Chapter 87 Volume Three, Chapter Fourteen, Iraq's Betrayal

1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty Golden Square India sent reinforcements to attack Habaniya Aviation School Bravely assisted Wavell's reluctance to send troops He had many concerns about domestic firmness Better news came from Habaniya Iraqi Army Crash and flight I telegraphed Wavell on May 9th and his reply Habbani forces arrived May 23rd Hitler's belated order to march on Baghdad Rashid Ali fled effectively occupying the Iraqi regency The return to Baghdad barely reversed the serious crisis of disagreement between London and Cairo at little cost. The Anglo-Iraq Treaty concluded in 1930 stipulated that in times of peace, we have, among other rights, the right to maintain air bases near Basra and Habaniya, and to transport troops and supplies at any time.This treaty also stipulates: In time of war, we will enjoy all facilities for the transportation of armed forces, including the right to use railways, rivers, ports and airfields.When war broke out, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Germany, but did not declare war; and when Italy entered the war, the Iraqi government did not even do so.The Italian Legation in Baghdad thus became the main center for Axis propaganda and anti-British sentiment.They were assisted in these activities by interpreters of Sharia law in Jerusalem; these were persons who fled from Palestine shortly before the outbreak of the war and later found refuge in Baghdad.

With the collapse of France and the arrival of Axis Armistice Commissioners in Syria, Britain's prestige has plummeted, and this situation worries us very much.However, since we are using our troops in other regions, it is out of the question to take military action, so we have to deal with it properly within our ability.In March 1941, the situation worsened.Rashid Ali, who was in collusion with Germany, became prime minister and began plotting with three prominent Iraqi military officers; the so-called Golden Square.At the end of March, the pro-British regent Abdul-Iraq escaped from Baghdad.

Now, more than ever, securing Iraq's key port of Basra on the Persian Gulf.I therefore sent the following Memorandum to the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs: Prime Minister to Minister for Indian Affairs April 8, 1941 You have suggested before that you might be able to draw another division for the Middle East from the Border Force.The situation in Iraq has deteriorated.We have to secure Basra, because the United States increasingly wants to build a large-scale aircraft assembly base there, so that the relevant materials can be shipped directly to the port.In view of the inevitable tendency of the war to develop eastward, this plan appears to be of the utmost importance.

I am about to explain to the Chiefs of Staff that you will study the possibility of the above issues.General Auchinleck also intended to provide another force. On the same day Mr. Amory telegraphed his intention to the Governor-General of India, whereupon Lord Linlithgow and General Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief, immediately proposed that a brigade of infantry and a regiment of artillery could be sent to Basra, and that the greater part of these troops had already been boarded. Ship to Malaya.The rest of the troops will arrive as soon as possible.On April 18, under the cover of a British battalion airlifted to Shuaiba the previous day, the brigade landed at Basra without resistance.We also request the Government of India to expeditiously transport to Basra the two brigades which have also been earmarked for Malaya.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transferred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and various parties concerned April 20, 1941 Troops should be sent to Basra as soon as possible.At least the three brigades that had been promised should be transported as quickly as possible. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary April 20, 1941 It should be explained to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis that our main purpose in sending troops to Iraq is to cover and establish a large assembly base in Basra, and that whatever happens in the interior, Except for what happened in Habania, they are currently of secondary nature.We exercise our right under the treaty to engage in this landing and avoid bloodshed, but if necessary, use the utmost force to ensure the success of the landing.Our position at Basra is therefore not based solely on treaties, but also on new developments brought about by the war.We cannot make any guarantees about sending troops to Baghdad or sending troops to Palestine via Iraq.The current Iraqi government itself is a government that has usurped power by means of armed change. The Iraqi country has already violated our rights and interests obtained under the treaty in spirit and substance. We do not recognize such a government or country as having the right to demand guarantees.And Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, don't try to explain yourself, so as not to tie your hands.

[1] British Ambassador to Baghdad. Accordingly, my ambassador informed Rashid Ali that some troop carriers would arrive in Basra on the 30th.Rashid Ali replied that he would not allow any further landings until the troops already in Basra had left the port.General Auchinleck was instructed that the troops would continue to land.Rashid Ali had been counting on German planes, and even German airlift, to come to his aid, and now he had to act. His initial hostilities were against Habaniya, our air force training base in the Iraqi desert.On April 29, 230 British women and children were airlifted from Baghdad to Habaniya.The total number of British troops stationed in the camp was no more than 2,200, while the number of civilians was no less than 9,000.Therefore, the aviation school became an extremely important stronghold.Air Force Maj. Gen. Smart, who was in command there, took courageous and timely precautions in response to the mounting crisis.The aviation school used to have only old-fashioned planes and planes used for training, but a few fighter jets had been brought in from Egypt, so eighty-two planes of various types were improvised into four squadrons.A battalion of British soldiers airlifted from India also arrived on the 29th.The outer fortifications are seven miles long, and there are only some isolated barbed wire fences, which is indeed not enough.On the 30th, Iraqi troops arrived from Baghdad and appeared less than a mile away on a high ground overlooking the airfield and barracks.Soon, reinforcements came from Baghdad, increasing to 9,000 men and carrying 50 cannon.The next two days were spent in fruitless negotiations, and by dawn on 2 May the fighting began.

From the very beginning of this new and dangerous situation, General Wavell showed great reluctance to assume further responsibility.He said he would be preparing and trying to give the impression that we were building up a large force in Palestine for an operation, which could have some influence on the Iraqi government.According to him, the number of troops he could dispatch was not large, and he was short of time.It will take at least a week for this army to move.Removing this army would leave me weak and in danger in Palestine, where there is already a situation of sedition.He said: I have repeatedly reminded you that under the current situation, troops cannot be transferred from Palestine to support the troops we send to Iraq, and I have often advised you to avoid disputes with Iraq.My troops everywhere are so strained that I must not throw any part of them into action which will not produce any effect.

In Syria, our forces are equally tense.The commanders-in-chief of the Middle East theater have said that before the Australian army is ready to re-equip, if it does not undertake tasks in Iraq, the troops that can be transferred to Syria are at most one mechanized cavalry brigade, one artillery regiment and one infantry battalion.This army cannot be expected to be able to deal with the troops that Germany may send to Syria, and we can only send troops if there is active resistance from Vichy France.If it is decided to march on Syria, it is of course better to send British troops first than to send the troops of the Free French, whose intervention will cause great indignation.

On May 4th we cabled General Wavell of our decision concerning Iraq: The use of troops in Iraq is inevitable.We must establish a base at Basra and control the port in order to secure Persian oil if necessary. Due to the superiority of the Luftwaffe in the Aegean Sea, the line of communication from Iraq to Turkey has become even more important.Even if we did not send troops to Basra, Iraq would still have the current situation in Habania under the instigation of the Axis powers. In the end, we would still have to forcefully land in Basra under the resistance of Iraq. Opportunity to build a bridgehead by resisting.Mediation by Turkey is of course acceptable.We cannot budge.Ensuring Egypt's security remains the top priority.But we should do everything in our power to save Habaniya and control the pipeline to the Mediterranean.

General Auchinleck was willing to continue to send reinforcements, and if ships could be arranged, five more infantry brigades and their appendages could be delivered by June 10.We are pleased with his can-do attitude.General Wavell obeyed, but was dissatisfied.He said in the five-day phone call: Your calls rarely take the actual situation into consideration.You have to face the facts.He doubted whether the army he himself was gathering would be strong enough to relieve Habania, or whether Habania would be able to support it when it might arrive on the twelfth.He said: "I feel, I have a duty to remind you in the most serious terms, that I think a prolonged war in Iraq will seriously jeopardize the defense of Palestine and Egypt.The political repercussions are immeasurable and could lead to what I have painstakingly tried to avoid for the past two years, namely serious unrest within my base.Therefore, I once again strongly request you to negotiate a settlement as soon as possible.

I disagree with this view. Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee May 6, 1941 The telegrams of Generals Wavell and Auchinleck should be considered immediately and reported to me in the House of Commons before lunch today. The following points should be noted: (1) The troops mentioned in the call seem to be quite strong, why do they think they are not strong enough to deal with the Iraqi army?What is your opinion?The cavalry divisions remained in Palestine for obvious reasons, and during this period not even the basic formation of a motorized column was formed! (2) Why will my troops stationed in Habania give in before the twelfth day?Judging from the reports so far, their losses are not large.Last night their infantry sortie was successful, and it was reported that the enemy bombardment ceased as soon as our air force appeared.The Air Force should do its best to reinforce and encourage Habania. Is it really possible to airlift some infantry from Egypt as reinforcements?Commanders in the field should be ordered to stick to it unrelentingly. General Wavell's proposal is to negotiate a settlement. How can we act on that?We guessed that the Iraqis, perhaps at the instigation of the Germans, insisted that we withdraw from Basra, or that our troops were divided into small groups at their mercy, to leave Iraq and drive to Palestine.My senior naval officer in Basra believed that a collapse or surrender of our army there would lead to a situation beyond control.The same is true of the Government of India.General Wavell's attitude disturbed me deeply.It appeared that he was as frightened by the enemy on the eastern flank as on the western one. Although he has a large number of troops under him, and a large-scale transport fleet is about to arrive, he seems to be unable to mobilize even a few battalions and companies.He gave me the impression that he was exhausted. It seems that the Indian Commander-in-Chief's proposal to reinforce Basra should be considered with extreme approval. With the support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I raised all the issues for discussion and resolution at the National Defense Committee meeting at noon.Everyone is very determined.They decided to issue the following order: Committee of the Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell and others concerned May 6, 1941 The National Defense Committee has considered your call yesterday.We cannot accept a negotiated settlement unless Iraq backs down and assures that the Axis powers will have no future plans against Iraq.The reality of the situation is that Rashid Ali has long been in collusion with the Axis powers, and he just wants to wait until the Axis powers can help him.Our advance to Basra had forced him to strike before the Axis was ready to stop.So bold action has a good chance of turning things around, as long as we don't miss the boat. Accordingly, the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services have indicated to the National Defense Committee that they are prepared to assume responsibility for the early deployment of the troops mentioned in your call.The Defense Council directed that Air Force Maj. Gen. Smart should be notified that he would be assisted, during which time his mission was to defend Habaniya to the last moment.On the premise of maintaining Egypt's security, we should use the maximum possible air power to support our army's battle in Iraq. At this time, several air force squadrons from the aviation school in Habaniya, together with Wellington bombers taking off from Shuaiba at the top of the Persian Gulf, attacked the Iraqi army on the high ground.They responded by bombarding our camp, and their planes also participated in the battle, dropping bombs and strafing our positions.On that day, more than 40 people were killed or injured in our army, and 22 aircraft were destroyed or injured.Despite the difficulty of taking off under heavy artillery fire, my pilot continued the attack.The attack of the enemy infantry did not expand, and their artillery fire was gradually suppressed.It turned out that the enemy gunners abandoned their guns and fled when they were attacked by the air, or even when they saw our planes passing overhead.We took full advantage of their timidity, so from the next day we were able to use part of our air force against the Iraqi air force and their bases.During the nights of May 3rd and 4th ground patrols went on the offensive, moving out from Habaniyah to attack the enemy lines.By May 5th, the enemy had been subjected to four consecutive days of air raids by the Royal Air Force, and could not hold on any longer, so they retreated from the heights at night.Our army pursued and captured 400 prisoners of war, 12 cannons, 60 machine guns, and 10 armored vehicles in a smooth battle.A reinforcement column from Falluja was spotted by our side on the way and was completely wiped out by forty planes sent by our side.Thus, by May 7, the siege of Habaniyah was lifted.Our defenders had been reinforced with fighter jets from Egypt; British women and children had been flown back to Basra; and the Iraqi Air Force, with some sixty aircraft, had been virtually wiped out.The good news came only slowly and bit by bit. Prime Minister to Air Force Rear Admiral Smart May 7, 1941 Your strong and excellent actions have brought the situation back to the way it used to be.We are all watching the glorious battle you are fighting.We will give you all possible assistance.Hope to continue. Prime Minister to General Wavell May 7, 1941 It appears that the situation in Habaniya has greatly improved; decisive action against Iraq now may crush the Iraqi treachery before the arrival of German forces.Of course, the German army can fly directly with heavy bombers, but the bombers can only transport some supplies for temporary use, and it is difficult to expect to fight for a long time.We should deal a heavy blow so that their morale will be affected before the German army arrives.I think that if Rutba and Habaniya are cleared, (my) column can take Baghdad, or take advantage of the victory to achieve something else.Regarding the agitation work for the tribe and the government's policies, we will send a separate telegram. General Wavell has wired directly to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services May 8, 1941 I think that with the political situation in Iraq going against me in the coming months, you should recognize the limitations of our military operations there.Troops sent from India could secure Basra, but, in my opinion, no advance north could be made without the full co-operation of the native peoples and tribes.The troops sent from Palestine could relieve Habaniyah and hold the passage to Baghdad to prevent further Iraqi advances to Habaniyah, but they could not enter Baghdad or hold there in the face of resistance.Because, in order to avoid being involved in a major military dispute in an insignificant area, I still recommend using all available methods to seek a political solution. Although I knew General Wavell was cautious and loyal, I continued to put pressure on him. Prime Minister to General Wavell May 9, 1941 The National Defense Committee has considered your cable of May 8 concerning Iraq.We have intelligence that Rashid Ali and his henchmen are in a desperate situation.Still, you should fight them.The mobile column, which is being prepared in Palestine, should march on the date you suggest, if possible, as early as possible, and actively engage with the enemy, whether at Rutba or at Habaniyah.After this column joins Habaniya's force, you should make the most of the situation and go into Baghdad without hesitation, even with a small force, taking the risk that the Germans are accustomed to take and profit from. . 2. There can be no talk of negotiations with Rashid Ali unless he immediately accepts the conditions set out in the telegram of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.Such negotiations are in vain to delay the time, and let the Luftwaffe come.We believe that your transfer of part of the ground forces to Iraq will not immediately affect your problems in the western desert.The Air Force should try to balance both sides.Lieutenant General Ted can refuse to send the necessary air force to support our military operations in Iraq unless you are actually under attack by the enemy in the western desert or you are about to launch an offensive. I tried to reassure General Wavell that we were not planning to expand the scope of our military operations, only to meet current needs. You don't have to worry about the distant future of Iraq.Your current task is to establish a friendly government in Baghdad and defeat Rashid Ali's army with high morale.At present, we are not prepared to be involved in any major advance up the river from Basra, and there are no provisions for capturing Kirkuk or Mosul.We do not intend to change Iraq's independent status and have issued detailed instructions in accordance with your opinion on this issue.The key, however, was action, the rapid advance of mobile columns in order to establish an effective link between Baghdad and Palestine.This matter cannot be delayed for a day, because the German army may be coming soon.We hope that this column will be dispatched on the tenth and reach Habania on the twelfth, if Habania can be held. In fact, not only have they defended Habaniya, but they have also achieved more results.We trust that you are on track with these agendas, and you will be urging them to move faster. Wavell responded courageously to the demands that were made of him.He reported on the 13th: Without waiting for the Tiger Project tanks to arrive, I ordered all existing tanks to be added to Gott's forces and attack the enemy in the Salloum area.If things go well in the western desert, I'm about to try to increase my troops in Palestine for an operation against Iraq.We should try to resolve the entangled Iraqi problem as quickly as possible.I am doing my best to strengthen Crete's defenses against the imminent attack.This afternoon, I discussed the Syrian issue with Quatrou. By this time, Tiger had safely reached Alexandria.I very much hope that in Crete, in the western desert, and in Syria, satisfactory results will be achieved.But these interconnected adventures had different fates. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck May 14, 1941 I am very pleased that you are going to Basra to meet Wavell.He'll tell you about the Tiger and Operation Searing (Defense of Crete).If it can win the war in Libya, it will change all the values ​​​​of Iraq in the minds of Germans and Iraqis. 2. You have made great efforts for Basra, and we are very grateful.The more Indian forces can be assembled there the better.However, we feel that it is not possible to rush north to attack Baghdad (unless the roads are in good condition to advance with a small force), let alone advance to Kirkuk and/or Mosul.We can't think about it until we know what's going on with the Tigers and the Sears.At the present moment, therefore, we can only try to form a friendly government in Baghdad and the strongest possible bridgehead in Basra.Now, it is less likely that we will try to control Syria, but the Free French can be given a free hand there.The defeat of the German army in Libya is a major event that affects the overall situation. Before this step is achieved, we cannot have a broader view.At that point, everything is much easier. During this period we encountered some more brutal, if not more dangerous, events in Crete.Before describing these events, it is best for me to finish the Iraq story. The Habaniya troops rushing to aid our Iraqi combat troops are a motorized brigade from Palestine.The vanguard of this brigade arrived at Habaniyah on May 18 in order to continue the attack on the enemy who was now holding the bridge across the Euphrates at Falluja.By this time, the Iraqis were not the only enemy.The first batch of German planes arrived at Mosul airfield on May 13.One of the main tasks our Air Force had to undertake was to attack German aircraft and prevent them from getting supplies from Syria by rail.The vanguard of Habaniya's forces and the ground forces of the former garrison in Habaniya launched an attack on Falluja on 19 May.Impossible to approach directly from the west due to flooding, a small column was sent across a flybridge upstream of Falluja to cut off the retreat of the enemy defenders; highway. We had expected that this action, combined with air strikes, would force a brigade of more than one enemy force to surrender or disperse.But later still need to attack from the ground.We had a small detachment on the west bank of the river, whose task it was to prevent the enemy from destroying the important bridge with their rifles;The enemy surrendered and took three hundred prisoners.A counterattack three days later was also repelled by our army. We had spent several days preparing for the final march to Baghdad.In the past few days, our air force has taken action against the Luftwaffe on the airfields in northern Iraq, and finally smashed their attempts.A squadron of Italian fighters came later, but achieved nothing.Field Marshal Blomberg's son, the German officer in charge of the Axis air squadron fighting with the Iraqi army, was shot in the head when he landed in Baghdad, thanks to an error of judgment by his ally who fired.His successor, General Fermi, though luckier in his landing, was also helpless.The date on which he received Hitler's menacing orders was May 23, by which time all opportunities for effective Axis intervention had passed. The headquarters of Hitler's thirtieth directive on the Middle East: May 23, 1941 In the Middle East, the Arab freedom movement is our natural ally against Britain. In this regard, fomenting the insurgency in Iraq is particularly important.This insurgency should be extended beyond Iraq in order to strengthen those forces hostile to Britain in the Middle East, cut off British lines of communication and contain British troops and ships here, thereby weakening its strength in other theaters.For these reasons, I have decided to advance the war in the Middle East by supporting Iraq.It remains to be seen whether, and in what manner, a future combined attack on the Suez Canal will ultimately destroy Britain's position between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. On the night of May 27th our army began to advance towards Baghdad, but progress was slowed down by widespread flooding and the destruction of bridges over many irrigation ditches.However, my vanguard arrived in the outskirts of Baghdad on May 30.Although our troops were limited and there was an Iraqi division stationed in the city, their presence caused Rashid Ali and his staff to panic, so Rashid Ali and others joined other culprits such as Germany and Italy that day His envoys and the ex-Muslim expositors from Jerusalem fled to Persia.The next day, May 31, an armistice was signed, the Iraqi regency was restored, and a new government took office.We were soon occupying all the important points in the territory with our land and air forces. In this way, Germany's attempt to instigate a defection in Iraq and control this vast area at a small cost has come to naught.The landing of a brigade of Indian troops at Basra on April 18 was timely.This forced Rashid Ali to act before the deployment was ready.Even so, our limited force was once a race against time.The aviation school's valiant defense of Habania has been a major factor in our success.Of course, the Germans had at their disposal an airlift force at their disposal; this force would have now allowed the Germans to include Syria, Iraq, Persia and their valuable oil fields.Hitler could have stretched his hand a long way to India and beckoned to Japan.But, as we shall see, he chose to use his best air forces in another direction. We often hear military experts instructing people that superior forces should be used in decisive battles.This remark is indeed very reasonable.But in war this principle, like all others, is governed by facts and circumstances, otherwise strategy would be too easy.It would become a military code rather than an art; it would be based on rules rather than on wise and well-adjusted judgments drawn from a scrutiny of changing circumstances.Hitler did lose the opportunity to get a huge booty in the Middle East at little cost.We in Britain, though in extreme embarrassment, were spared, by a limited army, from far-reaching or irreparable losses. We must remember that the Iraqi betrayal was only a small aspect of the extreme tension in the Middle East that put Wavell under pressure from all sides at the same time.Other issues were: the impending German attack on Crete, our plans to attack Rommel in the western desert, the fighting in Abyssinia and Eritrea, and the urgent need to pre-empt a German invasion in Syria, etc.Likewise, the whole situation in the Mediterranean, seen from London, is but a minor part of the world problems before us, of which the threat of German invasion, submarine warfare and the attitude of Japan are the main ones. feature.Only the strength and solidarity of the war cabinet, the mutual respect and unity of opinion between the political and military chiefs, and the smooth functioning of the operational machinery have enabled us to overcome these difficulties, and of course, without serious trauma. The reader will be aware of growing tensions between the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff and their difficult but heroic Commander-in-Chief in Cairo.The domestic leadership, chaired by me, overturned the decision-making of the field chief directly from Whitehall.We took things over from him, ordered the rush to help Habaniya ourselves, and rejected all negotiations with Rashid Ali or the idea of ​​a Turkish mediation at one point.The result was a quick and round success.Though Wavell himself was the one who felt the happiest and the greatest consolation, this episode had to leave a shadow on his mind and ours.At the same time, General Auchinleck's zeal for sending an Indian division to Basra as quickly as we wished and with the sincere consent of the Governor-General of India, and without hesitation in promising Indian reinforcements, made us I feel that he is a character who is full of vitality and whose personal talents have not yet been brought into play.The results of these impressions will be seen in the further development of events.