Chapter 40 Volume 1 Chapter 36 Setbacks in Norway

Appointment of Lord Cork as Supreme Commander in Narvik Lord Cork to me General Maxey Objection to Bombing Reply from the British Cabinet Eighth meeting of the Supreme Military Council held on 22 April Germany and the Allies in Contrasting forces on the ground and air forces Confusion in Scandinavia Decisions on Trondheim and Narvik Another change of command May 1st Battle of Trondheim at Namsos Defeat of the Andalsnes Expedition Paget's war cabinet decision on the withdrawal of British troops from central Norway The disastrous defeat at Moschoen My report on the 4th of May Gobbins's Army The German Northward Advance in Germany on the method and quality advantages.

On April 20th I obtained consent to appoint Lord Cork sole Commander of the British Navy, Land and Air Force in Narvik, thus placing General Maxey directly under his control.Lord Cork is full of attacking spirit, there is no doubt about it.He was keenly aware of the danger of delay; but the difficulties of local nature and administration far exceeded what we can conceive at home.Nay, naval officers, even if vested with the fullest powers, are inconvenient to issue orders to armies in purely military matters.This is even more true if the positions of the navy and the army are reversed.We had hoped that the removal of General Maxey from the immediate and heavy responsibility should make him feel more free to pursue bold tactics, but we were sorely disappointed.Maxey still uses all kinds of reasons to prevent us from taking drastic action.During the week since the impromptu decision to attack Narvik was rejected, the situation has gradually turned against us.Two thousand German soldiers were no doubt working day and night building their fortifications.And these fortifications, as well as Narvik City, are all hidden in the heavy snow.The enemy had doubtless by this time organized the two or three thousand sailors who had escaped from the sunken destroyer.Their arrangements for using air power against us are improving day by day.Our ships and troops already ashore are under increasing bombardment.On the 21st Lord Cork wrote to me as follows:

I am writing to thank you for your confidence in me.I must do my best so as not to disappoint your expectations.Situations of stagnation are difficult to overcome.Of course, the movement of the army was greatly hindered, especially by the heavy snowfall, which is still several kilometers deep on the northern slopes.I have personally surveyed it, but the situation has not improved due to the heavy snow that has been intermittent for two days.The original mistake was to assume that the original army would not encounter resistance when it set out, which is also a mistake we often make, such as the Battle of Tanga [1].Soldiers do not currently have access to stocks of small arms ammunition and fresh water, but there are tons of munitions and personnel that are not needed.

[1] refers to the Tanga landing near Zanzibar in 1914. What we really desperately need are fighter jets because we are at an absolute disadvantage in the air.In this place, enemy planes come to reconnaissance every day. If there are transport ships or ships, they will drop bombs and bomb them.These ships will inevitably be hit after all.I was flying over Narvik yesterday and it was hard to get a good look.The rocky cliffs are covered with snow except for the exposed apex; around this exposed apex the snow must have been deep.From the shore to the water's edge, there is a piece of white snow, so it is impossible to see the situation by the water's edge.

While waiting for the conditions to launch an offensive, we simultaneously sabotaged the underground railways and other means of transportation, bombed and burned the large ferries, and cut off the city from the outside world. It is very annoying that we cannot move forward; and I understand that you must be surprised. Why don't we move forward?However, I want to assure you that by no means does this mean that we are reluctant to move forward. General Maxey demurred Lord Coke's decision to conduct an armed search under naval volleys.He said that before the military action against Narvik was scheduled, he felt it his duty to declare that if Norwegian men, women and children in Narvik were to be bombarded as we planned, his men would be Shame on themselves and their country.Lord Coke himself reposted this statement without commenting on it.Neither the Prime Minister nor I will be able to attend the National Defense Council meeting on April 22, because we are all going to Paris to attend the Supreme Military Council that day.Before leaving, I drew up an answer, which my colleagues agreed with:

I think Lord Cork has read the bombardment orders that were issued when the war broke out.Should he feel it necessary to go beyond his instructions in view of the enemy's use of buildings as cover to maintain their operations at Narvik, he may use all means at his disposal, including the distribution of leaflets if possible. , to give a six-hour warning; and to inform the German commander that all civilians in the city must be ordered to leave the city; if the civilians are prevented from leaving, the German army should be responsible. He may also declare that the railway line shall not be damaged within a period of six hours, so that the civilians may withdraw peacefully by that route.

The National Defense Council approved this policy and stated firmly: The Germans cannot be allowed to imprison civilians in order to prevent our attack and turn Norwegian towns into war bastions. When we arrived in Paris, we were very anxious and confused about the Norwegian campaign, because the operation of the Norwegian campaign was originally in charge of the British.After welcoming us, Mr. Reynaud proceeded to describe the general military situation, the gravity of which made the joint expedition of our two countries to Scandinavia a secondary issue by comparison.Geographical position, said Mr. Reynaud, gave the Germans perpetual advantages for fighting on interior lines.Germany currently has 190 divisions, of which 150 can be used on the Western Front.The Allies had one hundred divisions against the German army, ten of which were British troops.In the last war, Germany had a population of 65 million and a strength of 248 divisions, 207 of which fought on the Western Front.On the French side, there are 118 divisions, of which 110 are stationed on the Western Front; the British have a total of 89 divisions, of which 63 are on the Western Front.In total, on the Western Front, the Allied Forces had 173 divisions against the German Army's 207 divisions. It was not until the United States joined the war that it sent 34 divisions to make the Allied Powers equal in strength to Germany.But today's situation is so unfavorable!Germany's population now stands at 80 million people.It can apparently build up to the strength of three hundred divisions.On the other hand, by the end of this year, it is difficult for France to expect Britain to send 20 divisions to the Western Front.Therefore, we are bound to face a huge and growing numerical superiority of the enemy.At present, the ratio of the number of the enemy and us is three to two, and I am afraid that it will soon become a ratio of two to one.As for equipment, Germany has an advantage in aviation and aircraft equipment, and the accumulation of artillery and munitions is also greater than ours.Renault's statement ends here.

We have gradually created the situation we have today.Had we intervened in 1936, when Germany occupied the Rhineland, a single police operation would have sufficed; or we had intervened after the Munich incident, when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia but There were only thirteen divisions that could be sent to the Western Front; or even if they did not intervene until September 1939, when Poland was still resisting, Germany could only send forty-two divisions to the Western Front. West Line. Because the victorious Allies never once dared to take any effective steps to resist Hitler's repeated aggression and breach of treaties, even in their strongest days, which finally caused Germany to be as formidable as it is today. The advantages.

We all understand the gravity of this sombre prelude.After this prelude, we return to the chaos in Scandinavia. The Prime Minister has clearly stated the current situation.We have landed at Namsos and Andalsnes with 13,000 troops without loss.Our military is advancing beyond our desired range.Feeling that a frontal attack on Trondheim would require too much naval power, it was decided to change the plan and adopt a north-south flank.But these new plans have been severely hampered in the last two days by a disastrous air raid on Namsos.Since there was no resistance from anti-aircraft fire, the Germans were able to bomb indiscriminately.On the other hand, all the German battleships in Narvik have been completely wiped out, but the German troops on land have strong fortifications, so it is not yet possible to attack the enemy on land.If we don't succeed on the first try, we have to try again.

As regards central Norway, Mr. Chamberlain said, the British command was anxious to reinforce the troops already on the way there, to protect them against a German attack from the south, and finally to assist in the capture of Trondheim.It has long been affirmed that this place needs reinforcements from new forces.5,000 British troops, 7,000 French troops, 3,000 Polish troops, 3 battalions of the British Mechanized Corps, 1 battalion of the British Light Tank Corps, 3 divisions of the French Light Division and the British Home Guard can be deployed in the near future. of a division.The current problem is not how many troops can be sent, but that the number of soldiers who can land and persist in fighting in the country is limited to a certain extent.

Mr Renault said France could send four light divisions. In these meetings, I have only now fully expressed my opinion for the first time. I pointed out to the French the difficulties encountered in bringing troops and supplies ashore under attack by enemy aircraft and submarines.Every ship must be escorted by a destroyer; Every landing site must be continuously defended by cruisers and destroyers, not only during the landing, but until the anti-aircraft guns are mounted on the shore.Until now, allied ships have been very lucky to have rarely been hit by enemy aircraft.But we should understand the difficulties encountered in combat.So far, although 13,000 people from the Allies have landed safely, they have not yet established a combat base. When fighting in the interior, they only rely on weak lines of communication, and in fact, they have no artillery or aircraft to cover operations.This is the situation in central Norway.At Narvik, the Germans were not as strong, and the port was not as vulnerable to air attack.Once the port is in hand, soldiers can land at a faster speed.Any troops that cannot land in the harbors further south should be transferred to Narvik.None of the troops sent to fight in Narvik, or even those that remained in England, could cross-country in the snow.The task at Narvik, I am afraid, was not only to liberate the harbor and town, or even to clear the whole area of ​​the Germans, but to advance along the railway line to the Swedish frontier with a force commensurate with any further German plans.In the deliberate opinion of the British command, this could be done, even if it would delay the landing of troops in other ports, but no more than they were already limited in landing by the difficulties mentioned above. We all unanimously acknowledge our present unpleasant situation and our temporary inability to do anything.The Supreme Military Council unanimously agreed that the current military objectives should be: (1) Occupy Trondheim. (2) Occupy Narvik and concentrate sufficient Allied forces on the Swedish border. The next day we spoke of the danger to the Dutch and the Belgians, and their refusal to take any common steps with us.We are well aware that at any moment Italy may declare war on us.With regard to the Mediterranean Sea, Admiral Pound and Admiral Darlan negotiated and prepared to take various naval measures.At this meeting, the head of the Polish government, General Sikorski, was also invited to participate.He declared that he could form an army of 100,000 men within a few months.And he was taking positive steps to recruit a Polish division in America. At this meeting, the two sides reached an agreement: If Germany invaded the Netherlands, the Allied forces should immediately enter Belgium without consulting with the Belgian government; the Royal Air Force could send out to bomb the assembly point of German troops and the oil refineries in the Ruhr area. After we returned from the conference, I was very much apprehensive that we would suffer a total failure not only in our efforts to confront the enemy, but also in the methods by which we conducted the operations.Accordingly, a letter was written to the Prime Minister with the following content: I very much hope to do my best to support you, so I must remind you that you are about to hit a wall in Norway. I appreciate that you accepted my request to chair the day-to-day affairs of the Military Coordinating Committee, etc.However, I thought it right to let you know that I would not accept this assignment from you if I did not have the necessary authority.No one is entitled right now.The committee had six chiefs and deputy chiefs of staff, three ministers, and General Ismay.They all have a say in the combat operations in Norway (except for the Battle of Narvik).But no one but yourself is in charge of formulating and directing military policy.If you feel capable of this task, you may trust that I will remain faithful to you in my position as Lord Admiralty, but if you do not feel capable of this task because of your various other duties, you may delegate your powers to To a representative capable of planning and directing our general operations, supported by you and the War Cabinet until there are good reasons not to. Before I sent this letter, I received a letter from the Prime Minister saying that he had been considering the situation in Scandinavia and felt that it was not satisfactory.He asked me to meet him in Downing Street that evening, after dinner, to discuss the whole situation in private. I have no record of what happened to this conversation.This conversation was very harmonious.I of course told him the points stated in this unsent letter, and the Prime Minister, as I had good and just reasons for the points, assented.He was more than willing to give me the command I asked for, and there was no personal barrier between us.Yet he had to consult with many important people and convince them.It was not until May 1 that he could issue the following circular to the War Cabinet and those concerned: May 1, 1940 I made a study of the present method of discussing and deciding various questions of defense, and exchanged views with the ministers in charge of the land, sea, and air forces.A memorandum is hereby circulated to my colleagues stating that it has been decided to introduce some reformation of these measures in the future, to which the Ministers of the Air, Land, and Air Forces have unanimously agreed.Rear Admiral Ismay (3rd Class of the Order of the Bath and 3rd Class of the Order of Special Merit) has been appointed Senior Staff Officer, in charge of the Central Staff, with the consent of the Secretary of the Navy. This staff, as stated in the memorandum, should be under the command of the Lord of the Admiralty.Major General Ismay has been appointed as an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services Committee for this role. Neville Chamberlain defense organization In order to make combat command matters more centralized, the following reforms will be implemented to the current method: The Secretary of the Navy will continue to preside over the various meetings of the Military Coordination Committee when the Prime Minister himself is not presiding over the meeting, and when the Prime Minister is not present at the meeting, he will handle all matters discussed by the War Cabinet at the meeting in the capacity of the Prime Minister's representative. The Secretary of the Navy, on behalf of the Military Coordination Council, will be responsible for leading and directing the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services Committee.To this end he may call the committee for personal consultations whenever he deems it necessary. The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces will still be responsible for presenting collective advice to the Government, and formulating with their staffs plans for the achievement of any objectives proposed by the Secretary of the Navy on behalf of the Military Coordination Committee; Comment. The chiefs of staff of the three armies, in their personal capacity, are respectively accountable to the ministers of their respective departments, and should report the conclusions they have drawn to their ministers at any time. If time permits, the proposals drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff, together with their comments and any comments made by the Secretary of the Navy, shall be submitted to the Military Coordinating Committee for approval; and unless the Military Coordinating Committee is authorized by the War Cabinet to make a final In the event of dissent from the Commission, these plans shall be sent to the War Cabinet for approval. With regard to urgent matters, it may not be possible to bring the proposal to a formal meeting of the Military Coordination Committee.However, in such a situation, the Secretary of the Navy will undoubtedly have various methods to discuss informally with the ministers of the armed forces.In case of objection, it shall be submitted to the Prime Minister for decision. In order to facilitate the general plan outlined above, and to provide a convenient means of maintaining close communication between the Lord of the Admiralty and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, an appropriate central staff (as distinguished from that of the Admiralty) will be established to assist the Navy Minister.The staff is chaired by a senior staff officer who is one of the additional members of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services Committee. I accepted this approach.It seems to have improved from before.I am now able to call and chair meetings of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services Committee.Without them, nothing can be done.And I have been formally charged with leading and commanding them.General Ismay, the senior staff officer in charge of the Central Staff, is now under my command as an officer and representative to me;General Ismay and I have known each other for many years, but until now, for the first time, we have had an intimate, even further relationship.Therefore, the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces are collectively responsible to me to a large extent, and as the representative of the prime minister, I can use my power to influence their resolutions and policies in name.On the other hand, it is only natural that they owe their allegiance mainly to the ministers of their respective departments.And it is beyond human nature for the ministers of the various military departments not to feel some displeasure at the transfer of a portion of the powers they possess to one of their colleagues.Moreover, in the memorandum, it has been clearly stipulated that I perform my duties on behalf of the Military Coordination Committee. Therefore, I have unlimited responsibilities, but I lack the actual power to perform my duties in my own hands.Nevertheless, I felt that perhaps I could make this new institution work.But it was destined to last only a week. However, from May 1, 1940, until I left office on July 27, 1945, my relationship with General Ismay, both public and private, and his relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces The relationship between the committees has continued without estrangement. It is now necessary to give a detailed account of the actual events of the Battle of Trondheim.Our northern army from Namsos was eighty miles from Trondheim, and our southern army from Andalsnes a hundred and fifty miles from that city.The central offensive through the fjords (Operation Hammer plan) had been abandoned; partly out of fear of too high a cost and partly out of hope in an outflanking offensive.Now the outflanking mobile warfare on both sides has completely failed.On the Namsos side, the army led by Caton de Viarte had obeyed the instructions and braved the snow in Norway and the air raids of the Germans and advanced quickly.On the 19th a brigade reached Verdal, fifty miles from Trondheim, at the mouth of the fjord.I had seen that the Germans could overnight send a force stronger than theirs to cut off their rear by the Trondheim waterway, and I warned the General Staff.This happened two days later.Our troops were forced to retreat several miles until they could intercept the enemy.The snow on the roads is unbearably deep, and in some places it is now beginning to melt.On the other hand, the German troops coming across the Inner Fjord also lacked vehicle transportation like us.For these reasons, no serious fighting on the ground could be waged; the few scattered troops along the way, weary and trudging forward, were no longer a target for the irresistible enemy air force.If Carton de Wiarte had known that he could only obtain a limited number of troops, or had learned of the important fact that the central offensive on Trondheim had been abandoned, and our staff had not informed him, then nothing Doubt, he will definitely move forward step by step.He acted in accordance with the main purpose that he had been told in advance. In the end almost everyone, exhausted and dispirited, retreated to Namsos, where the French Alpine Infantry Brigade remained.Carton de Viarte, whose opinion on these matters was respected, declared that there was no other way but to retreat.The Admiralty immediately made preparations, and on April 28 issued an order to withdraw the troops from Namsos.The French detachment will be on board ahead of the British, leaving some troops on skis to complement our rearguard.The date of retreat was probably the night of May 1st and 2nd.But in the end they all retreated overnight.All the troops were on board on the night of the third day, and when the German reconnaissance plane spotted them at dawn, they were already far into the sea.From 8:00 am to 3:00 pm, enemy bombers came in groups to attack our warships and transport ships one after another. Fortunately, none of the transport ships were hit by the enemy planes because there was no British Air Force to protect the fleet.Only the French destroyer Bisson and the British ship Afriday, carrying our rearguard, fought to the end and sank. A different series of misfortunes met our landing at Andalsnes, but here we at least inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.Responding to an urgent call for help from the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, General Ruger, Brigadier General Morgan's 148th Infantry Brigade advanced rapidly as far as Lillehammer.There they joined the exhausted and broken Norwegian forces.The Germans had pursued the Norwegian troops with the superior strength of their three well-equipped divisions along the road and rail from Oslo to Dambos and Trondheim. A fierce battle ensued.A ship, carrying Commodore Morgan's vehicle and all its artillery and mortars, was hit and sunk.But the young Home Guard under Commodore Morgan fought bravely with their rifles and machine guns, while the German vanguard, armed not only with 5-inch 9-caliber howitzers, but with many heavy mortars and a number of tanks, fought valiantly.On April 24, the main battalion of the Fifteenth Brigade from France arrived at the front line that was about to collapse.General Paget, who commanded these regular troops, learned from General Rueger that the Norwegian army was exhausted and could no longer fight without being adequately rested and reequipped.So he took over the command of the operation, and the rest of his brigade, as soon as it arrived, went into battle, and with firm will, against the Germans, a series of fierce confrontations were carried out.By skilful use of the railway, which luckily survived, Paget rescued his own troops, Morgan's brigade, which had lost seven hundred men, and some Norwegian troops.A large number of British troops hid in a long railway tunnel all day, supplied by their precious munitions train.In this way, it is completely undetected by the enemy and the enemy aircraft overlooking everything.Paget went through five rearguard battles, several of which inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, and marched more than a hundred miles before finally returning to Andalsnes by the sea.This little place, like Namsos, had been bombed to the ground; but on the night of 1 May the remnants of the Fifteenth Brigade and Morgan's 148th Brigade were aboard British cruisers and the destroyer arrived in their own country without incident.General Paget's caliber and determination during these few days enabled him to begin his progression through the ranks of the war until he later became the Senior Commander-in-Chief. Also, a heroic adventure by the Air Force in support of ground forces should also be recorded.Forty miles from Andalsnes, the frozen Lake Rescherskogan was the only airport for landing.On April 24, a squadron of fighter jets launched from the Glory flew to the local area. They were immediately attacked violently, and the naval aviation unit immediately provided full assistance; but while fighting for their own survival, they had to cover the distance The task of fighting two expeditionary armies two hundred miles away while protecting their own bases is really not something that a single air squadron is capable of.On April 26, the fleet could no longer take off, and at that time there were no bombers that could fly from Britain to provide long-distance support. Our retreat, compelled by the situation on the ground, was in line with the decision taken by the War Cabinet following the proposal of the Military Coordination Commission chaired by the Prime Minister.We all agreed that it was beyond our power to take and hold Trondheim.The weak pincer offensive, both wings have been defeated.Mr. Chamberlain declared to the Cabinet that, while we should in the meantime continue to resist the German advance, plans must be drawn up for the withdrawal of our troops from Namsos and Andalsnes.The cabinet was annoyed by these proposals, but that was inevitable. In order to delay as long as possible the enemy's northward advance to Narvik, we have now dispatched what became known as the Shock Troops, led by an enterprising officer, Colonel Gubbins, to Moshorn, a hundred and twenty miles from the coast.My greatest anxiety was that the small force at Namsos had to fight its way out by the road to Gland, using whatever vehicles were available.Even if there are only two hundred people, it is enough to engage in a small-scale rearguard battle.From Grand, they must be able to find their way to Moshaun on foot. I hoped that by this means Gubbins would be able to buy time to build up a position against the few troops the enemy was now able to reach.I have been told over and over again that this road is impassable.General Massey issued a firm demand from London.The answer he received was that not even a small regiment of French Alpine infantry, using their ski boots, could pass the road.A few days later, General Massey said in his telegram: It seems that if the French Alpine infantry cannot withdraw along this road, it seems obvious that the Germans cannot come along this road. This is a mistake. For the Germans later made good use of this road, and advanced along it so rapidly that our troops at Moschoen had no time to properly position themselves.It seems that we are bound to fail to hold this place.It turns out that's not true at all.The destroyer Janus, which once carried a hundred soldiers of the Alpine Infantry Regiment and two light anti-aircraft guns, arrived by sea, but left again before the arrival of the Germans. Our Norwegian campaign has now reached the point where it is overshadowed by many important events.The Germans clearly had the advantage in planning, execution, and strength, and they carried out a well-prepared battle plan to the bottom of it.They fully understand how to use the air force on a large scale in all aspects.Not only that, they have shown significant advantages in individual aspects, especially in team organization.At Narvik, a mixed, impromptu German force, numbering only 6,000 men, was able to hold out for six weeks against 20,000 Allied troops; and saw our troops forced to withdraw.The Narvik Offensive, launched brilliantly by the navy, was finally paralyzed by the refusal of the army commander to take what was recognized as a great risk.Our forces were divided between Narvik and Trondheim, with the result that the plans of attack in both were impaired.The abandonment of the breakthrough tactics in the middle of Trondheim is enough to show the indecision of the British High Command.Not only military experts should be responsible for this matter, but also those political leaders who are too gullible in the opinions of experts should be responsible.At Namsos, our troops made only one trek up and down the muddy roads, and only a blow to the Germans during the expedition to Andalsnes.The Germans traveled in seven days the road from Namsos to Moshon, which the British and French had declared impassable.At both Bodeau and Motown we were a step behind during the retreat of Gubbins' army to the north; In spite of all our heroics, they finally forced us to fall back.We have always had command of the sea, and can attack anywhere along the undefended coast, but we are now left behind by an enemy who marches on land, in spite of all dangers, and over long distances.In this Norwegian engagement, some of our finest troops, the Scottish and Irish Guards, were thwarted by Hitler's lean, daring and well-trained youth army. In order to fulfill our duty, we have made every effort to hold our ground in Norway.We certainly think that God has treated us very cruelly.Now we can see that fortunately we can get out of this difficult situation.At the same time, we should take comfort in a series of safe retreats.In Trondheim, it was a failure!In Narvik, it is a dilemma!This is the only result we can show before the British people, our allies and neutral countries, friendly or hostile, in the first week of May.In view of my own importance in these events, and my inability to account for the difficulties which have frustrated us, the defects of our staff, our government, and our methods of conducting war, I really It is strange that I should have retained my position, and continued to enjoy the respect of the public and the confidence of Parliament. That is because, for six or seven years, I had foreseen exactly the course of events, and had repeatedly warned; The murky war ended with Hitler's attack on Norway.This uncertainty suddenly disappeared with the outbreak of one of the most terrible military attacks that people have never seen, and everything appeared in a strong glare.I have explained the lethargy of England and France which for eight months has amazed the world.This stage proved most harmful to the Allies.From the moment Stalin signed the treaty with Hitler, the French Communist Party learned from Moscow, accusing war of being a crime of imperialism and capitalism against democracy. They did everything in their power to destroy the morale of the army and hinder the production of the factories.The morale of France, whether in terms of the army or the people, is clearly much lower in May than it was when the war broke out. This has not happened in the UK.The Communist Party in Britain, under the command of the Soviet Union, was active but weak.However, our government is still a government of one political party.It is led by a prime minister who is deeply estranged from the opposition and does not enjoy the warm and active support of the trade union movement.The calm, earnest, but methodical character of the government did not provoke the kind of intense effort of significance in the ruling class or in the arms factories.We need the shock of catastrophe and the thrill of danger in order to revive the potential of the sleeping British nation.Alarm bells will soon be ringing.