Chapter 95 Volume 3, Chapter 22, The Intermission of the War in Africa: The Defensive Battle of Tobruk

General Auchinleck took command on July 2nd. There was a need for an offensive in the western desert. My telegram of July 6th. Auchinleck was asking too much for the delay of the British division by four and a half months. Unnecessary concern for the northern flank. Telegram from the Chief of Staff on July 19th Telegram from me on the same day Auchinleck's blunt reply on July 23rd He came to London I was not convinced but agreed with the German views on Rommel's situation and the future of North Africa Opinion Mr. Menzies Returns We disagree on the organization of the War Cabinet Insist on full replacement. My telegram to General Auchinleck on 17th September. He intends to resign. Continue to appeal to Mr. Farding. Mr. Farding's government collapsed. Mr. Curtin's Labor government. The appeal was again rejected and we complied with Australia's request to replace the considerable losses suffered by the Royal Navy's defense of Tobruk.

General Auchinleck had in fact assumed command of the Middle East on July 2, and officially took office on July 5.It is with high hopes that I begin contact with our new Commander-in-Chief. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck July 1, 1941 You assume great command in times of crisis.When all the facts are before you, it is up to you to decide whether, and if so, when, to resume the offensive in the Western Desert.You should pay special attention to the situation in Tobruk, to the progress of the enemy's reinforcements in Libya and to the temporary concentration of the enemy on Russia.You should also take into account the danger of trouble if military action on the Syrian side slackens, and a decision should be made on one or both of these battlefields.

You should determine whether and how these actions fit together.Of course, you will deeply feel the urgency of these problems.We will be happy to hear from you as soon as possible. The following telegram was sent the next day: Prime Minister to General Auchinleck July 2, 1941 Once Syria is cleared, we would like you to consider sending Wilson to the Western Desert, but that is of course up to you. It is very regrettable that this suggestion, which was resubmitted later, was not accepted. General Auchinleck answered my first telegram on the Fourth of July.He agreed to plan an offensive in the Western Desert once Syria was secured and our position in Iraq subsequently reconsolidated.But adequate armor is a must for success.He estimated that two or three armored divisions would be needed, along with a motorized division.For logistical reasons, the advance to drive the enemy out of North Africa would have to be divided into several stages.The first objective is to recapture Cyrenaica, which also needs to be done in stages.The general concluded by saying that simultaneous action in the western desert and in Syria would invite defeat on both fronts.

I think it would be wise to state the situation as we see it in its entirety. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck July 6, 1941 I agree to complete the operation on Syria, and we have always believed here that securing Syria is a necessary basis for securing or regaining Cyprus.One hopes that things in Syria will be resolved soon and that you won't have any obstacles in Cyprus.We are fully aware that, given the evolution of the situation, we should suspend the start of the offensive in the western desert and devote ourselves to these two operations first. 2. Nevertheless, this fall, the western desert remains the decisive battleground for the defense of the Nile Valley.Only by recovering the airfields in eastern Cyrenaica can our navy and air force take effective action against the enemy's supplies transported by sea.

General III. Wavell mentioned in his April 18th telegram that he had six regiments of trained armored personnel waiting for the tanks.This was a major factor in our decision to ship the tanks in Project Tiger.In addition, personnel from three other tank regiments are now coming around the Cape of Good Hope.Therefore, while Wavell and you both stress the need for further training of these already trained armored units, we fully appreciate your need for armored vehicles.We estimate that, if your workshops are properly organized, by the end of July you could have five hundred patrol tanks, infantry tanks, and American patrol tanks, in addition to a large number of various light tanks and armored vehicles.

4. The supply of tanks cannot be improved within July and August, unless some are shipped from the United States and a small amount of supplements are made from home.It should be noted that it is necessary to wait until after July or August, because we must concentrate on resisting the invasion from September 1, so the General Staff is naturally unwilling to send a large number of tanks to Africa by detouring the Cape of Good Hope (now this is the only delivery route), This renders these tanks useless at home and abroad until the beginning of October.After October, the supply of armaments from the United States should increase, and our situation here will improve.But, before that time, many things will happen again.

5. At present, our information shows that there is a large number of Italian reinforcements in Libya, but there are few or no German troops.However, if the Russian front collapses, that could change very quickly, against you, without reducing the threat of invasion at home. 6. We have informed you of the size of the air reinforcements.It appears that you may have significant air superiority in July, August and parts of September.But, later, if the Russian front collapsed, it would only free up a large number of Luftwaffe reinforcements to Africa.If the enemy has no intention of attacking our country, but only bluffs, they can gain air superiority on your western front in September.

7. In addition, there is the question of Tobruk.From here we cannot judge what Tobruk was worth to the offensive for two months, or what might have happened in the interim.It seems that the enemy's capture or complete siege of Tobruk was an indispensable preparatory step for (their) large-scale attack on Egypt. 8. Based on all these points of view, it is difficult to see that after the second half of September, your situation will be better than it is now, and it is likely to be worse.I have no doubt that you will soon give mature consideration to the whole matter. 9. About the Air Force.It seems to me that your plan must control the employment of all air forces in the Middle East in the interest of all major combat purposes.It must be remembered, of course, that the air force itself has the main strategic task and must not be expended on providing small-scale cover for the army, as happened at the Battle of Salum.In your telegram you speak of aircraft supporting the Army, aircraft supporting the Navy, and aircraft used on individual strategic missions.The question is what is the ratio?This should be discussed and arranged by the commander-in-chief at any time.However, these arrangements should not prevent the Air Force from making a full contribution to any major operational plan you have developed.One can't help but feel that our air superiority was squandered during the Battle of Salum (codenamed Tomahawk), and that our presence in Tobruk The army did not take any action.

General Auchinleck replied on July 15 that he intended to reinforce Cyprus with a division as soon as possible, and that he understood the need to recapture Cyrenaica, but he was not sure that Tobruk would be held after September. .Concerning the already trained armored personnel of the Sixth Regiment, he said that the characteristics and equipment of the newly arrived American tanks had changed the methods of operation concerning tactics, and that time had to be provided for these lessons.He admitted that by the end of July he would have about five hundred patrol tanks, infantry tanks and American tanks.However, any battle requires 50% of the reserve tanks, so 25% of the tanks can be kept in the factory, and 25% of the tanks can be used to immediately replenish the losses in the battle.This can be regarded as a condition that is too high. Generals can only enjoy this kind of convenience in the kingdom of heaven.Moreover, those who demand such convenience may not necessarily be able to obtain it.Auchinleck emphasized that time must be allowed for individual and collective training, as well as for developing the spirit of collaboration that is essential for operational effectiveness.He believed that the decisive battle was fought on the Northern Front (that is, the German offensive through Turkey, Syria and Pakistan), not the desert.

It is clear from the above telegrams that our opinions and estimates differ seriously.This disappointed me greatly.Some of the general's first decisions were also confusing.As a result of my long-term persistence, the British 50th Division was finally transported to Egypt.I am sensitive to the enemy's propaganda that it is British policy to fight with any army other than our own, so as to spare the blood of the United Kingdom.British Army casualties in the Middle East (including Greece and Crete) were actually greater than those of all our other armies combined.But the customary troop names gave rise to false impressions that were not true.One-third of the infantry and all the artillery in the Indian divisions were British, but they were not called British|Indian divisions.The armored units that took the brunt of the battle were entirely British, but it was not apparent from the names of the units.Repeated exhortations and orders with British characters cannot cancel the practice of following the habit.Many battalions of the British 6th Division fought heavily, but failed to hold the division together as a unified entity in the tense situation.This is no small matter.The fact that British troops were rarely mentioned in any account of the fighting made the enemy's jeers all the more pleasant.Therefore, not only in the United States, but also in Australia, it has caused unfavorable comments on me.I had counted on the deployment of the 50th Division into Egypt as an effective means of defending against these criticisms from all quarters.General Auchinleck's decision to send this division to Cyprus appears to be unfortunate, and will serve as a source of unwarranted censure for us.From a military point of view, the chiefs of staff of the three domestic armies also expressed their astonishment at the so strange use of this excellent force.Indeed, this is incompatible with any conception of strategy as we understand it.

A much more serious decision by General Auchinleck was to postpone all fighting against Rommel in the Western Desert, at first for three months and finally for more than four and a half months.Wavell's tomahawk action on June 15 is defensible.For, although we fell back to our original position after considerable setbacks, the German army was completely unable to advance during the whole of this long period.Their lines of communication, threatened by Tobruk, could not receive the necessary armor or even artillery reinforcements to enable Rommel to do anything but hold on to them by force of will and prestige.The provision of his army gave him great hesitation, and his numbers could only be increased gradually.Under such circumstances, since the British army has sufficient roads, railways, and sea lines of communication, and is constantly being strengthened at a much faster rate than the German army in terms of men and materials, it should continue to fight him. Generals, when given the opportunity, are more often than not willing to fight a formal battle when all is ready and when they choose, rather than wear down the enemy with a series of inconspicuous battles.Naturally, they would rather play the sure game than take the risk.They forget that war is never ending, that it burns like a fire day by day, with ever-changing results not only on one field but on the whole.At this time, the Russian army was in a difficult time. The third misconception, in my opinion, is the overemphasis on the northern flank.On this flank, the utmost vigilance is indeed required, and much defensive preparations and solid lines of defense should be made in Palestine and Syria.However, the situation in this area soon improved considerably from what it had been in June.Syria was conquered.The Iraqi insurgency has been suppressed.Our troops hold all the important strongholds in the desert.In particular, the war between Germany and Russia gave Turkey new confidence.As long as the outcome of this battle is undecided, Germany will not ask for its troops to pass through Turkish territory.Due to the actions of Britain and Russia, Persia would soon join the Allies.This will keep us safe through the winter. At this time, the overall situation is favorable for us to take decisive action in the western desert. On July 19 the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces called General Auchinleck: You say that you cannot contemplate an offensive in the Western Desert until you have at least two, and preferably three, properly trained armored divisions.We could not contemplate any significant reinforcement of patrol tanks from here until Germany attacked Russia, since we had to regard the enemy's invasion of our homeland in August or September as a distinct possibility.We cannot say that this possibility has now completely disappeared, because Russia may soon collapse.However, if reinforcement tanks can retake Cyrenaica and reap all the benefits of this victory, we are ready to try.In your call of July 15th, you expressed doubts about whether Tobruk could be held after September.We therefore believe that any offensive to recapture Cyrenaica cannot be postponed beyond September.According to our calculations, our relative air force can grow until September, and may continue to increase even after September, depending of course on the outcome of the present Russian campaign. On the basis of the above considerations, it appears here that the best chance, if not the only chance, of retaking Cyrenaica is to launch an offensive by the end of September at the latest.Would you be willing to do this if we immediately shipped you an additional 150 patrol tanks?We expect these tanks to arrive in Suez between September 13th and 20th.We also intend to use W‧S‧11th (transportation fleet) to transport you 40,000 soldiers, and let you decide for yourself which of the soldiers and materials we can supply is what you need most.On the other hand, if you don't think you can attack in the western desert by the end of September, then we see no reason to call in ships for food imports and break up the 1st Armored Division until we are practically certain that the enemy will not attack this year. Ship one hundred and fifty tanks for you. I personally sent him a telegram with exactly the same content: Prime Minister to General Auchinleck July 19, 1941 Both the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Committee of the War Cabinet gave long consideration to your telegram of July 15th in reply to my June telegram.The Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces are now passing on their opinion to you, and we are in full agreement. 2. It seems that if you can get another large batch of tanks from here and the United States in mid-September, along with other large reinforcements, then you can have them as a reserve force, and with this reserve force, you can step up when you get it Offensive, to defend Egypt in case of defeat. 3. The National Defense Committee is deeply concerned to see that the 50th Division, your complete and brand new British division, is closed on the island of Cyprus, with what appears to be a purely defensive role, and cannot understand how it could be Can't find other armies. 4. They fail to see how Germany could launch an offensive against Syria, Palestine and Iraq from the north before the end of September at the earliest.The National Defense Council believed that Persia was in greater danger of German infiltration and intrigue and that forceful action should be taken there.But the matter was within General Wavell's purview, and his apparent intention to act was being earnestly and seriously noted here. 5. This opportunity may not be recovered if we do not take advantage of the lull resulting from the German-Russian war to restore the situation in Cyrenaica.A month had passed since the enemy's defeat at Sallum, and it might take another month to resume action.During this period, there must be sufficient time for training.It seemed justified to fight a fierce decisive battle in the western desert before the situation turned against us, and to take great risks that would not have resulted in victory. We still believe that if the next offensive is to be launched, unless you intend to command it yourself, it should be under the command of Wilson. General Auchinleck answered my telegram on July 23rd.He said that the transfer of the 50th Division to the island of Cyprus was his decision after the most careful consideration. If you want to know, I can wire you the detailed reasons which impelled me to do so, which seem to me indisputable.I would like to have full control over such deployments.He believes that the German army may launch an offensive on Syria via Anatolia[1] in the first half of September. 【1】That is, Asia Minor.translator I fully agree with striking the enemy in Libya while Germany is currently preoccupied with the invasion of Russia, but I must reiterate that, in my opinion, it is not reasonable to launch an offensive with the insufficient manpower and material resources currently available to us combat operations.As a result, it is almost inevitable to postpone even further the date on which we can launch an offensive with a reasonable probability of success.To be successful, you have to take risks.I am willing to take risks if there are good reasons for taking them. Finally, he said: My current intent is: One, to strengthen our position in Cyprus and Syria as soon as possible, and maintain our position in Syria. Second, intensify the much-needed reorganization and re-equipment of divisions and brigades that not only suffered losses of casualties and equipment in Greece, Crete, Libya, Eritrea, and Syria, but also in many Occasions are not used as formations but as sporadic stocks. Third, coordinate with the DG to accelerate the reorganization and modernization of rear service organizations related to resupply, movement, and repair. Fourth, to secure the training and equipment of our armored forces; without which the offensive would be impossible. Fifth, actively carry out reconnaissance and planning for the offensive in Libya, which was mentioned in the July 19th telegram of the commanders-in-chief of the Middle East to the chiefs of staff of the armed forces.I am sure that, as a result of the plan, I shall request you in the near future to furnish further supplies and equipment necessary for this success. At this moment I could not help feeling that General Auchinleck's rigid attitude was not beneficial to our common cause.Books published since the start of the war show how much a powerful section of the Cairo operational staff regretted the decision to send troops to Greece.They did not know how General Wavell had embraced the decision without reservation, much less how the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff had explored the issue with him and almost rejected it.It is said that Wavell was led astray by some politicians, and that the string of defeats followed when he complied with their wishes.Now, as a reward for his good disposition, he was dismissed when he was thwarted after many victories.I do not doubt that there was a strong feeling among these staff that the new commander should not allow himself to be forced into dangerous adventures, but should go slowly and steadily.Such a mood must have infected General Auchinleck.It can already be seen clearly that communication alone will not get things very far. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck July 23, 1941 All your telegrams to us and our telegrams to you indicate that we should have an interview.The chiefs of staff of the armed forces are eagerly looking forward to it.Unless the current state of affairs makes it difficult for you to get out, I hope you will come at once with a staff officer or two.During your absence (this matter shall be kept confidential), you shall be represented by Breme. Auchinleck is willing to come.His short sojourn in London was in every respect beneficial.He got on very well with the War Cabinet, with the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, and with the War Department.He and I spent a long weekend at the prime minister's residence on the outskirts of the country. Now, our future depends largely on the talents of this excellent officer, when we get to know him better, when he gets acquainted with the leading figures of the British war organization and sees how smoothly the war organization works. As time went on, our trust in each other grew.On the other hand, we could not get him to abandon his long-delayed decision to launch a well-planned offensive on November 1st.This offensive will be called Operation Crusader, and it will be a major battle like we have never seen before.He did sway my military advisers by his detailed arguments.As for myself, I was not persuaded by him.But General Auchinleck's undoubted talent, his power of interpretation, his nobility, majesty, and majesty of character lead me to think that he may be right after all, and that, if he is wrong, he is the best man .Therefore, I agree to launch the offensive in November and work for its success.We regret that we were not persuaded to put General Maitland Wilson in command should this battle come to pass.He preferred General Alan Cunningham, who had gained a great reputation after his victories in Abyssinia.We must try our best to get things done, and it is not worth trying to do something that has no beginning and no end.Therefore, we agreed with his decision and thereby shared his responsibility. We now know exactly what the German High Command thought of Rommel's situation.They greatly admired his courage and the incredible achievements which showed it, but, for all that, they considered him in great danger.They forbade him to run any further dangers until strong reinforcements had been secured.Perhaps, by virtue of his prestige, he could get through the period of his peril until the German High Command could render him the greatest assistance it could.His line of communication stretched for a thousand miles as far as Tripoli.For at least some of the supplies and new troops, Benghazi was a worthwhile closest port. However, no matter to Tripoli or Benghazi, it is unavoidable to suffer more and more losses in shipping.The British army, already outnumbered, was increasing every day.German tanks only had an advantage in terms of performance and organization.They are weaker in air force.They were so short of shells that they were terribly afraid of running out.Tobruk seemed to be the mortal threat behind Rommel, and our army could attack from here at any time to cut off his communication lines.They couldn't figure out our attack plan, whether to attack from Tobruk or to attack with the main force.But they are thankful for each passing day as long as we stand still. On June 2, 1941, Germany and Italy met at the Brenner Pass.The main figures in the military are Marshal Keitel and General Cavalero.Keitel agreed that an offensive against Egypt could not be launched until the autumn.Instead of using large numbers of troops in this offensive, only a handful of well-equipped special forces should be used.The size of the attacking force should be four armored divisions, of which there should be two German divisions, in addition to which there should be three motorized divisions.In North Africa there must be no superfluous consumers of food, but combatants must be regulated only in terms of food supplies.General Cavalero said that the Italian divisions serving in the Afrika Korps had been severely attrited, having lost forty to sixty per cent of their men and equipment.The condition of the vehicles was very poor, the Pavia division had only twenty-seven trucks. Keitel believed that the more urgent need was the provision of anti-aircraft guns and coastal artillery to better defend against enemy attacks on supply ports and depots.Next, it is important that reinforcements for the Afrika Korps arrive, since one of the most important conditions for future operations is the capture of Tobruk.At present, the German and Italian troops cannot take this place because they do not have heavy artillery.Leaving aside the supply of combat troops, it is necessary to prepare a large supply of supplies and to have transport columns ready before the offensive begins.The German Afrika Korps alone needs 40,000 to 50,000 tons of supplies per month. In addition, there are supplies to the Italian army.The Italians had access to all the vehicles that the Afrika Korps did not need. There are very few spaces available in German transport aircraft.The Italians had to defend sea and coastal transport themselves, as the Luftwaffe was withdrawing from Sicily.Stronger Luftwaffe units were being transferred to North Africa to protect the coast and coastal shipping. General Cavalero thanked the German military chief for his remarks.Both he and Mussolini agreed with him.The most important task for Italy is to maintain its present position.North Africa's defense forces are too small.The troops participating in the siege of Tobruk had to be transferred and rest for a period of time.The situation in Sallum is often dangerous. In August the Luftwaffe Operations Staff reported: The strain on supplies for our North African troops is well known.Until now, the capacity of Benghazi Port has not been fully utilized.What the British had destroyed had not been repaired in the port area since the recovery of Derna.Port Bardia must also be repaired.Therefore, we urgently request that the Italians be informed so that they can begin the necessary work immediately.It is absolutely necessary to use Benghazi, Derna and Bardia to bring in supplies.This will relieve some of the burden on the port of Tripoli and reduce the dangerous coastal transport from Tripoli to Benghazi.The critical transport situation in Africa is making it increasingly difficult for us to use the land line of communication from Tripoli to Benghazi.From this point of view, it becomes even more important. Reinforcement of air forces in the Mediterranean region was impossible until the fighting in Eastern Europe ceased. In late August, at a meeting between Keitel and General Cavalero at Hitler's headquarters on the Russian front, Keitel said that until Tobruk had been captured, the situation in North Africa could not be considered a foregone conclusion.If the shipments to Africa go well, German troops for the attack could be ready by mid-September.General Cavalero replied that the leader had ordered preparations for the attack on Tobruk to be accelerated.It is certain that the Italians will not be ready for the offensive until the middle of September, probably not until the end of September. In fact, they weren't ready at the end of September.Neither the Germans nor the Italians were ready in October, nor were they ready in November.There can be no doubt of their tenacious resistance when attacked. The German and Italian Staffs agreed on August 29th that: Recently, an offensive on the Suez Canal from Libya has been impossible.Even if Tobruk were captured in the autumn, the balance of power would not allow it.The same applies to any attack of limited aim, for a further push eastward would further exacerbate our tight supply situation and further improve that of Britain. On September 9, 1941, the German Liaison Staff commented on the situation: Despite repeated German-Italian air raids on Tobruk, the situation there remained largely unchanged.So far we have not been able to stop the enemy's nightly deliveries of supplies to the fort with destroyers and small craft.According to the African Air Force Command, Tobruk's air defenses have become so strong that they are not far behind those on the island of Malta.The many raids of the British defenders, both strong and weak, seemed to be aimed at discovering weaknesses in the enveloping lines.This was preparations for a breakout, which was expected to begin simultaneously with future offensives on the southern front. I have already stated the military discussion on delaying the offensive.I must also record my belief that General Auchinleck's delay of four and a half months in the desert to engage the enemy was both wrong and unfortunate. This chapter must also include an account of our differences of opinion with the Australian Government.Australia's heroic troops played a major role throughout the defense of Egypt. Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Menzies, bid us farewell in May.His extended stay in England was the rarest thing.He was part of the War Cabinet for two critical months and was with us in many of the most difficult decisions.He was dissatisfied with the organization of the War Cabinet and with my exercise of such wide powers in directing the war.On several occasions he expressed his opinion to me on these two points, and I gave reasons for not agreeing with him.He wanted to form an imperial war cabinet including representatives of the four dominions.On his way home via Canada, he formally submitted his proposals in writing to Mr. MacKenzie King, General Smuts, and Mr. Fraser.But none of them favored such a change, and Mr. Mackenzie King, in particular, used strong constitutional arguments against Canada's commitment to a decision taken at a conference in London by sending its representatives. Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia August 19, 1941 It goes without saying that it would be most welcome if you were able to visit us again, and to attend our meetings as Prime Minister while you are able to stay.We should welcome all Dominion Prime Ministers who share the burden for us in this way.It is impossible to have a Cabinet other than the Dominion Prime Minister in the War Cabinet, as the representation of the four Dominions would over-increase the permanent membership of the War Cabinet, and would entail some major changes in the organization which we have not yet considered.As far as I have been able to find out, the other Dominions would not agree to have a Cabinet from a single Dominion represent them in the War Cabinet.I want you to keep these points in mind as you draw up your plans.Kindest regards. However, it wasn't long before significant changes took place in the Australian government.Naturally, on the heels of so much misfortune, there were differences of opinion in the Federal Cabinet as to how to conduct the war.The Australian Labor Party opposed a vote to authorize Mr Menzies to visit London.In light of the political views expressed both inside and outside the government, he handed over his resignation to his colleagues and offered to serve in an Australian national cabinet.On August 25, the Australian Labor Party rejected the proposal and called for the government to resign. On the 28th, Mr. Menzies resigned and was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Fading.The Australian Government, weakened by the loss of its ablest man, has a majority of one vote in Parliament and, in times of crisis, is confronted by an opposition party eager for local power.I share with him, despite our aforementioned differences of opinion, the news of Mr. Menzies' resignation with great regret.Though our views were seriously at odds, our relations were exceedingly friendly.I find it a great pity that all the knowledge of our affairs and the war which he had gained during his two months in the War Cabinet, and all the connections we had all had with him, should have been wasted.So I sent him the following telegram: Prime Minister to Mr Menzies August 28, 1941 While I am careful to avoid meddling in Australian politics, I cannot fail to tell you how sad I am to hear of your resignation.You have governed for two tumultuous years and have come to be with us during Australia's most disturbing period.We are very grateful for the courage you have shown and for the help you have given.I have benefited greatly from our personal friendship.I have had a similar experience: I was dismissed as Lord of the Admiralty at the very moment when I was able to give the Australian and New Zealand Army a reasonable chance of victory in the Dardanelles.In such cases, it is always a comfort to know that one has done one's duty, that one has done one's best.Greetings from my wife and family. [1] This happened during World War I.translator I hastened to establish a close personal relationship with Mr. Farthing, and presented him with our arguments concerning the organization of the War Cabinet and the Japanese threat. Prime Minister to Prime Minister of Australia August 29, 1941 Now that you have assumed your great office, I wish you success with all sincerity and assure you that my colleagues and I will do our best to share the same spirit and sincerity with which we have worked with Mr. Menzies. You cooperate.We are pleased to learn that Mr. Menzies now serves as Defense Coordinating Secretary under your leadership. Then, on the advice of my colleagues, I gave a detailed explanation, both imperial and constitutional, of the questions raised by Mr. Menzies.This is included in the appendix of this book. 【１】 Our relations with Mr. Farthing's government, and later with Mr. Curtin's Labor government, have not been as harmonious as we were with its predecessor, and a serious difference of opinion has arisen which jeopardizes our war effort.Under the heavy pressure of the opposition party, the new government was very concerned about the situation of the Australian division in Tobruk. They want to consolidate the troops they send to the Middle East into one army to give them a chance to rest, discipline and re-equip to meet the demands of Australian public opinion.他們也擔心那個堡壘裡的軍隊身體抵抗力減退，擔心由於他們的抵抗力繼續減退和不能抵禦敵人的堅決進攻而引起一場災難的危險。因此，他們要求立即另派軍隊去接替這些澳大利亞部隊。奧金萊克強烈地抗議這個變動，他指出接替的困難，指出這將打亂他的新攻勢計劃。我試圖使這位將軍安心。 Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年九月六日 我相信，如果直率地把實際情況擺在澳大利亞人的面前，他們是會幹下去的。我們不願意讓你對托卜魯克的供應和你的其他配合行動受到妨礙。如果答應他們的要求，就會招致這樣結果的話，那麼，就讓我把事實告訴他們。澳大利亞不會容忍任何失掉體面的事。當然，如果這件事並沒有什麼重大關係的話，我們應該滿足他們的願望。 我認為，應當對我們的兄弟政府提出詳盡的解釋。這些函電也見於附錄中。 根據我的提議，奧金萊克將軍曾設法撤出駐防托卜魯克的澳大利亞步兵旅團中的一個旅而代之以波蘭旅。這使海軍冒相當大的危險，因為幾乎所有的艦隻都受到敵機的襲擊。這位總司令最後提出他中止這個行動的理由，宣稱，這可能進一步推遲西部沙漠的攻勢。因此，我建議，他說：要乾脆打消繼續大規模替換駐防托卜魯克的澳大利亞人員的念頭，而立刻以一個步兵坦克營增援守軍。我把他的電報轉給法丁先生，並向他作以下的呼籲： 首相致澳大利亞總理 一九四一年九月十一日 茲送上奧金萊克將軍就接替托卜魯克的澳大利亞軍隊一事給我的親啟電報全文。我所以這樣做，是因為我完全相信你會妥善處理這件事。奧金萊克將軍的電報是同中東戰區的海空軍司令長期會商的結果。 二‧你可以從他的電報中看出，即使你堅持接替托卜魯克的澳大利亞軍隊，實際上也不可能及時完成這項工作，讓你能在本月中向聯邦議會提出你所期望的說明。實際上，只有一半可以在九月無月光的期間撤出，另一半則不得不在十月的下半月撤出。這時，正是一切有關攻勢的準備趨於緊張的時候，同時，空軍的準備工作也需要他們集中全力去對付敵人的後方地區、供應站和飛機場。（況且）無論如何，你也無法向聯邦議會提出任何說明，因為，對公眾作出任何即將接替澳大利亞軍隊的暗示，都會招致敵人在你們的軍隊撤出時對托卜魯克港口和沿海岸進行猛烈的空襲。但是，如果你堅持要撤出澳大利亞軍隊，我們當不顧勢必蒙受的損失和對於前途的危害而發出命令。據守托卜魯克，直到勝利到來，是澳大利亞的光榮。這一光榮如果不受剝奪的話，靠上帝的幫助，將永遠屬於它。我相信，你會仔細估量你對剝奪澳大利亞這一光榮在歷史的面前所負的重大責任。 三‧我不得不再請你注意，務必對未來的行動和部隊的調遣絕對保密。這些情況是由於接替澳大利亞軍隊的問題而迫使總司令向我們透露的。 結果徒勞無功，我只好作以下的答覆： 首相致法丁先生 一九四一年九月十五日 將立刻按照你的決定發佈命令。目前保守秘密是對大家極其重要的事。 我致電奧金萊克說： Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年九月十七日 我對於澳大利亞的態度覺得痛心，但是，長久以來，我就擔心，似乎我們只用自治領的軍隊在中東進行一切戰鬥的看法，會在澳大利亞和世界輿論方面引起危險的反響。出於這個原因（且不談對你增援的願望），我曾經不斷地督促派出一些英國步兵師。你知道，你把英國第五十師派往塞浦路斯島的決定是使我們感到痛苦的事。我知道，當你把這個師安排在那裡的時候，你以為塞浦路斯島是一個特別危險的地方，但是，局勢已經由於德軍入侵俄國的戰事而發生變化，因此，我確信，你將繼續考慮，應否派這個英國師擔任似乎沒有危險的防禦任務。 我希望澳大利亞軍隊的撤退不致再推遲（你的）攻勢。局勢已經惡化。敵軍的汽油供應遠比以前多。非洲裝甲軍現已改為非洲裝甲集團軍【１】。你要想等待另外得到一旅人，你就很可能發現敵軍另外增加了一師人。敵人一定會注意到你的運輸車輛的運動和供應站的設置。一九四二年中東戰役的整個前途以及我們對土耳其和俄國的關係都繫於這一攻勢。 【１】隆美爾指揮下的德國裝甲部隊。translator 在奧金萊克將軍方面，由於法丁政府堅持他們的要求，他感到莫大的屈辱，以致想辭職，理由是他沒有得到澳大利亞政府的信任。這件事，當時從各方面來看，都是有害的。 我請那時駐在開羅的國務大臣奧利弗‧利特爾頓先生設法調處。 首相致國務大臣 一九四一年九月十八日 奧金萊克以為我們同他意見不合（關於托卜魯克澳大利亞軍隊的問題），這是不可能的事。我的一系列電報，其中特別是我於九月十一日致法丁並抄送奧金萊克，現在又抄送給你的電報表明，我們怎樣極力勸澳大利亞撤銷在當前的時刻撤離前線的決議。況且，當奧金萊克歸國的期間，我特意鼓勵他，不要因為不必要的接替而使托卜魯克的防禦受到影響。 二‧我對澳大利亞政府的決定感到驚異，我確信，如果把實際情況擺出來，他們就會取消這一決定。我們應當體諒這個政府，它只擁有一票的多數，並面對著激烈的反對黨，其中至少有一部分持有孤立主義的見解。 三‧最要緊的是，大不列顛和澳大利亞之間不應發生公開的爭論，因此，必須抑制一切私人為感情以維持表面上的團結一致。所以發生麻煩，大都是因為在歷次戰鬥中沒有英國的步兵師，致使世人和澳大利亞以為我們只使用自治領的軍隊作戰。 四‧我正致電奧金萊克，告訴他，三軍參謀長完全同意他在軍事上的觀點。 這樣，私人方面的糾葛暫時消除了，但是，要在十月間撤出最後一批澳大利亞軍隊的實際行動，仍然是一件有待我們去解決的事。 Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年九月二十九日 現在一切都繫於這場戰鬥。敵人可能容許給你以你所需要的時間。但是，每一天稽延，都是在更廣泛的領域內用高昂的代價換來的。我們要贏取的是土耳其，它的行動很可能取決於昔蘭尼加之戰的勝利。 我希望說服澳大利亞政府，不必在十月無月光的期間從托卜魯克撤出他們最後的兩個旅，以免妨礙你的行動。 這時，我向法丁先生報告全盤局勢，再次作強烈的呼籲。 答覆是固執的，但是這時，法丁先生的政府在一次關於預算的表決中被擊敗，於是，在柯廷先生領導下組成了同樣只有一票多數的澳大利亞工黨政府。我趕忙同這位給我拍來電報的新總理開始友誼的聯繫。 首相致澳大利亞總理 一九四一年十月八日 感謝你在總攝聯邦事務之際給我發來電報。我誠懇向你表示同樣的良好願望。你可以確信我們將在最親密的信任與友誼的基礎上同你共事。 但是這個新政府同樣反對我們的請求，所以最好就寫完這個不愉快的插曲吧。 Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年十月五日 我覺得遺憾的是，我沒有從前任澳大利亞政府在有關避免另外一次過分負擔（接替托卜魯克的澳大利亞軍隊）的問題上得到任何有益的答覆，並且，我還沒有同新政府取得任何聯繫，但是我希望十字軍戰士行動不致延期。 經過一段適當的間隔後，我就托卜魯克的問題致電柯廷先生。 首相致澳大利亞總理 一九四一年十月十四日 我覺得，應當請你再次考慮我致你的前任總理的電報中所提出的問題。奧金萊克將軍再次來電說，如果其餘的澳大利亞部隊能夠在即將來臨的戰鬥定局以前留在托卜魯克，將對他有莫大的幫助和便利。我不想重述我曾經用過的那些論點，但是，我只願補充這一句：如果你覺得能夠同意的話，那就不會讓你們的軍隊去冒任何過分或不當的危險，同時，我們將非常懇切地認為這是當前戰鬥中的一種友好行動。 Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年十月十四日 我曾說過，如果其餘的澳大利亞軍隊的接替能延至十字軍戰士行動以後，將對你有很大的幫助，因此，我今晨把附上的（以上的）電報發給澳大利亞政府。也許這個新政府願意給予你所期望的便利。如果他們這樣做，我當為澳大利亞和歷史感到高興。一兩天內，我就可獲悉他們的決定，並將情況奉告。 二‧關於俄國的消息日趨嚴重。現在一切就要看你了。 柯廷先生的政府依從他們的前任的決定，因此，我不得不通知奧金萊克將軍，接替澳大利亞軍隊的工作必須進行。 托卜魯克在被圍期間，儘管敵軍的空襲從未間斷而且規模越來越大，始終得到海軍的支持。況且，當時不能用戰鬥機去掩護該港，因為這時我們的飛機場是在東面很遠的地方。 普通的商船很快就不能在通往埃及的航線上航行，因而一切都必須在無月色的夜間用驅逐艦和小型艦艇載運。從七月以後，這一條托卜魯克航線的情況由於增添了阿布提埃爾號和拉托娜號這兩艘快速佈雷艦而大見好轉。除了維持軍火和給養的供應外，還有大批軍隊運入或運出這座被圍的堡壘，並需運進包括坦克在內的各種新式武器。海軍總共運交守軍兵員三萬四千名、坦克七十二輛、大炮九十二門、軍需品三萬四千噸。此外，除了傷兵和俘虜不計外，他們撤出的軍隊幾乎等於運入的軍隊。這一艱鉅而又必不可少的工作，使海軍損失了佈雷艦一艘、驅逐艦二艘以及其他艦艇二十二艘，另有十八艘受重創。有九艘商船和兩艘醫院船也被擊沉或受創。這些犧牲使得托卜魯克的守軍在二百四十二日中抵禦住敵軍繼續不斷的襲擊。在這一段時間內，這座堡壘在整個戰役的戰略方面，尤其是在即將發動的攻勢的戰略方面，起了積極的、顯著的作用。 十月二十五日夜間，為澳大利亞的兩個政黨所殷切期望的行動在非常危險的情況下開始了，遭到了相當大的損失。我把這個消息電告柯廷先生。 首相致澳大利亞總理 一九四一年十月二十六日 昨夜，我海軍艦隻在駛往托卜魯克載運最後一批澳大利亞軍隊一千二百人時，在敵機空襲下，我們的新的快速佈雷艦拉托娜號被擊沉，驅逐艦英雄號受創。上天保佑，你們的兵員並不在船上。我還沒有獲悉我們的傷亡人數。據坎寧安海軍上將報告，在下一次（十一月）無月光的時期以前，不可能運出這一千二百名兵員。已經盡了一切人力來適應你的願望。 首相致澳大利亞總理 一九四一年十月二十七日 幸而英艦拉托娜號只載運三十八名其他軍士到托卜魯克去。其餘的，為數約一千人，則在三艘伴隨的驅逐艦上。 從十九點到二十二點三十分，敵機低空轟炸約十五次。傷亡人數為：英艦拉托娜號上海軍軍官四名失蹤、一名受傷，船員二十五名失蹤、十七名受傷。陸軍軍官六名失蹤；其他軍士七名失蹤，一名受傷。英艦英雄號上無傷亡。敵機空襲沒有在接替工作的早期階段開始，這是值得我們慶幸的。 我因為不得不述說這件事而感到痛苦。永不提及這件事是不可能的。此外，澳大利亞的人民有權利知道曾經發生過的事，以及為什麼會發生這件事。另一方面，必須記住，且不談他們受到的嚴格的政黨制度的限制，澳大利亞的各屆政府也沒有什麼理由在這時信任英國對戰事的指揮，況且，在沙漠側翼被突破時，以及在希臘戰役中，他們的軍隊所冒的危險又使他們不勝焦慮。我們永遠不能忘記澳大利亞的崇高動機。這一動機使它把僅有的三個完整的師，即澳大利亞成年男子的精華，派往中東作戰，也不能忘記澳大利亞軍隊在中東歷次戰鬥中的英勇戰績。