Chapter 56 Volume 2, Chapter 14, Invasion Issues

Past Studies on Invasion New Air Forces My Report to Parliament of June 18 Rumors First Emerged My Memorandum of June 28 My Memorandum of July 10 on the Invasion of the Mobile Reserve Importance Two Thousand Miles of British Coastline Memorandum of the First Sea Lord Where the Enemy Is Likely to Attack Deployment Recommendations The Chiefs of Staff agree with me We are biased towards the East Coast The Germans are going to attack the South Coast We are shifting our fronts in February 1989 Our deployment changes The danger of the enemy attacking across the North Sea remains the tension of July and August.

After the evacuation of Dunkirk, and especially when the French government announced its surrender three weeks later, we could see that the question was on the minds of the British people whether Hitler would, or back down, be able to invade and subjugate us What about this island?I am not new to this problem.As Secretary of the Navy, I participated in all discussions on this subject in the Reich Defense Council for three years before the First World War.On behalf of the Admiralty, I have always insisted that until the home defense and other wartime forces become operational, we should retain at least two of the six divisions of the expeditionary force to defend the homeland.As Marshal Wilson said: Without a goalkeeper, the navy cannot play international football.However, when the First World War broke out, our situation was: our navy was fully mobilized, the British Grand Fleet was safe at sea, far from the enemy's nest, and we saw no accidents, treachery, and disasters before us, and felt that We ourselves can do a better job in the Admiralty than lip service says.At a special meeting of the Cabinet and the senior military authorities called by Mr. Asquith in the Cabinet Room on August 5, 1914, I obtained the full approval of the First Sea Lord (Prince Louis of Battenberg). After agreeing, it was officially declared that even if all the regular troops were sent to France immediately to participate in the upcoming war, the navy would still be able to undertake the responsibility of defending the homeland and repel the enemy's invasion or large-scale attack.As far as we are concerned, the entire army can be transferred.Within the first six weeks, all six divisions were transferred.

The Navy can play a huge role if the meaning of the Navy is properly understood.In the face of superior fleets, large and small, it is simply impossible to transport the army across the strait.The steam engine greatly enhanced the naval defense of Great Britain.In Napoleon's time the same wind which blew his barges from Boulogne across the English Channel could have swept away our blockade fleet.However, everything that has happened since that time clearly shows that the superior naval power has greatly increased, and can wipe out the invaders in transit.Every nuisance modern equipment presents to the troops creates greater inconvenience and danger to their sea transport, and the logistical work after landing will encounter insurmountable difficulties.When the fortunes of our homeland were last at stake, we had superior, and later proved to be sufficient, sea power.It is impossible for the enemy to engage in a large-scale naval battle with us.They cannot fight our cruisers.We outnumber the enemy ten times in small fleets and light ships.Add to this the many benefits that the weather, and especially the fog, give us.Even if the weather is unfavorable for us and the enemy successfully lands at a certain point or points, the problems of the enemy's maintenance of communication lines and supply of occupied strongholds cannot be solved.This is what happened in World War I.

But now there is also the Air Force.What impact did this all-important new thing have on the invasion problem?It is evident that if the enemy, by superior air power, holds the narrow seas on both sides of the Dover Strait, our small fleet will suffer great losses, even fatal blows.Unless the most serious situation is encountered, no one wants to drive huge battleships and large cruisers to the sea controlled by German bombers.In fact, we do not have capital ships anchored south of the Firth of Forth or east of Plymouth, but off the coasts of Harwich, Noah, Dover, Portsmouth and Portland our light combatants have been constantly Stationary guard patrols, and the number of ships participating in the patrols is also constantly increasing.By September there were more than 800 ships on patrol, and the enemy could destroy them only by air force, and only gradually.

However, who is stronger in terms of air force?In the Battle of France we fought Germany in a ratio of two or three, giving them a similar proportion of losses.At Dunkirk, since we had to patrol constantly to cover the army's retreat, the battle was fought in a ratio of four or five, which turned out to be very successful and profitable. In our own territorial waters and on the exposed coasts and counties, Air Chief Admiral Dowding intends to fight in our favor at a ratio of one to seven to eight. During this period, the strength of the Luftwaffe as a whole, as far as we know, is about three to one with our strength, except for places where it is particularly concentrated.Although we were outnumbered fighting the ferocious and powerful German forces, my conclusion is this: In our airspace, in our country, and in our territorial waters, we can defeat the German air force.If this is the case, our navy can continue to control the seas and destroy any enemy that comes their way.

Of course, there is a third possibility.Have the Germans, who have always been known for their thoughtfulness and foresight, secretly prepared a huge fleet of specially-made landing craft that can unload tanks, artillery, and motorcycles anywhere on the beach without a port or dock, and will later be able to What about adequate logistics for landing troops? As I have already mentioned, I had this idea in my head as early as 1917, and now, as a result of my guidance, I have actually acted on it.But we have no reason to believe that Germany has such equipment, but it is best to take the worst into consideration.In order to prepare the landing equipment of the same scale as the Normandy landing, we spent four years, intensively conducted experiments, and also received a large amount of material assistance from the United States.At present, if the Germans want to achieve this step, the manpower and material resources required can of course be greatly reduced, but they only have a small number of Speer-type ferries.

Therefore, if the German army wants to attack Britain in the summer or autumn of 1940, it needs to have naval superiority, air superiority and a large number of special landing ships in some areas. However, we are the ones who have the naval superiority; We believe (and as far as we now know they do) that they did not build or design any special ships.The foregoing constituted the ideological basis of my views on the question of the German invasion in 1940, and from this basis I issued daily the orders and instructions contained in the following chapters. On June 18, in Parliament, I set out the general outline very clearly:

The Navy never said that they could prevent a few hostile forces of five or ten thousand men from suddenly crossing the Channel at night or in the foggy morning, and landing against us at some point on the coast.The effectiveness of sea power, especially in modern conditions, lies in the sheer numbers of the invading force.Given our military strength, an invading army can only do anything if it is large.If the number of incoming enemy troops is large, then our navy will be able to spot them, attack them head-on, and bite them down.We must remember that no matter how lightly equipped the five divisions are, two hundred to two hundred and fifty ships are needed to load them, and due to modern aircraft reconnaissance and aircraft photography techniques, if there is no strong naval escort It is no easy task, however, to organize and command such a force across the strait; and, to put it mildly, such a force is likely to be intercepted long before it reaches the shore, and all perish at sea, or at last Unfortunately, it was smashed together with the equipment when it tried to land.

As early as the end of June, some people reported that the enemy's battle plan might include the English Channel, so I immediately asked for an investigation. prime minister to general ismay June 27, 1940 It is hard to believe that the enemy can deploy a large-scale transport fleet to the ports of the strait without us noticing, or that some methods of laying mines can prevent our minesweepers from clearing a channel for our navy to intercept the enemy's transport fleet halfway .Nevertheless, the Chiefs of Staff Committee should be urged to take note of such rumors. Although the possibility of a cross-strait invasion was small at the time, we still have to study this possibility carefully.I'm not entirely satisfied with our military deployment.It is imperative that the armies understand what their task is, and, above all, that they should not be wasted by dispersing fixed numbers along the threatened coast, or unduly heavily deployed throughout the coast, and thereby exhaust the resources of the nation.Therefore, I wrote:

prime minister to general ismay June 28, 1940 Prime Minister's Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 1. Please refer to the documents sent by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and later by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 2. It is advisable to close off certain beaches which may be attacked by strong fortifications, and to take security measures for the large and small ports on the east coast.The immediate danger to the south coast is less.Without a port and its docks and other facilities, the enemy cannot make a large-scale invasion.In the event of our naval defeat, there is no telling where on the east coast the enemy will be engaged.Perhaps some places will be encroached upon.Once this happens, troops elsewhere on the coastal front will be as useless as those on the Maginot Line.Although fighting on the seashore is beneficial for defense, it cannot be exchanged for this advantage by defending the entire seashore.Fortified areas must be selected, however, if time permits, fortified areas can be expanded and improved.

3. Every effort should be made to deploy some permanent troops on the coasts to be fortified, with experienced officers from the previous war.The security of the country (after all) depends on whether we have many leopard brigades (currently only nine, but will increase to fifteen soon), such brigades can be quickly (ie within four hours) to the occupation place to go.Even if the invading army reaches the beach, it is extremely difficult to land; under the fierce attack of our sea, land, and air force, it is even more difficult to deliver supplies to them. The troops fought swiftly and resolutely.As long as the field troops don't run out of strength in the beach defense battle, maintain a high degree of mobility, hide, and be dispatched immediately when there is a situation, we have a way to deal with it. 4. In the unfortunate event that the enemy seizes a certain port, a larger force equipped with artillery is required to deal with it.Four or five elite divisions should be kept in general reserve for this unlikely misfortune.It is estimated that the enemy's landing scale will not exceed 10,000 people, and the three simultaneous landings will total 30,000 people; as for the scale of airlift landings, the total number of enemy troops landing at two or three places at the same time will not exceed 15,000 people.The enemy does not have the strength to carry out such airdrops on a regular basis.It is doubtful whether the airlift force can force a landing at night; if it lands in the daytime, it will be easily eliminated (by our air force). 5. The situation with respect to tanks is somewhat different. It is a very appropriate method to place cannons and obstacles in certain places to narrow down the places where tanks can land.The Admiralty should report the size, characteristics, speed of the barges or barges that might be used to carry the tanks, and whether these ships have their own motors or are towed by something.Since it is difficult for such ships to travel more than seven miles per hour, they will be spotted as soon as they are out in summer. Even if there is fog or even heavy fog, the radio direction finding station can also detect them when they are several hours away from the shore. Alert.Destroyers from hidden harbors must hit these ships hard.The fixed troops in various places should continuously strengthen the arrangement of obstacles and form anti-tank squads.Our own tank reserves must meet the enemy's surviving tanks, and, of course, tank reserves should be stationed where they can move quickly (by rail) to the attack. 6. Enemy paratroopers, fifth columns and motorcycle teams may infiltrate, or appear in disguise in some unexpected places, which can be dealt with by our National Guard with the support of special forces detachments.Beware of the ruse of (the enemy) donning British uniforms. 7. In general, I agree with the commander-in-chief's plan, but as far as possible, field troops should be drawn from the beaches and incorporated into the Leopard Brigade and other mobile units that can be dispatched immediately.Special attention should be paid to the general reserve team.The outcome of the war is not decided by the beach, but by the mobile brigade and the general reserve.By the time the air force is rendered incapable of fighting due to prolonged air combat and the entire supply of aircraft has been destroyed, naval power can still be decisive in defending against a large-scale invasion. 8. The above comments only apply to the current summer months.We are sure to be better equipped and stronger by the fall. During July, there was growing talk and unease about the issue, both within the British government and among the general public.Despite our constant reconnaissance and the use of aerial photography, we have seen no sign of a large concentration of ships in the Baltic or in the ports of the Rhine or Scheldt, and indeed we have seen no transport ships or barges with engines coming from However, preparations for resistance to aggression are the primary task of each of us, and our military authorities and Home Force Command are preoccupied with this question. About intrusion Prime Minister's Memorandum Prime Minister to Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, Chief of the Reich General Staff and General Smey July 10, 1940 1. I find it difficult to conceive of an invasion along our coast with small ships or even small ships.I have seen no real evidence of a mass concentration of such ships, and it would be extreme to send large numbers of troops to risk at sea, under the fire of our large armed patrol fleet, except to cross the narrowest of seas. Recklessness is even a kind of suicidal behavior.The Admiralty has more than 1,000 armed patrol ships, of which 200 to 300 are often patrolling at sea, and the ships are equipped with experienced seafarers.Unexpected crossings of the strait were impossible, and in the wider part of the North Sea the invading forces were more easily destroyed, since part of their voyage was in daylight.Behind these patrol ships, there is also a fleet of destroyers. Currently, forty of these destroyers are deployed between the Humber River and Portsmouth, most of which are on the narrowest sea.Patrol at night, and there are more ships resting during the day.Therefore, they may meet enemy ships transporting troops at night, but they may also reach any point or points of enemy landing on the coast within three hours.They can destroy the landing craft at once, intercept the landing troops, and bombard the enemy troops who have already landed. However lightly equipped these troops are, they also have to carry munitions and equipment from their ships to the beaches.However, when our fleet takes blocking action, it will need strong support from our fighter jets from dawn onwards.After daybreak, covering our destroyers with fighter jets is crucial for our destroyers to slam the landing force. 2. You should refer to the reply of the Commander-in-Chief (Home Fleet) to the question put to him at the direction of the Cabinet: What if the enemy escorts the invasion force with heavy warships?The answer is that, so far as we know, not one of their great warships is not under overhaul except those at Trondheim[1] which are under the control of our overwhelmingly superior fleet. close monitoring.In a few days (thirteenth to sixteenth), when Nelson and Barham are refitted, it is probable that there will be two large British fleets, each with very powerful firepower; At the same time, it can quickly meet the southward attack of the warships in Trondheim Port.Moreover, the cruisers on the Thames and the Humber were so strong that, in combination with the flotilla, they were sufficient to attack effectively any light cruiser which the enemy used to cover the landing.I think, therefore, that it would be very difficult for the enemy to bring a large and well-armed army to the east coast of England, either in bulk or in small groups after crossing the sea.If the enemy wants to use large ships to transport troops to attack from the north, it will be more difficult.It may also be said that, except in the Baltic ports, there is as yet no indication of a disturbing concentration of enemy ships, large and small.With the continuous reconnaissance of the air and the continuous patrol of the submarine, the alarm can be issued in time. At the same time, our minefields will also add a layer of obstacles to the enemy. [1] In fact, both the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, which were anchored in Trondheim, were hit by torpedoes and were unable to move. 3. The south coast is less likely to be attacked by the enemy.We know that there are no large numbers of ships assembled in the French ports, and that there are not many small boats.Dover's artillery barrage was being strengthened and would reach the French coast.This measure is of such great importance that the Admiralty has been called upon to continually and expeditiously supervise the work.In their opinion, no significant ships, warships or troop transports passed through the Strait of Dover. So it's hard for me to believe that the south coast is in a very dangerous state right now.Of course, the enemy might launch a small attack on Ireland from Brest, but it was still dangerous when the invading force crossed the sea. 4. The main danger will come from the Dutch and German ports, and the main object of the attack will be the coast from Dover to Wash.As the nights get longer, this danger zone will gradually extend northward, but by this time, the weather will become more and more unfavorable, and the plan of invasion by fishing boats will be more difficult to realize.Also, because of the cloudy skies, the enemy probably wouldn't be able to deploy air power to assist when the two sides engaged. 5. I hope, therefore, that on the basis of the above inferences (should be checked with the Admiralty), you will be able to bring back the vast majority of your organized divisions from the coast as support or reserve forces for the highest form of offensive and counter-offensive operations train.As for the coastal area, because it has been fortified, it can gradually be handed over to troops other than regular divisions and the National Guard.I am sure you will agree with this view in principle, the only problem I am afraid is the speed of the defense.At this point, I also hope that we can agree to proceed as quickly as possible. 6. This memorandum does not discuss attacks by airborne units, but this does not change its conclusions. It should be mentioned that my advisors and I agree that the east coast is more likely to be attacked than the south coast in July and August.In fact, neither coast was hit during those two months.As will be seen below, the German plan was to invade across the English Channel with medium warships (4,000 to 5,000 tons) and small ships; The hopes and intentions of the army; and they had no plans of attacking from the ports of the Bay of Biscay.That doesn't mean they were right and we were wrong in choosing the South Coast as their target.An invasion of the East Coast would be far more terrifying if the enemy had the means to do so.An invasion of the south coast was, of course, impossible unless or until the necessary ships sailed south from the Straits of Dover and assembled in French ports.There was no sign of such action in July. However, we had to be prepared for the unexpected, and at the same time, avoid spreading our mobile forces and build up reserves.This delicate and difficult question can only be resolved by linking the weekly news and developments.The coastline of Great Britain is jagged, with countless bays, and it is more than two thousand miles in circumference, not counting Ireland.With such a large perimeter, any one or several of it can be attacked simultaneously or successively. The only way of defense is to establish surveillance and defense lines along the coast or border in order to stop the enemy; , Highly trained mobile troops as a reserve army, properly deployed, in order to arrive at the attacked location in the shortest possible time, and carry out a fierce counterattack.When Hitler found himself surrounded in the final stages of the war, faced with such a problem, we can see that he made a very serious mistake in handling it.He built a traffic system like a spider's web, but forgot about the spiders.In view of the fact that France was still fresh in our memory of the fatal blow which resulted from the mismanagement of France, we did not forget large-scale mobile warfare; a policy. The views expressed in my paper of July 10 were generally in line with those of the Admiralty; two days later Admiral Pound sent an A well-thought-out and well-thought-out submission.It is only natural and appropriate that the submissions should stress the dangers to which we are exposed. However, Admiral Pound said in his summary: It seems possible that a group of enemy troops numbering in the hundreds of thousands could reach the coast of our country without being blocked by the navy.But unless the Luftwaffe triumphs over our air and navy at the same time, it will be impossible to maintain their supply lines.If the enemy did land and attack, they hoped to reach London very quickly, to draw all supplies there, and to force the surrender of the British Government.The First Sea Lord lists the highest number of 100,000 people according to the ports from which the enemy troops depart and the coasts where they may attack us, as follows: From the port of Biscay to the south coast twenty, From Channel Harbor to South Coast V, From the ports of Holland and Belgium to the east coast Twelve, Fifty from German ports to the east coast, From Norwegian ports to Shetland Islands, Iceland and Scotland coast ten, Ninety-seven in total, I'm happy with this estimate.Since the enemy cannot carry heavy weapons, and the supply lines to any stronghold are quickly cut, even an enemy invasion in July can be dealt with by our rapidly improving army.I then sent the following two documents to the Chiefs of Staff and Home Forces Command. prime minister's memorandum The CCS and Home Forces Command should study these documents.The First Sea Lord's memorandum could serve as a basis for working on, and while I personally believe that the Admiralty will actually do better than they say, and that the loss of the invasion force in transit will further reduce the size of the attack, however Therefore, the preparations of our ground forces should also be foolproof.Of course, as far as the ground force is concerned, the size of the attack should be doubled, that is to say, 200,000 people should be distributed according to the plan (proportion fixed) of the First Sea Lord.My home force already has enough strength to handle such an invasion, and its strength is growing rapidly. I should be very glad if our plans for meeting the enemy's landing were re-examined on this basis, and the Cabinet made aware of any corrections.It should be borne in mind that while the heaviest attacks are likely to be in the north, the south should be the area where the highest precautions must be taken due to London's paramount importance and the narrowness of the sea. This principle was unanimously agreed upon, and we followed it in the weeks that followed.Definite orders were given as to the conduct of our capital fleet in the narrow sea, and I fully agreed with them.On July 20, after an in-depth study with Admiral Forbes, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the following decisions were issued by the Admiralty: (1) The Chief of the Admiralty does not want our heavy ships to sail south to crush enemy troops landing on our shores before they have been reported to have spotted enemy heavy ships. (2) If the enemy's heavy warships are willing to take the risk and march towards our coast in the southern part of the North Sea to support the troops attempting to land, our heavy warships should also take the risk to sail to the south to meet them. In order to draw more definite conclusions on the probabilities and extent of the enemy's attack on our extensive coastline, and thereby avoid unduly spreading our forces, I sent a further memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff in early August. Memorandum of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defense Concerning the Defense of Invasions August 5, 1940 In view of the great expense and disadvantages of combat power which would be involved in attempting to fortify the whole coast of Great Britain, and of the dangers which would arise from an inappropriate system of passive defense, I wish to consider the following: 1. We should always make the enemy's ports the first line of defense against invasion.Having obtained information by aerial reconnaissance, submarine surveillance, and other means, we should then resolutely attack the enemy's massed ships with all suitable forces available. 2. Our second line of defense is tight sea patrols to intercept invading troops and eliminate them in transit. 3. The third line of defense is to counterattack the enemy when they are approaching land, especially when the enemy is landing.Such counterattacks must be prepared well in advance at sea and must be supported by air; naval and air counterattacks should be carried out in succession so that the invaders cannot resupply the occupied positions. 4. The main purpose of ground defense and home forces is to allow the enemy to come in such large numbers as to provide suitable targets for attack by the navy and air force as stated above, and to enable aerial or other forms of reconnaissance to ascertain the enemy's presence. Prepare and act. 5. However, if the enemy successfully lands at a different location, the resistance on the local beaches should be coordinated with the above-mentioned attacks by our sea and air force to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy.This forces the enemy to run out of ammunition and confines them to a limited area.Whether any section of the coast can be defended is not measured by the strength of the troops on the coast, but by how many hours the mobile force can be transferred to the landing site for a strong counterattack.We must take advantage of the enemy's weakest time to attack the enemy with all speed and strength; the so-called enemy's weakest time is not when the enemy is disembarking, as some people say, but when the enemy has climbed ashore and the traffic is blocked. Cut off, when supplies run out.Ten thousand fully armed soldiers must be assembled within six hours, and twenty thousand within twelve hours, to attack any strong point established by the enemy.Before the real center of gravity of the attack is known, how to control the reserve force is a problem that the headquarters of the local forces should carefully consider. 6. It must be admitted that the task of stopping an invasion in the Channel, that is, from Wash to Dover, is more difficult for the Navy and Air Force.The defense line of this sector of the coast is also closest to London, the enemy's biggest target.The sector from Dover to Cape Lands End was less threatened, for the Navy and Air Force knew that large numbers of ships could not enter the ports of the French Channel, let alone ships of war for cover.At present, according to the estimates of the Admiralty, the scale of the attack on this vast front line will not exceed 5,000 men. [1] A doubling of forces for greater security would be an advisable arrangement for a swift counter-offensive with superior numbers, while saving a great deal of force in the southern sector; Troops should be kept to a minimum and mobile reserves as large as possible.These mobile reserves must be able to move to the southeast fan at short notice.Obviously, the situation can only be judged on a week-to-week basis. [1] I have not mentioned here the possible arrival of twenty thousand men from the distant ports of the Bay of Biscay; but, as you will see, the disposition of our troops which I propose is adequate. This potential (which we now know does not exist) danger. 7. When we come to the west coast of Great Britain, a new set of circumstances comes into play.The enemy must pass through a wide sea, and as soon as we detect the enemy's approach to the coast, we have ample time to attack them with cruisers and small fleets.The deployment of the Admiralty must meet this need.The enemy currently has no warships to escort the army.For example, in the face of a superior navy and air force, would we send twelve thousand men aboard unescorted merchant ships to land on the coast of Norway or in the Skagerrak [1] and Kattegat [2]?This would be seen as madness. [1] The Skagerrak Strait is located between southern Norway and northern Denmark.translator [2] Kattegat Strait, located between Sweden and Denmark.translator 8. However, in order to achieve triple insurance, the Admiralty should continue to carry out the plan of laying strong minefields from Cornwall to Ireland to secure the Bristol Channel and Irish Sea from attack from the south.Since our merchant ships circumnavigated the northern route, we have diverted a large number of patrol ships from the west (south) channel, leaving the south-west more empty and less protected, and thus more need to mine this area. 9. The establishment of this minefield will simplify and ease the defense of this area in all areas north of the point of contact with Cornwall.We must see that the sector from Cornwall to Cape Canthal is least exposed to attack from the sea.The defense here only needs to use a few cannons and land-based mine launch tubes to protect the main port, and a small defensive force at the entrance and exit of the port [1].We should not waste our limited manpower and material resources in this sector. 【１】In other words, the entrance and exit on the back. 10. From the north of Cape Kantel to Scapa Flow, the Shejenland Islands and the Faroe Islands, all are within the range of activities of the main fleet.The enemy would run great risks in transporting an invasion force from the Norwegian coast, and would not immediately cause serious problems even if they reached the mouth of the Kromalty.Enemies currently lurking will be scurrying around by then.The enemy will encounter many difficulties and walk in sparsely populated places.We were able to hold the enemy in check until sufficient forces were mobilized to deal them a head-on blow and cut off his sea lines of communication at once.This would make things more difficult for the enemy, as the distance to any one important destination would be much greater and would require a lot of vehicular transport.It is impossible to stick to all the landing strongholds in this sector.The result will be futile.We will have more time to prepare for a counter-offensive than if we invaded from the south-east coast opposite London. 11. From the mouth of the Cromarty to Wash, is the second most important sector, after the one from Wash to Dover.However, all the ports and bays here are protected from the sea and the rear, and can launch a counter-offensive with superior forces within 24 hours.The Tyne must be regarded as the second most important target of attack after London, since an invading force, a large surprise force, could do serious damage here (and to a lesser extent on the Teez) in a short time .On the other hand, conditions at sea and in the air are more favorable to us than in the south. 12. The Joint Staff should determine the relative proportions of weakness and defense of all these sectors, the number of men to defend locally on the beaches and harbors, and the number of days or hours in which a major counteroffensive can be achieved.Regarding the relative proportions of attack and defense, I propose the following points, please consider: Cromarty Estuary to Wash (including Wash)【1】｜3 Wash to Cape Dover｜5 Cape Dover to Cape Lands End and around to start minelaying area one (one/two) From the area where the mines began to the head of Kantel｜1/4 Cantel Point north to Cromarty Estuary 1/2 【1】These figures refer to proportional numbers, not division numbers, of course. After the Chiefs of Staff Committee had reviewed all our information again, Colonel Hollis, the secretary of the Committee, wrote a report in reply to my memorandum. Defense against intrusion prime minister August 13, 1940 1. The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, has studied your memorandum (August 5) and agrees unanimously with the principles you have stated in paragraphs 1-5. 2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces has repeatedly stated to us that all officers and men believe that it is of the utmost importance that if the enemy gains a temporary foothold on the coast, he must immediately launch a counter-offensive against the enemy, so he will adopt this policy: As soon as the divisions were trained and equipped for offensive operations, they were brought back into reserve. 三‧參謀長委員會也同意你對沿岸各扇形地帶的弱點和來自海上的攻擊所估計的相對比例。的確，值得注意的是，本土部隊各師目前的分佈情況和你在第十二段所列舉的數字非常相近。 五‧如果按照上述比例分配一支擁有十個師的兵力，則可把三個師分配在福思｜瓦什扇形地帶，五個師在瓦什｜多佛爾扇形地帶，等等，事實上，在本土上有二十六個師，而且，如果把你的數字乘以二‧六，然後和這二十六個師的實際分佈情況比較一下，就可以得出下列結果： 六‧這兩組數字之間的共同點甚至比乍一看去還要近似，原因是駐紮在緊靠倫敦北面和西北面的後備師既可以部署在瓦什多佛爾扇形地帶，又可以部署在多佛爾樸次茅斯扇形地帶，因此，這兩個扇形地帶可用的師數是可以隨時改變的。可供聯合扇形地帶使用的師共計十五個，而你要求的是十六又四分之三個師。 七‧參謀長委員會指出，你的數字是根據來自海上的侵略的規模計算的，而實際的分配情況則把來自空中的侵略也考慮在內。因此，雖然目前南方沿岸的防禦似乎稍稍超過於實際的需要，但理由是：我們在那裡的防衛部隊可能被敵戰鬥機形成的幕所籠罩，敵軍可跨過相對說來是比較窄的海峽進行突擊。 正當我們審核這些文件準備付印的時候，情況已開始大變。我們卓越的情報機構證實，希特勒已最後下令採取海獅作戰計劃，並已積極準備。看來此人是要試一試了。況且，攻擊的戰線和東部海岸完全不同，也就是說是在東部海岸之外的，但是，參謀長委員會、海軍部和我仍然一致同意把重點放在東部海岸。 但是，此後的情況急轉直下。大批自動推進的駁船和摩托艇開始在夜裡渡過多佛爾海峽，沿法國海岸暗中移動，並逐漸集結在加來到佈雷斯特一帶法國海岸的各個港口。我們每日進行的空中攝影準確地證明了這一行動。已經不可能重新在接近法國海岸的海面佈置水雷區了。我們立即開始用我們的小型艦隻襲擊那些運送部隊的船隻，轟炸機隊集中轟炸新發現的一系列發動侵略的港口。同時，我們得到大量的情報說，德軍有一個或幾個軍正沿這段敵方海岸集結，準備入侵。情報表明敵軍鐵路運輸也很繁忙，並在加來海峽和諾曼底大量集結。後來，據報告，在布洛涅附近有兩個山地作戰師配備了騾子，顯然是要攀越福克斯通懸崖。與此同時，在法國的海峽沿岸出現了大批威力強大的遠程大炮。 為了應付新出現的威脅，我們開始把我們的負荷從這條腿轉移到另一條腿，並且改進了我們所有的運輸條件，以便把我們日益壯大的機動後備隊調往南部防線。大約在八月的第一個週末，現任本土部隊總司令布魯克將軍指出，南部海岸遭受入侵的威脅也如同在東部海岸一樣在增長。我軍的人數、效率、機動性和裝備也日益增加。 因此，在九月下半月，我們已經能夠把十六個精銳的師投入包括多佛爾在內的南部海岸防線，這十六個師中有三個裝甲師或是相當於三個師的裝甲旅，所有這些師都是當地沿岸防禦部隊的補充，可以迅速地投入戰鬥，進攻任何一處登陸入侵的敵軍。這樣一來，我們就能夠狠狠地把敵人揍一頓，布魯克將軍已經擺好架勢，在必要的時候就迎頭痛擊；誰也不如他擅長這一手。 在這期間，我們很不放心：從加來到特斯黑靈和黑利戈蘭的那些海灣和河口以及荷蘭和德國沿海的大群島嶼（上次戰爭中的沙地之謎）會不會隱藏著大批擁有小型或中型艦隻的敵軍。從哈里奇往右到樸次茅斯、波特蘭，甚或到普利茅斯這一帶以肯特海角為中心的地方似乎馬上就要受到侵襲。我們只有一些反面的證據說明敵人不會從波羅的海用大型艦隻通過斯卡格拉克海峽，掀起第三個入侵的浪潮，以配合其他的浪潮。這對德軍能否取得成功，至關重要，因為除此之外別無其他方法可以把重型武器運送給已經登陸的部隊或在停泊於東部海灘附近的補給船上和補給船附近建立大供應站。 我們現在邁入了一個非常緊張、需要非常警惕的時期。在這時期內，從瓦什往北一直到克羅馬爾提河口，我們當然有重兵鎮守；並且作出安排，如果敵人硬要從南方入侵，那麼就從這裡抽調兵力。我們這個島上的鐵路縱橫交錯，我們還繼續控制著本土的領空，這些條件使我們有充分的把握，在敵方兵力全部暴露後，如果在第四天、第五天和第六天有必要的話，我們還能夠另外抽調四個或五個師增援南部防線。 我們曾對月光和潮汐進行了仔細的研究。我們推測，敵人可能在夜間渡海、黎明登陸；我們現在知道，德國陸軍統帥部也打算這樣做。他們還希望在渡海途中有半明的月光，以便保持秩序並能正確無誤地接近陸地。精確地衡量了這一切之後，海軍部認為，對敵人最為有利的時機是在九月十五至三十日之間。我們現在發現，在這一點上我們和敵人的想法完全一致。我們毫不懷疑，我們有能力摧毀在多佛爾海角、或在多佛爾到樸次茅斯這段海岸、甚或在波特蘭登陸的任何入侵部隊。當我們最高指揮機關的思想充分協調一致以後，我們對愈來愈清楚的圖景不由得感到欣喜。這也許是打擊強大敵人震動世界的一次好機會。同樣，那些呈現在我們面前的希特勒入侵的氣氛和現象不能不使我們內心感到憤慨。的確，有些人從純技術的觀點出發真願意看到他來試一下，看一看他渡海遠征，全軍覆沒，對整個戰局將產生什麼影響。 七月和八月我們控制了大不列顛的上空，特別在東南部倫敦附近各郡的上空，我空軍則更加強大，佔據優勢。加拿大集團軍駐紮在倫敦和多佛爾之間，最便於待機而動。他們的刺刀鋒利，鬥志甚旺。能夠為不列顛和自由狠狠地給敵人以致命的打擊，將使他們感到自豪。所有的人的心裡都燃燒著這種烈火。規模龐大的錯綜複雜的防禦系統、防禦據點、反坦克障礙物、碉堡和掩蔽設施等佈滿了整個地區。海岸線上的防禦工事和炮台比比皆是，同時，由於減少了大西洋上的護航艦隻（這使我們的船運損失比較小），由於把新建的軍艦編入現役，使小艦隊在數量和質量上都大大提高。我們把復仇號、舊靶艦兼演習艦百人隊長號和一艘巡洋艦調往普利茅斯。這時，本土艦隊擁有最大的戰鬥力，可以巡航至恆伯河甚至瓦什灣也無多大危險，因此，我們在各方面都已作好充分的準備了。 最後，照例在十月分秋分時候常刮的暴風即將來臨。很顯然，如果希特勒真敢動手的話，那就是在九月，在九月中旬潮汐的漲落和月亮的盈虧都對他有利。 危險過去後，在議會中有時談到入侵的恐懼。那些最了解情況的人當然是最不恐懼的。除了在空中和海上掌握優勢以外，我們還有一支鬥志旺盛的生力軍（雖說裝備還不十分充分），其人數和四年後德國集結在諾曼底抵抗我們返回歐洲大陸的軍隊不相上下。在諾曼底，我們雖然在頭一個月裡就有一百萬人登陸，並擁有大量武器和其他一切有利的條件，但戰鬥仍然是十分持久和殘酷的，費了將近三個月的時間才擴大了開頭佔領的地區、開闢了廣闊的戰場，但是這些軍事行動的意義只有在將來才能得到印證和了解。 現在話題應該轉過去談談敵人那邊的情形，就我們現在所知道的情況敘述一下敵人的準備和計劃。