to draw up a plan for opening access to the Baltic Sea.The Planning Division quickly replied that, if the plan was to succeed, it was necessary to keep Italy and Japan neutral; the threat of air raids seemed to make it impossible; If considered feasible, it should be implemented on or before March 1940.Meanwhile, I had a long talk about the program with my old friend from 1911-1912, Chief of Naval Construction Sir Stanley Goodall, who was immediately fascinated by the idea .I call this plan the Catherine Plan, after the great Russian Empress Catherine, because behind my thoughts lies Russia.On September 12, I wrote a detailed memorandum and sent it to all parties involved. Admiral Pound replied to me on the twentieth that, in his view, the success of this plan depended on Russia's participation on the German side, and on Norway and Sweden's assurance of co-operation; The Baltics, we must be able to stand against any possible combined power of several nations and still win.He fully approves of this risky move.On September 21st he granted Admiral Cork, Earl of Ory, an admiral of great accomplishment and renown, to the Admiralty, and provided him with offices and a small select staff and all Intelligence necessary for planning the Baltic Sea Offensive.There happened to be a precedent for such a course of action in the last war, when I had Lord Fisher's full consent, and the famous Admiral Wilson, nicknamed Tugboat, was transferred back to the Admiralty to serve as an officer of this kind. special tasks; and in this war there have been many instances of such important questions being explored in an unrestrained and friendly manner without arousing the slightest dislike from the Chiefs of Staff concerned. Both Lord Cork's and my own were in favor of a capital ship especially suited to withstand aircraft and torpedo attacks.As indicated in the memorandum contained in the appendix, I hope to convert two or three ships of the Royal Sovereign class, so that they will be equipped with super hulls against torpedoes and strong iron decks against bombs, so that they can be sent to the coast or channel. fight in.I'm prepared to sacrifice a turret or even two and seven or eight miles of speed for this purpose.Such ships, not only for use in the Baltic Sea, but also provide us with favorable conditions for launching an offensive near the enemy's North Sea coast, especially in the Mediterranean.But even if the earliest estimates for naval construction and dockyards were realized, none of this would be completed before the late spring of 1940.So we work with that situation. On the twenty-sixth Lord Coke presented his preliminary estimates, which were of course based on a purely military study of the problem.He thought that this battle plan, which he must command in the future, was completely feasible, but it was not without danger.He believed that it would be inevitable to suffer losses when opening the passage, so he required at least 30% more wealthy ships than the German fleet.If we are to be ready for action in mid-1940, the mustering of the fleet and all necessary training should be completed by mid-February. I therefore count on the plans for iron decking on the decks of the HMS Sovereign and hulling on the sides, as time will not permit.This is another deadlock.However, if this type of work continues, we may be able to act as planned in a year's time.But in war, as in everyday life, all other things are developing.If we can arrange it calmly and calmly for a year or two, we can find a better solution. In all these respects, Deputy Chief of Staff Admiral Tom Phillips (died when the Prince of Wales sank off Singapore in late 1940) and Admiral Fraser, Chief of the Admiralty and Third Sea Lord, gave me strong support.後者建議以格倫輪船公司的四艘快速商船加入進攻的艦隊之內，這些船隻後來在其他事件中發揮了作用。 我在海軍部最初處理的任務之一，是審查現有的新艦建造計劃和在戰爭發生時實行的戰時擴充計劃。 在任何時候，海軍部至少有四個連續的每年造艦計劃在同時進行。在一九三六和一九三七年間，有五艘戰列艦已經著手建造，預定在一九四○年和一九四一年中可以服役。一九三八年和一九三九年間，議會又核准建造四艘戰列艦，但從定造日起，非有五六年不能完成。此外，還有十九艘巡洋艦正處在不同的建造階段。在過去二十年中，由於條約的限制，皇家海軍在設計方面的建築天才和令人欽佩的名譽受到了歪曲和束縛。我們所有的巡洋艦，都是為了要遵照這些條約限制和君子協定而取得的結果。在和平時期，艦隻便按照這種標準在困難的政治局面下年復一年地建造，用以維持海軍的力量。在戰時，一切艦隻的建造，一定要以明確的戰術目標作為標準。我極希望建造若干艘一萬四千噸的巡洋艦，裝有九點二吋口徑的大炮，和足以抵禦八吋口徑的炮彈的堅固裝甲板，而且它必須有很遠的續航能力，和超過任何現有的德意志號或其他德國巡洋艦的速度。在這以前，條約的限制阻止了我們採用這樣的政策。現在我們已經不再受它們的拘束，但戰時許多事務迫切地需要優先處理，因而使這種長期計劃同樣無法實行。 驅逐艦是我們最迫切需要的艦隻，也是我們最弱的一個環節。一九三八年的造艦計劃中完全沒有驅逐艦，但在一九三九年中定造了十六艘。當時在造船塢中，這種不可缺少的艦隻共有三十二艘，而在一九四○年底以前能交貨的只有九艘。因為要使每個新建的驅逐艦隊能比上次建造的艦隊更好，這種難以抗拒的傾向，便將建造的時間由二年延長到將近三年。海軍方面當然希望有能夠在大西洋上乘風破浪的艦隻，並要使艦身大小，足以容納在炮擊方面，尤其是在防空方面的一切現代化設備。顯而易見，按照這種言之成理的論點而建造的艦隻，很快就會變成小型巡洋艦，而不再是驅逐艦了。這些沒有裝甲的艦隻的排水量，接近甚至超過了二千噸，並載有二百名海軍在海上行駛，它們本身便輕易地成了任何正規的巡洋艦的犧牲品了。驅逐艦原是防禦潛艇的主要武器，但隨著艦身的增大，它自己卻變成了一個有價值的目標。它已逾越了獵人的界線而成為被豬者了。我們需要的驅逐艦愈多愈好，但它們不斷地改進和擴大，使造船廠所能容納的數量，大受限制，並且大大延遲了完成的時間。 另一方面，在海洋航行的英國商船往往超過了二千艘，而且每星期在我們國內港口進出的遠洋輪船達幾百艘，沿海商船達幾千艘之多。為了實行護航制度，為了在英吉利海峽和大不列顛與愛爾蘭之間的海峽進行巡邏，為了保衛英倫三島的幾百個海口，為了供應我們遍佈全世界的基地，為了保護掃雷艇來履行它們連續不斷的任務，凡此種種都使我們必須大大增加小型武裝艦隻的數量。數量以及建造速度是極重要的兩個條件。 我的責任是調整我們的造艦計劃，使它配合當時的需要，並盡力最大限度地增加我們的反潛艇艦艇。為了達到這個目的，我確定了兩個原則：第一，長期的造艦計劃應該完全停止，或者嚴格推遲，這樣就可以將勞動力和原料集中於我們在第一年或一年半中能夠建成的艦隻；第二，必須設計出新式的反潛艇艦隻，只要它們能夠在臨近我們島國的海面活動，以便使我們較大的驅逐艦能抽出來，派到較遠的海洋上去完成任務。 關於這些問題，我連續寫了幾個節略給我的海軍部同僚： 鑒於潛艇的威脅在接近一九四○年底時一定會以更大的規模捲土重來，我們需要建造的驅逐艦，必須注意數量和建造速度，而不應著重其大小和威力。我們應該可以設計出在一年以內能夠完成的驅逐艦，按照這種情況，至少有五十艘應該立即開始建造。我很理解必須有相當數量的小艦隊領隊艦隻，和能在遠洋服役的大型驅逐艦，但如果我們的艦隊獲得了我所計劃的五十艘中型緊急式驅逐艦，則可以使所有較大的艦隻移往海洋活動或作戰。 長期政策和短期政策之間往往發生的衝突，在戰時變得尤其劇烈。我規定所有在一九四○年底以前不能建成服役的大型艦隻的建造工程，只要是可能同主要的造艦計劃相競爭的應該停止。此外我們必須以能夠在十二個月以內或者可能的話，在八個月以內建成的新型艦艇，來增加我們反潛艇艦隊的數量。對於這類艦隻的第一種型式，我們恢復了驅潛快艇的舊稱。在戰事爆發以前不久，這類艦隻已經定造了五十八艘，但還沒有一艘開始建造。後來一種經過改進的類似艦隻，在一九四○年定造的，則稱為快速巡洋艦。此外，還有大量的各種型式的小艦艇，尤其是拖網船，必須在最短期間內迅速改裝，增加大炮、深水炸彈和潛艇探測器等配備；海軍部新設計的汽艇，亦必須大量製造，以便擔任沿海一帶的任務。發出的定單，達到了我們造艦能力的限度，包括加拿大在內。即便如此，我們並沒有完成我們所希望的一切，而在當時的條件下不可避免地發生種種耽擱，使造船廠的交貨，同我們的預期，產生了很大的差距。 我對於波羅的海戰略以及戰列艦的改造方面的見解，經過長時間的討論，終於佔了優勢。設計完成了，定單也發出了。但是，人們陸續提出各種理由，不主張進行這項工作，其中有些理由是很有根據的。據說如果德國的袖珍戰列艦或有八吋口徑大炮的巡洋艦衝破了封鎖線，我們就可能需要用皇家君主號級的艦隻來護航。同時也有人認為，這個計劃對於其他的重要工作，將產生令人不能接受的妨礙作用，而關於把我們的勞動力與裝甲優先用於其他方面所提出的理由，似乎也令人信服。我一直希望建立這樣一個分艦隊，其艦隻甲板上裝著極厚的鐵甲，速度不超過十五浬，擁有大量的高射炮和任何其他艦隻所不及的抵禦空中和水下襲擊的能力，但我這個希望始終未能實現，使我深以為憾。到了一九四一和一九四二年，當時馬爾他島的保衛和援救變得非常迫切時，當我們極需轟炸意大利的港口，尤其是的黎波里時，其他人和我都同樣深切地感到需要上述艦隻，但到那時，一切都已經太晚了。 在整個戰爭期間，皇家君主號級艦隻始終是一種浪費和隱憂。它們不像其姊妹艦伊麗莎白號一級那樣，經過了重新改裝；我們以後將會看到，到了一九四二年四月，日本艦隊侵入印度洋，有可能讓它們參加作戰時，駐在當地的海軍上將，以及龐德海軍上將和國防大臣的唯一思想，就是設法在最短的時間內，使它們和敵人間的距離，能夠相隔幾千哩，而且愈遠愈好。 我接任海軍大臣和成為戰時內閣閣員以後，最初採取的步驟之一就是建立一個自己的統計處。為了這個目的，我聘用了林德曼教授，他是我多年的老朋友和親信。我們相處在一起，共同提出了我們對於整個戰局的見解和估計。我現在把他安置在海軍部內，和六個統計專家和經濟學家一道工作，我們相信這些專家都是專注意現實而不管其他的人。這一批能幹的人，在林德曼的指導下，利用一切官方情報，能夠不斷地向我提供圖表和圖解，並就我們所了解的全部戰局加以解說。他們孜孜不倦地審查和分析各部門送給戰時內閣的一切文件，並且對於我自己希望進行的各種調查，亦都加以研究。 這時，並沒有一個全面性的政府統計機構。每個部門根據它自己的數字和論據而提出它的見解。空軍部這樣統計，而陸軍部又那樣統計。供應部和貿易部雖然指的是一件事，但各有不同的說法。這種情況，當某些問題在內閣發生分歧時，有時引起了誤解並浪費了時間。然而，我從開始就有我自己可靠的、穩定的情報來源，它的每一部分都和所有其他部分整個連繫著。雖然最初，這只包括整個情報領域中的一部分，但是卻大大地幫助我對於向我們不斷湧來的無數事實和數字，形成一個正確和綜合的見解。