Chapter 57 Volume 2, Chapter 15, Sea Lion Operation Plan

The plan of the German Admiralty The conditions created by Germany through the conquest of France and the Low Countries July 21st The meeting between the heads of the armed forces and the Fuehrer Hitler gave the order knowing the difficulty Not agreeing to a compromise New apprehensions of the German Admiralty German naval and army generals shift responsibility to Göring and Luftwaffe Knowing that the three armies of amphibious operations are not in harmony with the Germans, the bet is on air combat. We know from the German archives we have seized that shortly after the outbreak of the war on September 3, 1939, the German Admiralty began to study the invasion of Great Britain by its staff.The Germans think differently than we do: they are convinced that the only way is to cross the narrow waters of the English Channel.They never considered any other way.If we had known this earlier, we would have been greatly relieved.The attack from the English Channel happened to meet our most fortified coast; this is our ancient coastal defense front against France, the ports along the coast are fortified, and our main fleet is based here; in recent years, in order to defend In London, most airports and air control stations are also established here.There is no other place on our island where we can go into battle more quickly or concentrate such great forces of land, sea, and air as here.Admiral Raeder feared that once the German navy was ordered to attack Britain, the navy would not be strong enough.So, he asks for many conditions.The first condition was complete control of the coasts, ports, and estuaries of France, Belgium, and Holland, and the plan was therefore shelved in the obscurity of the war.

Suddenly, these conditions were unexpectedly met, and immediately after Dunkirk and the surrender of France, he went to the Fuehrer with a plan, and he was very happy, although he was somewhat suspicious.He discussed this issue with Hitler on May 21, and then on June 20. His purpose was not to suggest an invasion, but to explain that if an invasion of Britain was ordered, it must be carefully planned and not carried out hastily.Hitler, too, was skeptical, saying he was fully aware of the special difficulties of such a task.He also harbored hopes that Britain would soon seek peace.It was not until the last week of June that the High Command settled on the idea, and it was not until July 2 that the first order was issued, making the invasion of Britain a possible war plan.The Führer concluded that certain conditions (the most important of which is air superiority) can be landed in the UK.On July 16, Hitler issued instructions saying:

In spite of England's militarily hopeless position, there was no sign of peace, and I resolved to prepare a plan for landing in England and, if necessary, to carry it out.Preparations for the entire program should be completed by mid-August.Therefore, all aspects stepped up this work. The plans of the German Navy, which I had heard about in June, were basically mechanical.They intended to bombard Dover with heavy artillery from Cape Graynose, and to cover the French coast in the Channel of Dover with powerful artillery, thereby opening a narrow corridor on the most convenient line of the English Channel, surrounded on both sides by minefields. Get up and lay out submarine protection on the outer edge.The army took a ferry across the sea from this corridor, and large troops were reinforced in batches one after another.The task of the navy ends here, and it will be up to the generals of the German army to solve the problem in the future.

We have overwhelming naval superiority, and under the cover of a superior air force, we can smash their minefields with small ships, and destroy the ten or twenty submarines assembled to protect the minefields. idea.Nevertheless, after the fall of France, anyone could see that the only hope of avoiding a protracted war, with all its consequences, was the capitulation of England.As we have already recounted, the German navy was badly damaged in the battle off Norway; it was itself crippled, so little support was given to the army.However, the German Navy still has its own plans, and no one can say whether they will encounter good luck unintentionally.

The German High Command was at first rather hesitant about the question of invading Britain.They had neither planned nor prepared for the event, had no such training, but they were emboldened by a succession of fine victories for several weeks.It is not the army's duty to ensure safe passage across the sea, but once the armies are on land they feel that it is their duty to fight.Indeed, as early as August Admiral Raeder felt obliged to draw their attention to the dangers of crossing the Channel, where they might be wiped out.When the responsibility for transporting the army across the sea was clearly assigned to the navy, the German Admiralty has always expressed pessimism.

On July 21, the heads of the armed forces met with the head of state.He told them that the decisive stage of the war had come, but that Britain had not yet recognized it and hoped to save the day.He spoke of American support for Great Britain and possible changes in Germany's political relations with Soviet Russia.He said it should be recognized that the execution of Operation Sea Lion is the most effective way to end a war quickly.It was only after a long conversation with Admiral Raeder that Hitler began to understand what crossing the Channel would involve, with the tides, currents, and mysteries of the sea.He described Operation Sea Lion as a very daring and courageous enterprise.Even if the voyage is short, it is not a river crossing, but a sea controlled by the enemy.This is not a one-shot attack like Norway; a surprise attack will not do; a defensively prepared and extremely resolute enemy will resist us and control the seas we must use.Army operations require forty divisions.The most difficult problem is the supply and storage of materials.We cannot expect any supplies to be supplied locally in England.The first condition is complete control of the air, the use of powerful artillery to cover the crossing in the Strait of Dover, and protect it with minefields.He said: "The time of year is also an important factor, as the weather in the North Sea and English Channel can be very harsh in the second half of September, with fog starting in mid-October.Therefore, the main landing operation had to be completed on September 15, after which the cooperation of the Luftwaffe and heavy weapons was not very reliable.Since the cooperation of the air force is the decisive condition, this should be regarded as the main factor in determining the date.

A heated and rather violent dispute arose among the German staff over the width of the coast to land on and the number of targets to attack.The Army called for landings at a series of points along the southern coast of England from Dover to Lyme Ridges west of Portland.They also called for an auxiliary landing at Ramsgate, north of Dover.The German Naval Staff said that the most suitable area for safe crossing of the English Channel was between Cape North Flanders and the western tip of the Isle of Wight.The Army Staff had drawn up plans on this point to land 100,000 men at various points westward from Dover to Lyme Bay, followed immediately by 160,000 men.The German Army Commander Halder announced that at least four divisions should be landed in the Brighton area.He also called for landings between Diehl and Ramsgate; at least thirteen divisions, at as many points as possible on the entire front at the same time.In addition, the Luftwaffe requested ships to transport fifty-two squadrons of anti-aircraft guns with the first troops to land.

However, the Chief of Naval Staff stated that such a large-scale or such a rapid operation is simply impossible.He was not in a position to undertake the task of escorting the landing force through the mentioned expanse of sea.He meant that the Army should choose the most favorable landing sites within these ranges.Even with air supremacy, the naval power could only escort one group at a time across the sea, and they considered the narrowest part of the Strait of Dover to be the passage of least difficulty.To transport the second batch of 160,000 people and their equipment across the Strait at one time, a ship of 2 million tons is required.Even with the requisites of this utopia, the port of embarkation could hardly accommodate such a large number of ships.Only the first echelon of these divisions could be transported across the strait to establish a narrow bridgehead position, and it would take at least two more days to transport the second echelon of these divisions to land, not to mention the second batch of six divisions considered necessary to land. Shipped over.He further pointed out that landing on a vast coastline means that the time of high tide at each selected landing site varies from three hours to five and a half hours.Therefore, either accept unfavorable tidal conditions at certain landing sites, or abandon the idea of ​​simultaneous landings.His opinion is hard to refute.

A lot of precious time was wasted in the debate between your memorandum and mine.Admiral Halder did not consult with the Chief of Naval Staff until August 7th.Halder said in this meeting: I completely reject the Navy's proposal.From the Army's point of view, I think it's suicide.Simply send the landing troops directly to the meat grinder.The Chief of the Naval Staff replied that he also rejected the plan of landing on the vast coastline, since it would only cost troops in transit.In the end, Hitler adopted a compromise solution that could neither satisfy the army's requirements nor the navy's.A directive issued by the Supreme Command on August 27 stipulated that the actions of the army must take into account the availability of shipping positions and the safety of crossing and landing.The landings between Deal and Ramsgate were all abandoned, but the coastline of landings stretched from Folkestone to Bognor.By the time such an agreement is reached, it will be the end of August; of course, all this will depend on the success of the air battle, which has now been going on for six weeks.

The final plan was drawn up based on the finally determined landing site.Military command was given to Rundstedt, but lack of ships reduced his force to thirteen divisions, with a reserve of twelve.Sixteenth Army from the ports between Rotterdam and Boulogne will land near Hais, Rye, Hastings and Eastbourne; from the ports between Boulogne and Le Havre The Ninth Army attacked the coast between Brighton and Watson.Dover was to be taken from the ground; the two corps then advanced together on the Canterbury|Ashford|Mayfield|Arundel line of cover.In total, eleven divisions will land in the first batch.

They also hoped optimistically to advance to Gravesend, Reigett, Petersfield and Portsmouth a week after landing.With the Sixth Army in reserve, its divisions were on standby for reinforcements and, if the situation permitted, to extend the offensive coast to Weymouth.Once the bridgehead was established, it was easy to increase the numbers of these three armies, because, General Halder said, there was no military force against Germany on the Continent.It is true that Germany has no shortage of brave and well-armed troops, but these troops need ships and safe transportation. The first and most important task fell to the Naval Staff.Germany has about 1,200,000 tons of sea-going vessels at its disposal for all its needs.Carrying the invasion force would have required more than half that, which would have caused huge economic disruption.In early September, the Naval Staff reported that it had requisitioned: 168 transport ships (a total of 700,000 tons) Barge 1910 419 tugboats and trawlers 1,600 motorboats These large numbers of ships need to be manned and sail from seaways and canals to the port of assembly.Meanwhile, we have been attacking ships anchored in Wilhelmshaven, Kiel Canal, Cuxshafen, Bremen, and Emden since the beginning of July; It was also attacked unexpectedly.On September 1, when the mass of ships preparing to invade began to move southwards, they were watched by the Royal Air Force, reported their situation in time, and attacked violently along the entire coast from Antwerp to Le Havre.The German Naval Staff Department recorded: The enemy continued to conduct combat defenses along the coast, concentrated bombers bombing the port where the sea lions departed, and coastal reconnaissance activities are enough to show that the enemy is now ready to deal with our upcoming landing. Again: the British bombers and the RAF mine-laying teams are still in full combat capability, and it must be admitted that the activities of the British troops have undoubtedly been successful, if not decisively hindering the German transport. But despite repeated setbacks and losses, the German Navy completed the first part of their mission.Their 10 per cent margin for accidents and losses had been fully used up, but there was not much less than the planned minimum for the first phase. At this time, both the navy and the army put their burden on the Luftwaffe. The whole plan of opening up the corridor, faced with the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet and small ships, covered by the Luftwaffe, the success of laying mines on both sides of the channel depended on whether the Luftwaffe could defeat the British Air Force, completely in the English Channel and southeast England. Master the air supremacy not only over the sea crossing channel but also over the landing site.Both of the older branches of the armed forces blamed Field Marshal Göring. Göring accepted this responsibility without hesitation, believing that the Luftwaffe, with its considerable numerical superiority, would overwhelm the British air defenses and destroy the British airfields at Kent and Sussex after a few weeks of hard work. , complete control of the English Channel.Besides, he was convinced that the bombing of England, and especially of London, would depress the decadent and peace-loving Englishmen to the point of peace, especially when the threat of invasion loomed large on their horizon. Want to make peace.The German Admiralty disagreed, and they had a lot of concerns.They believe that the sea lion operation plan should only be carried out as a last resort.In July they suggested that unless unlimited air raids and unlimited submarine warfare would enable the enemy to negotiate peace on the terms of the Führer, action should be postponed until the spring of 1941, but Field Marshal Keitel and Jodl The general was delighted to see that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force had such certainty. These were really good times for Nazi Germany.Hitler danced with joy even before he forced France to suffer the humiliation of the Compiègne armistice.The German army used to march through the Arc de Triomphe all the way to the Elysee Garden Avenue.What else could they not do?Why hesitate and not take advantage of the victory to advance?Therefore, the sea, land, and air forces participating in the Sea Lion combat plan all study the favorable factors within their own scope, and leave the negative side to their partners. [1] At 5 a.m. on November 11, 1918, General Foch and German military representatives signed an armistice agreement in a train compartment dedicated to General Foch in the dense forest of Compiègne. signed in the same carriage at the same place.translator As the days passed, their doubts arose and their actions were delayed.Hitler's order of July 16 stipulated that all preparations should be completed by mid-August.The naval, land and air forces considered this impossible, and by the end of July Hitler agreed to set September 15th as the earliest possible date for an invasion of Britain, while at the same time reserving his decision pending the outcome of the planned intensified air campaign Take action after finding out. On 30 August the Naval Staff reported that preparations could not be completed on 15 September because of the British response to the invasion fleet.According to their request, the date of the invasion was postponed to September 21st, and there was another condition attached: they must be notified ten days in advance.This means that the preparatory order should be issued on September 11th.On 10 September the Naval Staff reported again that they were experiencing various difficulties due to persistently bad weather and British counter-bombing.They pointed out that although the necessary naval preparations could be completed by the 21st, the prescribed operational condition of absolute air superiority over the English Channel had not been realized.Therefore, on the 11th, Hitler postponed the preparatory order for another three days, changing the earliest date of the invasion to the 24th, but on the 14th he postponed the date of the invasion again. On the 14th, Admiral Raeder expressed the following opinion: (1) The present air situation does not yet provide the conditions required for the completion of this operation, and therefore the danger remains too great. (2) The failure of Operation Sea Lion would mean a great increase in British prestige, and the powerful influence of our attack on Britain would soon be wiped out. (3) There should be continuous air raids on Britain, and especially on London.If the weather is good, the air strikes will be stepped up without regard to the sea lions.Air strikes must have had a decisive effect. (4) But Operation Sea Lion cannot be cancelled, so as to keep the British anxious; and it would be a great relief to the British if news of its cancellation came to the outside world. On the 17th, the date of the operation was postponed indefinitely. The main reason for this is that the views of both the enemy and us are the same.Raeder continued: (1) Our preparations for landing on the coast of the Channel are widely known to the enemy, who are constantly taking countermeasures.The following phenomena may be cited as examples: enemy planes attacked and reconnaissance the port where Germany launched this military operation, enemy destroyers frequently appeared in the sea off the southern coast of England, the Strait of Dover and the seas off the coast of France and Belgium, and in the sea near the northern coast of France. The constant patrols of the sea, Churchill's latest speech, and so on. (2) Although most of the ships of the enemy's home fleet are still docked at the western base, their main ships are ready to counterattack our army's landing. (3) Our aerial reconnaissance planes have spotted a large number of destroyers (more than 30 ships) in the south and southeast ports. (4) All available information indicates that the enemy's navy is concentrating all its attention on this battlefield. In August, the bodies of some forty German soldiers washed up at various points along the coast between the Isle of Wight and Cornwall.The Germans used barges to practice boarding ships off the coast of France.In order to avoid British bombing, some barges sailed to sea, or were bombed by British planes or sank due to bad weather.This was the source of the widespread rumors of an attempted invasion by the Germans, who were said to have suffered disproportionate losses either by drowning or by burning gasoline at sea.We have not refuted such rumors, which spread freely throughout the fallen country, exaggerated as they spread, and gave great encouragement to the oppressed people.For example, in Brussels, there is a store that marked on the men's bathrobes on display that they are only for swimming in the English Channel. On the 7th of September we received information that barges and small ships were moving west and south to the ports between Ostend and Le Havre, as these ports of massing ships were being heavily attacked by the British Air Force Attacks, these ships will not come to these ports until the German army is about to take actual action.The attack capability of the Luftwaffe between Amsterdam and Brest was enhanced by the transfer of 160 bombers from Norway; short-range dive-bomber formations were also seen at forward airfields in the Pas-de-Calais region.The four Germans captured a few days ago who confessed to being spies, landed from a rowboat on the south-east coast, said they were ready to report to Ipswich any time in the next fortnight|London| Reading | Developments in the British Reserves at Oxford.The moonlight and tidal conditions between September 8 and 10 are favorable for the enemy to attack the southwestern coast.At this point, the Chiefs of Staff decided that the possibility of an invasion was imminent, and that the defense forces should be immediately on standby. At that time there was no way within Home Forces Command to change the original eight-hour readiness for battle order to some intermediate degree of immediate readiness for battle.Therefore, at 8:00 p.m. on September 7th, the home force issued the Cromwell coded order to the two districts on the east and south coasts, which meant that the invasion was imminent; these districts were actually the operating stations of the coastal outposts.The order was also sent to all troops stationed in the London area and to the 4th and 7th Corps of the HQ Reserve.The order was also communicated to all other jurisdictions in the United Kingdom in order to make this known.On this basis the National Guard commanders in certain parts of the country took it upon themselves to ring the church bells to summon the National Guard.This gave rise to rumors that enemy paratroopers had landed and that German fast torpedo boats were approaching the shore.Neither I nor the Chiefs of Staff were aware that Cromwell's definite coded order had been used; so instructions were issued the following morning that some intermediate alert signals should be prepared for a gradual increase in subsequent situations, and that It is not necessary to declare that an invasion is imminent.Even with this coded order from Cromwell, the National Guard is not to be called up except for special missions; moreover, a National Guard soldier should only knock on a church if he personally witnesses the landing of up to twenty-five enemy paratroopers You should not ring a bell just because you hear someone else ringing it or for any other reason.The incident caused much chatter and unease, as can be imagined, but neither the newspapers nor the Parliament had a say in the matter.For all concerned, this can serve as an effective pep talk and defensive exercise. As we follow the preparations for the German invasion all the way to their climax, we see how their early victories gradually gave way to doubt and finally to total loss of confidence.In fact, they had already lost heart in 1940; although the plan was raised again in 1941, it never aroused the fantasies of the German leaders as it did in the happy days after the fall of France.In the fateful months of July and August, we see Commander-in-Chief Raeder urging his Army and Air Force colleagues to explain the difficulties that would be encountered in large-scale amphibious operations.Knowing the weakness of the German navy and the lack of time to make adequate preparations, he tried to limit Halder's huge plan to land a large number of troops on a vast coast at the same time.At the same time, the ambitious Göring was preoccupied with stunning victories with his air force alone, rather than participating in joint operational planning and acting as a more modest partner in the systematic weakening of resisting enemy air and sea forces in the area of ​​invasion. supporting role. It is evident from the record that the German High Command was by no means a cooperative body with a common purpose and a proper understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations.Everyone wants to be the brightest star in the sky.Clearly, there had been friction from the start, and Halder had no desire to revise his plan to make it realistically possible as long as he could put the blame on Raeder.The Führer's intervention was necessary but did not appear to have done much to improve relations between the armed forces.In Germany, where the prestige of the army is the highest, the generals of the army always treat their naval colleagues as their subordinates.There is no way not to come to the conclusion that the German Army is unwilling to submit to the domination of the Navy in a major military operation.When General Yodl was questioned about these plans after the battle, he replied impatiently: Our deployments are exactly the same as those of Julius Caesar.This sentence shows the attitude of an authentic German army soldier towards naval warfare, who has no understanding of the problems that will be encountered in landing, and does not understand the risks at sea that will be encountered when deploying a large number of troops on a fortified coast. In England, whatever our faults, we know everything about sea affairs.We have been familiar with it from generation to generation through the centuries, and its traditions inspire not only our sailors but the nation as a whole.This is the most important reason why we have been able to deal with the threat of invasion with equanimity.The system in which the chiefs of staff of the three services coordinate military operations under the leadership of the secretary of defense has produced an unprecedented example of a spirit of cooperation, mutual understanding and sincere cooperation. Over time, when we have the opportunity to attack the enemy in a large scale from the sea, we will base our operations on the thoroughness of the preparations necessary for this mission and on a full understanding of the technical aspects of an operation of such magnitude and danger. need.Even if Germany had well-trained amphibious forces and modern amphibious equipment in 1940, their hopes would be dashed before our navy and air force.In fact, they lack both the tools and the training. We have seen how our many scruples and doubts were increasingly transformed into firm confidence, and we confidently analyzed the enemy's invasion plans from the beginning.On the other hand, the more the German High Command and Fuehrer looked at this risky plan, the less they liked it.Of course, we were ignorant of each other's mood and opinion of such a plan; but with each passing week from mid-July to mid-September the relationship between the German Admiralty and the British Admiralty became more clearly seen. Opinions on this question coincided between the German High Command and the British Chiefs of Staff, and between the Führer and the author of this book.If we agreed in this way on other matters, there would be no need for war.Of course, the common view among us is: everything depends on the war in the air.The question is how the fighters on both sides will see each other.Moreover, the Germans could not fathom whether the British people would withstand aerial bombardment (the effects of which were greatly exaggerated at the time) or whether they would yield and force His Majesty's government to surrender.For this, Field Marshal Goering is full of hope, but we are not afraid at all.