Chapter 101 Volume III, Chapter 28. Closer Contact with Russia | Autumn and Winter 1941

Anglo-Soviet Relations Difficulties in Military Coordination Our Efforts in the Caucasus Problem of Assisting Our Declaration of War on Finland, Romania and Hungary My Telegram to Stalin November 4th His Reply November 8th Eden November 20th Conversation between Mr. Eden and the Ambassador of the Soviet Union I propose to send Mr. Eden to Moscow Stalin accepts I have no intention of breaking with Finland, Romania and Hungary I appeal to Marshal Mannerheim Mr. Eden's mission to Moscow My order of December 5th Germany The first defeat of the Blitz. Two themes dominated our relationship with the Soviet Union at this time.The first is the vague and unsatisfactory state of our military talks; the second is that Russia demands that we break off diplomatic relations with the Axis satellites Finland, Hungary and Romania.As we have seen, little progress has been made on the former front in the recent Moscow talks.In this connection I sent the following memorandum to the Foreign Secretary on the 1st of November:

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary November 1, 1941 I am not aware that we have ever adopted a policy of no talks on the military front.On the contrary, didn't we tell them explicitly that we would have discussions on the military side?Indeed, I have written a paper [1] on the military situation, leaving aside the question of supplies, for Lord Beaverbrook's guidance.General Ismay was sent to Russia just to start military discussions.In fact, this is unlikely to make any difference, as there are no really important practical steps that can be taken at the moment.He may have illustrated with facts and figures the folly and practical impossibility of our proposal to send twenty-five to thirty divisions to the Russian front.He might have explained how even bringing in two or three divisions to either end of the Russian front would have blocked the lines of communication needed to deliver supplies to Russia.On the other hand, I don't understand why this kind of talk wasn't involved at some point during the meeting.There is no doubt that Lord Beaverbrook and Stalin touched upon military matters.

General Wavell had been in Tbilisi and could not find anyone in authority with whom he could talk.He speaks Russian very well, so it would be best for him to go to Moscow.For many months to come we will be able to enter Russia only via the southern flank. Anyway, let's get the facts straight. P.S. You should read Wavell's telegram just received explaining how sending even two divisions to Tabriz or north would completely block the railway across Persia. I feel that as long as a military consultation body can be established, the issue of joint operations can be discussed in a reasonable manner that will not cause misunderstandings.The unsatisfactory nature of the situation at the time is clearly evident from the following memorandum of mine:

PM sends General Ismay to Chiefs of Staff Committee November 5, 1941 We do not know when the Germans will enter the Caucasus, nor how long it will be before they reach that mountain barrier.We don't know what the Russians will do, how many troops they will use, or how long they will resist.It was quite certain that neither the British 50th nor the 18th Division would be able to reach the spot in time if the Germans pressed hard.We are hampered by the delay in the actions of the crusaders, so it is impossible to see beyond that at present.I do not believe that the Germans will be prevented from taking the Baku oil fields, or that the Russians will effectively destroy them.The Russians don't tell us anything, and take any inquiry we make on the subject with great suspicion.

2. The only thing we can do, if it is possible, is to send four or five heavy bomber squadrons stationed in northern Persia to aid the Russians in defending the Caucasus, and to bomb Pakistan effectively if the worst happens Ku oil fields, set the land ablaze.These bomber squadrons certainly needed fighter protection. The supply of these bombers or fighters will have to wait until the crusader action and its consequences can be determined.But a plan should be drawn up with the intention of moving large numbers of air forces from Libya to Persia in order to keep the oil fields out of the enemy's hands for as long as possible.Hoping to get this done within the next week so we can see what's involved.No one can tell how long the Russians will maintain control of the Black Sea, although it would be unforgivable to lose it with their armies.

As we have seen, the question of our severance of diplomatic relations with Finland was first raised by Mr. Maisky when he and I met on September 4th. [1] I know this is an issue on which the Russians take a hard line.The Finns had taken advantage of the German attack on Russia to resume hostilities on the Karelian front in July 1941.They hoped to recover those territories lost under the Treaty of Moscow signed the previous year.Their military action in the autumn of 1941 was a serious threat not only to Leningrad but also to the supply lines from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to the Russian-German front.Since August, the US government and we have warned the Finns in harsh terms about the possible consequences of this situation.Their attitude was that they needed the East Karelia province in dispute for their own security against Russia, and the history of the previous two years had reinforced this view.But now that Russia was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany, it was obviously impossible for the Allies to allow Finland, as a satellite of Germany, to cut off Russia's main northern line of communication with the West.

The situation in Romania is similar to that in Finland.The Russians had already occupied the Romanian province of Bessarabia in June 1940, thereby controlling the mouth of the Danube.Now the Romanian army, under the leadership of Marshal Antonescu, in alliance with Germany, has not only reoccupied the province of Bessarabia, but has penetrated into the provinces of the Black Sea region of Russia, just as the Finns have done in Eastern Karelia.Hungary is located at the transportation hub across Central and Southeastern Europe, so the Hungarians are also directly helpful to Germany's war effort.

But I can never rely on declaring war as the right way to deal with the situation.Under pressure from the United States and from us, it will still be possible for Finland to agree to fair and reasonable peace terms.With regard to Romania, there were at least every reason to believe that Antonescu's dictatorship would not continue indefinitely.I therefore decided to call Marshal Stalin to discuss military planning and cooperation and the avoidance of declaring war on these Axis satellites. Prime Minister to Premier Stalin November 4, 1941 To clear things up and plan for the future, I am going to send General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief of our forces in India, Persia and Iraq, to ​​meet with you in Moscow, Kuibyshev, Tbilisi or wherever you please.In addition, General Paget, our secretly chosen new Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, will be with General Wavell.General Paget has been here with all the insight and will therefore have the latest and most mature opinion from our High Command.These two officers should be able to tell you exactly where we are, what is possible, and what we think is wise.They can get to you within two weeks.Would you like to host them?

2. In my telegram of September 6, we told you that we were willing to declare war on Finland.But do you want to think about it, is it really a good thing for Britain to declare war on Finland, Hungary and Romania at this moment?This is no more than a formality as our extreme lockdown policy has been imposed on them.My judgment is against a declaration of war because, first, Finland has many friends in America, and prudence should take this fact into account.Second, on the question of Romania and Hungary: these countries are full of our friends; they were used as pawns by Hitler, but they could easily come back to us if that scoundrel's fortunes turn against him.Britain's declaration of war would only freeze them all and create the impression that Hitler was the head of a solid European alliance against us.Let us not think that it is a lack of zeal or friendship that makes us doubt the benefit of this step.None of our Dominions, with the exception of Australia, are willing to take this step.Even so, if you think this would be a real help to you and worth doing, I would raise the matter again with the Cabinet.

3. I want our supplies to leave Arkhangelsk as quickly as they come in.A few supplies are now beginning to arrive via Persia.We will try our best to import supplies from these two roads.Please make sure that the technicians who go with these tanks and aircraft are given ample opportunity to deliver these weapons to your personnel under the best conditions.At present, our mission in Kuibyshev has no access to all these matters.They are just there to help you.These weapons are the ones we risked, so we fervently hope that they will be put to the best possible use.An order from you is necessary.

4. I cannot tell our immediate military plans, any more than you can tell me about your military plans, but rest assured, we will not sit idle. V. In order to quiet Japan, we are about to send into the Indian Ocean our newest battleship, the Prince of Wales, capable of capturing and destroying any Japanese warship, and we are building up a strong battle fleet there.I am urging President Roosevelt to increase the pressure on Japan to keep them in a state of fear so that the sea route to Vladivostok will not be blocked. 6. I don't want to waste words on words of praise, because you already know from Beaverbrook and Harriman how we feel about your excellent fighting.Count on our tireless support. 7. It would be my pleasure if I could learn directly from you that you have received this telegram. On November 11, Mr. Maisky handed me Stalin's cold, flickering reply to this telegram. Mr. Stalin to the Prime Minister November 8, 1941 Your call was received on November 7th. I fully agree with you that the relationship between the USSR and Great Britain should be clarified.Currently, such clarification does not exist.This lack of clarification is due to two circumstances: (1) There is no definite understanding between our two countries concerning the objectives of the war and concerning the organization of the post-war peace. (2) There is no agreement between the USSR and Great Britain regarding mutual military assistance against Hitler in Europe. As long as there is no agreement on these two issues, it will be impossible to clarify Anglo-Soviet relations.Not only that, but, frankly, as long as the current situation exists, it will be difficult to gain mutual trust.Of course, the agreement on the supply of military supplies to the USSR was of great positive importance, but it was not sufficient to solve or to fully summarize all the problems of our relations.If General Wavell and Paget, whom your call refers to, have come to Moscow to conclude an agreement on the two fundamental issues mentioned above, I would, of course, be happy to meet with them and discuss them.But if the task of these generals is limited to raising intelligence questions and secondary considerations, I do not think it worth disturbing them.Under such circumstances, it will be very difficult for me to find some time for talks. 2. In my opinion, an intolerable situation has arisen concerning the declaration of war by Great Britain against Finland, Hungary and Rumania.The Soviet government raised this question to the British government through secret diplomatic channels.Totally unexpected to the Soviet Union, the whole issue was widely publicized from the time the Soviet government made a request to the British government until the American government considered it.The whole question is now being discussed freely in the press (friendly and hostile).After all this, the British Government notified us of its negative attitude towards our proposal.Why do all this?To show the lack of consistency between Su Ying? 3. You may rest assured that we are taking all necessary measures to bring all ordnance brought from England to Arkhangelsk to its proper place expeditiously.The same would be done for the route through Persia.In this regard, I may draw your attention to the fact (though it is a trifle) that tanks, planes, and artillery are shipped in poor packaging, and parts of one vehicle are sometimes divided over several ships, (and ) Due to incomplete packaging, the plane was damaged when it arrived. It seems that even Stalin felt after some time that the tone of his telegram was going too far.I don't want to answer this call.Silence is enough to express my opinion.On November 20, the Soviet ambassador to London visited Mr. Eden at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Here is Mr. Eden's transcript of this conversation, which was telegraphed to Sir Stafford Cripps, who was at this time in Kuibyshev: The Soviet ambassador asked to see me this afternoon when he said that he had received an order from Mr. Stalin to come and convey to me that his recent telegrams to the Prime Minister were only concerned with matters of a practical and business nature.Mr. Stalin certainly had no intention of offending any member of the British government, let alone the Prime Minister. Mr. Stalin was indeed very busy with front-line affairs, and had practically no chance of thinking of anything other than front-line affairs.He had raised the important practical issues of mutual military aid and postwar peace organization in Europe against Hitler.These issues are very important and in no way want to be complicated by any personal misunderstanding or emotion.Mr. Stalin also overcame certain personal emotions in carrying out the course he adopted, because the incident concerning Finland had caused him and the entire Soviet Union great pain.My motherland, Mr. Stalin said, felt in a humiliated position.Our requests are made in secret.Then, the whole thing became public, and again the fact that His Majesty's Government found it impossible to accept the demands of the Soviet Union. This places our country in a humiliating position and has a depressing effect on the psyche of our people.Mr. Stalin was distressed by this, but in spite of this, he still pursued only one goal: to reach an agreement on mutual military assistance and post-war peace organization in Europe against Hitler. Stalin's reply made it clear that, according to the current thinking of the Russian leaders, no concrete results would be produced by mere military talks.The almost hysterical tone of Stalin's telegrams about Finland indicated the differences in understanding between our two countries.I therefore propose to send Mr. Eden to Russia in order to try again to reconcile our relations.This is what I meant when I called Mr. Stalin on November 21: Just got your call, thank you.My personal correspondence with President Roosevelt, which I began in the early days of the war, has established a very strong understanding between us and has often helped to get things done quickly.My only desire is to cooperate with you under the same conditions of friendship and trust. 2. About Finland.When I sent you my September 4th telegram, I was fully prepared to recommend that the Cabinet declare war on Finland.Subsequent news made me think that if the Finns could be made to stop fighting and stand still, or return to their own country, it would be better than us to put them in the criminal seat with the criminal Axis countries by a formal declaration of war, so that they could fight to the end , will be more beneficial to Russia and our common cause.But if they don't stop fighting within the next two weeks, and you still want us to declare war on them, then we will do so.I agree with you that it would be very wrong to make any announcement on this matter.Of course, the responsibility is not ours. 3. If our offensive in Libya results, as we hope, in the destruction of the German and Italian armies there, then His Majesty's Government may be more at ease than usual in making a wide-ranging survey of the war as a whole. 4. For this purpose, we intend to send Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary whom you know, via the Mediterranean to Moscow or other places in the near future to meet with you.He will be accompanied by senior military and other experts, and will be able to discuss all kinds of war issues, not only sending troops into the Caucasus, but also sending troops into your army's southern front.Our ship resources and lines of communication do not allow the use of large numbers of ships, and even then you will have to choose between sending troops through Persia and sending supplies. 5. I noticed that you also wish to discuss the issue of post-war peace organization.It is our intention to fight to the best of our ability, in alliance with you, and in constant consultation with you, and however long the war lasts; and when we win (and I am sure we will), We hope that Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States will meet at the victor's table as the three main partners and enforcers in the destruction of Nazism.The first object, of course, will be to prevent a third German, and especially Prussian, surprise attack on us.The fact that Russia is a communist country, while Great Britain and the United States are not, and do not intend to be, does not in any way prevent us from working out a sound plan for our mutual security and legitimate interests.The Foreign Secretary should be able to discuss the whole matter with you. 6. It is likely that your defense of Moscow and Leningrad, and your superior resistance to the invaders along the entire Russian front, will mortally wound the internal structure of the Nazi regime.We should never count on such good luck, we can only continue to fight the enemy with all our strength. Mr. Stalin replied two days later with a calmer tone than before: November 23, 1941 Thank you for your telegram.I sincerely welcome your willingness to cooperate with me through a private correspondence based on friendship and trust expressed in your call.I hope this will contribute greatly to the success of our common cause. 2. With regard to Finland, the Soviet Union never, at least initially, made any demands other than the cessation of military operations and de facto withdrawal from the war.But if Finland, after the short period you specify, refuses to comply even to this point, then I believe Britain's declaration of war will be justified and necessary.If not, it might create the impression that we do not agree on the issue of fighting Hitler and his zealous accomplices, and that the accomplices in Hitler's aggression could carry out their dastardly deeds with impunity.As for Hungary and Romania, we may be able to wait a little longer. 3. I will definitely support your proposal to send Mr. Eden, the Foreign Minister, to visit the Soviet Union at an early date.I believe that our joint consideration and acceptance of an agreement on joint Soviet and British military operations on our fronts, and its speedy implementation, will be of great positive importance.It is right to consider and accept a plan for the organization of the post-war peace on the basis of the general concept of preventing Germany, and above all Prussia, from breaking the peace again and again throwing peoples into horrific massacres. 4. I am concerned that the differences in the organization of the State which exist between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other should not, and must not prevent us from achieving full resolution on all fundamental questions concerning our mutual security and legitimate interests. Totally agree with you on addressing this.If there are still omissions and doubts in this regard, I hope that in the course of the negotiations with Mr. Eden they will be cleared up. 5. Please accept my congratulations on the successful start of the British offensive in Libya. 6. The battle of the Soviet Army against Hitler's army remained tense.But against all odds, the resistance of our troops is growing and will continue to grow.Our will to defeat the enemy is unwavering. As a result of Stalin's urgent appeal, it was decided to arrange for an ultimatum with a time limit to be delivered to the Finns, as well as to Romania and Hungary.I was forced into this position with great reluctance, as the following memorandums show: Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary November 28, 1941 You seem to take the declaration of war on these three countries (Finland, Romania and Hungary) on December 3rd as a matter of course.I don't want to make such a decision before we know how Finland will behave.Besides, three days is too early.The 5th marks the end of the two weeks since I telegraphed Stalin.I only sent my telegram to Mannerheim tonight.We must allow considerable time for an answer. My opinion that this measure is unwise remains the same, and I still hope that the Finns will withdraw.I did not expect to take this step at this time. Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary November 29, 1941 About the countries of Finland.If there is any hope of getting Finland out of the Great War, I don't want to be bound by time.Please read my telegram (November 21) to Stalin, which says if they do not stop fighting within the next two weeks and you still want us to declare war on them.Therefore, the procedure should be as follows. If by the fifth day we have not heard that the Finns are about to withdraw from the war, or that we have heard that they are stubbornly resisting, then we call Stalin and say: If he still wants, we shall declare war immediately.War would then be declared against Romania and Hungary, which would also be done according to his wishes. At this time, with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet government, I thought it worthwhile to make a final appeal to the leader of Finland, Marshal Mannerheim himself. Prime Minister to Marshal Mannerheim November 29, 1941 I think with deep sadness that what is about to happen is that we will have to declare war on Finland in a matter of days out of loyalty to our ally Russia. If we declare war, we will fight when we get the chance.Indeed, your armies have advanced far enough during the war to keep you safe, and can now be suspended and withdrawn.This required no public announcement, but a disengagement from combat and a cessation of military action, which was done for every reason in the harsh winter, and thus a de facto withdrawal from the war.I hope I can convince Your Excellency that we are going to defeat the Nazis.I feel more confident than I did in 1917 or 1918.Many of your country's friends in Britain would be terribly saddened if Finland placed itself in a seat with the criminal and defeated Nazis.Recalling our pleasant conversations and correspondence concerning the last war, I have thought of sending this purely personal telegram for your consideration at the earliest opportunity. On December 2 I received a reply from Marshal Mannerheim. Marshal Mannerheim to Prime Minister Winston Churchill December 2, 1941 Yesterday I had the honor of receiving your call of November 29, 1941, forwarded by the United States Minister in Helsinki, and I thank you for your kindness in sending me this personal telegram.I am sure you will understand that it is impossible for me to stop the present military action until our forces have reached a position which, in my opinion, will provide the security we need.I should be sorry if these military operations in the defense of Finland should bring my country into conflict with Great Britain, and I would be deeply saddened if you consider yourself compelled to declare war on Finland.I am very grateful for the personal telegrams that have been sent to me during these difficult times. This reply made it clear that Finland did not intend to withdraw its troops to the 1939 borders, and the British Government therefore arranged for a declaration of war.The same was followed against Romania and Hungary. It was against this backdrop that preparations for Mr. Eden's trip to Moscow took place.He will be accompanied by General Nye, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.The talks in Moscow were to give a general review of the war, both military and general, and, if possible, a formal written treaty of alliance. On December 5th I wrote a general instruction to the Foreign Secretary examining certain aspects of the military situation from our point of view.The battle in the western desert, which is now to be discussed, has reached its climax. December 5, 1941 A prolongation of the war in Libya, which is drawing as much resources as the Axis powers, may require the use of the two British divisions of the 50th and 18th which we had hoped could be used to defend the Caucasus or fight on the Russian front.Therefore, it is impossible for these divisions to be transferred in the immediate future.The best form our assistance can take (supplies aside) is to place a strong air force, say ten squadrons, on the southern flank of the Russian army; there, among other things, they can assist Protect Russian naval bases on the Black Sea.These squadrons will be withdrawn from Libya as soon as possible after the victory of the campaign.Their ground personnel and supplies would not unduly obstruct the lines of communication through Persia as would a division of infantry.High Command Middle East has been ordered to draw up plans for this movement, the completion of which of course depends on the facilities provided for detailed reconnaissance. 2. The Turkish attitude became increasingly important to Russia as well as to Great Britain.The Turkish army of fifty divisions needed air support.We have promised to send as few as four and as many as twelve fighter squadrons to Turkey should Turkey be attacked.Sure enough, we may need to withdraw some of the squadrons we intend to send to the southern Russian front.How best to make use of our aircraft on both sides of the Black Sea, and the type of aircraft to be used, will be decided by the British and Russian Governments and Staffs as the case may be. During the time these exchanges were going on, the urgency of the military crisis on the Russian front had receded.Hitler had decided to make yet another colossal effort, ordering on November 13 an autumn offensive to take Moscow by the end of the year.This plan was opposed by Bock and Guderian, who suggested that the German army should dig in and hold in the winter.Their suggestion was rejected.In the second half of November, the German army made some progress on the two flanks, but not only because of the tenacious resistance of the defenders and residents, but also because of the severe cold that had hit at this time, the main offensive of the German army on the center that started on December 4 completely collapsed. .Automatic weapons don't work; the motors of planes and tanks don't start.Due to insufficient winter clothing, German soldiers were half-frozen. Like the supreme military genius[1] who had walked this path a century before him, Hitler was only now discovering what winter meant in Russia. [1] Refers to Bonaparte Napoleon.translator He bowed his head before the cold facts.So orders were issued to withdraw the troops to a better front in the rear, although they had to resist the Russian attack at the same time.There are many such attacks.During the rest of the year, the Russian offensive continued, so that the German armored forces south and north of Moscow were forced to retreat, and it was not until December 31 that they stabilized at a distance of sixty miles from Moscow City. A front from north to south; and the Germans had come within twenty miles of the city.In the north, the German army fared no better.Leningrad was indeed completely cut off from the Soviet rear and surrounded by German forces to the south and Finnish forces to the north, but all attacks were repulsed.In the south, the German army had more gains.Rundstedt reached Rostov at one point and turned to the Caucasus.Here he was driven back forty miles for his audacity.Nevertheless, he had advanced five hundred miles.The industrial south of Russia and the fertile wheat fields of Ukraine were already behind him.It's just that there are still some Russians in Crimea to be driven back or wiped out. Thus the Germans had achieved great success in the six-month campaign and inflicted losses on their enemy which no other country could afford, but the three main targets which they attempted to capture were Moscow, Leningrad and the Don. Downstream remained firmly in Russian hands.Still far from the Caucasus, the Volga and Arkhangelsk.The Russian army is far from defeated, but it is getting stronger and stronger in the coming year, and its strength will definitely increase even more.Winter has come.Protracted war is inevitable. All anti-Nazi nations, large and small, rejoiced at the first defeat of the German Blitzkrieg.As long as German armies are engaged in a life-and-death struggle in the East, the threat of invasion to our island nation is eliminated.How long that fight will last, no one can predict.At least Hitler still had confidence in the future.The many disputes he had had with his generals in the autumn and their failure to satisfy his far-reaching intentions led to the dismissal of Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch.Rundstedt also resigned.From then on, Hitler personally commanded the army in the east. He was confident in his generals and hoped that the Russian army would collapse as soon as possible in 1942. Our negotiations with the Soviet Union (which at a later stage seemed to be going well) have been described above, and General Auchinleck's offensive in the Western Desert follows.Negotiations and offensives were also moved to a different stage by the Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7. We will return to these topics in due course with vastly different combinations of forces in the world.