Chapter 34 Volume 1 Chapter 30 Scandinavia - Finland

Norwegian peninsulaSweden's iron ore neutrality and Norwegian corridor watersCorrection of a mistakeAdmiral von Raeder and Herr RosenbergWidkon QuislingDecember 14, 1939Hitler The decision of the Soviet Union against the activities of the Baltic states Stalin's claim to Finland 28 November 1939 The Soviet Union declared war on Finland The heroic resistance of Finland The failures and setbacks of the Soviet Union The satisfaction of the nations of the world Aid to Finland Neutrality of Norway and Sweden Moral disputes over the argument for mining in Norwegian waterways. This peninsula, stretching for a thousand miles from the mouth of the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Circle, is of great strategic importance.Norway's mountains descend towards the sea, forming a continuous fringe of islands.Between these islands and the mainland there is a corridor-shaped territorial sea through which Germany maintains communication with the open sea, and our blockade has therefore done serious damage.Germany's war industry mainly relied on iron ore supplied by Sweden.In summer, the ore is exported from Sweden at the port of Luleå in the upper part of the Gulf of Bothnia. In winter, when the port freezes, it is exported from the port of Narvik on the west coast of Norway.If the waters of this corridor are respected, the whole of this trade will be left to run freely under the cover of neutral countries.Although we have the superior command of the sea, there is nothing we can do about it.The Naval Staff was deeply disturbed by this important facility enjoyed by Germany, and I therefore seized the opportunity at the earliest opportunity to raise the matter in the Cabinet.

I recall that in the last war, the British and American governments had no scruples about laying mines in the channel, that is, in this protected body of water.From 1917 to 1918, from Scotland to Norway, across the North Sea, a large-scale mine was laid to block money.But the mine blockade could not be fully effective as long as German merchant ships and U-boats sailed around the edge of the blockade and slipped past it unharmed.But I found that the fleets of the two Allies did not lay any minefields in the territorial waters of Norway.Their admirals complained that unless the waters of the corridor were blocked at the same time, the mine blockade, which cost a lot of manpower and money to complete, would not be able to produce any effect. Therefore, the governments of all the Allied countries exerted the greatest pressure on Norway to promote It has sealed off the corridor waters by itself.Laying a vast mine blockade would take a long time, and by the time it was completed there was little doubt as to the outcome of the war and the fact that Germany was powerless to invade Scandinavia.However, the Norwegian government was not persuaded to take action until the end of September 1918.The war was over before they could actually complete the mine-laying project.

When I finally brought the question to the House of Commons in April 1940, I said: In the last great war, when we fought alongside the United States, the German U-boats made particular use of this sheltered waterway, setting out on their sea-marauding adventures, to the detriment of the Allies.Therefore, the governments of Britain, France, and the United States jointly advised the Norwegians to (start) to cross this covered waterway within their own territorial waters.It was therefore natural, since the beginning of this war, that the Admiralty would draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to a precedent which, though not quite the same as it was, is nevertheless a modern and most respectable precedent; Naturally, the Admiralty also insisted that we should be allowed to lay our own minefields in the Norwegian territorial waters, so as to force the German trade shipping in this waterway to move to the high seas.In this way, it must take risks, and it is very likely to accept the control of wartime contraband imposed by our large and small blockade fleets, or be directly captured as the enemy's spoils of war.It is only natural and proper that His Majesty's Government has long hesitated to be condemned even for technical violations of international law.

They do delay for a long time without being able to make a decision. Initially, people responded well to my reasons.All my colleagues were deeply impressed by the above-mentioned abuses, but strictly respecting the neutrality of small countries is a code of conduct that we all abide by. Secretary of the Admiralty to the First Sea Lord and others September 19, 1939 This morning I drew the attention of the Cabinet to the importance of stopping shipments of Swedish iron ore from the Norwegian port of Narvik, stating that shipments from Narvik will begin as soon as the Gulf of Bothnia freezes.I pointed out that in 1918 we had, with the consent and cooperation of the United States, laid a minefield within a limit of three miles across Norwegian territorial waters.I propose that we should, within a short period of time, resume such measures.

(This, as stated above, is not an exact statement, and I was shortly notified of the actual situation.) The Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary, seemed very much in favor of such a course of action. Therefore, every action must be taken to prepare. (1) First of all there must be serious negotiations with the Norwegians to charter all their merchant ships. (2) Since we absolutely do not want to have disputes with the Swedes, the Ministry of Trade should negotiate with Sweden and let us purchase the relevant ores. (3) The Foreign Office should be made fully aware of our proposals; the full facts of the joint British and American action in 1918, together with reasonable explanations, should be carefully presented.

(4) The minelaying program itself should be studied by the appropriate personnel of the Naval Staff and, if necessary, notified to the Economic Operations Division. Please keep me informed of the progress of the plan which is of the utmost importance in combating the enemy's war industries. When everything is ready, a cabinet decision is required. On the twenty-ninth, at the request of my colleagues, and after having exhaustively studied the whole subject at the Admiralty, I drew up a report on this subject, and the related matter of chartering neutral merchant ships, for cabinet discussion.

sweden and norway Memorandum of the Secretary of the Navy Chartering a Norwegian Merchant Ship September 29, 1939 (1) The Norwegian delegation is about to arrive, and the trade minister hopes to negotiate with them in a few days for chartering all their remaining merchant ships, most of which are tankers. The Admiralty considered the chartering of these merchant ships to be of the utmost importance, and Lord Chatfield had written observations urging this course of action. Ore from Narvik for Germany (2) By the end of November, the Gulf of Bothnia is usually frozen. Therefore, Swedish iron ore can only be shipped to Germany through the port of Oxelosend in the Baltic Sea or the port of Narvik in northern Norway.The Oxelhosend port can only transport about one-fifth of the amount of Swedish ore Germany needs.In winter, the main trade usually takes place from the port of Narvik.From this port, merchant ships can go down the western coast of Norway until the Skagerrak Strait, and the entire voyage to Germany is always within Norwegian territorial waters.

It should be understood that an adequate supply of iron ore from Sweden is of great importance to Germany, so that if this supply from Narvik could be cut off or prevented during the winter period from October to April , can greatly weaken its resistance.During the first three weeks of the war no iron ore ship left Narvik due to the reluctance of the crews to sail and other reasons beyond our control.If this satisfactory state of affairs can continue, the Admiralty need not call for any special action.In addition, negotiations with the Swedish government are underway, and the negotiations themselves may significantly reduce Scandinavia's supply of ore to Germany.

However, if supplies to Germany from Narvik were to resume, we would need to take more severe action. Ties to Sweden (3) Our relationship with Sweden needs careful consideration.Germany takes threatening action against Sweden.Our command of the seas also gives us powerful weapons, which we must employ, if necessary, to exercise direct control over Sweden.We should, however, propose to help the Swedes as much as possible to solve their ore problem, that we exchange them for coal, as part of the policy stated in section (2); Part of it can be compensated in other ways.This is the second step.

Chartering and insurance of all available neutral ships (4) The considerations above gave rise to a proposal of a wider scope.Shall we secure, by charter or otherwise, control of the remaining ships of all neutral nations we can get, including Norway, so that the Allies can control most of the world's sea traffic, and on favorable terms, then Sublease to countries that do what we say? Shall we extend the advantages of our convoy regime to ships of neutral nations not under our direct control? The success of the Royal Navy hitherto in warding off submarine attacks seemed, in the opinion of the Admiralty, to justify the latter route.

This would mean that we should provide safe escort to all ships of all countries that ply our routes, provided they obey our rules governing contraband, and pay the necessary remuneration in foreign currency.They can therefore be freed from the risk of war by virtue of their contract, and as our ASW is successful we can hope to make a profit to compensate for the enormous expense of ASW. In this way, not only ships owned by us or under our control, but also independent neutral ships will be protected by the United Kingdom on the high seas. In case of accidents, compensation can also be obtained. The Admiralty does not think this is super beyond our power.If, at the outset of the last war, some similar scheme had been instituted for the hire and insurance of neutral ships, it would undoubtedly have proved a very profitable transaction.In this war it may well prove to form the basis of a confederacy of free-navigating nations in which it would be advantageous to join. (5) Therefore, it is necessary to make a request: If the cabinet agrees in principle with the above four main objectives, the issue should be handed back to the relevant departments in order to draw up detailed plans and take prompt action. Before circulating this report in the Cabinet for discussion, I request the Naval Staff to conduct a thorough review of the whole situation. secretary of the navy to assistant chief of naval staff September 29, 1939 When the Cabinet meets tomorrow morning, please reconvene the Ore meeting we had on Thursday to study my draft report.Unless the consequences are of paramount importance, I will not appeal to the Cabinet for the severe action I propose against a neutral country. I have heard that there are no German or Swedish ships at present ready to carry ore south from Narvik.It is also heard that in order to prevent the port from freezing in winter, Germany has accumulated ore by sea in Oxelosende, to be shipped in a steady stream in winter, from the Baltic Sea to the Ruhr area through the Kiel Canal.Are these two statements true?It would be bad if I mine mines in Norway's territorial waters and it turns out to be ineffective. Also, assuming that ore shipments off the west coast of Norway are a genuinely important factor worth the effort to interdict, where are you going to interdict? Please survey the coast in detail and let me know the exact location.Obviously the interception point should be north of Bergen anyway.In this way, the southern part of the west coast of Norway can still navigate freely, and trade shipping from Norway or from the Baltic Sea can still join the Norwegian merchant fleet to come to our country.All of this is subject to further exploration before I can bring my propositions to Cabinet.I'm not going to bring it up until next Monday or Tuesday. When the Admiralty had agreed to all this and settled it, I again referred the matter to the Cabinet.As before, the need for this was shared by all, and I could not obtain their consent to take action.The reasons for respecting neutrality put forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are so weighty that my opinion cannot be passed.As will be seen later, I use various methods, and on various occasions, to maintain my arguments.However, it was not until April 1940 that a decision was made to adopt the request I had made in September 1939, but by then it was too late. At about this time, according to what we now know, German attention was directed in the same direction.On October 3, Naval Chief of Staff Raeder made a proposal to Hitler entitled to obtain a base in Norway.He demanded that the Führer be informed as soon as possible of the opinion of the Naval Operations Staff regarding the possibility of extending the base of operations to Northern Europe.It must now be determined whether it is possible to secure a base in Norway under combined pressure from Russia and Germany.In order to improve our strategic and tactical position.He therefore drew up a series of reports which he submitted to Hitler for review on October 10.In these reports, he wrote, I have tried to illustrate the disadvantages that Britain would suffer if Norway occupied Norway: British control of the entrance to the Baltic Sea, encirclement of our naval operations and air raids on Britain, and termination of our imposition on Sweden. pressure.At the same time, I also emphasized the benefits to us of occupying the Norwegian coast: access to the North Atlantic Ocean, Britain can no longer lay mines to blockade it as it did in 1917-18. The head of state immediately saw the importance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to Leave the report, stating that he wishes to consider it for himself. Admiral Raeder shared Admiral Raeder's opinion with Rosenberg, the Nazi party's expert on foreign affairs and a specialized agency in charge of foreign propaganda.He dreamed of converting the Scandinavians to the idea of ​​a Nordic bloc comprising all the Nordic peoples under the natural leadership of Germany.In early 1939 he thought he had discovered that Norway's extreme National Party was a useful tool.The party is led by former Norwegian Army Minister Viedkon Quisling.Contact soon took place between the two parties.Quisling's activities, through Rosenberg's organization and the German Naval Attaché in Oslo, were linked to the plans of the German Naval Staff. On December 14, Quisling and his assistant Hagelin arrived in Berlin, where Raeder introduced Hitler to discuss political instigation in Norway.Quisling came with an elaborate plan.Hitler, for the sake of secrecy, feigned reluctance to increase his obligations, saying it would have preferred a neutral Scandinavia.On the same day, however, according to Raeder, he ordered the German High Command to prepare a plan for operations in Norway. Of course, we knew nothing about all this at the time. Meanwhile, a scene of unexpected conflict arose in Scandinavia. The conflict, which aroused great indignation in England and France, greatly affected discussions about Norway.Since the Soviet Union was involved in the war against Britain and France since Germany, it blocked the passage from the West to the Soviet Union in accordance with the spirit of the treaty with Germany.The first route is from East Prussia through the Baltic countries and enters the Soviet Union; the second route is through the waters of the Gulf of Finland; the third route is through the mainland of Finland, across the Karelian Isthmus to the Finn-Soviet border, a distance from Lenin There is a place only twenty miles away in the outskirts of Gale.The Soviets had not forgotten the dangers facing Leningrad in 1919.Even Kolchak's Belarusian government had informed the Paris Peace Conference that bases in the Baltic states, as well as in Finland, were necessary to protect the Russian capital.In the summer of 1939, Stalin spoke the same words to the British and French delegations; we have seen in the relevant previous chapters how the natural fear of these small countries became a hindrance. The obstacles to the British and French alliance with the Soviet Union and how it paved the way for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Stalin wasted no time; on September 24 the Estonian foreign minister was summoned to visit Moscow, and four days later his government signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union giving Russia the right to garrison important bases in Estonia.On October 21, the Soviet Red Army and Air Force went to garrison.At the same time, the same steps were taken against Latvia, and a Soviet garrison also appeared in Lithuania.Thus, the southern route to Leningrad and half of the Gulf of Finland were quickly blocked by Soviet armed forces to prevent possible German invasion ambitions.Now there is only one route left, through mainland Finland. In early October, Mr. Pasikivi, a Finnish statesman who had signed the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty in 1921, arrived in Moscow.The scope of the Soviet Union's requirements is very wide. On the Karelian Isthmus border with Finland, a considerable distance must be moved back to keep Leningrad out of the threat of enemy artillery fire.Other demands of the Soviet Union include: Finland cedes several islands in the Gulf of Finland; leases the Rybesi Peninsula, together with Bitsammo, Finland's only ice-free port in the Arctic Sea, to the Soviet Union; and most importantly, will be located at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland The port of Hango, leased to Russia as a naval and air base.The Finns are ready to give in to all but the last of these demands.In their view, if the key points in the Gulf of Finland are controlled by Russia, Finland's strategic security and national security will be wiped out.Negotiations broke down on November 13, and the Finnish government mobilized and strengthened their troops on the Karelian border.On November 28, Molotov declared the "Soviet-Finnish Non-Aggression Treaty" invalid; two days later, the Soviet army attacked from eight places along the thousand-mile-long Finnish border. Helsinki was bombed by the Soviet Air Force. The main force of the Soviet offensive was first concentrated on the Finnish border fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.This fortification consisted of a fortified zone extending from south to north to a depth of about twenty miles, through a forested area covered with heavy snow.It was known as the Mannerheim Line, after Mannerheim was Finland's Commander-in-Chief and the savior who saved Finland from being conquered by the Bolsheviks in 1917.The unprovoked attack of the Soviet Union with its enormous power on a small, highly civilized, vibrant country aroused extreme indignation in England, France, and especially in the United States, but was soon followed by surprise and relief.During the first few weeks of the war, Soviet troops made no progress, and the attacking force was initially drawn almost entirely from the Leningrad garrison.The total combat strength of the Finnish army is only nearly 200,000, but it has performed well.They took on the Russian tanks with courage and a new type of hand grenade that was soon to be known as the Molotov cocktail. The Soviet government might have expected to drive straight in.Their initial airstrikes in Helsinki and elsewhere were modest, but they hoped to instill terror in the people.The army they used initially, though numerically much stronger than the Finnish army, was inferior and poorly trained.The air raids and the invasion of Finnish land by the enemy had resulted in a high morale among the Finns, who fought together against the invaders with absolute determination and the best tactics.The Russian divisions in charge of attacking Bittsamo had no trouble driving back the 700 Finnish soldiers there, but the attack on the Finnish waist proved to be costly to the invaders.This area is almost entirely pine forest, and the terrain is slightly undulating. At this time, the snow is frozen to a depth of one foot.The climate is very cold.The Finns are well equipped with snowshoes and warm clothing, while the Russians, on the other hand, are lacking in both.Moreover, the Finns proved that each of them was an aggressive fighter, highly trained in reconnaissance and forest warfare.The Russians relied on their numbers and heavy weapons to no avail.Across the front, the sentries on the Finnish border slowly pulled back from the road, with Russian columns in their wake.When they had penetrated about thirty miles, they were attacked by Finnish troops.The Soviet army, facing the defense line built by Finland in the forest, was unable to advance, and the left and right wings were constantly attacked day and night. The line of communication behind them was cut again, and the column was cut to pieces. If you are lucky, after heavy losses, retreat to the place where the attack started. By the end of December the whole plan of Russia to advance through the waist belt had collapsed. At the same time, the attack on the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus turned out no better.About two Soviet divisions were about to launch an outflanking movement north of Lake Ladoga, but they met the same fate as the battle farther north.Against the Mannerheim Line itself, the Soviets mobilized about a dozen divisions in early December in a series of group attacks that continued throughout December.The bombardment of the Russian artillery was insufficient; their tanks, for the most part, were light; successive frontal attacks were repulsed, with heavy losses and no gains.By the end of the year, defeats across the board had convinced the Soviet government that they had to deal with an enemy very different from what they had expected in the past.They decided to make a larger effort.They realized that in the northern forest war, the pressure of numbers alone could not defeat the superior tactics and training of the Finns. Therefore, they decided to use the method of fortified battle to concentrate all their efforts on breaking through the Mannerheim Line; In , a large number of concentrated use of artillery and heavy tanks can give full play to their power.Such a war required massive preparations, so that from the end of the year the war on all fronts became quiet, and the Finns had by this time prevailed over their formidable enemy.This unexpected event satisfied all nations of the world, neutrals and belligerents alike.It was also an ad that discredited the Soviet Army.On the British side there were many who were glad that we had not gone out of our way to draw the Soviets to our side, and at the same time flattered themselves with their foresight.They concluded too hastily that the purges had destroyed the Russian army, while the corruption and decline of the Russian political and social system itself had now been confirmed.Those who hold this view are not limited to the United Kingdom.Hitler and his generals undoubtedly gave thoughtful consideration to the revelations of the Finnish War and undoubtedly played an important role in influencing the thinking of the Führer. Because of the treaty signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov, everyone was already very angry with the Soviet government, but the recent brutal aggressive behavior of the strong country bullying the weak country has only added fuel to the fire.Added to this was a mixture of contempt for the incompetence shown by the Soviet Army and excitement of sympathy for the heroic Finns.Although Britain and France themselves had declared war, there was an urgent desire to aid Finland from Britain, the United States, and especially France, with aircraft and other valuable war supplies, as well as volunteer troops.However, there was only one possible route to Finland, both for munitions supplies and volunteers.Thus, the port of Narvik, from which iron ore was shipped, and the railway over the mountains to the Swedish mines, took on a new emotional, if not strategic, importance.The use of the port of Narvik and its railway as a means of supplying the Finnish army affects the neutrality of Norway and Sweden.These two countries, with the same fear of Germany and Russia, have but one object, that of keeping themselves out of the war which surrounds them and which may draw them into the vortex.In their view, neutrality is the only chance to guarantee their continued survival.But although the British government is naturally reluctant to mine Norwegian waterways for its own benefit and to attack Germany, even if it technically constitutes a violation of Norwegian territorial waters, on the other hand, it is based on wartime problems with us. A sentiment of generosity, with only indirect connections, made a much more serious demand on Norway and Sweden to allow men and supplies to cross to Finland. With warm sympathy for the Finns, I support all proposals for aid to them, and I welcome this new and favorable atmosphere, which will cut off the vital supply of iron ore to Germany and complete our major strategic interest. If Narvik had become an Allied stronghold supplying the Finns, it would of course have been easy to prevent German ships from loading ore in the port and safely passing through Norwegian waterways to Germany.Whatever the reason, once the protests in Norway and Sweden are suppressed, larger measures will contain smaller ones.At this time, the eyes of the Admiralty were also watching the movement of a huge and efficient icebreaker in Russia. This ship sailed from Murmansk to Germany, apparently for repairs, but the more likely reason was that it was a ship carrying ore for Germany. Open the port of Luleå on the now frozen Baltic coast.I, therefore, renewed my efforts to obtain the consent of all to adopt the simple and bloodless method which had some precedent in the previous war, viz., mining the Norwegian waterways.Because this question raises a moral issue, I feel it appropriate to present the conclusions I have reached after lengthy consideration and debate. Norway ore transportation report by the secretary of the navy December 16, 1939 (1) The effective blocking of Norwegian ore supplies to Germany should be listed as one of the major offensive operations of the war.No other measure in the coming months will give us such a good opportunity of reducing the waste and destruction of war, and perhaps preventing the mass slaughter that accompanies the engagement of the main forces. (2) This whole step of preventing the supply of the enemy must be carried out if it is considered that the advantages obtained outweigh the obvious and serious opposition.The ore shipments from Luleå have stopped due to the winter freeze, and if the Soviet icebreakers attempt to break through the ice, we will not allow it to proceed.The ore from Narvik must be stopped by successively laying a series of small minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at two or three suitable points along the coast; Ships, had to leave territorial waters and enter the high seas.On the high seas, if we encounter a German vessel, we capture it as a trophy; if it is a neutral vessel, we subject it to our war embargo controls.With regard to the shipment of ore from the main ice-free port of Oxelhosend in the Baltic Sea, it should also be stopped by means neither diplomatic nor military.All three ports should be dealt with differently and appropriately as soon as possible. (3) The problem, therefore, not only deprives Germany of a million tons of ore from now until May, but cuts off Germany's supply for the whole winter, although she can still obtain it from Gavle or from other secondary sources in the Baltic. Some negligible supplies were obtained from ice-free ports.But by the time the Gulf of Bothnia freezes and thaws, Luleå's ample supplies are about to reopen, and Germany is no doubt planning not only to secure as much as possible in the winter, but also to prepare for its return on May 1, 1940. The entire 9.5 million tons required from 15th December to 15th December, or even more. After that, it may wish to organize supplies from the Soviet Union so that a long war can be waged. (4) If by next May Germany feels a deep shortage of iron ore both industrially and munitions, preventing the reopening of the port of Luleå will be a major (our) naval objective.One approach would have been for British submarines to lay an open minefield, including magnetic mines, off Luleå harbor.Also, there are other ways. If we were to cut off all ore supplies from Sweden to Germany between now and the end of 1940, the blow to Germany's combat capability would amount to a major victory on the field or in the air, and No serious loss of life will be incurred.In fact, it may be decisive at once. (5) For every blow inflicted in war, there is a counterstrike.If you shoot at an enemy, he will surely shoot back.So we absolutely have to take seriously the possible countermeasures that Germany, or Norway or Sweden, under her oppression, might take.In the case of Norway, there are three sets of positive and negative things linked together.First: The Germans, who fought in a cruel and illegal manner, violated Norwegian territorial waters and sank many British and neutral ships without warning and did not rescue them afterwards.To deal with this kind of behavior, our response is to lay minefields as mentioned above.Second: It is said that Norway, as a protest, may cancel the important agreement we have concluded with it for the chartering of its oil tankers and other ships, but in doing so, it will lose the extremely favorable agreement it had with us. trade, and given our control over wartime contraband, such ships would become useless to it.Its ships would be idle and useless, and their owners impoverished.It would be against Norway's interests for the Norwegian Government to take such a step; and the question of interests is a powerful factor.Third: Norway can retaliate by stopping the export of aluminum and other war materials needed by our Ministry of Air Force and Ministry of Supply.In this respect, however, its interests are adversely affected.Not only would she lose the valuable benefits that this trade afforded her, but if England withdrew from her bauxite and other essential raw materials, the whole of Norwegian industry, centered at Oslo and Bergen, would be completely destroyed. At a standstill.Simply put, Norway would be in economic and industrial ruin if it retaliated against us. (6) The sympathies of Norway are on our side, and its future independence from German control depends on the victory of the Allies.So it is reasonable to assume that unless Germany forces it to take such an action by inflicting violence on it, it will not take the above two measures, although it may threaten to use them. (7) If Germany finds it in her interest to control Scandinavia by force, she will always use force against Norway, no matter what we do.In this case the war would spread to norway and sweden but since we have command of the sea there is no reason why french and british armies should not be fighting german invaders on scandinavian soil .In any case, we must be free to choose any island or suitable place off the coast of Norway to occupy and garrison.In this way, our blockade of Germany in the north can be transformed into an absolute blockade.For example, we could occupy Narvik and Bergen and keep them open to our trade while keeping them completely cut off from Germany.British control of the Norwegian coastline is a strategic object of paramount importance, and this should be stressed with all strength.We have therefore taken the course now proposed, which would in no way see how it would have put us at a disadvantage, had it provoked unscrupulous reprisals from Germany.Germany, on the other hand, would gain more than we lose by attacking Norway or Sweden.A more detailed explanation can be made on this point, but it is not necessary to go into detail here. There is now no reason why we should not try to secure a substantial and long-term supply of ore from Sweden through Narvik, while diverting all supplies to Germany.We must aim for this. My conclusions are as follows: (8) What effect our actions against Norway will have on world opinion and on our own reputation must also be considered.We have fought in accordance with the principles of the League of Nations Covenant to help the victims of German aggression.Technical violations of international law can never deprive neutral nations of their goodwill towards us, provided they do not at the same time give rise to any inhumanity.For the United States, the largest of the neutral countries, it will not have a bad impact.We have reason to believe that they will handle this problem in a tactful way that will help us the most.And they are very resourceful. (9) The final judge is our own conscience.We fight to re-establish the rule of law and to protect the liberty of small nations.If we are defeated, it will mean that the world faces an age of barbaric atrocities, mortal threats not only to ourselves, but to the independent existence of every small state in Europe.我們以國聯盟約的名義，而且作為國聯及其所代表的一切實際代理人，對於設法要加強和重新肯定的法律中的若干慣例，有權利而且也有不可推卸的義務，在短暫的時期內加以摒棄。當我們為小國的權利與自由而戰的時候，它們不應該束住我們的手腳。在非常緊急的時期，法律的條文，不應該用來妨礙保護和執行法律者的行動。如果侵略者一方面可以自由撕毀一切法律，從而享受一種利益，而另一方面，卻憑借它們對方對法律的內心尊重，以資掩護，從而又享受另一種利益，那是既非正當，同時也是不合理的。我們不應該以是否合法，而應該以是否合乎人道，作為我們的指針。 對於所有這一切，歷史將會作出判斷。現在我們要正視當前的局勢。 十二月二十二日，內閣討論了我的備忘錄，我竭力為我的理由進行辯護。但我不能獲得關於採取行動的任何決議。關於德國濫用挪威的領海，可以向挪威提出外交上的抗議，參謀長委員會奉命研究在斯堪的納維亞半島的土地上承擔義務，在軍事方面所引起的後果。他們被授權制訂關於派遣部隊在納爾維克登陸以援助芬蘭的計劃，同時考慮德國可能佔領挪威南部的問題。但對於海軍部卻不能發出執行的命令。在十二月二十四日，我所分發的一個文件中，我把情報機關的報告，扼要地加以敘述，表明俄國對挪威可能施展陰謀。據說，蘇聯在摩爾曼斯克集中了三個師的兵力，準備從海上進行遠征。我最後說：也許這個場所，將變成展開早期活動的舞台。這些話證明一點也沒有錯：但活動卻來自一個不同的方面。