Chapter 93 Volume 3, Chapter 20, Retribution of the Soviet Union

Soviet Miscalculations Unimaginable Prospects for German Deployment in the East The Joint Intelligence Committee's Views The Chiefs of Staff's Warning on May 31 A Lightning I Personally Warned Stalin on April 3 of the Exasperating Delay Hitler Delayed Twice Operation Barbarossa Three Army Groups Stop the Efforts of Hitler and Ribbentrop A Fateful Telegram from Troff Declaring War on June 22 Schulenburg Hitler's Brutal Policy Checkers Weekend President's Guarantee German Attack I Radio on June 22. Nemesis is the goddess of retribution, who destroys all undeserved luck, suppresses the pride that comes with it, and is the punisher of all villains. 【１】

[1] See the Oxford English Dictionary. We must now expose the fallacies and falsehoods of the cold calculations of the Soviet government and the vast Communist apparatus, their utter ignorance of their own situation.They were indifferent to the fate of the Western powers, and although it meant the destruction of the Second Front, they soon clamored for it to be opened.Little did they seem to realize that Hitler had been determined to destroy them more than six months earlier.If their intelligence organizations had reported that Germany was deploying large (by now increasing) armies to Eastern Europe, they had neglected to take many necessary countermeasures.Thus, they left Germany to ravage all the Balkan countries.They hate and loathe the Western democracies, but the four countries whose basic interests and their own security have the greatest bearing on them, namely Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, could have been separated from the Soviet Union in January with the active assistance of Great Britain. United to form the Balkan Front against Hitler.They threw these countries into chaos, and then, one by one, they were annexed by Germany, except Turkey.War is primarily a record of people's missteps, but we doubt that history has ever made such mistakes as those made by Stalin and the leaders of the Communist Party, who waited and abandoned all opportunities in the Balkans, and failed to perceive the impending threat to Russian onslaught.We've seen them as selfish strategists, and now they're proven fools.Russia's strength, masses, bravery, and perseverance have yet to be tested, but judging by strategy, policy, foresight, and talent, Stalin and his commissars were, at that time, utterly hoodwinked fools in World War II.

The Barbarossa Directive issued by Hitler on December 18, 1940, had established the general disposition and main tasks of the troops assembled for the attack on Russia.At that time, the total strength of Germany on the Eastern Front was thirty-four divisions.To more than triple this number required a vast process of planning and preparation, which took up the first few months of 1941.In January and February, the Führer decided to take risks in the Balkans, and five divisions, three of them armored, moved from the east to the south.During May, the number of German troops deployed in the east increased to eighty-seven divisions. In addition, no fewer than twenty-five German divisions were held in the Balkans.In view of the importance and riskiness of Germany's attack on Russia, it would be unwise to disperse her forces so severely that she would hinder the concentration of her eastern armies.We shall now see how our resistance in the Balkans, and especially the revolution in Yugoslavia, delayed this major military operation for five weeks.No one can accurately estimate how much this delay before the onset of winter will affect the victory or defeat of the German-Russian campaign.But we have reason to believe that Moscow has thus been preserved.In May and early June, many of Germany's elite divisions and all armored divisions moved from the Balkans to the Eastern Front, so that at the start of the war Germany attacked with a force of 120 divisions, of which 17 were Armored divisions, twelve divisions are motorized divisions.Six Romanian divisions were also included in their Army Group South.

Another twenty-six divisions in the general reserve had been assembled, or were being assembled.Thus, at the beginning of July, the German High Command could count on at least 150 divisions, supported by a main air force of about 2,700 aircraft. Until the end of March, I did not believe that Hitler was determined to fight Russia to the death, nor that such a war was imminent.Our intelligence materials reveal in great detail how large groups of German troops advanced to the Balkans and entered these countries from January to March 1941.Our intelligence operatives can move freely in these quasi-neutral countries and can always and accurately inform us about the build-up of German troops to South-Eastern Europe by rail and road transport.But none of these messages was necessarily connected with the attack on Russia.All this news can be explained logically in terms of German interests and policies in Romania and Bulgaria, German attempts in Greece and agreements with Yugoslavia and Hungary.It is even more difficult to see information on the movement of large numbers of German troops from Romania to the Baltic via the German mainland towards the main front against Russia.It seems to me unimaginable that Germany can fight a major war with Russia at this stage before the situation in the Balkans is clarified.

We do not know the gist of the conversations Molotov, Hitler and Ribbentrop held in Berlin in November 1940, nor the content of the negotiations and proposed agreement that followed them.The strength of the Germans against us across the English Channel shows no sign of diminishing.German air raids on Britain continued to intensify.The Soviet government was very secretive about, and apparently accepted, the build-up of German troops in Romania and Bulgaria; we had evidence of Russian shipments of valuable supplies to Germany; The imperial side of the East clearly has common interests all of this looks a lot like Hitler and Stalin trying to make a deal at our expense rather than fighting each other.We now know that such a deal was largely Stalin's purpose.

These are impressions shared by our Inter-Services Joint Intelligence Committee.On April 7, the committee announced that news was circulating in Europe that Germany planned to attack Russia. They say that while Germany has a large army in Eastern Europe and is expected to fight Russia sooner or later, it is not yet ready to open another front in a major war.In their view, its main objective in 1941 was still to defeat the United Kingdom.As late as May 23, the JSIC also reported that rumors of an impending attack on Russia had died down and that it had heard that a new agreement between the two countries was about to be concluded.They thought it was possible because Germany needed to strengthen its economy to cope with the demands of a long war.Germany could obtain the necessary assistance from Russia either by force or by agreement.Germany, they believed, would choose the latter path, although the threat of force would facilitate the latter.Now, that threat is building.

There is much evidence that roads and railway sidings are being built, airfields are being built, and that there is a massive build-up of troops, including troops and air forces from the Balkans, in German-occupied Poland. Our chiefs of staff see farther and with greater certainty than their advisers.They warned the Middle East Command on May 31: We have solid evidence that Germany is now massing a large army and air force against Russia.Under this threat, they may demand concessions from Russia which are extremely harmful to us.If Russia refuses, Germany is about to march. It was not until June 5 that the Joint Intelligence Committee reported that the scale of German military preparations in Eastern Europe appeared to point to a bigger problem than the signing of an economic agreement.Possibly, Germany wanted to eliminate the potential threat posed by the increasingly powerful Soviet army from its eastern frontiers.They believe that it is still difficult to say whether the result will be a war or an agreement.On June 10, they claimed, in the second half of June we shall see either war or agreement.Finally, on June 12, they reported that there was new evidence that Hitler was determined to clear the Soviet Union and launch an offensive.

I've never been content with this collective intelligence approach, preferring to read the source material myself.So early in the summer of 1940, I asked Major Desmond Morton to pick up tidbits for me every day.I read the messages all the time, and thus formed my own opinions, sometimes early on. It was therefore with great relief and excitement that I read at the end of March 1941 information from reliable sources concerning the movement of German armored units to and from Bucharest to Cracow on the railway.This information shows that when the Yugoslav ministers capitulated in Vienna, three of the five German panzer divisions sent south via Rumania to Greece and Yugoslavia were immediately transferred north to Cracow.Secondly, after the revolution in Belgrade, the transport was reversed and the three armored divisions were transferred back to Romania.The diversion and return of about sixty trains could not be hidden from my local intelligence personnel.

This information seemed to me like a bolt of lightning illuminating the situation across Eastern Europe.The sudden transfer to Krakow of so many armored units needed for the Balkans could only mean that Hitler intended to attack Russia in May.I have since felt that this must have been his main intention.The fact that these troops had to go back to Romania because of the revolution in Belgrade probably necessitated a postponement of the date of the attack from May to June.I immediately telegraphed this important news to Mr. Eden in Athens. I do not wish to have this type of intelligence received first selected and compiled by intelligence agencies at all levels.I will now be doing the review for me by Major Morton, who will submit to me information which he considers to be of greater importance.All information should be shown to him.Please submit originals of reliable materials to me.

Prime Minister to Mr Eden (in Athens) March 30, 1941 My interpretation of this information is that the bad guy had assembled a large number of armored forces to join other forces to intimidate Yugoslavia and Greece in order to take the former or both without bloodshed.When he was sure that Yugoslavia would join the Axis, he took three of the five armored divisions to deal with the bear, thinking that the remaining two would be enough to settle the Greek problem.However, the revolution in Belgrade spoiled this beauty and halted the transfer of troops to the north.As far as I can see, this can only mean an early attack on Yugoslavia, or else a move on Turkey.

It seems that he wants to use heavy troops in the Balkan Peninsula, and temporarily put the big bear aside.In addition, this situation of changing from day to day, combined with the coup in Belgrade, just shows that Germany's plans for southeastern and eastern Europe are huge.And that's the clearest sign we've seen yet.Whether you and Dill agree with my impression, please let me know after careful consideration. I also wanted to find ways to warn Stalin by drawing his attention to the danger he faced, so as to establish with him the kind of connection I had with President Roosevelt. I hope to rely on the fact that I have kept my message short and reserved, and that it is after my official telegram on June 25, 1940, when I introduced Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador. This is the first communication that can arouse his attention and deep thought. Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps April 3, 1941 The following is my telegram to Mr. Stalin, to be delivered in person only. I have received reliable information from a reliable intelligence officer that when the Germans thought that Yugoslavia had been set up (that is, after March 20), they began to take three of the five armored divisions from Romania. Transferred to southern Poland. When they heard of the Serbian revolution, they immediately ordered the advance to be halted.You are free to ponder the significance of these facts. At this time, the foreign minister who had returned from Cairo added some explanations: If you have had an opportunity to expand on this view after receiving this letter, you can point out that this change in German military disposition must mean that Hitler has now postponed his original plans to threaten the Soviet government because of the actions in Yugoslavia.If so, the Soviet government should take this opportunity to strengthen their own position.This delay showed that the enemy's army was not infinite, and that it was advantageous to form an organization like the United Front. 2. The method for the Soviet government to strengthen its position is obviously to provide material aid to Turkey and Greece, and aid Yugoslavia through Greece.Such assistance might increase Germany's difficulties in the Balkans and further delay the already indicated German attack on the Soviet Union.But if the opportunity is not taken now to thwart German plans as much as possible, within a few months the crisis could resume. 3. Of course, you do not imply that we ourselves need any help from the Soviet government, or that the Soviet government should act only in its own interests, but what we want them to understand is that Hitler will attack them sooner or later when he can offensive; the fact that he was at war with us would not in itself deter him from attacking the Soviet Union if he had not encountered some particularly intractable problems such as he was currently encountering in the Balkans; It was in the Soviet Union's interest to prevent him from resolving the Balkan question in accordance with his own intentions. My ambassador to the Soviet Union did not send a reply until April 12th.He said that before receiving my telegram he had written a long letter to Vyshinsky in his own name.The letter recalled the successive failures of the Soviet government to resist German aggression in the Balkans, and stated in the strongest possible terms that the Soviet Union must immediately adopt a vigorous policy if it did not want to miss its last chance to ally with others to defend its borders. The Balkans remained opposed to Axis state cooperation. (He said,) If I deliver this telegram to the Prime Minister through Molotov, which expresses the same subject in a shorter message and in a weaker tone, I am afraid that the only effect may be to weaken the letter sent by me to Vyshinsky. impression already made.I am sure that the Soviet Government will find it difficult to understand why such a solemn statement should be used in such a brief and fragmented comment based on facts that they must know well, in which they neither explicitly ask the Soviet Government to express its position nor recommend that they take action. to submit this telegram. I feel compelled to convey these considerations to you, for I am deeply afraid that delivering the Prime Minister's letter will not only be ineffective, but will be a serious mistake in tactics, but if you do not agree with this opinion, I will immediately try to agree with Moloteau. husband meeting. The Foreign Secretary wrote me a signature for this: I think Sir Stafford Cripps's argument about not having to deliver your telegram is strong in this new situation.If you agree, I intend to tell him that there is no need to deliver this telegram now, but that if Vyshinsky responds favorably to his letter, he should inform him of the facts contained in your telegram.At the same time, I would like to ask him to send as soon as possible a summary of his letter to Vyshinsky and to send him the full text afterwards. I am very troubled by this matter and the delay that has occurred.This was the only telegram I sent directly to Stalin before the German attack.The brevity of the message, the great significance of the communication, and the fact that it was sent by the head of the British government and delivered by the British ambassador himself to the head of the Russian government, all serve to give it special importance and to attract Stalin's attention. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary April 16, 1941 I attached great importance to the submission of my private telegram to Stalin. I don't understand why it is getting rejected.The ambassador was not sensitive to the military implications of those facts.Please do so. Another memo reads: Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary April 18, 1941 Has Sir Stafford Cripps sent me my private telegram warning Stalin of a possible German attack?It is extremely astonishing that I should take so long a message of such profound importance that I take it so seriously. Accordingly, the Foreign Secretary telegraphed the Ambassador on the 18th to deliver my telegram.There was no reply from Sir Stafford Cripps, so I asked why. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary April 30, 1941 When did Sir Stafford Cripps send my telegram to Stalin?Please ask him to report the situation. Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister April 30, 1941 Sir Stafford Cripps sent the telegram to Mr. Wyshinski on the 19th of April, and Mr. Wyshinsky informed him in writing on the 23rd of April that the telegram had been transmitted to Mister Stalin. I am very sorry that, by mistake, I did not immediately send you the telegram reporting this incident.The transcript is now attached. Here are those transcripts: Sir Stafford Cripps to Foreign Secretary from Moscow April 19, 1941 I have sent the telegram to Vyshinsky today and asked him to forward it to Stalin.Whether the clarification should be incorporated in the message, or as a side note to my own, you did not make clear in your call.Therefore, in view of the fact that I wrote to Vyshinsky on April 11 and met with him yesterday, I thought it best not to add any clarification, which is merely a restatement. Sir Stafford Cripps to Foreign Secretary from Moscow April 22, 1941 Vyshinsky informed me in writing today that he had forwarded the telegram to Stalin. 【１】 [1] Eden said in the memorandum of April 30 that Vyshinsky notified Cripps on the 23rd, and that the telegram said it was on the 22nd, and the date is obviously wrong, and all are translated according to the original text. .translator Whether or not my telegram would have been altered in the course of events had it been delivered in time and in the manner I have appointed, I cannot make any final judgment.Even so, I regret not following my instructions effectively.If I had had any direct contact with Stalin, I might have saved him from having so much air force destroyed on the ground. We now know that Hitler had set May 15 as the date for the attack on Russia in his Dec. One month, and then postponed to June 22.By mid-March, the German movement of troops in the north towards the main Russian front was no longer an operation requiring special covert measures.However, on March 13, the Berlin authorities ordered the members of the Russian delegation working in Germany to stop working and send them back home.Russians in this part of Germany are only allowed to stay until March 25th.In the north, Germany has assembled strong forces.After March 20, more powerful troops will be assembled. 【１】 [1] "Nazi｜Soviet Relations, 1939｜1941", p. 279. On April 22, the Soviet Union accused the German Foreign Office of successive violations of the Russian border by more and more German aircraft.From March 27th to April 18th there were eighty such incidents.The Russian note also stated that serious incidents would occur if German planes continued to fly over the Soviet border. Germany's answer was a series of counter-charges against the Soviet aircraft. At this time, one hundred and twenty of the best German divisions, divided into three army groups, were gathering along the Russian front.Army Group South, under the command of Rundstedt, was, for reasons already explained, very inadequately armored.Its armored divisions had only recently returned to Germany from Greece and Yugoslavia.Although the date of the attack was postponed to 22 June, due to the wear and tear of the armored vehicles in the Balkans, rest and inspection were urgently needed. On April 13, Schulenburg returned to Berlin from Moscow.Hitler received him on April 28. During the interview, he made a lot of comments on the topic of Russia's attitude towards Yugoslavia.According to Schulenburg's account of the conversation, he attempted to justify the Soviet actions.He said: Russia was shocked to hear rumors of an imminent German attack.He did not believe that Russia would attack Germany.Hitler said he had been forewarned of events in Serbia.In his view, the events there were an example of the political unreliability of some countries.But Schulenburg stuck to the tenor of all his reports from Moscow.I am convinced that Stalin was prepared to make even greater concessions to us.They have already told our economic negotiators (if we ask in due course) that Russia can supply us with five million tons of grain a year. 【１】 [1] "Nazi|Soviet Relations", page 332. Schulenburg returned to Moscow on April 30, and his meeting with Hitler gave him an epiphany.He got a clear impression that Hitler was bent on waging war.He also seems to have tried to warn the Russian ambassador in Berlin Dykanosov against this view, and to the last moment he continued to fight for his policy of Russian-German understanding. Weizsäcker, the Permanent Undersecretary of the German Foreign Office, was one of those extremely competent civilians who are often seen in the government departments of many countries.He is not a political officer with executive power, so according to British habits, he is not responsible for national policy.A court set up by the victorious powers sentenced him to seven years in prison, which he is currently serving.Although he was listed as a war criminal, he did warn his superiors in writing.At that time, his superiors did not adopt it, which we are very fortunate.He commented on the meeting as follows: Weizsäcker to Ribbentrop Berlin April 28, 1941 I can sum up my views on the German-Russian conflict in one sentence.If every reduced Russian city was worth to us a sunken British warship, I would be in favor of a German-Russian war this summer.But I believe that we can only be victors in Russia in the military sense, and losers in the economic sense, on the other hand. A fatal blow to the communist system may be considered tempting, and the inclusion of Eurasia against the Anglo-Saxon kingdom and its minions may be taken for granted, but the only determining factor is Can such a plan hasten the collapse of Great Britain. We must distinguish between two possibilities: (1) Britain is close to collapse.If we accept this assumption, but add a new opponent, it will increase British aspirations.Russia is not a potential ally of Great Britain.Britain cannot expect anything from Russia.The Russians did not wish to delay the collapse of Britain.Fighting against Russia did not destroy any hope for the British. (2) If we do not believe that the collapse of Britain is imminent, then we naturally think that the use of force requires supplies from Soviet territory.We will be victorious in Moscow and beyond, I think that is certain.However, I very much doubt that we will get any benefit in the face of the famous passive resistance of the Slavs.I don't see any serious opposition in Russia that could succeed communism, unite with us, and serve us.We may therefore have to expect the continuation of the Stalinist regime in eastern Russia and Siberia, and a resumption of hostilities in the spring of 1942.The gateway to the Pacific remains closed. A German attack on Russia would only give the British new spiritual strength.This will be interpreted by them as the Germans are not sure of winning the war against Britain.So not only do we have to admit that the war is going on for a long time, but we may, by doing so, actually prolong it, not shorten it. On May 7, Schulenburg reported hopefully that Stalin had succeeded Molotov as chairman of the People's Commissars and thus head of the Soviet government. The reason for the replacement may lie in recent mistakes in foreign policy. These mistakes contributed to the cooling of the fiery German-Soviet relations, which Stalin had consciously worked to establish and maintain on both sides. Stalin has a new position and will be responsible for all measures of the government's domestic and foreign affairs.I am convinced that Stalin will use his new position to personally work on maintaining and developing good relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The report from Moscow by the German Naval Attaché made the same point by saying that Stalin was the center of German-Soviet cooperation.Instances of Russian appeasement to Germany increased.On May 3, Russia formally recognized the pro-German government of Rashid Ali in Iraq.On May 7, the diplomatic representatives of Belgium and Norway were expelled from Russia, and even the Yugoslav minister was also expelled.In early June, the entire staff of the Greek legation was driven out of Moscow.As General Thomas, Director of Economics of the German War Ministry, later wrote in his article on German wartime economy: the Russians performed delivery tasks until the eve of the offensive, and in the last few days, they also rushed rubber from the Far East by express train. Of course, we have not yet obtained sufficient information about Moscow's mood, but Germany's purpose seems to be clear and understandable.I telegraphed General Smuts on May 16 saying: It appears that Hitler is gathering forces against Russia.Troops, armored units and aircraft are constantly being moved north from the Balkans and east from France and Germany.Stalin must have condescended to maintain his illusions about Hitler's policies.After another month of intense movement and deployment of the German army, Schulenburg was able to send the following telegram to the German Foreign Office on June 13: Commissar Molotov has just handed me a TASS telegram.The telegram will be broadcast tonight and appear in the papers tomorrow.Its content is as follows: Even before the British Ambassador Cripps returned to London, but especially since his return, the newspapers of Britain and other countries were spreading rumors of an imminent Soviet-German war.These rumors say: 1. Germany has presumably made various territorial and economic claims to the Soviet Union, and Germany and the Soviet Union are about to negotiate a new, closer agreement. 2. The Soviet Union has presumably rejected these demands, and Germany has therefore assembled troops on the Soviet borders in order to attack Russia. 3. The Soviet Union may have begun intensive preparations for a war against Germany and has assembled troops on the German border. Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumors, the responsible authorities in Moscow felt it necessary to explain that this was a foolish propaganda campaign by forces opposed to the Soviet Union and Germany, who wanted the war to expand and intensify. Hitler should have been satisfied with the success of his tricks of deception and concealment, and with the state of mind of his victims. Molotov's ignorance to the end is worth recording. Schulenburg to the German Foreign Office Moscow, June 22, 1941 at one seventeen Molotov summoned me in his office at nine-thirty last night.He first referred to Soviet allegations of repeated border violations by German planes and said that Dykanosov had been instructed to meet with the German Foreign Minister on this matter, then Molotov said the following: There were many signs that the German government was dissatisfied with the Soviet government, and there were even rumors that a German-Soviet war was imminent.The persistence of these rumors is due to the fact that there was no reaction in Germany to the TASS telegram of June 13, and the fact that this telegram was not even published in Germany.The Soviet government could not understand the reasons for Germany's dissatisfaction.If it was the Yugoslav problem that caused this dissatisfaction, he (Molotov) believed that through previous contacts he had already solved the problem, and, moreover, it was a thing of the past.He would be very grateful if I could tell him the reasons for the present state of German-Soviet relations. I replied that I could not answer his question because I did not know the facts, and that I should convey his words to Berlin. But now, the time has come. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg Berlin June 21, 1941 1. Upon receipt of this telegram, all encrypted data still in hand should be destroyed.The radio transceiver should be disabled immediately. 2. Please tell Mr. Molotov immediately that you have something urgent to inform him, so see him immediately.After you meet, read the following statement to him: The German government declares that the Soviet government has violated its obligations by (1) not only continuing, but even intensifying its attempts to undermine Germany and Europe; (2) adopted an increasingly anti-German foreign policy; (3) To muster all its forces on the German frontier. The Soviet government has therefore broken its treaty with Germany and is about to attack from behind at a critical moment for Germany, so the Fuehrer has ordered the German armed forces to resist this threat by all possible means. Please do not discuss this notice with him.The Soviet government should be responsible for ensuring the safety of embassy personnel. At four o'clock in the morning on June 22, Ribbentrop handed over the official declaration of war to the Russian ambassador in Berlin.At dawn, Schulenburg met Molotov in the Kremlin. The latter listened in silence to the announcement read by the German ambassador, and then commented: This is war.Your planes have just bombed over a dozen of our undefended villages. Do you think we should be treated like this? 【１】 [1] This was the last act of Count Schulenburg's diplomatic career.At the end of 1943, his name was included in the list of German secret groups conspiring against Hitler. He was a possible candidate for foreign minister in the government that would succeed the Nazi regime because he had special qualifications to negotiate with Stalin. Separate peace.After the murder of Hitler in July 1944, he was arrested by the Nazi Party and interned in a prison of the German Secret Police.Executed on November 10. Facing the TASS broadcast, it was useless to try to add to the warnings Mr. Eden had already given to the Soviet ambassador in London, or to renew my personal efforts to awaken Stalin's attention to his danger. useless thing.The United States even regularly sent more reliable information to the Soviet government.None of us can break the ignorant prejudices and stubborn ideas that Stalin held between himself and the terrible truth.Although, according to German estimates, Russia had 186 divisions massed on its borders, of which 119 divisions faced the German front, the Russian army was mostly attacked by surprise.The Germans saw no signs of preparing to attack on the frontier, and the Russian covering forces were quickly defeated.A catastrophe similar to that encountered by the Polish Air Force on September 1, 1939, had again befell the Russian airfields on a much larger scale.After daybreak, hundreds of Russian planes were found and destroyed before they could take off.Thus, the outcries of hatred for Britain and the United States broadcast by the Soviet propaganda machine at midnight were silenced by the sound of German artillery at dawn. Unrighteous people are not always wise, and dictators are not always right. In order to complete this account I cannot fail to speak of a ferocious decision by Hitler against his new enemy, and of carrying it out under all the pressure of fighting to the death over vast lands desolate or ruined and in the rigors of winter. A process of decision-making.Hitler issued verbal orders at a conference on June 14, 1941, which largely regulated what the Germans did to the Russian army and people, resulting in many cruel and barbaric atrocities.According to the Nuremberg Papers, General Halder testified: Before attacking Russia, the head of state convened a meeting of all generals and personnel related to the Supreme Command to discuss the upcoming attack on Russia.I can't recall the exact date of this meeting.At this meeting, the Fuehrer said that the methods used in the war against Russia would have to be different from those used against the West.He said that the war between Russia and Germany was, for the Russians, desperate.He said that since Russia was not a signatory to the Hague Convention, the treatment of Russian prisoners of war did not necessarily follow the terms of the convention.He (also) said that the so-called people's commissars should not be treated as prisoners of war. 【１】 [1] "Nuremberg Papers", Book VI, pp. 310ff. According to Keitel: The theme of Hitler's talk was: This war is a decisive battle between two ideologies; Due to this fact, in this war (against Russia) it is impossible to apply those methods which, as we soldiers know, are considered to be the only correct ones according to international law. 【１】 [1] "Nuremberg Papers", Part Eleven, page sixteen. On the evening of Friday, June 20th, I drove alone to Checkers.I know that the German attack on Russia is only a matter of days, perhaps hours.I had arranged to give a radio address on this matter on Saturday night. This, of course, has to be done with careful words.而且這時蘇聯政府態度傲慢，盲目無知，把我們提出的一切警告，只當作是被打敗的人想拉別人同歸於盡的圖謀。我在汽車中思索的結果，把這次廣播演說推遲到星期日晚上，我想到那時一切會明朗起來。所以星期六像往常一樣，在忙忙碌碌中度過了。 五天以前，即六月十五日，我曾經電告總統如下： 根據我能從各方面獲得的消息，其中並有最可靠的消息，德國看來即將大舉進攻俄國。德國不但已經把主力部隊部署在芬蘭到羅馬尼亞一線，而且已完成了空軍和裝甲部隊的調動。昨日，盧佐夫號袖珍戰列艦試圖從斯卡格拉克海峽出航，當即被我駐在海岸的飛機用魚雷擊中。該戰艦原來很可能是想開往北方，以加強北極側翼的海軍力量的。如果這場新戰爭爆發，我們當然要遵循希特勒乃是我們必須擊敗的敵人這項原則，給予俄國人以最大的鼓勵和我們能夠提供的任何援助。我認為，此間不會有任何階級性的政治反應，並相信德俄衝突不致使你感到為難。 週末在我處作客的美國大使，把總統的答覆告訴了我。總統答應，如果德國進攻俄國，他當立刻公開支持首相可能就歡迎俄國為同盟國而發表的任何聲明。懷南特先生口頭上轉達了這項保證。 我在星期日（二十二日）早晨醒來以後，聽到了希特勒進攻俄國的消息。信念已變成了事實。我毫不懷疑我們的任務和政策是什麼，也毫不懷疑我要說的話是什麼。現在尚待完成的只是起草這篇演說稿了。我吩咐負責人員立刻公告我將在當晚九時發表廣播演說。不久，迪爾將軍從倫敦趕來，帶著詳細的消息進入我的臥室。德軍已經從一條遼闊的戰線進攻俄國，已經突然襲擊了蘇聯一大部分停留在地面上的空軍，並且似乎正銳不可當地迅速前進。這位帝國總參謀長又說：我想，他們將會成群地被包圍。 我一整天在起草我的廣播稿。沒有時間去同戰時內閣商量，而且也沒有必要。我知道，我們大家對這件事的看法是一致的。艾登先生、比弗布魯克勳爵和斯塔福德‧克里普斯爵士（他是在十日離開莫斯科的）也一整天和我在一起。 我的私人秘書科爾維爾先生在這個週末值勤，他所寫的這個星期日契克斯的情況，或許是值得一讀的。 六月二十一日，星期六，我在晚餐以前到了契克斯，懷南特夫婦、艾登夫婦和愛德華‧布里奇斯正在那裡。進餐時，邱吉爾先生說，德國進攻俄國，現在已經是確定不移的事了。他認為，希特勒正指望得英國和美國的資本家和右翼的同情。但是希特勒錯了，我們應當全力幫助俄國。懷南特說，美國的態度也是一樣。 飯後，當我同邱吉爾先生在槌球草場上散步時，他又回到這個話題上來。我問他，對他這位頭號反共人物來說，這樣一來是不是就同流合污了。邱吉爾先生答道，完全不是這樣。我只有一個目的，就是打倒希特勒，我的一生這樣一來就變得簡單多了。如果希特勒攻打地獄，我至少也會在下院為魔鬼說幾句好話。 翌日晨四時，我被外交部打來的電話驚醒，電話說，德國已經進攻俄國了。首相曾經常說，除非敵人打到（英格蘭），不得因別的事情把他喚醒。因此，我延遲到八點鐘才告訴他。他只說了一句話：通知英國廣播公司，我在今晚九時廣播。他在上午十一時開始準備講稿，除了同斯塔福德‧克里普斯爵士、克蘭伯恩勳爵和比弗布魯克勳爵共進午餐外，他整天都在忙於此事。講稿在八時四十分才準備好。 我在這次廣播中說： 納粹制度同共產主義最壞的特徵相比較，並沒有什麼區別。它除了貪得無厭和種族統治而外，沒有任何宗旨和原則。 它的殘酷行為和凶暴侵略所造成的惡果超過了各式各樣的人類罪行。在過去二十五年中，沒有一個人像我這樣始終一貫地反對共產主義。我並不想收回我說過的話。但是，這一切，在正在我們眼前展現的情景對照之下，都已黯然失色了。過去的一切，連同它的罪惡，它的愚蠢，它的悲劇，都已經一閃而過了。我眼前看到的是，俄國的士兵們站在他們故鄉的門旁，在捍衛著他們的祖先自古以來耕種的田地。我看到的是，他們在捍衛著他們的家園，母親和妻子們在家鄉祈禱啊，是的，大家經常都在祈禱她們在祝願親人平安，祝願她們的贍養者、戰鬥者和保護者的歸來。我看到俄國上萬的村莊，那裡穿衣吃飯都依靠土地，生活雖然十分艱辛，可是那裡仍然有著基本的人類樂趣，少女們在歡笑，兒童們在嬉戲。我看到，納粹的戰爭機器正以瘋狂的進攻，向這一切猛衝過去；跟著過去的是身著華麗戎裝、佩刀和鞋跟叮噹作響的普魯士軍官們，以及剛剛威嚇過、壓制過十多個國家的那些奸詐的專業特務們。我也看到大批頭腦愚鈍、受過訓練、唯命是從而凶暴殘忍的德國士兵，像一群爬行的蝗蟲在蹣跚行進。我看到德國轟炸機和戰鬥機在空中飛翔，它們被英國人多次鞭撻仍然傷痛在身，卻想尋找它們認為是比較省力和穩當的獵取對象。 在這一切令人頭暈目眩的突然襲擊的背後，我看到那一小撮計劃、組織和發動這種造成人類極大恐怖的惡棍。 我必須宣佈英皇陛下政府的決定（我確信偉大的自治領不久就會一致同意這個決定），因為我們現在必須立即宣佈這項決定，一天也不能耽擱。我必須發表這個宣言，但是，我們將要採取什麼政策，你們還有懷疑嗎？我們只有一個宗旨，一個唯一的、不可改變的目標。我們決心要毀滅希特勒，以及納粹制度的一切痕跡。什麼也不能使我們改變這個決心。Nothing.我們絕不和敵人談判，我們絕不同希特勒或他的任何黨羽進行會談，我們將在陸地上對他作戰，我們將在海洋裡對他作戰，我們將在天空中對他作戰，直到邀天之助，我們把他的影子從地球上消除盡淨，把世界上的人民從他的壓迫下解放出來為止。任何對納粹帝國作戰的個人或國家，都將得到我們的援助。任何跟著希特勒走的個人或國家，都是我們的敵人。這就是我們的政策，這就是我們的宣言。根據以上的理由，我們將要對俄國和俄國人民進行我們能夠給與的一切援助。我們將向世界每一個角落的朋友和盟國呼籲，請他們採取同一方針，並且如同我們一樣，忠誠不渝地堅持到底。 這不是階級的戰爭，而是整個英帝國和英聯邦不分種族、信仰與黨派所從事的一場戰爭。美國的行動，不應當由我來講，但是我要說這樣一句話：如果希特勒妄想他對蘇俄的進攻，將會使決心消滅他的偉大民主國家的目標有絲毫偏離，或者會使他們的努力有絲毫鬆懈，那麼他就大錯特錯了。 相反地，我們從他的暴政下拯救人類的努力將得到增強和鼓舞。我們將加強而不是減弱我們的決心和手段。 有些國家和政府行事愚蠢，它們讓自己被人家各個擊破，但是如果它們採取聯合行動的話，它們本來是能夠拯救自己，並且能夠使世界免於發生這場災禍的，但是現在不是針對它們的愚蠢向它們講清這些道理的時候。我在幾分鐘前談到迫使或誘使希特勒對俄國進行冒險所表現出來的嗜殺和貪慾時，我曾指出在他的暴行的後面還存在著一個更深的動機。他想摧毀俄國的力量，因為，他希望，如果他能得逞，就可以把他的陸空軍主力從東歐調回，再大舉進攻這個島國。他知道，他必須征服這個島國，否則他就要因他的罪行而受到懲罰。他進攻俄國，只不過是企圖進攻不列顛諸島的前奏。毫無疑問，他希望這一切行動可以在冬季來到以前結束，他可以在美國的海空軍進行干涉以前擊敗大不列顛，他希望用比以前更大的規模重演他各個擊破敵人的故伎。他一向就是依靠這種手段起家的。然後，他就可以為他的最後行動掃清障礙，這最後行動就是使西半球屈服於他的意志和制度之下，如果做不到這一點，他征服別國的一切戰果都是空的。 因此，俄國的危難就是我們的危難，也是美國的危難，正如俄國人為保衛家鄉而戰的事業，是世界各地的自由人民和自由民族的事業一樣。讓我們吸取通過殘酷的經驗得來的教訓吧。讓我們加倍努力，只要一息尚存，力量還在，就齊心協力打擊敵人吧。