Chapter 86 Volume Three Chapter Thirteen Tripoli and the Tiger Project

From the desert to the sea Admiral Cunningham's anxiety We have a difficult alternative to the necessary bombardment of the attack on Tripoli The First Sea Lord's vehement Admiral Cunningham's replies A 21st of April A successful and bloodless operation Admiral Cunningham's strong opinion is credited to all of you with my explanation of Admiral Cunningham's assistance to the United States of America's disturbing news from Wavell which I sent on April 20 Memorandum National Defense Committee agrees to transport 300 tanks via the Mediterranean Sea I severely criticize the Tobruk garrison on April 22 Rommel's reinforcements arrive Tigers are a brilliant achievement Transporting tanks to Crete I hope to send tanks to Crete Tiger plan to go ahead Wavell never asked.

The consequences in Africa of the rout on my desert flank have been described above.It also meant that we had lost the possibility of taking Rhodes, which was a barrier to communication between us and Greece.It seriously affected our already dangerous military operation in Greece, although this operation was also unsuccessful.Now, while we are describing the course of events in the desert, we should say a few things that happened simultaneously on the sea.Anyone can see how much our Eastern Mediterranean Fleet has been strained by sending troops to Greece, yet this is only one of the tasks entrusted to them in these troubled times.As early as April 10, Admiral Cunningham felt that the sudden advance of Rommel's arrogant armored forces was extremely unfavorable to his own situation.He warns us:

If Germany can send enough troops across the Mediterranean to North Africa next month, they will be able to control at least as far as the Port of Matruh; It can also be used as a base for the fleet, which is very problematic.Unless the port of Tripoli is destroyed, the Germans stand a good chance of achieving this goal.I don't think it is practical to destroy the port of Tripoli by bombardment.It is not only a question of the risks to be taken by the combat fleet, but also whether it is worth taking such an approach in view of the effective effects it produces.The solution, I think, is continuous air strikes.I therefore consider it imperative that long-range bombers be flown to Egypt on this mission without delay and without any hindrance.Such a mission is likely to take some time, and its outcome will determine whether we are able to maintain the Eastern Mediterranean area.I would like to stress again the time factor, which is critical.

God, it's not easy to build a long-range bomber fleet in Egypt in a few weeks that can be effective in destroying Tripoli.Bombardment from the sea, besides being far more effective and economical in practice, was the only practical means within our power, and I also feel that my fleet, in spite of the difficult task it had to do in the Greek campaign, could still use this One way to make a significant contribution to the defense of Egypt. There was a heated debate between the Admiralty and Admiral Cunningham over whether it was necessary to attack Tripoli; during the debate, the First Sea Lord, aware of the American aid given by the President, proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet He found a difficult alternative to aircraft bombing and let his fleet desperately bombard Tripoli in the most dangerous waters.This incident is very unusual in my naval history.

Admiralty calls to Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet April 15, 1941 In order to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, decisive measures are clearly necessary.After a thorough study, we believe that an airstrike on Tripoli alone may not be enough to stop reinforcements coming into Libya mainly through the port. It was therefore necessary to take measures against Tripoli which would seriously disrupt the enemy's traffic and render it impossible to recover for a considerable period of time.We think that the port and the shipping lanes leading to it will be well mined, but we cannot wait for this measure to be effective.Other approaches must therefore be taken early on.

There are two alternatives: (1) bombard the port; (2) try to block it. The Admiralties of the Admiralty agree with you that bombardment is unlikely to be effective, nor is it even possible to expect a temporary and drastic reduction in the enemy's reinforcement rate. We have therefore decided that it is necessary to try a blockade combined with bombardment, which should be carried out within direct range of the blockade ships as they approach the port. After careful consideration of the types of ships available, it was decided that Barham and a C-class cruiser would perform the task.

You will undoubtedly regret the use of the Barham for this task. But we felt that it would be far better to sacrifice a ship altogether and achieve some really worthwhile results than to have a few ships damaged by bombardment, thereby incurring disappointing results. This order was intended to convince the heroic Cunningham of the magnitude of events which we in Whitehall have seen, and that at this critical moment all risks should be risked.Admiral Murningham strongly objected to the suggestion that he should sacrifice a first-class battleship like HMS Barham. Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet to the Admiralty

April 15, 1941 The Admiralties of the Admiralty and His Majesty's Government have resolved to sacrifice a ship of the line in the destruction of Tripoli, and I am fully aware that they must have given this decision the utmost deliberation.However, I think it is worth paying such a price only if the following conditions are met: first, the success is quite sure; second, after the success, the result is effective.I don't think either of those conditions are met.As to whether it will be successful, I think it is hard to say whether there is even a tenth of the possibility of sailing this large warship to the right place.

Even if we were successful, we would lose a tier one ship, the loss of which would greatly increase the strength of the Italian Navy, and the enemy would have surmised from this action alone that we thought the situation in Cyrenaica had come to an end. How serious. If this action fails or is only partially successful, these adverse effects will be intensified.And we had to take another ship from the Atlantic campaign to replace it. The reward we get from all these actions is at best to make the port unusable, but it is still capable of unloading, and there are other French ports to take its place.

In these considerations I have not yet taken into account the inevitable loss of nearly a thousand officers and men on board the two warships, who were thrown into the operation hastily, ignorant of the purpose of the mission, and, moreover, I do not see that in time The hope of taking them away. 【１】 【1】When a ship is used as a blockade ship or arsonist ship, only a small number of crew members are left on board when approaching the target. Rather than use the Barham without cover in exchange for such a slim chance of success, I'd rather send the entire combat fleet on a sortie and risk the odds.

On the above grounds, I feel that the decision of the Admiralties of the Admiralty should be called into question, and be eager to be reconsidered in light of these arguments. When we received the news that the fleet would bombard Tripoli, we felt relieved.The Admiralty immediately agreed, and his duties were shared in London, far from the field.At dawn on April 21, Cunningham appeared in the waters near Tripoli with the battleships Wospite, Barham, Valiant, cruiser Gloucester, and destroyers, and bombarded the port for 40 years. Minutes long.The operation was beyond everyone's expectations. It was a complete surprise attack. The coastal artillery did not return fire within twenty minutes, and the air force did not provide any resistance.Ships in the harbor as well as wharves and port equipment suffered heavy losses.A gasoline depot and surrounding houses were on fire.The British fleet retreated safely without a single ship being hit. Admiral Cunningham reports: At five o'clock this morning (Monday) my fleet bombarded the port of Tripoli for forty-two minutes at a range between eleven thousand and fourteen thousand yards.To my surprise, we managed the surprise attack, probably because the Luftwaffe had been transferred to other theaters of operations. My views on adopting this bombardment strategy will be communicated in future telegrams. The Commander-in-Chief immediately followed with a second telegram in which he passionately expressed his feelings. Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet to the Admiralty April 23, 1941 We find that the tasks we are currently taking on seem to exceed our ability to carry them out smoothly. I would like to make it clear that I remain firmly opposed to the tactic of bombarding Tripoli by the Mediterranean Fleet.We got away with it last time, but only because the Luftwaffe was busy elsewhere.We accomplished the surprise attack, but it took five days for the whole Mediterranean fleet to do it, whereas a heavy bomber fleet from Egypt would probably take only a few hours.In this operation my fleet was exposed to considerable and in my opinion not worthwhile risks, and for this reason stopped all other tasks which were at present extremely urgent. I don't see how the Nelson and Rodney could be drawn (from the Atlantic) to join the Mediterranean Fleet. It seems to me that the Department of the Air Force is shifting their own responsibilities onto the Navy, and that the Air Force is not supporting us as it should with the Navy. It seems to me that this event reflects the contribution of the senior admirals on both sides involved, and is sufficient to show to future readers of naval history the extraordinary pressures under which we all carry out our duties at this critical juncture.It may be true that the Admiralty, with my sincere consent, had forced their Commander-in-Chief to unnecessary perils;On the other hand, only we at home can weigh the world's priorities, and the ultimate responsibility rests with us.While I remain convinced that the actions of the First Sea Lord were strong and correct, I feel that he should give the fullest explanation to the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, and present him with the wider picture of the war as he can see from Alexandria. Prime Minister to Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet April 24, 1941 The primary task of the Mediterranean Fleet is to cut off all traffic between Italy and Africa. This is a principle that cannot be violated. 2. I am very sorry that your idea of ​​attacking by aircraft hindered your bombardment of Tripoli.We should have seen this earlier, but there is no need to regret it now, especially since we have achieved practical results, and neither ships nor men have been lost.Personally, I'm not surprised that this time around it's unscathed.The fact that the main batteries in the main African strongholds of the enemy, although under German control, did not return fire until twenty minutes later, clearly shows that it is impossible for the enemy to be constantly ready everywhere at the same time.I imagine that under these circumstances the blockade plan would certainly be possible. 3. About our air support: You should clarify the situation; because the situation is not clear, you cannot make a judgment.The Chief of the Air Staff told me that to drop bombs of the same weight as you fired on Tripoli in forty-two minutes, i.e. 530 tons, (1) a squadron of Wellingtons from the island of Malta would probably Ten and a half weeks; (2) Thirty weeks if a squadron of Stirling bombers were dispatched from Egypt. 5. The important deployment of troops between the various theaters is in the charge of the National Defense Commission chaired by me, and has nothing to do with the Ministry of the Air Force, which only implements our resolutions.Since November, I have tried various methods and channels to transport the plane to the Middle East.We took great risks and suffered great sacrifices, especially when a fighter squadron was flying to Malta, two thirds of the planes were shot down into the sea, and Furious had to put her mission in the Atlantic aside. , to and from Takoradi three times.I am here to try to support you in various ways and to praise your achievements, so I sincerely hope that you also believe that we at the Cephalon are trying to make healthy and courageous decisions amidst many difficulties. 7. You don't understand why I propose to transfer the Nelson and Rodney from the Atlantic to join the Mediterranean Fleet.The reason why I think these two warships are especially suitable is because they have armor plates, because I am worried about the attack of enemy dive bombers.Whether they can be drawn out depends on the situation in the Atlantic Ocean.In view of your status as a senior general, now I want to tell you a situation.I have long been in regular and close contact with President Roosevelt.He has now begun a large portion of the patrol west of the 26th longitude.From midnight on April 24, the entire US Atlantic Fleet, which has a large number of seaplanes, has begun to implement the first phase of this plan.U.S. warships are to patrol along the route of my convoy, tail or as they say track all raid ships and submarines that are spotted, and broadcast their positions in plain code to the world every four hours, and if necessary, increase broadcast times.I hope that this matter will not be announced suddenly, but let it be gradually understood during the development process.Therefore I am disclosing it to you in the utmost confidentiality.It relieved the Admiralty of great burden and provided great convenience.Of course, it can also easily give rise to even more decisive events. Therefore, at this moment, you need not worry too much about the Atlantic Ocean, but put all your forces (we are strengthening in many ways) to cutting off the communication between the enemy and Africa, whether it is through Tripoli or Cyrenaica All need to be cut off.This is a task related to the Egyptian campaign. 8. I have taken the trouble to write you all because I admire you for what you have achieved, because you have so many things to look after, because I sympathize with you for having to expose your fleet to many perils, and because Also because your responsibilities are extremely important. My final aim remains to achieve victory in the Western Desert, to destroy Rommel's army before it grows too powerful, and before all the fierce new armored divisions arrive.We are going to save our position in Egypt from this debacle no matter what.I must therefore detail an episode in which I assumed a more direct responsibility than usual.Wavell's defeat on his desert flank nearly cost him his armored vehicles.On Sunday, April 20th, while I was sitting up in bed at work at Ditchley for the weekend, I received a telegram from General Wavell to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, revealing his extremely difficult situation.He said that although the situation in Cyrenaica had improved, looking to the future still made me anxious for a considerable period because of my weakness in tanks, especially patrol tanks.As you know, the success of this desert battle depends largely on the strength of the armored forces.The enemy probably had at least one hundred and fifty tanks on the Cyrenaica front, half of them medium tanks.At present, most of these tanks are deployed in the Bardia|Selum area, and, if the enemy can solve the supply problem, perhaps preparations are being made to move forward.I have a weak armored unit that is a mix of patrol tanks, infantry tanks and light tanks in Tobruk and a squadron of patrol tanks in the Matruh area.By the end of the month, the armored units expected to assist in the defense of the Matruh area will be at most one patrol tank regiment and one infantry tank regiment, each short of a squadron.By May I might be able to get another thirty or forty patrol tanks from the factory to form a new weak force.In addition, a small number of infantry tanks will be obtained, which may be needed for the defense of the outskirts of Alexandria in case the enemy launches a surprise attack.I cannot expect any tanks to be brought back from Greece, and no more will arrive for quite some time. He added: latest news.I have just received a disturbing piece of information.I had expected another German colonial division, which landed in Tripoli earlier this month, to be on the field by the end of the month.Now some troops have been identified.I have just been reported that recent indications are that this is not a colonial division but an armored one.If so, the situation is indeed serious, because an armored division has 400 tanks, of which 138 are medium tanks.If the enemy can solve the supply problem, this will hinder us a lot.Allow me to analyze and study this piece of unpleasant news before continuing to report. 【１】 [1] This estimate proved to be an exaggeration. In another telegram sent the same day, General Wavell gave details of the condition of his tanks.he said we will see that by the end of may only two regiments of patrol tanks will be available to egypt and there will be no reserve tanks sufficient to replace the destroyed tanks whereas currently there are enough trained tank regiments in egypt for six tank regiments Excellent staff.In my opinion, it is very important to supply patrol tanks in addition to infantry tanks, whose speed and radius of action are insufficient in desert operations.Chief of the General Staff of the Empire, please give us your full assistance. After reading these astonishing telegrams, I resolved to disregard the objections of the Admiralty, and proceeded to send a convoy, loaded with all the tanks General Wavell required, to sail directly across the Mediterranean to Alexandria.We have a convoy carrying a large number of reinforcement armored vehicles about to sail around the Cape of Good Hope.I decided that the tank-laden fast ships of the convoy would split off at Gibraltar and take a short cut, which would save nearly forty days.General Ismay, who was living nearby at the time, came to see me at noon.So, in my own name, I wrote a memorandum addressed to General Ismay as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. I asked him to take this memorandum to London at once, and to state the importance I attached to taking this step.The content of the memorandum is as follows: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee April 20, 1941 Please read the last telegram from General Wavell.Whether we lose the Suez Canal, whether the large forces we have built up in Egypt are defeated or thrown into disarray, and whether all hope of America's cooperation with us through the Red Sea ends, it all may depend. on hundreds of armored vehicles.These armored vehicles had to be delivered at all costs, if possible. 2. I shall preside over a meeting at noon tomorrow (that is, Sunday, the 21st) with the participation of the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces and the ministers of the navy, land and air force, and immediately take necessary actions and collect intelligence. 3. The only way to achieve this great purpose is to send the vehicle-transporting fast ships of the W.S. No. 7 transport fleet to Alexandria via the Mediterranean Sea.General Wavell's telegram indicated that what he needed were tanks, not men.We must risk losing these vehicles or parts of them.Even if you can only ship halfway, you can turn the situation around.The five vehicle carriers carried two hundred and fifty tanks, all but fourteen of which were infantry tanks.Every effort should be made to increase the number of patrol tanks in this delivery.It is reported that if the ship can only stay about 24 hours longer, it can load 20 more vehicles. That is to say, the transport fleet composed of vehicle transport ships will set sail on the morning of April 23. 4. Ships transporting personnel will circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope, but the voyage should be temporarily changed according to the instructions of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 5. I have asked the Ministry of Shipping to try to find two other vehicle carriers of the same speed before the above-mentioned sailing date, regardless of other needs. If found, another hundred patrol tanks should be allocated from the best armored divisions in the country.It is expected that these tanks are also suitable for tropical combat, of course, those special devices suitable for desert combat are out of the question. 6. The Departments of the Navy and the Air Force are to consider and draw up plans this day for the passage of this vital convoy through the Mediterranean.Of course, we have to take risks and not count on guaranteed success.But by then, the island of Malta had received reinforcements.Destroyers under Mountbatten's command and other naval reinforcements should have reached the island (or set sail at the same time as the convoy).The enemy dive bombers had many other targets, and they had no idea what the convoys were carrying. 7. Gaining time is the most important thing, and this matter cannot be delayed for a day.Please make an agenda and submit it if possible.Calculated at a speed of 16 nautical miles per hour, the voyage from the date of sailing (that is, April 23) will only take about eight days, so let's count it as ten days.This will enable us to give General Wavell effective support during the first week of May.The most important thing was secrecy, and no one but senior officers should be informed of the purpose of diverting certain ships of the convoy at Gibraltar.Everyone on board the convoy should be made to think they are circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope. When Ismay arrived in London, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces were in a meeting, and they discussed my memo until late at night.Their initial reaction to the proposals was disapproval.There is little hope of getting the vehicle transports through the central Mediterranean unscathed, as they will be attacked by enemy dive-bombers the day before entering the strait and the morning after passing the island of Malta, both in the area where we are stationed. Shore-based fighters are out of range.Some people at the meeting expressed the opinion that the domestic tank force has become dangerously weak. If we lose a large number of tanks overseas at this time, the overseas troops will inevitably demand replenishment, and the result will be that the local tank force will be further dispersed. But when the Defense Committee met the next day, Admiral Pound supported my opinion, and agreed to the convoy's passage through the Mediterranean, to my great satisfaction.Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Porter said he would try to arrange for a squadron of Warrior fighters to step up the cover from the island of Malta.I then asked the committee to consider adding a hundred more patrol tanks to this fleet.I would rather have delayed my sailing for two days.General Deal opposed the addition of tanks, citing the lack of tanks in the home defense.Considering that in July 1940 he had allowed us to send half of our few tank shipments around the Cape of Good Hope to the Middle East only ten months earlier, I cannot but think that his reasoning was that full.As the reader will know, I did not consider the danger of an enemy invasion to be very serious in April 1941, since we had been properly prepared.Now, we know that perception was correct at the time.It was then decided to carry out what I call the Tiger plan; that a sixth ship should be added to the convoy to carry sixty-seven Type 6 (patrol) tanks.However, despite various efforts, the ship was not finished in time and set sail at the same time as the transport fleet. I have no delay in informing Wavell of the good news. Prime Minister to General Wavell April 22, 1941 For the past few days I have been trying to get reinforcements on your behalf; we are shipping 307 of our best tanks to you across the Mediterranean, and you can expect to receive them around May 10th.I am sure you will be delighted to hear this news.Of this batch, ninety-nine were Patrol Tanks of Types IV and VI, and necessary parts for Patrol Tanks of Type VI, in addition to one hundred and eighty infantry tanks. 2. You stated in your telegram of April 18 that you had enough tank-trained personnel for six regiments.Therefore, we only ship vehicles to you on the most convenient routes.The personnel will circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope according to the previous discussion, but there may be temporary changes. 3. You will receive through the usual contact channels: (1) detailed instructions on the tank and accessories that are being shipped out, and these accessories are suitable for the tanks you have received before; (2) about the equipment that must be installed to adapt to desert operations Instructions for various accessories.I hope you will make all preparations at once so that this work can be carried forward steadily and step by step, and that the famous 7th Armored Division, which was broken up against our expectations, can be rebuilt under Clay's command for new victories. 4. After you have received detailed notification, you should submit to us your plan for putting these vehicles into battle as soon as possible.If this batch of vehicles survives the hurdles of the voyage (this is of course not guaranteed), the future will depend on you.By the end of June, there should be no more German troops in Cyrenaica. 5. While you are preparing to put these vehicles into battle, you should spread the word that they are in transit around the Cape of Good Hope, because the issue of secrecy is extremely important, and only a few people here know about it.In this way, after you receive this batch of tanks, you will have a chance of winning by surprise.Wish you all the best. While all this was going on, we were worried about the situation in Tobruk.Wavell reported on the 24th that the situation on the Air Force fighter side was serious.All the Tornados sent to Greece have been lost, and as a result of the enemy's recent air attack on Tobruk, a large part of the Tornados stationed there have been destroyed and damaged.Lieutenant General Longmore of the Air Force believed that it would be in vain to incur heavy losses if he wanted to station a fighter squadron within the urban area of ​​Tobruk. Therefore, until the new force of the fighter force is established, the enemy will enjoy absolute air superiority in Tobruk.This morning, however, the defenders repelled an attack, killing and wounding many of the enemy, and taking one hundred and fifty prisoners. At this time, people's mood is panic, and some pessimistic disappointment.I have to offer a harsh criticism of this sentiment. Prime Minister to Chief of the Reich General Staff April 22, 1941 We must never forget that the besieged army is three or four times stronger than the besieging army.They want to be comfortable, we have no objection to that.However, they must be careful not to allow themselves to be trapped by a smaller force and thus lose the strength to attack the enemy's lines of communication.We expect that 25,000 men, armed with a hundred guns and a great deal of munitions, will be able to hold against an enemy force of 4,500 marched seven hundred miles, and hold this well-fortified country; even if the enemy is The German army can also withstand and defend, not to mention that some of the troops surrounding Tobruk are not German troops.The figures I have used were supplied by the War Department.We must never underestimate ourselves in comparison with our enemies. Soon after, news from General Wavell that Rommel's reinforcements were about to arrive was even more disturbing.The German Fifteenth Panzer Division (with some losses in transit across the Mediterranean) may have landed by April 21st.Several units have been recognized by our army on the opposite side of Tobruk or in the area of ​​Fort Kaputso.According to prisoners of war, the division still lacked vehicles to transport supplies.From our observations of the ships arriving at Tripoli, it appears that another twenty-one shipments of supplies, each carrying an average of five or six thousand tons, would be required to fully equip the division.The division's supply problem when it penetrated into the eastern region had to rely on other small ports in Benghazi and Cyrenaica.There are indications that the enemy is regularly using the port of Benghazi.It takes at least fifteen days for them to ship supplies.On this assumption, the Fifteenth Armored Division, the Fifth Light Motorized Division, and the Ariete and Trento Divisions[1] would advance from mid-June onwards, not only from July onwards, which is more advanced than the previous ones. Estimated to speed up by two weeks.Wavell added that he had to admit that German actions were often unexpected; he was not sure that the enemy's capabilities would not exceed his estimates.For example, last night they began their advance from the Salloum area, which, according to our estimates of their supply situation, is very difficult to do. [1] The latter two divisions are Italian divisions.translator We have not been able to use Benghazi as a useful base, but since it fell into German hands it has played such an important role that it seems unsatisfactory to us at home. For the next two weeks my eager attention and restlessness were devoted to the fate of Project Tiger.I do not underestimate the risk the First Sea Lord is taking, and I know the Admiralty is sweating it.The convoy consisted of five ships at fifteen knots, escorted by Fleet H (HMS Renown, Malaya, Ark Royal and Sheffield) under the command of Admiral Somerville. Sailing through Gibraltar.Sailing with this convoy were ships to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet, including HMS Queen Elizabeth and the cruisers Aquaman and Fiji.On May 8th, the enemy planes made repeated air strikes and were all repelled. Our side suffered no losses, and seven enemy planes were destroyed.However, during the night of the same day, two ships in the convoy struck mines as they approached the Tunisian Strait.One of them, the Anthem of the Empire, exploded into flames and sank; the other, the Star of New Zealand, continued to sail with the convoy.After sailing to the entrance of the Skokie Strait, Admiral Somerville broke up with the convoy and sailed back to Gibraltar.He sent six destroyers along with the cruiser HMS Gloucester to reinforce the escort ships.On the afternoon of the 9th, Admiral Cunningham seized the opportunity to send a convoy to the island of Malta, and then joined the convoy of tigers fifty miles south of the island of Malta.So all his ships sailed to Alexandria, without any loss on the way, and arrived safely at their destination.In these operations they also took the opportunity to bombard Benghazi twice at night with light fleets on the 7th and 10th of May. I am glad to know that this important convoy on which my hopes have been deposited has sailed safely through the Tunis Straits, and is now fully protected by the strengthened Mediterranean Fleet.The matter was not settled, but my thoughts had turned to Crete again, when we did learn that a major German airborne attack on the island was about to take place.I feel that if the Germans could capture and use the island's airfield, they would have almost unlimited reinforcements.I also felt that even a dozen infantry tanks could play a decisive role in stopping the German advance.I therefore asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of having one of the Tiger convoys diverted towards Crete mid-voyage in order to unload a few infantry tanks.My knowledgeable colleagues agreed with me that tanks would be particularly useful in the defense of Crete, but thought it inappropriate that such a change of course would endanger the rest of the valuable supplies on board.I therefore suggested to them on the 9th of May that if it was considered too dangerous to have the Lamont Clan sail into Souda Bay, the ship should be delivered with twelve tanks as soon as she arrived at Alexandria for unloading, or by other ships. shipment.So the command was issued as I suggested.Wavell telegraphed back on May 10 that he had managed to send six infantry tanks and fifteen light tanks to Crete and that, if all went well, they should arrive within a few days. Of course, I look forward to some more great achievements from Project Tiger.I probably did not realize at the time how much pressure this project had put on all parties involved, although the main responsibility for it clearly lay with me.I think that my judgment of the dangers of the Mediterranean was at last vindicated.My friends in the navy, on the other hand, said it was due to our rare good luck and good weather.The Admiralty did not wish, of course, that this success should lead them to a continuation of such dangerous operations, and I met what seemed to me considerable resistance.If it had not been for the fact that General Wavell, instead of urging, had opposed it, I should have referred the dispute to the Cabinet for adjudication.Wavell's attitude baffles me.Fifty patrol tanks and fifty infantry tanks were therefore rounded the Cape of Good Hope by a subsequent convoy which did not anchor at Suez until 15 July. By this time, many things have happened, but not all unsatisfactory.