Chapter 39 Volume 1, Chapter 35, Trondheim

A major objective is clearly a plan for the Hammer campaign. The attitude of the commander-in-chief of the Home Fleet. The selection of the general to command some unexpected events. The situation on April 14th. The situation on April 17th. Changes to the Might plan Sir Roger Case's aspirations and achievements April 19th My report to the Military Coordinating Council The War Cabinet agrees to abandon the Hammer plan April 20th On the urgency of attacking Narvik Summary by General Ismay. Trondheim, if in our hands, could certainly be a key location for a major campaign in central Norway.If we occupy this place, we shall obtain a safe harbor with wharves and docks, etc., where an army of fifty thousand men or more may be established and made its base.Near it, there is an airfield that can accommodate several fighter squadrons.If you occupy Trondheim, you can have direct railway communication with Sweden, which greatly increases the chances of Sweden participating in the war, or when Sweden itself is attacked, you can greatly increase the degree of mutual assistance. Only from Trondheim can you Capable of reliably interdicting German advances northward from Oslo.On the broadest grounds of policy and strategy, if central Norway was Hitler's desired destination, the Allies should have fought him there with the greatest battles.Narvik was in the far north, ready to attack or fall at any time, and always to be defended.We have a strong command of the seas.As for air power, if we were able to firmly occupy the Norwegian airfields, we should not hesitate to engage in all possible battles with the local Luftwaffe, subject to severe constraints on both sides.

The French Military Council and the British War Cabinet, with most of their advisers, were unanimous in these reasons.The British Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister are also in full agreement.General Gamelin was willing to draw French troops from France or withdraw British divisions to Norway according to the degree to which Germany would draw troops from the Western Front to Norway.He evidently welcomes prolonged and large-scale fighting south of Trondheim, where the ground is almost everywhere favorable for defensive warfare.It seems that we can transport troops and supplies by sea to the battle site through Trondheim much faster than the German army advances northward from Oslo along the only road and railway line, and, moreover, behind them Roads and rail lines could be cut by bombs or by troops dropped from the air.The only question is, will we be able to capture Trondheim in time?Can we get there before the main body of the enemy arrives from the south?To that end, can we take even brief respite from their now invincible air superiority?

Opinions in favor of an attack on Trondheim poured in, far beyond the Cabinet.The advantages of conducting this campaign are so obvious that all people can fully appreciate it.The public, clubs, newspapers and their military correspondents have discussed this policy freely during the past few days.My good friend Admiral Sir Roger Case was a proponent of opening the Dardanelles, and was a hero and victor at the Battle of Zeebrugge.He wished fervently to command the Home Fleet, or a part of it, over the battery, into the Trondheim Fjord, and land by sea to attack the city.Lord Coke was also an admiral, and although he was the predecessor of Admiral Forbes, the commander-in-chief of the navy, since he had been ordered to command the naval operations of Narvik, the difficulty of the rank problem seemed to have been resolved.The admirals had always remained on the active-duty list, and Case was in contact with the Admiralty from time to time.He told me again and again with great enthusiasm, and wrote to remind me of the story of the Dardanelles, that a campaign which might have easily opened it had we not been thwarted by those cowardly disturbers.I also often think about the lesson of attacking the Dardanelles.The batteries at Trondheim, and the minefields that might have been laid there, were insignificant compared with what we encountered at the time.But on the other hand, there are now airplanes which can drop their bombs on the unprotected decks of the few huge British warships which are now the naval power of Britain on the seas.

In the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord and the Naval Staff generally did not flinch from such ventures.On April 13th, the Admiralty formally notified the commander-in-chief of the decision of the Supreme Military Council to send troops to occupy Trondheim, and asked him in a positive manner whether the local fleet should be dispatched to open this passage question. Do you think (the telegram continues) that it is possible to destroy or overwhelm the batteries ashore so that the transports can be brought into port?If so, how many ships and what types of ships do you propose to use? Admiral Forbes immediately demanded that he be informed of the state of Trondheim's defenses.He agreed that a battleship could destroy or overwhelm a shore battery during the day if it had the proper shells.But none of the ships of the Home Fleet had such shells on board at that time.He said, first of all, the most important task is to protect the transport ships so that they will not be subjected to heavy air attack when they pass through the thirty-mile narrow sea area at the entrance; secondly, to implement a forced landing in front of the enemy. Regarding this point, we Adequate warnings have been given.Under the current circumstances, he does not think this battle plan is feasible.

The Naval Staff stood by their opinion.The Admiralty, with my warm approval, replied on April 15 as follows: We still believe that the operational plan described should be further studied.This battle plan cannot be carried out within seven days, because during this period all efforts will be made to carry out careful preparations.Wherever a large transport ship enters a danger zone, the dangers of the air cannot be reduced.We mean, in addition to bombing the Stavanger airfield with the RAF, and sending the Suffolk to bombard it with highly explosive shells at dawn, in the hope of rendering the airfield unusable.As for the Trondheim airfield, the bombers of the Naval Air Force can be used first, and then the platoons of artillery can be used to deal with it.High-explosive shells for fifteen-inch guns were destined for Rosyth.Fury and the 1st Cruiser Squadron will be used for this task.Therefore, please give further consideration to this important plan.

Admiral Forbes, though not entirely convinced of the adequacy of the plan, proceeded, thanks to this telegram, with a gradual assent.In a subsequent reply he said that there would be no serious difficulty on the naval side, except that he would not be able to defend the transports with air when he landed.He believed that the required naval power would be to use the Valor and the Prestige for the air defense of the Glory, and the Wospite for the bombardment, in addition to at least four cruisers with anti-aircraft guns and about twenty destroyers. . While the plan to attack Trondheim head-on by sea was being prepared at the fastest pace, two other auxiliary landings were already underway, the purpose of which was to advance by land and encircle the city.The first of these landings was at Namsos, a hundred miles to the north.Major General Caton de Viarte, Order of the Victoria, was chosen to command this force and was ordered to occupy the Trondheim area.He was informed that the navy would take an initial position of three hundred men in order to seize and hold positions in preparation for the landing of his troops.At that time, it meant that two infantry brigades and a light division of the French Alpine Infantry Regiment would land there in response to the Navy's main attack on Trondheim, the Hammer Operation Plan.For this purpose the 146th Brigade and the French Alpine Infantry Regiment are being transferred from Narvik.Carton de Viarte immediately set off in a seaplane, and arrived in Namsos under heavy enemy air raids on the evening of the 15th.His staff officer was wounded, but he immediately assumed strong command on the scene.The second landing was at Andalsnes, about 150 miles southwest of Trondheim along the road.Here, too, the navy first occupied the position, and Brigadier General Morgan arrived on April 18th with an army to assume command.Commander-in-Chief of all the troops fighting in central Norway, appointed Lieutenant General Messi.He can only command from the War Office, because at present there is no place for his general headquarters across the ocean.

On the 15th I reported that these plans were proceeding, but with the greatest difficulties.Namsos was four feet deep in the snow, leaving no cover for air attack.The enemy has complete air supremacy.We have neither anti-aircraft guns nor airfields for squadrons, and the admiral was not very much in favor of a forced landing at Trondheim at first, because the danger of an air attack was great, so, of course, the most important thing is that the RAF should continue to attack The Stavanger Airport that enemy planes must pass through to the north.The Suffolk would bombard the airfield with her eight-foot sun guns on April 17.This proposal was approved, and the platoon bombardment was carried out as planned.The airfield was considerably damaged, but as Suffolk pulled back it was bombarded continuously for seven hours.She was badly damaged and by the time she reached Scapa Flow the next day her afterdeck was submerged.

The Secretary of State for War must now choose a Commander of the Army, but the choices he made were not going well.Colonel Stanley initially selected Major General Holtbrak, who was quite prestigious at the time.He was given detailed instructions on the job he was to perform at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at the Admiralty on April 17.At twelve-thirty that night, he had a sudden onset of chronic illness and fell unconscious on the steps of the Duke of York, only to be discovered a few moments later.Fortunately his papers have been given to his staff and are being studied.The next morning Brigadier General Bernie Fickling was appointed to succeed him.He also followed detailed instructions and set off for Edinburgh by train.On April 19 he and his staff flew to Scapa Flow.Their plane crashed at Kirkwall Airport and the pilot was seriously injured.But the date is very short.

On April 17 I briefed the Supreme War Council on the plans the General Staff had drawn up for the landing at Trondheim.The troops immediately available consisted of a regular brigade (2,500 men) from France, 1,000 Canadians, and a brigade of the Home Guard of about 1,000 men in reserve. It was reported to the Military Coordinating Committee that the number of troops available was sufficient and that the risk, though great, was worth the risk.The operation will be fully supported by the fleet and will be joined by two additional aircraft carriers carrying a hundred aircraft, including forty-five fighters.The landing date is tentatively decided to be April 22.The second and a half brigade of the French Alpine Infantry would not reach Trondheim until April 25.It is hoped that one day they will disembark at the docks in Trondheim.

At that time, at the meeting, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces were asked whether they agreed with the above-mentioned plan.On their behalf, and in their presence, the Chief of Air Staff agreed.There were of course considerable dangers in this campaign, but they were worth the risk. The Prime Minister agreed, stressing the importance of Air Force cooperation.The War Cabinet enthusiastically endorsed the plan, and I did everything possible to bring it to fruition. By this time all the staff officers, and their chiefs, seemed determined to pursue the tactics of a breakthrough in the middle against Trondheim.Admiral Forbes was actively preparing for the attack, and there seemed no reason at the time not to keep the date of the 22nd.Although I particularly liked the attack on Narvik, I went into this daring venture with growing confidence, and was willing to subject the fleet to certain risks, such as bombardment of small batteries at the entrance of the fjord, possible minefields, and Most seriously, the danger of air strikes.The ships were armed with anti-aircraft guns that were considered to be very powerful at the time.A group of ships united and fired into the air can force aircraft to dare not attack at the height of accurate bombing.I should say here that the power of the Air Force is formidable when it meets no resistance.Pilots can fly as low as they want, and are often safer at fifty feet than at high altitude.They could drop well and machine-gun soldiers on the ground, the only danger being the occasional accidental rifle shot.Our little expeditionary force at Namsos and Andalsnes had to fight in these arduous conditions.

But the fleet had both anti-aircraft guns and a hundred seaplanes, so that in actual combat it might be superior to any air power the enemy could send there.If Trondheim is taken, the nearby Venus airfield will fall into our hands, and within a few days we will not only have a large garrison in the city, but several squadrons of Royal Air Force fighters will be dispatched to assist.If I had been at my personal liberty, I might have insisted on the battle of Narvik, which was of great interest at first; but having served under a respectable Prime Minister and a friendly People are excited about plans to succeed.The plan was warmly endorsed by many serious and prudent Ministers, and it also seems to have been embraced by the Naval Staff and nearly all our specialists.This is the situation on the 17th. It occurred to me then that we should do our best to keep the King of Norway and his advisers informed of our plans, and that an official who could understand Norway and speak authoritatively should be sent to visit the King of Norway.Admiral Sir Edward Evans was so well suited for the task that he was ordered to fly to Norway via Stockholm to communicate with the King of Norway at his headquarters.There he was required to do everything in his power to help the Norwegian government in the war of resistance, and to explain the various measures that the British government had taken to aid them.From April 22nd he consulted for several days with the King and the principal Norwegian authorities, helping them understand our plans and our difficulties. On the 18th, the opinions of the chiefs of staff of the three armies and the Admiralty suddenly changed sharply and decisively.The reasons for this change were, first, that they felt more and more that the Navy was running too great a risk in committing so many of our best capital ships to such an adventurous operation.Secondly, the War Department believes that even if the fleet can enter the port and sail out safely, it is still very dangerous for our troops to land in front of the enemy under the pressure of the Luftwaffe.On the other hand, the already successful landings north and south of Trondheim seemed to all these authorities a much less dangerous solution.So the chiefs of staff of the three services drew up a very long report against the hammer operation plan. This report began by reminding everyone that a joint campaign involving forced landings in front of the enemy is the most difficult and dangerous way of fighting in war.The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces have always considered that this particular campaign involved serious dangers; because the urgency of the situation did not allow time for the detailed and sophisticated preparations due to an operation plan of this nature, and because there was no aerial reconnaissance or aerial photography , so plans had to be based on maps and charts.This plan also had the flaw of concentrating almost all the Home Fleet in an area that could be heavily attacked by enemy air forces.In addition, there are other new factors that should be considered in this situation.We have captured landing points at Namsos and Andalsnes, and stationed troops ashore; according to reliable reports, the Germans are improving the defenses of Trondheim; about our attempted direct landing at Trondheim The news has been published in the press.The chiefs of staff of the three services reconsidered the original plan in the light of these new factors, and unanimously proposed a change to the plan. They still considered it necessary for us to take Trondheim as a base for further operations in Scandinavia; The Ersnes army landed unexpectedly successfully, encircling Trondheim in a pincer attack from the north and south.By this means, they say, we can convert a risky operation involving serious dangers into one which can achieve the same effect with very few risks.The news of our intentions published in the newspapers may also turn to our advantage when the plans are changed; for by means of such deliberate disclosures we may hope to make the enemy think that we are still trying to stick to our original plans.The Chief of Staff, therefore, proposes that we should throw our greatest forces at Namsos and Andalsnes, occupy the road and rail lines through Dambosch, and encircle Trondheim from the north and the south.Shortly before the main landings at Namsos and Andalsnes, the outlying batteries of Trondheim should be bombarded with platoons from the sea, to give the enemy the impression that we are about to make a direct attack there.We should encircle Trondheim from the land and block it from the sea in this way. Although the occupation of the city will be delayed compared with the original plan, the main force of our army may complete the landing at an earlier date.Finally, the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the abandonment of direct attack to this outflanking operation would allow a large number of valuable ships in our fleet to be used in campaigns in other areas, such as Narvik.These powerful proposals were made not only by the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, but also by their three able Deputy Chiefs of Staff, including the newly appointed Admiral Tom Phillips and Sir John Deere. It is difficult to conceive of any objection that could have been more decisive than theirs in denying such an active amphibious plan.At the same time, I have not seen a single cabinet or minister overriding their opposition.Under the current system, the Chiefs of Staff form a separate and largely independent working body, not supervised or directed by the Prime Minister or any authoritative representative of the highest executive.In addition, the heads of the sea, land, and air forces do not have a comprehensive concept of the entire battle situation, and they are all too limited to the views of their departments.After discussing with the ministers of their own departments, the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces held meetings and negotiated, and published abbreviations or memorandums with great influence.This was the most unfortunate shortcoming of our command and operations system at the time. When I learned of this change of turning backwards, I was very angry, and I asked the relevant officer to find out the reason.It soon became clear to me that all the specialists who only a few days ago had actively supported this battle plan were now unanimously opposed.Of course, there are people who don't follow the crowd, and there is Sir Roger Case in front of us. He yearns passionately for battle and glory.He laughed at these belated fears and reconsiderations.He volunteered to take the few old ships and the requisite transports into the Trondheim Fjord, land an army, and attack that place, before the German army became stronger.Keith had an extremely great record of success.Passionate in his heart.During the debate in May, I was reminded that the Battle of the Dardanelles made me sad.It means that because of the incident that made me quit my job, I no longer have the ability to take risks; but in fact, this is not true.The difficulties that arise in a subordinate position where drastic action is necessary are enormous. In addition, the personal relationship between the relevant senior admirals at that time was also very special.Roger Keyes, like Lord Cork, was senior to the Commander-in-Chief and the First Sea Lord.Admiral Pound had been Keyes' staff officer in the Mediterranean for two years.If I take Roger Case's advice and reject his, it will lead to his resignation, and Admiral Forbes will certainly ask for his own dismissal.In my position, I certainly should not be exposing the Prime Minister and my colleagues in the War Cabinet to these personnel dramas at this time for the sake of a battle plan.And this plan of operations, for all its appeal and importance, was after all essentially secondary to the situation as a whole, even to the Norwegian campaign.So I have no doubts that, although the staff has changed its mind, and obvious objections can be raised to their censored plan, we must still accept their opinion. So, I accepted the decision to abandon the Hammer project.On the afternoon of the 18th, I reported the facts to the Prime Minister.Disappointed as he was, he, like me, had no choice but to accept the new situation.In war, as in life, there are often times when a desired plan fails and the best possible alternative is compelled to take place; Realizing it would be foolish.So, I also turned my gun.I submitted a written report to the Military Coordination Committee on April 19 as follows: (1) Since Carton de Viarte has made great progress, our landings at Andalsnes and other ports in the South Fjords have been easily carried out, and the press has accidentally leaked information about the attack on Trondhe Mu's secrets, and the enormous naval power required to carry out this so-called Hammer plan, and at the same time take great risks to keep many extremely important ships under the threat of close-range air attack for a long time Therefore, the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces and their deputy chiefs of staff proposed that, with regard to the plan of emphasizing between the two pincer offensives and the breakthrough in the middle, the emphasis should now be completely changed, meaning that the main force should be placed instead on the north and the north. The pincer offensive to the south, and the attack on Trondheim in the center should instead be merely a demonstration. (2) Due to the rapid change of events and opinions, we must take the above decision, which has been approved by the Prime Minister, and the order is now being issued. (3) The proposal should seek to convince people that a frontal attack on Trondheim is imminent, and that at the appropriate moment the battleship's platoons should bombard the outer batteries to emphasize this action. (4) Every effort should be made to reinforce Carton de Viarte with artillery. His army would not be well organized without artillery. (5) All the forces which we have assembled for the Hammer project should be sent in large numbers by warships to the ports of the Romsdel Fjord as soon as possible, and advance to Dambos.After reaching Dambosch, the bulk of the force should be turned north, towards Trondheim, with the exception of a part of the interdicting force to be sent south to the main Norwegian front.Somewhere beyond Andalsnes a brigade (Morgan's) and 600 marines have landed.A brigade from France and a brigade of the auxiliary Home Guard will all be engaged here as soon as possible.This would take Dambosch and extend control over the eastern of the two Norwegian railways from Oslo to Trondheim, and Ström was a particularly advantageous stronghold.In addition, there was the second and a half brigade of the French Alpine Infantry, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion and a thousand Canadian troops.Their destination may not be decided today or tomorrow. (6) The army at Namsos is in such a position that it should be considered that there is still some danger, but its commander is accustomed to taking risks.On the other hand, we see no reason why we should not advance with decisively superior forces to the Andalsnes d'Ambers line, in order, if the opportunity arises, to pass this most important Isolate and keep it occupied for purpose. (7) This change of emphasis, although it may be called a change of plan, should recognize that we have moved from a more dangerous plan of operations to a less dangerous one, and that the addition of the Hammer plan has been greatly reduced. heavy burden on the Navy.It would seem that our purpose would be equally attained by this more secure plan, without necessarily delaying our attainment by doing so.By this method we must be able to bring more troops into Norwegian territory sooner than by another method. (8) The battleships at Narvik cannot, of course, be withdrawn at this time, since we have urged vigorous fighting at Narvik.The Wospite has therefore been ordered to return to (the place).Narvik still needs further reinforcements.This must be studied immediately.The Canadian Forces should also be considered. (9) At the same time, it is now possible to carry out mine-sweeping operations in the Skagerrak Strait in order to clear the enemy's anti-submarine ships and to facilitate the activities of our submarines. The next day I explained to the War Cabinet the circumstances which had led to our decision to call off the direct attack on Trondheim, and presented the new plan which the Prime Minister had endorsed.The plan, in general, was to send the entire force of the 1st Light Division of the French Alpine Infantry to General Carton de Viarte, to attack Trondheim from the north, and to send a few regular troops from France. The brigade was to reinforce Brigadier General Morgan, who had landed at Andalsnes and marched to occupy Dambos.Another home defense brigade was to be sent to the south.A portion of this army to the south might possibly have been pushed forward to reinforce the Norwegian army on the Oslo front.We were fortunate enough to be able to land all our troops without suffering any losses so far (except for the ships carrying all of Commodore Morgan's vehicles).According to the present plan, it was stipulated that some twenty-five thousand persons should be disembarked by the end of the first week in May.France once offered to send us two additional light divisions.The main limiting factor was the lack of the necessary bases and lines of communication to keep the army fed, and all bases were also vulnerable to heavy air attack. The Secretary of State for War then said that the new plan was no less dangerous than a direct attack on Trondheim.Until we were able to occupy the airfield at Trondheim, we were almost defenseless against a massive air attack by enemy aircraft.At the same time, the new plan cannot exactly be called a pincer offensive against Trondheim, because although the army in the north will exert pressure on Trondheim in the near future, the primary task of the army in the south is It is to consolidate its own position to resist the German offensive from the south. Any serious action against Trondheim from the south, therefore, would probably be a month away.This criticism is very pertinent.General Ironside, however, heavily sponsored the new operation.He hoped that General Carton de Wiart, with French reinforcements, would have a large army, mostly very mobile, possibly across the railway from Trondheim to Sweden.As for the troops already at Dambos, they had no artillery or transport, but they should be able to take a defensive position.I then spoke again, explaining that the plan for a frontal attack on Trondheim was considered to be too dangerous for the fleet and our landing force.If in a successful attack the fleet loses a capital ship to enemy air activity.This loss will negate any success we gain in combat.Moreover, it is clear that the landing force may suffer heavy casualties.General Massey's opinion is that the risks assumed are not commensurate with the effects desired, especially since these effects could equally be obtained by other means. The Secretary of State for War, while expressly pointing out that these other means offered no safe or satisfactory solution, was also willing to try them.We all realize that we are actually left with a choice among many unpleasant options and are forced to act.As a result, the War Cabinet approved a change in the plan to attack Trondheim. I am now back again to the Narvik problem.Since the plan to attack Trondheim head-on was abandoned, the plan to attack Narvik seemed to be more important and more likely, so I wrote a memorandum to the Military Coordination Committee as follows: (1) With regard to Narvik, we must make a decision of more importance and urgency than words can express.If the fighting remains static, it will become increasingly difficult for us.It is now only one month away from the thawing date of the Gulf of Bothnia.At that point, the Germans might ask Sweden to grant Germany free passage through the ironfields in order to reinforce their army at Narvik, and perhaps demand control of the ironfields.They may promise the Swedes that if Sweden agrees to such an action in its far north, Germany will guarantee that the rest of Sweden will not be disturbed.In any case, we should think that the Germans must try to enter the iron mines by force or softness and reinforce their garrison at Narvik.We therefore have at most one month of sufficient time. (2) During this month we must not only capture that city and surrender the Germans who had landed there, but must advance by rail to the Swedish frontier and obtain an effective, well-defended seaplane base on a lake.In this way, if we cannot control the iron ore field, we can prevent it from being produced under the control of the German army.It seems that at least three thousand (additional) soldiers must be dispatched to Narvik at once, and they should be there by the end of the first week of May at the latest.This order should now be issued immediately, because at the same time, if the situation is cleared, it will be the easiest thing to transfer the troops elsewhere. If these armies are all British, it will be of great convenience in administration, but if for any reason this cannot be done, can the main brigade of the second French light division be sent to Narvik ?There should be no undue danger in sending a large ship into Hill Fjord or the vicinity. (3) I would like the Vice Chief of Naval Staff to confer with a comparable officer in the War Department on how this need can be met, ships and time.Failure to take Narvik would have been a great misfortune and would have given Germany control of the ironfields. General Ismay's report on April 21 puts very well the general situation at this time: The purpose of the battle at Narvik was to capture the city and the railway to the Swedish border.This will enable us, if necessary, to send troops into the Gallivare iron mines, which are the chief object of all our campaigns in Scandinavia. The ice in Lulea harbor melts in about a month.Once the ice has melted, we should expect the Germans to use threat or force to gain the passage their army needs so that they can take the Gallivare mines themselves, and perhaps go a step further to reinforce their army at Narvik.Therefore, Narvik must be taken within a month. The object of the operations in the Trondheim area was to capture Trondheim so as to obtain a base for further operations in central Norway and, if necessary, in Sweden.Troops had landed at Namsos to the north of Trondheim and Andalsnes to the south.Our purpose is that the Namsos army should be stationed on both sides of the railway from Trondheim to the east, so as to surround the local German army from the east and northeast.The main task of the troops landing at Andalsnes, in cooperation with the Norwegian forces at Lillehammer, was to occupy a defensive position in order to prevent the reinforcement of Trondheim from the main landing point at Oslo.Both the road and the railway between Oslo and Trondheim should be defended.After completing this task, part of the army can go north and put pressure on Trondheim from the south. At the moment, our main focus is on the Trondheim area.The most important thing is to support the Norwegian army and ensure that Trondheim cannot receive reinforcements.The occupation of Narvik is not very urgent at present, but its urgency will increase with the thawing of the waterways in the Gulf of Bothnia.If Sweden joins the war, Narvik will become a very important stronghold. The fighting which is now being waged in the middle of Norway is of an extremely adventurous character, and we are encountering serious difficulties.Chief among these are: first, that the haste to immediately aid the Norwegians obliges us to hasten the landing of whatever troops are immediately available from the improvised army.Second, when we entered Norway, due to the situation, we had to choose a base that was not enough to maintain a large army organization.全地區中唯一可用的基地是特隆赫姆，但該地已在敵人的掌握中。我們正在利用納姆索斯和昂達耳斯內斯，這些都只是次要的港口，卸下軍需物資的設備，即使有也很少，而且和內地的交通也很簡陋。因此，要把機械化的運輸工具、大炮、供應品和汽油（這些在當地都是不能取得的）運上岸去，即使不受其他的障礙，也成為相當困難的事。所以，在沒有佔領特隆赫姆以前，我們能在挪威維持的軍隊，數量必須受到嚴格的限制。 當然，人們可以說，我們在挪威進行的種種戰役，即使能在當地取得成功，在現在看來，勢必要被在法國即將發生的可怕戰爭的結果一掃而光。在一個月的時間內，盟國主力部隊即要被敵人擊潰，或驅入海中。我們所有的一切，都將投入為繼續生存而進行的鬥爭。因此，我們沒有在特隆赫姆四周建立起龐大的陸軍和空軍，還是幸運的。掩蓋著未來事件的帷幕正在一幅一幅地揭開，而我們凡人俗夫則必須一天一天地採取行動。根據我們在四月間所了解的情況，我的意見至今仍認為，我們既然已經進行到這種地步，我們就應該堅持實行鐵錘作戰計劃以及我們大家一致同意的對特隆赫姆的三面圍攻；但在我們的專家顧問堅決反對這個計劃並向我們提出嚴重的反對理由時，我並沒有強迫他們接受我的意見。這一點我應該負全部的責任。然而，在那種情況下，最好還是將進攻特隆赫姆的計劃全部放棄，而集中全力攻打納爾維克。但到了這時，這個計劃已經太晚了。我們的許多部隊都已登陸，而挪威人則正在呼籲援助。