Chapter 30 Volume 1 Chapter 26 French Front

British Expeditionary Force to France Strengthens defenses on Belgian borders Aggressor's vantage point Belgian neutrality France vs. offensive Maginot Line Recognized defensive power Military Forces Possible German Lines of Attack Advice of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and its Opinion of September 18, 1939 Gamelin's Plan D Instruction No. 8 Supreme Allied Military Conference September 17 at Meeting in Paris Plan D was approved to extend Plan D to the Netherlands. As soon as the war broke out, our marching army set off for France.Before the last war at least three years were wasted in preparations, but this time it was not until the spring of 1938 that the War Department created a special agency for this purpose.At this time, two serious new factors appeared: first, the equipment and organization of a modern army were far from being as simple as in 1914.Each division has mechanized transport, a larger organization, and a larger number of non-combatants.Second, due to the excessive fear of enemy air raids on the ships transporting troops and the ports where troops landed, the Ministry of War had to use only the ports in southern France, with Saint-Nazaire as its main base.The Army's lines of communication were thus greatly extended, with the result that the arrival, deployment, and supply of British troops were delayed, and a great deal of manpower was expended along the way.

It is strange that no decision was made before the outbreak of the war as to what part of the front our troops should be fortified, but it was then strongly conjectured that it should be south of Leer; confirmed.By mid-October, two regiments of the regular army, consisting of four British divisions, were stationed along the Franco-Belgian border.They all arrived at their destinations after 250 miles of road and rail transport from remote ports dedicated to the landing of troops.The three infantry brigades that arrived successively in October and November were formed into the Fifth Division in December 1939.

In January 1940, the 48th Division set out from the country, and then, in February, the 50th and 51st Divisions, and in March, the 42nd and 44th Divisions successively launched Come, a total of ten divisions arrived.Our numbers gradually increased, and we took over more lines of defense.Of course, we had no contact with the enemy at any point. After the British Expeditionary Force[1] arrived at their designated position, they found that a fairly complete artificial anti-tank trench had been built along the front line, and at intervals of about a thousand yards, there was a large and prominent trench. bunkers that allow machine guns and anti-tank guns to fire longitudinally along the trenches.In addition, there is a continuous belt of barbed wire.During this unusual autumn and winter, the main work of our army was to improve the fortifications built by the French, forming a line similar to the Siegfried Line.Despite the harsh climate, the work progressed quickly.From aerial photography, we learn how quickly the Germans extended their own Siegfried Line northward from the Moselle.Despite their many advantages in accessing domestic resources and forced labor, our work appears to be on par with theirs.By the time the Germans attacked in May 1940, our troops had completed four hundred new bunkers.Forty miles of anti-tank trenches with parapets had been dug, and a great deal of barbed wire had been installed.As the line of communication stretched back as far as Nantes, the needs became very great.Huge base facilities had been erected, roads had been improved, a hundred miles of broad-gauge railroad had been laid, a vast system of underground telegraph wires had been buried, several underground general headquarters for regimental and corps commanders Also close to completion.Some fifty new and satellite airports have had their runways extended or improved, using more than 50,000 tons of concrete.

【1】The vanguard of the British Expeditionary Force began to land in France on September 4th.The First Army landed on September 19, and the Second Army landed on October 3.General Headquarters was initially at Le Mans on 15th September.The movement of the army was mainly through Cherbourg, vehicles and supplies through Brest and Nantes, and Le Mans and Laval were used as assembly points. For all these tasks the British troops worked hard, and to enrich their experience, brigades were sent in rotation to the French front near Metz, where the enemy was confronted, at least on patrol.The rest of the time, our troops are engaged in training.This is indeed necessary.When war broke out the army was far less prepared than Sir John French's army was twenty-five years earlier.At home, the military has not been drilled on a significant scale for several years.The establishment of the regular military academy is short of 20,000 people, including 5,000 officers, and according to the Cadwell plan to defend India with regular troops, most of the responsibility falls on the native troops. As a result, the quality of the native troops is almost the same as that of the army cadets equal.The doubling of the home defense force in March 1939 was well-intentioned but ill-advised, and the establishment of the militia in May of the same year resulted in the mobilization of a large number of instructors from the regular army.The months of garrisoning in France in winter have been well utilized, and various training plans have been incorporated into the main work of strengthening the fortification.During this rare period of respite, our army has indeed improved significantly in terms of efficiency. Although the work is arduous and there has been no combat behavior, the morale and mental outlook of the troops are improving.

[1] Commander-in-Chief of the British Army during the First World War.translator In the rear of our front lines, along the lines of communication, there are large stores of supplies and ammunition in the depots.Ten days' supplies were stored between the Seine and the Somme, and an additional seven days' supply north of the Somme.The latter provision, after the Germans broke through the front line, tided over the British troops.In view of the calm situation at the time, other ports north of Le Havre were gradually used.Dieppe became a hospital base; Fécamp was used exclusively for munitions; finally, we made use of thirteen French ports.

The advantages of a government which is not bound by any law or treaty are incalculable, over those which must wait for a criminal state to arouse the sentiments and plans of war before it has begun its attack.This is a really huge bargain.On the contrary, unless the victory of the aggressor is absolute and decisive, there will always be a day of reckoning in the future.Hitler, free from any constraints other than those greater than his own, could decide when and where he would attack at will; but the two Western democracies could not violate Belgian neutrality.The best they could do was to be ready to go to the rescue if Belgium called for them, but by the time it did it would probably be too late.Of course, if, during the five years preceding the outbreak of war, England and France had adopted a resolute and decisive policy within the bounds of treaty sanction and League of Nations endorsement, Belgium might have been able to stick to the old alliance and allow a common front to form.This might lead to great safety, and perhaps averted impending disaster.

Such an alliance, properly organized, could provide a barrier along the Belgian frontier to the sea, against the kind that nearly wiped us out in 1914 and will crush France in 1940. Terrible devious tactics.At the same time, this alliance will also enable us to quickly attack from Belgium into the German industrial heartland of the Ruhr, thereby adding a strong resistance to German aggression. Even in the worst case, Belgium could not suffer a more dire fate than it actually did afterwards.When we recall that the United States was on the sidelines; that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald advocated the disarmament of France; that we have been repeatedly frustrated and humiliated by Germany's repeated breaches of the terms of the peace treaty on disarmament; surrender; we acquiesce to the annexation of Austria;

Our Treaty at Munich and the Recognition of the German Occupation of Prague When we recall all the above, none of those who were in charge of the affairs of state in England or France in those days had a right to blame Belgium.In a period of vacillation and compromise, Belgium could only remain neutral and console itself with the hope that it would hold off a German invasion on its fortified fronts, pending the arrival of British and French troops to their aid. In 1914, the French army and the French people were in a fierce offensive spirit with the vengeful fury that had been passed down from generation to generation since 1870.Their theory holds that a numerically weaker state must counter-offensive everywhere not only strategically but tactically in order to resist enemy invasion.At the beginning of the war, the French army in blue clothes and red trousers marched forward bravely with the Marseillaise played by the military band.

The Germans, although they were invading, stopped and fired upon the French wherever they encountered them, causing them great casualties.Colonel Grand-Maison, the initiator of the most aggressive offensive, died for his country and his creed at the forefront of the battlefield.In my book "World Crisis", I explained why defensive artillery was absolutely preponderant in the period from 1914 to 1916 or 1917.We have personally seen automatic rifles used by a few Boers in the South African War to great effect; heavy casualties.In addition to this, there were an increasing number of machine guns at that time.

A massive artillery battle ensued.Hundreds, and later increased to thousands of cannons, can blast an area to pieces; however, if the British and French armies, after their heroic sacrifices, were to go forward side by side to attack the German army entrenched in trenches, they would face a series of battles. The strong fortifications connected to each other; and the artillery they suppressed on the front line has already bombarded the land in front of them with many bomb craters. Even if they win the attack, these bomb craters will become a huge obstacle for them to move forward.The only conclusion that can be drawn from these arduous experiences is that to be on the defensive is to win.Furthermore, the firepower of weapons has increased considerably over the past twenty-five years.However, defensiveness has its advantages and disadvantages, which will be clearly seen in the future.

France at this time was completely different from France in August 1914, which was fighting to the death with her generational enemy.The spirit of revenge, since the war was won and the mission accomplished, has vanished, and the leaders who fostered it are long gone.In the last war, 1.5 million adult Frenchmen were killed.In the minds of most French people, when they think of offensive operations, they associate the initial failure of the French offensive in 1914, the retreat of General Nivelles in 1917, the Somme and Passendale. The long-term bitter battle, especially the huge casualties caused by the firepower of modern weapons to the attacking troops.Neither in France nor in England did anyone fully comprehend the consequences of a novelty, the ability of armored vehicles to withstand bombardment and advance a hundred miles a day.On this subject, a few years ago a commandant named de Gaulle published an illuminating work, which caused no reaction.The authority of the aging Marshal Pétain in the Supreme Military Council had a great influence on French military thought, for it blocked the avenues for the assimilation of new ideas, especially those which were queerly called offensive weapons. In the aftermath, the policy of relying on the Maginot Line was often criticized.This policy does create a defensive mentality.However, when defending a frontier stretching several hundred miles, the wise defensive measure is often to separate as much as possible from the enemy by fortifications, so that the army can be saved while the army is stationed, and at the same time it can control the enemy's possible attack. route.The Maginot Line could have been of great service to France if it had been properly utilized in French operational planning.It should be seen as a long series of interconnected valuable outlets, especially capable of being used to cut off a large part of the front line, to concentrate general reserves behind it, or to make large movements. Given the demographic differences between France and Germany, we should admit that the Maginot Line was a wise and prudent measure.In fact, it is very odd that this line of defense did not extend at least all the way along the Meuse.If it could be stretched all the way, it would be a reliable barrier, allowing France to charge the enemy freely with her strong and sharp sword.But Marshal Pétain opposed the extension of the line of defense.He insisted that the Ardennes region could never be a passage for invasion because of its topography.Therefore, the plan to extend the defense line was rejected.General Giraud explained to me the offensive significance of the Maginot Line when I visited Metz in 1937.However, the concept of the offensive was not put into practice, and this line of defense not only absorbed a large number of trained regular army soldiers and technicians, but also weakened the vigilance of the military strategy and the people of the whole country. The new air power is rightly seen as a revolutionary factor in all kinds of operations.Its effectiveness has been exaggerated given the small number of aircraft available to both sides at the time, and air power is generally believed to be useful on the defensive side by hindering the concentration and transport of large numbers of troops in case of an enemy attack.The French High Command even considered the period of French mobilization to be extremely dangerous because the railway center might be damaged by air attack, although at that time German aircraft, like the Allies, were too few to undertake such a major task.The ideas expressed by the Air Force chiefs were, of course, correct, and were fully vindicated in the later stages of the war, when the air power was increased tenfold or twentyfold.But at the beginning of the war, this view was premature. In England it was joked that the War Office was always preparing for the last war.But this is probably the case in other ministries and other countries, and it is certainly the case with the French army.I also believe that the defensive is extremely powerful as long as it is actively played on the defensive.But I am now free of any responsibility, and at the same time unable to obtain coherent information to make a new assessment.I know the massacres of the last war, which the French people will never forget.Germany had been given time to build the Siegfried Line.How terrible it would be if the remaining French men were sent to attack this iron wall made of gunfire and concrete!In Appendix (XV) I publish a long-term method (codenamed Tiller No. 6) which I thought at the time could be used to subdue the fire of an enemy on the defensive.But during the first months of the Second World War, I felt, according to what was in my mind, that I had no different views on the defensive than the average person, and I believed that anti-tank barriers and field guns, if cleverly Deployed, with sufficient ammunition, to drive back or destroy the tanks except at night or in natural and man-made fog. Among the problems that Almighty God has set for His lowly servant, there is not one thing that happens twice the same, and even if one event seems to have happened, there are always variations in it, so that It cannot be generalized.Ordinary people grow up in an environment with fixed conclusions, and their psychology, unless they are guided by extraordinary geniuses, can never go beyond the inherent conclusions.But as we shall soon see, after eight months of inactivity on both sides, Hitler suddenly launched a massive attack, led by a mass of bulletproof or heavily armored tanks, breached all fortifications, and over the centuries For the first time since the invention of gunpowder, and perhaps even for the first time since the invention of gunpowder, cannon was temporarily rendered almost completely ineffective on the battlefield.As we shall see, the increased power of fire enables a small number of troops to defend the necessary positions, thereby reducing the size of the human target and greatly reducing the bloodshed in actual warfare. No frontier was ever as strategically important and as a subject of experimentation as the Franco-German frontier stretching across the Low Countries.Every aspect of this land, its mountains and waterways, has been industriously studied for centuries by all the generals and academies of war in Western Europe, often on the basis of the experience of their last campaign at that time.In the present period, if Belgium should be invaded by Germany, the Allies could send troops there if they decided to lend their aid, or, if Belgium should invite them, they could occupy it secretly and suddenly, according to a well-arranged plan. Yes, there are two lines of defense: the first of which is the so-called Scheldt line.This line was close to the French frontier and required no long marches and no great risks.At worst, it does no harm in holding a false line of defense; at best, it can be built into a line of defense as the situation develops.The second line of defense is greater.It follows the Meuse River, through Gives, Dinan and Namur, and then through Louvain to Antwerp.If the Allies were able to capture and hold this adventurous line through hard fighting, Germany's right-wing outflanking in the event of an invasion would be seriously hindered; It was a laudable prelude to an important center of German arms production in the Seoul region. For reasons of international morality, it is not possible to advance across the Belgian frontier without the consent of Belgium, therefore, only from the frontier between France and Germany, if north and south of Strasbourg To attack due east across the Rhine, the army would then mainly enter the Black Forest region, which, like the Ardennes, was considered unsuitable for attack at the time.But there was still the possibility of entering the Palatinate northeast from the Strasbourg-Metz front.This advance, with the Rhine on its right, might hold the river as far north as Koblenz or Cologne.Good areas of warfare are accessible from here; and these possibilities, together with many variations, have for many years been part of the study of war in the General Staff Colleges of Western Europe.However, in this part of the country, there was the Siegfried Line, with many solidly built concrete bunkers forming the horns of each other, and a large number of barbed wire formed a deep position. By September 1939, this line of defense was already impenetrable.The earliest date on which the French could launch a major offensive was perhaps the last days of the third week of September.But by then, the Polish campaign was over.By mid-October, the German army on the Western Front had seventy divisions.France's temporary advantage in numbers on the Western Front quickly disappeared.A French offensive from its eastern frontier would necessarily weaken their forces on the more important northern line.Even if the French army could achieve initial success, within a month they would have great difficulty in maintaining their gains in the East and would be unable to withstand a full-scale German counterattack on its northern defenses. This is why passive defense has been adopted until Poland is destroyed?answer to such a question.But this battle was actually lost years ago.If the war had taken place in 1938, when the Czech Republic still existed, it might have had a good chance of victory.In 1936 there would probably not be a strong resistance.In 1933, a Geneva resolution could be obeyed without bloodshed.In 1939, General Gamelin was not alone in daring to risk an attack, for the danger had been greatly increased since the crises, and the French and British governments had always been timid about them. forward. The British Chiefs of Staff estimated that by September 18, Germany had mobilized at least 16 divisions of various armies, distributed as follows: 42 divisions on the Western Front; 16 divisions in Central Germany; Fifty-eight divisions.We now know from enemy records that this estimate was almost entirely correct.The entire German army consists of 108 to 170 divisions.The fifty-eight divisions attacking Poland are the most mature units.The remaining fifty or sixty divisions were of varying quality.Among them, forty-two German divisions (fourteen active divisions; twenty-five reserve divisions, and three reserve troops) were stationed along the western front from Aix|La|Chapelle to the Swiss border.German panzer divisions had either been sent to fight in Poland, or had not yet been established, and factories had not yet begun mass production of tanks.The British Expeditionary Force was little more than a symbolic support.It could send only two divisions in the first week of October, and added two more divisions in the second week.Although Germany's relative power had increased enormously since the Munich crisis, the German High Command remained very anxious about their situation on the Western Front before Poland was conquered, only because of Hitler's despotic power and resolute will and His political judgment that France and England would not want to fight was confirmed five times in succession before they could be coaxed or compelled to accept risks they thought they should not take. Hitler was convinced that the French political system was corrupt, and the French army was tainted.He understood the power of the French Communist Party and believed that once Ribbentrop and Molotov compromised and Moscow attacked the French and British governments for a capitalist and imperialist war, they could use the French Communist Party's power to make the French military Operations are weakened, or paralyzed.He knew very well that Britain believed in pacifism and was declining day by day.According to his opinion, Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Daladier were driven to the point of declaring war by a small number of British militants. Just as in the events in Czechoslovakia a year ago.On numerous occasions previously described, Hitler's intuitions proved correct, while the arguments and fears of his generals were wrong.But he did not understand the violent changes that would take place in Great Britain and the British Empire should the signal for war be given; Work hard.He cannot comprehend the strength of mind or spirit of our island peoples, who, however strenuously against war or military preparations, have for generations considered victory to be their birthright.But, in any case, the British army was incapable of functioning at first, and he also concluded that France was not fully committed to fighting.In fact, this is indeed the real situation.As a result, he got his wish, and his order was carried out. Our officers believe that after Germany's complete defeat of the Polish army, it will retain about fifteen divisions in Poland, the majority of which may be of inferior quality.If she had any doubts about the treaty with Russia, her total number of troops on the Eastern Front might increase to thirty divisions.Therefore, according to the most unfavorable assumption, Germany will transfer 40 divisions from the Eastern Front, so that the Western Front will have a total strength of 100 divisions.But by then the French might have mobilized seventy-two divisions, in addition to the fort garrison equivalent to twelve or fourteen divisions, and four divisions of the British Expeditionary Force.In addition to the twelve divisions of the French army that should be stationed on the Italian frontier, there are seventy-six divisions that can be used against Germany.The enemy therefore holds a four-to-three advantage over the Allies; and it is expected that the enemy may form additional reserve divisions, bringing the total number of troops to 130 divisions in the near future.To deal with this situation, France still has 14 divisions in North Africa, some of which can be transferred back, together with the British troops that may gradually increase in the future. With regard to the air force, our Chiefs of Staff estimated that after the destruction of Poland, Germany might concentrate more than 2,000 bombers on the Western Front, while the combined bombers of France and Britain at that time totaled 950. [1] Therefore, after the settlement of Poland, Germany's strength, whether on land or in the air, is obviously far stronger than the combined strength of Britain and France.Therefore, there is no need to consider France's offensive against Germany at all, but is it possible for Germany to attack France? [1] The exact number of German bombers at that time was 1,546. Of course, there are three ways that Germany may take: First, invade through Switzerland.This could be rounded around the southern flank of the Maginot Line, but there were many geographical and strategic difficulties.Second, invade France through the border between France and Germany.This also seemed impossible, since it was believed that the German army was not yet adequately equipped and armed for a frontal assault on the Maginot Line.Third, invade France through Holland and Belgium.Such an attack would also bypass the Maginot Line and avoid the losses that a frontal attack on permanent fortifications would suffer.The Chiefs of Staff estimated that, for such an attack, Germany would have to draw twenty-nine divisions from the Eastern Front at the time of war, and another fourteen divisions to form an echelon in the rear to reinforce the troops already on the Western Front.It was impossible to accomplish such a movement within three weeks without adequate artillery support for the attacking force.And this preparatory activity will inevitably be discovered by us in the two weeks before the offensive begins.If Germany wants to launch such a large-scale military operation, it is bound to be later this year, but this possibility cannot be ruled out. We should of course prevent the movement of German troops from the east to the west by means of air strikes on the lines of communication and concentration areas.It was therefore to be expected that Germany would launch an air campaign early in the war in order to weaken or eliminate the air forces of the Allies by attacking our airfields and aircraft factories.But as far as Britain is concerned, this kind of air combat is not unwelcome.Our next step will be to deal with the German invasion through the Low Countries.We cannot push forward into Holland and give them a head-on blow, but it is in the interests of the Allies to stop them as far as possible in Belgium.We know, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff wrote, that the opinion of France was that if Belgium could still hold on to the Meuse, the French and British forces should occupy the Givats-Namur line, while the British Expeditionary Force fought on the left.We believe that unless a plan can be agreed with Belgium to occupy this line of defense in sufficient time before the German attack, this plan should not be adopted unless there is a change in Belgium's current attitude and we can formulate an early occupation of Givie｜Namu Otherwise we insist that the German attack should be resisted on prepared positions on the French frontier. Under these circumstances, the towns and railways in Belgium and Holland which were used or occupied by the Germans would of course have to be bombed. The subsequent changes on this important issue should be recorded.On September 20 the question was referred to the War Cabinet and, after a brief discussion, to the Supreme Military Council.General Gamelin was consulted in turn by the Supreme Council of War through the usual procedure.In reply, General Gamelin merely stated that the question of Plan D (advance to the Meuse|Antwerp line) was already arranged by the French delegation in its report.The combat section of this report reads: Anglo-French troops will enter Belgium if Belgium requests it in time, but no encounters are to be prepared.Among the recognized lines are the Scheldt line and the Meuse|Namur|Antwerp line.After considering the French reply, the British Chiefs of Staff made another submission to the Cabinet, discussing alternatives for advancing to the Scheldt line, but for advancing to the Meuse|Namur|Antwerp line There is no mention of this more important task.When this second report was presented to the Cabinet by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on October 4, they made no mention of this all-important alternative to Plan D.Accordingly, the War Cabinet considered that the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee had been satisfied and that no further action or resolution was required.I attended both of these Cabinet meetings and did not feel that any major issues remained unresolved.During October, neither we nor Belgium had made any effective dispositions, so it was assumed that our advance would be limited to the Scheldt line. During this period, General Gamelin was conducting secret negotiations with Belgium, and determined that: first, the Belgian army should maintain sufficient strength;By the beginning of November France and Belgium had reached an agreement on these points, and from November 5th to the 14th a series of conferences were held at Vincennes and La Fertte, with Ironside, Newall And Gott was present at all or part of the meeting.On November 15, Gamelin issued Instruction No. 8, confirming the agreement made on the 14th, according to which, if circumstances permitted, advances to the Meuse-Antwerp line should be made in support of Belgium.The Supreme Military Council of the Allied Powers met in Paris on November 17, and Mr. Chamberlain took Lord Halifax, Lord Chatfield and Sir Kingsley Wood to attend.I was not yet in a position to be invited to accompany the prime minister to such meetings.The resolution at that time was: Since it was recognized that it was necessary to hold the German army as far as possible on the farthest eastern line of defense, if Germany invaded Belgium, it should do its best to hold on to the Meuse|Antwerp line of defense.At this meeting, both Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Daladier repeatedly emphasized the importance of this resolution, so subsequent actions were governed by this resolution.In fact, it was a resolution in favor of Plan D, and it thus superseded the earlier, more cautious agreement to advance only to the Scheldt line. Plan D soon added a new content, that is, the task of the French Seventh Army.The idea of ​​sending this force along the coast on the Allied flanks was first mooted in early November 1939.General Giraud, commanding a reserve corps, stationed near Reims, was already restless, when he was appointed commander.The purpose of the expanded plan D is to send troops into Holland via Antwerp in order to assist the Dutch; secondly, to attempt to occupy certain areas of the Dutch islands of Valcheren and Beverland.All these plans were of course very good if the German army had been blocked at the Albert Canal from advancing.General Gamelin wished to carry out this plan.But General George thinks this is out of our reach; he prefers to keep the troops used for this purpose in the rear of the center of the line, as a reserve.We were completely ignorant of these differences of opinion about them. So, in this case, we passed the severe winter and waited for the spring. During the six months between now and the German offensive no new decisions on strategic principles have been taken by the French and British Staffs and their Governments.