Chapter 69 Volume 2, Chapter 27, Mussolini’s Attack on Greece

October 1940 | November Mussolini decides to attack Greece His letter to Hitler October 19 Florence Conference Italy invades Greece October 28, 1940 Reinforcement of Admiral Cunningham's fleet HMS Radiance arrives Our duty Importance of Crete for Air Support to Greece My Memorandum to Chief of Air Staff November 2, 1940 Misunderstood Secrecy of Wavell Wilson's Plan for Offensive in Libya Recall Mr. Eden Greece Needs Cree The last telegrams of Mr. Eden, Specialist. He returned to England. He stated that the Compass plan was completely agreed. Combat naval deployments I hope the Compass plan will have an amphibious character I sent a message to Wavell on November 26th Policies towards Turkey The situation is improving The lapse in Souda Bay Italy invaded Greece from Albania Mr. Chamberlain's death mourns Chamberlain gentlemen.

Now, on the Mediterranean scene, Mussolini committed a new, though not entirely unexpected, atrocity, which brought many embarrassments and far-reaching consequences to what was already troublesome enough for us. The leaders finally decided to attack Greece on October 15, 1940.That morning, an Italian military summit was held at the Palazzo Venezia.His opening remarks at the meeting were as follows: The purpose of this meeting is to explain in general terms the line of action which I have decided to launch against Greece.First, the nature of this action has both maritime and territorial purposes.The purpose of the territory is to occupy the entire coast of southern Albania and the Ionian Islands including Zakynthos, Kefalonia and Corfu, as well as Salonib.When we achieve these ends, it will make a difference in our confrontation with Britain in the Mediterranean.Second, to occupy Greece in its entirety, incapacitating it, and ensuring that it will remain within our political and economic sphere under any circumstances.

Having clarified the problem in this way, I have fixed the date. My opinion is that there should be no delay for an hour and the action should be on the 26th of this month.Long before we went to war, long before the conflict began, I had thought it through for months, and now I had this action in mind.I would like to add that I don't expect any problems in the North.Yugoslavia will remain silent due to various interests.I don't think there will be much trouble on the Turkish side, especially since Germany has established itself in Romania and Bulgaria has grown in power.Bulgaria can play a role in our game and I will take the necessary steps to take advantage of this unique opportunity to bring about its coveted Macedonia [1] and an access to the sea [2] October 10 On the 9th, Mussolini wrote to Hitler explaining the decision he had taken.At the time, Hitler was on his way to Handay and Mondois.The letter (the contents of which have not been published) appears to have been forwarded to him after some difficulty.When the letter finally reached him, he immediately suggested to Mussolini that a conference be held to discuss the overall political situation in Europe.The meeting took place in Florence on October 28.That morning, Italy had begun its offensive against Greece.Hitler, however, did not seem to intend to make the adventurous invasion of Greece a subject of discussion.He said very politely that Germany agreed with Italy's actions in Greece, and then talked about his meeting with Franco and Pétain.No doubt he didn't like what his partner was doing.A few weeks later, when the Italian offensive was thwarted, he wrote to Mussolini on November 20: When I asked for a meeting with you in Florence, it was with this hope that I embarked on the Journey: I wish to clarify my opinion before your imminent move towards Greece (of which I have heard only a rough idea) begins.But, on the whole, he took his allies' decisions for granted.

[1] In northern Greece.translator [2] "Letters and Documents of Hitler and Mussolini", p. 61. Before dawn on October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Prime Minister, General Murtaxes.Mussolini demanded that all of Greece be opened to Italian troops.At the same time, Italian troops stationed in Albania also invaded Greece from several points.The Greek army was by no means unprepared on the border, so the Greek government rejected the ultimatum.They also submitted Mr. Chamberlain's pledge of April 13, 1939.We cannot fail to fulfill this point.His Majesty, at the suggestion of the War Cabinet, and from his own wishes, replied to the King of Greece:

Your cause is our cause; we shall fight a common enemy.I answered the appeal of General Murtaxes: We will give you all the assistance we can.We will fight the common enemy, and we will share in the common victory.Over the course of a long journey, we have kept our promises. Although the Italian fleet greatly surpassed ours numerically, our strength in the Mediterranean had also grown remarkably.In September, Valiant, the armored aircraft carrier Splendor, and two cruisers with anti-aircraft equipment sailed safely through the Mediterranean to join Admiral Cunningham's fleet at Alexandria.Prior to this, Cunningham's ships were often spotted by the enemy and frequently bombed by the superior Italian air force.The Radiant, equipped with new fighter jets and the latest radar equipment, shot down some reconnaissance and attack aircraft, thus keeping the whereabouts of our fleet secret from the enemy.This was done very timely.

We have nothing left to offer but a few air squadrons, a British military delegation, and some token troops; and even these meager forces have been painfully curtailed from the urgent military plans on the Libyan battlefield down.At this time, we suddenly thought of a major strategic event Crete!Never let the Italians take it.We must act first, and at once.Fortunately Mr Eden was in the Middle East at the time so I could get in touch with one of my cabinet colleagues who was on the ground.He had planned to return home after his meeting with General Smuts in Khartoum.I sent him a telegram: October 29, 1940

I realize the importance of your meeting with Smuts, but I want Wavell to go back to Cairo first, and then you as soon as possible. All of us here are convinced that an effort must be made to secure our footing in Crete, and that it is worth the risk to secure this valuable prize.You will see military cables on this issue. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (to Khartoum) October 29, 1949 The most important thing, it seemed, was to have the best airfield and base for naval fuel at Souda Bay.The successful defense of Crete is of great help to the defense of Egypt.The loss of Crete to Italy would greatly increase all the difficulties of the Mediterranean.Such a large prize was worth the risk, and was worth almost as much as a successful offensive in Libya.Having thoroughly studied this matter with Wavell and Smuts, please do not hesitate to suggest a large-scale operation, even if it affects other theaters, and please advise us what additional support is required, including aircraft and Anti-aircraft artillery squadrons can be proposed.We are considering how to meet your needs.I think you should return to Cairo immediately.

At the request of the Greek government, Souda Bay, the best port in Crete, was taken by our troops two days later. Prime Minister to Chief of the Reich General Staff October 30, 1940 What steps are we taking to get news from the Greek front?Do we have military observers there?What are our military attaches doing there? Why don't you appoint a general from Egypt to head my military delegation to the Field Army headquarters in Greece?Let them go and watch the battle, and give us details about the strengths and weaknesses of both armies.As long as the Greek side agrees, I hope to receive a detailed telegram on a daily basis or approximately daily, telling us the situation very accurately.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee October 30, 1940 We have no objection to the following arrangement: transfer two battalions to Freetown, and after the West African Brigade goes to take up the defense, they can go to Egypt.The two battalions could not leave England until it was agreed that the West African Brigade should go to West Africa. As far as the supply of anti-aircraft guns is concerned, both Crete and Malta should precede Freetown. At the present moment, I cannot agree to the transfer of anti-aircraft guns to Freetown, nor can I agree at this stage (to Freetown ) to a fighter squadron.

The Navy shall be responsible for preventing any expeditionary force from the sea from attacking our West African colonies. As for air raids, if the French bombed Freetown or Bathurst, we bombed Vichy.I don't think that's going to happen yet. Prime Minister to Air Force Major General Longmore [1] [1] Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in the Middle East. November 1, 1940 (In sending a squadron of Branham fighters to Greece) You made a very brave and wise decision.I hope to be able to reinforce you as soon as possible. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer Air Force Chief of Staff and Chiefs of Staff Committee

November 1, 1940 I propose that immediate arrangements be made for the redeployment of four additional squadrons of heavy bombers (including the one already transferred to the island of Malta) and four squadrons of fighter jets to the Middle East.Please send the dispatch plan for review.I hope to get a report on this today. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee November 1, 1940 Mr. Eden requested the distribution of 10,000 rifles for the Middle East.Couldn't these guns be sourced from US supplies, or a small batch of rifles found elsewhere in the world? Prime Minister to Chief of Air Staff November 2, 1940 1. I think the four bomber squadrons could fly to Crete or Greece via the island of Malta.Personnel and ground support materials are transported by cruisers.It is imperative that these squadrons be dispatched from their bases in Greek territory as soon as possible to attack the Italian fleet at Taranto and to harass southern Italy generally.For such a major operation, the Navy has to make a special effort, so don't you think that there will be no ships to assist, in any case, there will be some time for the delivery of ground crews, supplies, etc., which must be put into battle at this very urgent time. A warship came. I think the more difficult thing is the vehicles, but perhaps one can be brought in from Egypt and the rest improvised. 2. The delivery of fighter jets is of course more difficult, but I hope they can fly to Malta from an aircraft carrier, just like the last time.The Fury should support the Ark Royal if necessary.Can a fighter jet fly from Malta to an airfield in Greece?If not, is it possible to fly to an aircraft carrier to refuel before flying to Greece?The same preparations for these fighters will be made in terms of materiel and ground crews as has been done for the bombers. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (sent to Middle East Command) November 2, 1940 The situation in Greece must be seen as the overriding issue at the moment. We are well aware that our manpower and material resources are weak.Aid to Greece must be carefully studied, or we are about to lose the whole favorable position in Turkey if it is supposed that Britain never intends to honor its pledges.Please stay in Cairo for at least one more week, during which time we will study these matters, really doing the best we can on both sides.At the same time, another 30,000 people will arrive at your place around November 15th, which will definitely influence the situation in Egypt. In Mr. Eden's previous meetings and talks with General Wavell and General Wilson, he had raised the question: What will we do if the Italians don't go on the offensive?They told him, as a great military secret, that they were drawing up a plan to attack the Italians in the deserts of West Africa, without waiting for them to attack Matruh.Neither he nor Wavell communicated these thoughts to me or to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.General Wavell begged the Secretary of State for War not to send any telegrams on the matter, but to tell us orally upon his return. So for a few weeks we had no idea what was going on in their heads.It is clear from my telegram of October 26 that any large-scale pre-emptive military action in the West African desert would have my strong support.However, until Mr. Eden returned, we all had the impression that Wavell and Wilson were still entangled in the defense of Port Matruh, waiting to be beaten.At this critical juncture the only action they seemed to intend to take was to send a battalion or so to Crete, a few squadrons to Greece, a few troops to attack the Dodecanese, and launch a campaign in the Sudan. A massive but well-timed offensive.We have risked so much, worked so hard, and paid so much to provide them with such a force, and yet their use of it does not appear to be at all satisfactory. Therefore, during this period, our correspondence and telegrams were based on mutual misunderstandings.Wavell and the Secretary of War felt that in order to give Greece little support, we were forcing them to disperse the forces that had been assembled for the offensive in the West African desert.On the other hand, because we do not know their intention to launch an offensive, we object to them standing still or wasting time at this critical juncture.In fact, as we shall see, we all agree.Indeed, on November 1st, Mr. Eden secretly sent a telegram: We cannot draw from the forces in the Middle East sufficient air or army reinforcements to make any decisive difference in the Greek campaign.Removal of such forces from here, or of reinforcements in transit or authorized, would jeopardize our entire favorable position in the Middle East, and would also hinder the present plan to launch an offensive on more than one theater .After untold painstaking efforts and many serious risks, we have now established here a defense capable of coping with ample so far as ground forces are concerned.We will soon be in a favorable position to launch an offensive on some fronts which, if successful, will have far-reaching effects on the overall situation of the war.It would certainly be a mistake to ask us to abandon this task for other purposes, nor would it be wise to deploy our forces sporadically on a battlefield where they cannot be decisive.The best way we can help Greece is to strike Italy, and we can do this most effectively from where our forces are already strong and where our plans have been drawn up.I am eager to give you a detailed account of the deployment and plans here as soon as possible. I propose to leave in three days and return home by the most convenient route. This telegram was staggered from my telegram to Khartoum to him, and he went to Cairo, so my telegram had to be resent to Cairo. Prime Minister to Mr Eden (sent to Middle East Command) November 3, 1940 The seriousness of the situation in Greece and its consequences compel you to travel to Cairo.However unfair this is, if we sit by and let Greece collapse without helping it, it will have fatal consequences for Turkey and the future of the war. German troops hadn't been there yet.The fuel bases and airfields established on Crete must be gradually developed into permanent combat fortresses.This thing is a work in progress.But a real effort must be made to assist Greece directly, even if only by sending some token troops.I know very well that those with you are determined to fight a big battle in Port Matruh.It is for this reason that this great war may not happen.The enemy will wait for the completion of the oil pipeline and the expansion of the currently assembled army.The difficulty of your attack across the desert is obvious, but if you are unable to launch a major offensive in Libya yourself within the next two months, you should take the risk of strengthening the Greek resistance.Since June, more than 70,000 people have been dispatched to Middle East Command, another 30,000 will arrive by November 15, and 53,000 will arrive by the end of the year.The armored regiment set off yesterday in a massive military transport fleet.Therefore, I cannot believe that those small offensives you speak of, combined with the main defense of Port Matruh, are more important than effective action in Greece. No one would be grateful to us for standing still and increasing our forces in Egypt, and to turn our backs on the situation in Greece, and all that depended on it.The loss of Athens is far more harmful than the loss of Kenya and Khartoum, and we do not need to pay such a price.Please read carefully the telegram from Palerit (our Minister in Athens).In war, when new events arise, they must be dealt with, and the main problem must not be subordinated to partial views.Nobody expected that Italy would attack Greece so late in the year.Greece might be able to hold off the invaders if she fought bravely, with the appropriate assistance from Egypt and England.I am trying to send a strong bomber and fighter force to Crete and Greece for reinforcements, aircraft from England and ground support by cruisers.If this is practicable, details will be telegraphed tomorrow or Monday. I believe that you will firmly grasp the situation, abandon all negative and passive policies, and seize the opportunity that has come into our hands.In war, safety first will inevitably lead to destruction. You say you are safe, but you are not.Send your proposal as early as possible, or state that you have no suggestions to make. I sent another telegram: November 4, 1940 We are sending you Air Force Reinforcements, and the attached cable from the Chiefs of Staff has details on how to get there.Please send one Gladiator squadron and two Brenham fighter squadrons to Greece immediately.If necessary, send another battalion to Crete.According to the arrival of the above-mentioned air force reinforcements, a squadron of fighter jets will be dispatched first.The anti-aircraft guns used on the Greek airfields had to be brought in before these squadrons could arrive. At this time it was proposed that the Greeks should leave their Cretan divisions on the island.So I sent the following memo: Prime Minister to Chief of the Reich General Staff November 6, 1940 It will be very difficult to prevent the Greeks from using this Kerryian island division.If this is the case, we will certainly have to send more troops to the island.The important thing is that there must be a considerable number of troops there, and that the enemy think that we have a large number of troops landing.The area that needs to be guarded is very vast, and the consequences of a counterattack are also extremely disastrous. Please tell us your opinion. Prime Minister to Chief of the Reich General Staff November 7, 1940 If we use Crete only for our own purposes, and do not allow the Greeks to use two-thirds of their Fifth Division, we shall not be doing Greece much good.The defense of Crete depended on the navy, but, in any case, a certain deterrent force must be stationed on the shore.I doubt whether the two British battalions and the three left by the Greeks are enough.I would like you to send a telegram to General Wavell as I have requested.He must think of ways to plan: (1) A British supplementary team of three or four thousand men and twelve cannons.These three or four thousand people do not need to be fully equipped or mobile. (2) He can draw only such a force from an army which he does not prepare to engage in the battle which may be at hand. (3) We should tell the Greeks that we can spare six Greek battalions and the artillery of the 5th Greek Division (to fight with the main Greek forces). Every effort must be made to rush in arms or equipment to form a Greek reserve division in Crete.This reserve division is well stocked with rifles and machine guns.It would be inappropriate not to keep a Greek division on the Epirus front to fight, and it would be a crime to lose Crete because we did not have enough troops on the island. It is time for Mr. Eden to report back to us in accordance with his urgency.The following telegram will explain why. Mr Eden to Prime Minister November 3, 1940 It is strongly urged that I should return home as soon as possible so that I can present to you the whole situation as I observe it from the Middle East.Hope you can agree with this.I intend to leave tomorrow morning. After meeting with you, I am ready to fly back here if necessary, and I am convinced that the meeting between the two of us is extremely urgent.It is impossible to detail the plans for the situation here by telegram. Please reply quickly. I agreed, and the Secretary of State for War set off on his way home.The following points were mentioned in his telegram to me on his departure: The situation in Crete was discussed at the meeting in Cairo.Admiral Cunningham emphasized that the capture of Crete would be of great value to us, as from that island it would be possible to control the eastern Mediterranean and interfere with Italian traffic to North Africa, however, due to the lack of anti-submarine protection, the present The mooring of the fleet in Souda Bay should not exceed a few hours at a time. He believed that the Italians were not expected to take Crete in the immediate future or until Greece was taken.He and Wavell agreed to make arrangements for the immediate dispatch to Crete of part of the reinforcements referred to in my 1st November telegram.Admiral Cunningham believed that there was no need to station a large number of British troops on Crete. He was convinced that once the Cretans were organized, a battalion plus air defense would be enough.Then we discussed the whole issue of supporting Greece.As we said on September 22, any assistance we may give to Greece cannot be realized until the German and Italian threats to Egypt have finally been eliminated, because Egypt's security is so important to our strategy as to Greece's. The future is very important The support that Greece desperately needs is mainly the air force.The 30th Branham Fighter Squadron flew to Athens today.Longmore emphasized again that under the present circumstances, he was extremely reluctant to send more air squadrons to take on the Greek battlefield. He felt that this would expose his aircraft to heavy losses from Italian attacks, since, at the airfields in Greece or Crete, there were no aircraft shelters, no proper ground and other anti-aircraft defenses, and in the short term It is also very difficult to construct these facilities in the country. All in all, the commander-in-chief strongly argues that the defense of Egypt is of the utmost importance to our overall position in the Middle East.They believe that from a strategic point of view, defending Egypt is the most urgent task, more important than preventing Greece from being captured by the enemy.It is also critically important if we want to continue to have the support of Turkey. He also sent the following supplementary telegram in my private code: November 5, 1940 Although the reinforcements called by the Chiefs of Staff would bring greater risks to operations in the deserts of West Africa, and possibly increased casualties, these risks had to be taken in view of the political mission to aid Greece.Although the withdrawal of troops is not conducive to the deployment in the West African desert, it will not disrupt the entire deployment.But any increase in commitments beyond the limits currently imposed, or any attempt to increase the pace of reinforcements to Greece, would seriously jeopardize our position in Egypt.It has not yet been determined when air force reinforcements, especially fighter squadrons, will arrive in Egypt to replace the air force transferred to Greece.Past experience has shown that past projections have not been realized and that time has fallen considerably behind expectations.Now, I feel that I have nothing more to do here, so I plan to fly out tomorrow morning. The Secretary of State for War returned on 8th November, and that night, after the usual air raids had begun, he came to my temporary underground flats in Piccadilly.He brought the dark secret I've long wanted to know.Although it was only told to me now, it did not cause any damage.Mr. Eden disclosed in considerable detail the plans conceived and drawn up by General Wavell and General Wilson to a few persons appointed by us, including the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and General Ismay.We have made long and careful arrangements for the defense of Port Matruh, and now we do not have to wait for the Italians to attack on a strong line of defense.Instead, in another month or so, we're going to hit them.This action was named Operation Compass. It can be seen from the map [1] that the Italian army led by Marshal Graziani had more than 80,000 troops at that time, and had already crossed the Egyptian border. In the camps, the camps are far apart from each other, and they cannot support each other, and there is no deep equipment in their layout.The enemy had a gap of more than twenty miles between Sofafi's right flank and its immediate neighbor, the Nibewa camp.The plan was to storm through this gap and then move towards the Mediterranean, from the west, that is to say from the enemy's rear, to attack Nibeva's camp and then a series of camps at Tumar.Meanwhile, on the coast, keep Sophafi's camp and Mechtila's camp at bay with a small force.For this purpose the 7th Armored Division, the 4th Indian Division (now fully manned), the British 16th Infantry Brigade, and a mixed force from the garrison at Port Matruh were required.The plan involved serious danger, but also a chance for surprise.The danger is this: When our best troops break into the heart of the enemy's position, they will need to rush seventy miles in two consecutive nights in the open desert area, and, in the daytime between the two nights, there will be a chance of being detected and attacked by the enemy during the day. Danger.In addition, rations and gasoline must be carefully planned, and if the scheduled time is wrong, the consequences can be very serious. 【1】See page five hundred and forty-five (original book page number. Translator). The purpose to be achieved is worth the risk.Our vanguard by sea could cut off three-quarters of the communications of Marshal Graziani's troops as soon as they reached or near Buc Buc.The enemy was suddenly attacked by our army in the rear. After our army fought bravely, they would have to surrender in large numbers.In this way, the Italian army's front will fall apart and be out of control.Once their best troops had been captured or wiped out, they would have no remnants capable of withstanding our continued onslaught, nor could they withdraw in an organized way to Tripoli along the hundreds of miles of coast road. This is the absolute secret discussed by those generals and the Minister of War.That's what they're not willing to telegraph us.We are all very happy.I kept applauding.Really worth the effort.Immediate decision: If the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet agree, it will be approved immediately, and this promising plan of action will be given all possible support, and it will be the top priority of all our work, and, in our very tight manpower 1. The use of material resources should be used for this plan first, regardless of other urgent needs. These plans were then presented to the War Cabinet.I was prepared to speak on the matter myself or to have someone else speak of it, but my colleagues, when informed that the generals in the field and the Chiefs of Staff had fully agreed with myself and Mr. Eden, declared that they did not I hope to know the details of this plan, saying that the fewer people who know the better, and expressing that I fully agree with this offensive strategy.Such was the attitude of the War Cabinet in several important matters, and I record it here as a model for future similar dangers and difficulties. The Italian fleet showed little reaction to our occupation of Crete, but Admiral Cunningham had long been eager to use his now greatly strengthened fleet planes to attack the Italian fleet at its main base at Taranto.The attack, launched on 11 November, was preceded by a well-coordinated series of military operations: the arrival of troops in Malta, another reinforcement of ships, which included the battleship Barham, two cruisers and three The destroyer, sailed to Alexandria, and finally, as a climax, made the attack.Taranto lies at the heel of Italy's boot-shaped peninsula, twenty miles on three sides from Malta.Its wide harbor is well-fortified enough to withstand all modern weapons.We have several fast reconnaissance planes in Malta so we can identify our targets.The British plan was to dispatch two batches of planes from the Radiance, the first batch of twelve and the second batch of nine, of which eleven carried torpedoes and the rest either carried bombs or flares.Shortly after nightfall, the Radiance dispatched its aircraft from an area about 170 miles from Taranto.For an hour the battle raged amidst the flames and sound of destruction of the Italian fleet.Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, only two of our aircraft were shot down.The rest flew back to the Radiance safely. Such a battle was fought, which suddenly changed the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean. Aerial photographs prove that one of three battleships, the newly built Litrio, was torpedoed, and that a cruiser was also said to have been hit, and that the shipyard was also badly damaged.Half the Italian fleet was out of action for at least six months; and our Fleet Air Force, for their heroism, rejoiced in timely seizing such a rare opportunity. On this very day, the Italian Air Force was ordered by Mussolini to participate in the air raid on Great Britain, thus adding a bit of irony to our air force's attack on Taranto.An Italian bomber fleet, under the cover of sixty fighter jets, attempted to bomb the Allied military transport fleet on the Medway River.They were intercepted by my fighters and eight bombers and five fighters were shot down.This is the first and last time they will interfere in our internal affairs.They might as well use these planes to protect their fleet at Taranto. I have been keeping the President informed of the details. Ex-Navy personnel call the president November 16, 1940 I'm sure you're delighted about Taranto.The three undamaged Italian warships have left Taranto today, perhaps for Trieste. And another telegram: Ex-Navy personnel call the president November 21, 1940 I have instructed the Admiralty to make the following naval account of the Battle of Taranto, which may interest you: (1) The Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet planned a great deal of time for the attack; he had intended to attack on the 21st of October (Trafalgar Day)[1] if moonlight conditions were favorable, but as the Radiance was out Delayed by a small accident.On October 31 and November 1, while cruising in the middle of the Mediterranean, he considered attacking again, but the moon was out of the picture, and he also thought that attacking with flares attached to parachutes would not be very effective. .He was convinced that the success of the attack depended on the good or bad moonlight and weather, on the undetected approach of the fleet, and on our effective reconnaissance.Reconnaissance was carried out by airships and squadrons of Glenn Martins from Malta.November 11 | On the night of the 12th, all the above-mentioned conditions were met.Unfortunately, due to the bad weather in the Gulf of Taranto, it was not possible to attack again on the night of the 12th-13th. [1] On October 21, 1805, British Nelson defeated the combined fleet of France and Spain at Trafalgar.translator (2) Duplex launch tubes were used, which probably also helped the torpedo hit the enemy ship. (3) The Greek ambassador to Angola reported on November 11 that the Italian fleet was concentrating at Taranto for an attack on Corfu.The reconnaissance of November 13th proved that the undamaged battleships and cruisers with eight-inch guns had left Taranto, probably in response to the attack of the 11th-12th. At this moment I sent a telegram to General Wavell. Prime Minister to General Wavell November 14, 1940 The Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Armed Forces, and I have studied the full picture of recent events.The blockade of the Italians on the Greek front, the success of the British naval attack on the Taranto fleet, the incompetence of the Italian airmen over Britain, the exciting reports of low morale in Italy, the situation in Gerabat[1] , your own experience with the enemy in the deserts of West Africa, and especially the general political situation, are all very favorable for the military action you have spoken of to the Secretary of War.Germany probably will not go without aid to its faltering allies for long.Therefore, it seems that now is the time to venture into Italy by sea, land and air.You should take coordinated actions with the other Commanders-in-Chief. [1] Gerabat is located on the Sudanese border, bordering Ethiopia.translator Prime Minister to General Wavell November 26, 1940 從各方面傳來的消息必然使你已經注意到，羅盤作戰計劃，對包括巴爾幹各國和土耳其在內的整個中東的局勢、對法國在北非的態度、對目前正在惴惴不安的西班牙人的態度、對處於困境的意大利以及對整個戰爭，是多麼重要。我雖不過分自信，但我不能不感到充滿了信心和希望，並且深信，為取得豐功偉績而冒險，是完全應該的。 已請海軍部詢問艦隊分擔的任務。如果能夠成功，想你必有計劃，加以充分的利用。我正在讓參謀部研究，如果一切順利的話，我們是否有可能從海上進行長距離的運輸，沿著海岸把作戰部隊和後備部隊運到前方，並修建新的供應基地，以供我們追擊敵人的裝甲車輛和裝甲部隊使用。我並不希望知道細節，但我願確知，是否曾對這一切加以估計、探索和盡可能的準備。 有人說，希特勒是無論如何不會去援助他的夥伴，這是難於令人相信的。顯然，德國的計劃已遠遠超出了穿過保加利亞直達薩洛尼卡的範圍。我們曾從幾方面接獲報告，說德國人並不贊同墨索里尼的冒險行動，所以他們想讓墨索里尼自作自受。這使我更加懷疑：某種不妙的事已醞釀成熟，不久就可爆發。每遲延一天就對我們有利一天。也許，羅盤作戰計劃本身就會決定南斯拉夫和土耳其的行動，而且，無論如何，如果成功的話，我們就能夠向土耳其提出早日給予支援的保證，遠遠超過我們目前力所能及的程度。人們的確可以看到，中東的重心有突然從埃及轉到巴爾幹各國，從開羅轉到君士坦丁堡的可能。毫無疑問，你當然想到了這一點，而且此間的參謀部也正在進行研究。 正如我數日前告訴你的，我們支持你和威爾遜的任何深思熟慮的行動，而不計成敗如何，因為在戰爭中，一個人只能爭取成功而不能保證成功。 請轉告朗莫爾，他從南部調回空軍中隊，不顧有遭受懲處之虞，【１】我對此非常欽佩。如果一切順利，狂暴號及其載運的裝備明日即將到達塔科拉迪。這將彌補我們為了支援希臘而從他手中抽調的力量；皇家空軍在希臘的幾次勝利的戰鬥中所起的作用，產生了巨大的軍事影響和政治影響。祝你們二人一切順利，也祝海軍上將坎寧安順利，他近來的成就非常出色。我很高興地聽說，他發現蘇達灣有不可估量的價值。 【１】當意大利進攻希臘後，英國駐中東空軍總司令朗莫爾因鑒於情勢緊急，未經批准即從非洲南部調回一部分空軍中隊，並派遣空軍中隊支援希臘。translator Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary 一九四○年十一月二十六日 我建議向我國駐土耳其大使提出下列幾點： （開始）參謀人員曾就他們所見到的關於贊成和反對土耳其參戰的各種論點提出報告；我們已把這些論點告訴了你，但是，我們不願你對我們自己的主張和對你的指示有任何疑難不明的地方。我們希望土耳其盡快參戰。我們並不強迫它採取任何特殊的步驟去支援希臘，我們只希望它向保加利亞申明，如果德軍假道保加利亞進攻希臘，或是保加利亞對希臘採取任何敵對行動，那麼，土耳其就立即宣戰。我們希望土耳其和南斯拉夫現在共同協商，如果可能的話，便在一發現德軍有向保加利亞移動的跡象時，立即向保加利亞和德國提出聯合警告。如果德軍穿過保加利亞，無論他們是否得到保加利亞的協助，土耳其都必須就在當時當地投入戰鬥，這一點，極為重要。如果土耳其不這樣做，它將發現自己完全陷於孤立，巴爾幹國家將被一一吞併，而且我們也將無力去幫助它。你可以提一下，到一九四一年夏，我們希望至少有十五個師在中東作戰，到年底則差不多有二十五個師。我們毫不懷疑，我們能夠在非洲擊敗意大利。 下午六時參謀長委員會一致同意以上各點。 首相致海軍大臣、第一海務大臣，並請伊斯梅將軍轉參謀長委員會 一九四○年十一月三十日 （送空軍參謀長一閱） 狂暴號當立即返回，並運送另一批飛機和駕駛員作為中東的增援部隊。在它尚未運完這批軍隊之前，應當盡力延緩它的檢修。應由空軍參謀長決定如何編組這支軍隊才好。 prime minister to general ismay 一九四○年十二月一日 我們在蘇達灣（克里特島）到底做得怎麼樣即：軍隊、高射炮、海岸防禦炮、探照燈、無線電、雷達測向器、防潛網、水雷和機場的準備等，做得怎麼樣？ 我希望，一定要有數百名克里特島人去加強防禦工事並加長和改善飛機場。 致伊斯梅將軍， Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 一九四○年十二月一日 意大利軍隊在阿爾巴尼亞的繼續撤退，我們今天接到的關於意軍難以在利比亞沙漠獲得食物和飲水的報告，還有其他關於意軍把飛機調回的黎波里以免遭受我方襲擊的報告，以及三十三架擁有第一流駕駛員的旋風式戰鬥機的安全到達塔科拉迪，所有這一切造成了新的事實，使我們能夠對局勢抱更有信心的看法，應將我們的看法電告韋維爾將軍。 一旦敵人潰逃，就能在一夜之間從海路把供應品和作戰部隊向前推進八十哩，並使新到達的軍隊去充當前鋒，這種大佔上風的情形在戰爭中是罕見的。韋維爾將軍給我的覆電似乎沒有著重談這一點，考慮到我們押在這場戰鬥中的賭注是如此重大，所以我認為，如果不把參謀人員研究的結果送他一閱，我們就沒有盡到我們的責任。擁有兩棲部隊而不加以使用，是一種罪行。因此，我希望，如果這份研究報告有所裨益，就用電報發去。無論如何，此事至遲必須在三日做好。 我還要提一下總的看法：我們現在佔據了蘇達灣，這就使我們對馬耳他大大放下了心。只要艦隊停泊在或是可以停泊的蘇達灣，則敵人便很難試圖在馬耳他大舉登陸，何況我們又從中東調去坦克和大炮增援該島。蘇達灣的佔領使東地中海的局面大為改觀。 蘇達灣的故事是悲慘的，直到一九四一年悲劇才開始上演。【１】我相信，我手中掌握的直接控制作戰指揮的權力，可與這一時期中任何國家的任何執政者相匹敵。我所擁有的知識，戰時內閣的推誠相與和積極協助，我所有的同僚的拳拳服膺，我們作戰機構的效能的日益增長，這一切，都使我們可以把憲法的權力高度集中起來。但是，中東司令部所採取的行動，比我們所命令的以及我們大家所期望的相差得多！為了正確估計人的活動的限度，必須記住，在這同一時期在各個方面都在從事許許多多的行動。然而，我仍然不勝詫異，我們竟未使蘇達灣變為兩棲作戰的根據地，把整個克里特島作為這一根據地的要塞。在一切事情上都取得了諒解和一致的意見，並且也作了不少的工作；但是所有這些工作都是半搞半不搞的樣子。我們不久就要因為我們的疏失付出慘重的代價。 【１】德軍空運部隊自一九四一年五月二十日起進擊克里特島，雙方戰鬥激烈，英守軍被迫撤退，損失慘重。守軍三萬五千人，生還者僅及半數。translator 意軍之取道阿爾巴尼亞侵入希臘，使墨索里尼又遭受一次重大的挫折。首次進攻的部隊被擊退，損失重大，而且希臘立即發動了反攻。在北部（馬其頓）戰區，希臘軍隊攻入阿爾巴尼亞，於十一月二十二日進佔科爾察。在平都斯山脈北部的中心戰區，意大利的一個山地師全軍覆沒。在沿海地區，意軍剛一開始時長驅直入，但又匆忙從卡拉馬斯河撤退。在帕帕戈斯將軍的統率下，希臘軍隊在山地戰中顯示了高超的戰術，他們出奇制勝，從兩翼包抄敵人。到年末，他們英勇善戰的結果，迫使意軍沿整個戰線從阿爾巴尼亞邊境後撤三十哩。意大利的二十七個師被希臘的十六個師圍困在阿爾巴尼亞達數月之久。希臘出色的抗戰，大大地鼓舞了其他巴爾幹國家，而墨索里尼的威望則一落千丈。 十一月九日，內維爾‧張伯倫先生在他的故鄉漢普夏郡逝世。我曾得到英皇的許可，把內閣的文件送到他家裡去，他在臨死的前幾天，一直是不顧重病，非常關心國事。他臨終時顯得十分安詳。我想，他死時必須感到心中非常寬慰，知道他的國家至少已擺脫了困境。 十一月十二日，當議會剛一召開時，我就致辭稱讚他的為人和事跡。 我們在臨終之際，都要對我們自己的言行反覆省察。上天沒有賦予人類在很大的程度上預見或預言事態演變的能力，這對人類來說是幸事，不然，生活就難以忍受。在一個時期，人們似乎做得對，在另一個時期，似乎又做錯了。然後，過了幾年，經過較長時間的深刻觀察，以往一切，又事過境遷，顯得迥然不同。事物有新的準繩。有另外的價值尺度。歷史，帶著一盞閃爍的燈，沿著過往的陳跡踉蹌前進，試圖重現它的情景，再響起它的回聲，用黯淡的光激發昔日的感情。這一切有什麼價值呢？一個人的唯一的嚮導就是他的良心；他追憶往事時，唯一的盾牌是他的行為正直和誠實。踏上人生的旅程而不舉起這面盾牌，那是非常孟浪的，因為我們時常由於希望破滅和計劃落空而受到嘲弄；但是，只要我們舉起這面盾牌，就不管命運怎樣捉弄我們，我們都可永遠在光榮的行列中前進。 不管歷史對這些驚心動魄的歲月可能說些什麼或不說什麼，但是，我們確信，內維爾‧張伯倫曾經十分誠實地按照他的智慧，最大限度地運用他那巨大的能力和權力，竭力從我們目前正在進行的塗炭生靈的可怕的戰爭中把世界拯救出來。希特勒先生大言不慚，故作姿態，胡說他只希望和平。這些狂言囈語，在內維爾‧張伯倫肅穆的墓前值得一提嗎？漫長艱苦而又凶險莫測的歲月擺在我們的面前，但我們至少是團結起來，懷著純潔的心向前走去了。 他同他已故的父親和哥哥奧斯汀一樣，都是下院知名的議員；我們，各政黨的成員，今晨一個不缺地聚集在這裡，追悼一位配得上狄斯累利所稱的英國的財富的人，我們都覺得，這對我們自己和我們的國家都是一種光榮。