Chapter 102 Volume 3, Chapter 29, The Way Forward

British plans for the autumn of 1941 Hopes for a decisive victory in the Western Desert The only possible second front Lord Louis Mountbatten to succeed Sir Roger Case Auchinleck asks for another postponement of Mr Attlee's visit to Washington I Letter to the President dated October 20th. My presentation of my thoughts on war. Proposal for the United States to send troops to Northern Ireland. The far-reaching effects of winning the western desert. Tank landing craft are indispensable equipment for landing in Europe. Telegram to the Minister of State in the Middle East Reaction of the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East We abandon the plan to attack Sicily My Memorandum of October 28 The plan Germany will adopt if Russia is defeated Months of German weakness in the Mediterranean The arrival of German submarines on the battlefield is an instruction for the desert campaign.

Both policy and will lead me to my most intimate correspondence with the President.Every week, often nearly every day, I told him in the fullest detail of everything I knew about our British thoughts and intentions and the general state of the war.No doubt such correspondence received his closest attention and aroused his keen interest and sympathy.His answer was naturally more reserved, but at this time, I knew his position and wishes very clearly.I am charged with leading a struggling nation attacked by a sworn enemy.He was at the head of a powerful neutral nation, lofty and majestic, and he was eager to throw his country into the struggle for freedom.But he could not yet see how to do it.At this time, Great Britain had to work out its own operational plan: how to mobilize all our troops to fight Hitler on the largest scale practically possible; How to survive!

Still, there was a plan for the remainder of 1941 and 1942 that had formed in my mind and was largely accepted by the Chiefs of Staff.At this time, of course, the plan was based on the fact that the United States remained out of the war and gave us all the assistance Congress would allow.From my correspondence with the President, I have perceived that he takes special care in all naval matters, and that he does not only follow American ideas, but also his own, regarding French North Africa, including Dakar, as well as Spain and the United States. Portugal's islands in the Atlantic Ocean are of particular concern.Such thinking is also in harmony with my own opinion, and, as I believe it will later be shown, with the strategy which we may endeavor to do both individually and in joint action with the United States if we become belligerents.

I hope we can win a decisive victory in the Western Desert and drive Rommel back from Libya and Tripolitania.If all goes well, this could lead to Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco coming together apart from Vichy, perhaps even Vichy itself.This purpose is but a hope based on hope.But we have one armored division and three field divisions ready in the United Kingdom, and have sufficient ship strength to carry them anywhere in the western Mediterranean while the Luftwaffe is drawn to Russia.If we take Tripoli and France does nothing, our possession of the island of Malta enables us to attack Sicily and thus open up in Europe the only possible Second World War that we were able to achieve when we were fighting alone in the West. battlefield.Apart from Norway, I don't see ourselves doing anything else in 1942, no matter how lucky we were on the field.The plan for the attack on Sicily was carefully drawn up by the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Planning Committee.We call it a whip rope.

Once Rommel is defeated, and his few daring troops are wiped out, and Tripoli is ours again, the best troops of our four divisions (about 80,000 men) are to land in Sicily and conquer This island, we don't think it is impossible.The Luftwaffe, which had done us so much harm by dispatching from the airfields in Sicily, had been transferred to Russia, and Sicily was now without German troops.When our expeditionary force is at sea and has entered the Mediterranean Sea, it will of course be discovered by the enemy, but the enemy has no way of knowing whether we are heading for Bizerte, Algiers, Oran, French North Africa, or Sicily or Sarah. Dingdao's.Such is the favorable freedom of choice enjoyed by naval states.What other plan of active offensive could Great Britain and the British Empire pursue alone during 1942?How can we fight the Germans on a large scale?What plan would provide us with many options that would be desirable in the vicissitudes of war?This may be beyond our ability to support alone.Or something could go wrong.

But in any case, this will not endanger our lifeline across the Atlantic, or damage our own defenses against invasion. It's one thing to see a path forward and quite another to be able to follow it, but it's better to have an ambitious plan than none at all.Everything was first of all dependent on the success of the offensive that General Auchinleck had prepared for a long time in the western desert.Everything has to be calculated in relation to the unforeseen dangers we face from the possibility of a German penetration into the Caspian region, or in the same direction through Turkey, or into the Middle East, Syria, Palestine, Persia, and Iraq, but I always think that all this happened Less likely, it turned out to be correct.At every stage through which I have studied these hypothetical plans I have had the confidence and support of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services and my fellow Ministers in the Defense Committee and the War Cabinet.In the end, everything was done exactly in the prescribed order, but not until 1942 and 1943, and the situation was as good as we could have guessed in October 1941. It is very different than that, and it is much more beneficial.

Notwithstanding all these speculations which affected the opinions of those in our secret circles, I resolved not to let up the preparations of the equipment and plans for the invasion of the Continent.Sir Roger Case was now in his seventies.He made invaluable contributions in the design and construction of the ships used in establishing commandos and advancing the offensive.His lofty position and strong personality as admiral had caused so much friction in the various logistical departments that it is with great personal regret that I have come to the conclusion that a new, younger figure should be appointed to lead that overseas operation. organization, would be in the public interest.Lord Louis Mountbatten was no more than a colonel in the Royal Navy, but his merit and ability, in my opinion, qualify him for the omission.He was now on a special mission to America, where he was received with great respect.He cruised with the Pacific Fleet, and on his return to Washington had a long consultation with the President, who was authorized to inform him of our preparations for landing in Europe and of the plans I had in mind.The President expressed the utmost confidence in him and invited him to live in the White House.I had to call him back to the country before he actually went to the White House.

Prime Minister to Lord Louis Mountbatten October 10, 1941 We need you to return home immediately to do something that will interest you most. Prime Minister to Mr Harry Hopkins October 10, 1941 We need Mountbatten here for a very active and urgent task.Please explain to the President how regretful he is that he will not be honored to be invited to the White House.He will ask to see the president once before leaving the United States. I am troubled by General Auchinleck's request for a final delay of nearly two weeks in order to complete his deployment. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck

October 18, 1941 Your call has deepened my uneasiness.The date was proposed by you to the National Defense Council, and although we have found the delay to be the most dangerous, we have accepted your request and proceeded with this as our general plan.It is impossible to explain to Congress and the nation how our Middle Eastern armies have stood still for four and a half months without engaging the enemy while Russia has been bombarded to pieces throughout this entire period.I'm always trying to prevent public discussion, but it can happen at any moment.Moreover, those few precious weeks in which we could have any success are passing.Regarding your postponement again, you did not give me a notice, nor did you give me a reason.I must be able to inform the War Cabinet on Monday of the number of days you are now asking for another extension.

Furthermore, the Keeper of the Seal will leave for the United States on Monday carrying a personal letter to the President.In this letter (to be read separately with Mr. Roosevelt, to be burned or returned after reading), I intend to state your intention to attack on a moonlit night in early November.It is necessary for me to inspire the President to act of friendliness by informing him of our secrets.In view of the whiplash [1] we are preparing, I am asking him in this letter to send three or four American divisions to replace our troops in Northern Ireland as a greater safeguard against a German spring invasion.The date I have appointed the Keeper of the Seal to go to America is connected with the date you reported to us.Of course, if it's just a delay of two or three days, it doesn't matter much.However, if important changes were made in the agreed plan without notice or reason, it would be impossible for me to fully coordinate the operations of the war.Therefore, look forward to calling in time.

【1】That is to attack Sicily. As General Auchinleck had wished, the date was finally fixed on November 18th. Speculating what might be going on in the President's mind, I decided to express all my thoughts to Auchinleck on the eve of his considerable adventure in the Western Desert.At this time Mr. Attlee, generally recognized as the Deputy Prime Minister, was about to visit Washington to attend the International Labor Conference, so I asked him to take the following letter to the President.This is very consistent with Mr. Roosevelt's own thought development.This will become increasingly apparent. prime minister to president October 20, 1941 first part Dear Mr. President, At some point in the autumn of this year, General Auchinleck will attack the German and Italian forces in Cyrenaica with the largest force he can muster. [1] We believe that his army will be stronger than the enemy's in men, artillery, aircraft, and especially in tanks.His purpose would be to destroy the enemy's armed forces, especially armored forces, and take Benghazi as quickly as possible. [1] The exact date and designation of the crusaders are stated in a separate memorandum. 2. If this battle is successful, the plans that have been prepared for the further advance to Tripoli will be put into effect.Should this further effort be successful again, important reactions are expected and can be studied in advance for the sake of forethought. 3. General Weygand may be inspired to join the war, or the Germans may ask him or Vichy for facilities in French North Africa, which may force him to join the war. 4. In order to take advantage of these contingencies, we are maintaining an army equivalent to one armored division and three field divisions, with ships ready to go from about mid-November.This army can enter Morocco via Casablanca when France invites it, otherwise it will assist in the victory in Libya in the Mediterranean area. 5. To give effective cover to these preparations we have prepared a large-scale plan to attack the Norwegian coast and also to reinforce the Russian forces at Murmansk.Some of these plans are more specific, while others are only preliminary ideas. 6. It thus appears probable that, in addition to the 18th Division, which will arrive at the port of Halifax on November 7th, on its way round the Cape of Good Hope to Suez, we will have to send four Or even five divisions.We must expect that Hitler, once he has stabilized the Russian front, will immediately begin gathering perhaps forty or fifty divisions in the west for the invasion of the British Isles.We have received reports, perhaps exaggerated, that the Germans are building eight hundred ships, each capable of carrying eight or ten tanks across the North Sea and landing at any point along the coast.Of course, there will also be attacks by paratroopers and airlift troops, the scale of which is impossible to predict.One can imagine his sequence: 1939, Poland; 1940, France; 1941, Russia; 1942, England; 1943?In any case, I feel we must prepare for the biggest assault from March onwards. 7. We are obviously running a risk in moving four or five divisions (including an armored division) out of the United Kingdom under these circumstances.If events are fortunate enough to take place as assumed in the first sections of this letter, and if we actually reduce our domestic forces to the extent mentioned above, then if you can take a U.S. corps and armored of the Air Force, stationed in the north of Ireland (at the invitation of that Government and His Majesty's Government, of course), thus enabling us to add the three divisions which we are now defending Great Britain to, in addition to the army which is now replaced in Iceland. Withdrawal, that would be a great guarantee and a supreme military interest. 8. We should feel freer to take forceful action on the lines I have outlined if we know you can take this step.In addition, the arrival of American troops in Northern Ireland will have a major impact on the entire Irish Free State, bringing immeasurable beneficial consequences, and will also become a hindrance to the German invasion plan.I hope this will hold a favorable place in your thoughts.I do not wish to suggest that any decision be made before we see the outcome of the upcoming campaign. After a few paragraphs on the question of command and the relation of the navy and air force to the army, my letter continues: the second part 13. All the information I have received tends to indicate that a British victory over the Germans at Cyrenaica will change the whole face of the Mediterranean war.Spain may be encouraged to strive for neutrality.It may also have a profound impact on Italy, whose morale has been demoralized.Perhaps, most importantly, Turkey may be steadfast in its resistance to Hitler.We do not require Turkey to actively participate in the war at present, but only to maintain an attitude of unyielding resistance to German threats and fawning.As long as Turkey is not invaded or lured, this large rectangular area of ​​underdevelopment will remain an insurmountable barrier to the eastern flank of our Nile Army.Should Turkey be forced into the war, we would of course have to give her substantial support which could be better employed elsewhere (in French North Africa or in the Caucasus).We are making promises of support (depending on the military situation) to Turkey in the amount of four to six divisions and twenty or thirty air squadrons, and are actively building with them in Anatolia the necessary airport.But what Turkey needs to keep her safe is the British victory over the Germans to make all promises true and valid. 14. These deployments mentioned above do not allow us to make any significant contribution to Russia's defense of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region within the next six months.The best help we can give to the Russians is to take over from the five Russian divisions now concentrated in northern Persia.Should these divisions be brought home for use in the field, I have given Stalin British assurances that the legitimate interests of Russia will not be harmed, and that we will never seek interests in Persia at their expense.But I do not see how we could send a larger than token army into the Caucasus and how the Russians could keep a similar army in Persia during the period mentioned.Persia is very disturbed by the arrival of the Russians, their theories and behavior, and if there is a commotion it means we will have to deploy three or four Anglo-Indian divisions to maintain those lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. Unimpeded.These lines of communication, which form an important part of our joint policy of aid to Russia, will thus be largely blocked by the need to provide additional troops.I have tried to make this clear to the Russians. 15. In the telegram I sent you on July 25, 1941, before our meeting on the Atlantic, I mentioned the long-term plan for 1943: say, 15,000 vehicles Tanks, transported by hundreds of specially equipped ocean-going ships, landed simultaneously on the beaches of three or four countries where the time for uprising was ripe.I have suggested that at this stage a portion of the merchant ships which you are currently engaged in building on such a large scale could easily be allocated for the necessary refits.I present to you the plans made by the Admiralty showing the required treatment of these ships.You will see that this is estimated at an added cost of about £50,000, and I think considerable delay.I think there should be no fewer than two hundred ships so fitted.Time is enough, because we cannot imagine such a plan before 1943.But the main problem associated with the tank building program you have now begun is the ability to ship these tanks across the ocean and land them on the undefended beaches along the long coastline that Hitler has undertaken to defend.So, Mr. President, I am sure this will have your approval. 16. I am sending you a brief memorandum I have written on the use of field and anti-aircraft guns.This has to do with the impending offensive described in Part I and the organization of our home army to deal with the invasion. [1] All authorities agree with the principles set forth in it, and I welcome you to submit this document to your officers, if you think it worthwhile. 17. I also send for your personal reference a memorandum I have written concerning the present and future formation of the British and Imperial Army which we attempted to introduce in 1942. [1] Of course, this figure of about a hundred divisions does not, as has been amply explained, imply a hundred mobile standard field divisions. Some are garrisons, some are anti-aircraft artillery units, and some are equivalent to brigades.But broadly speaking, this represents a far greater deployment of military power than we had planned when the war broke out.This disposition was made possible by the fact that we had not engaged in any major engagements since our losses at Dunkirk, and that ammunition and reserves were thus greatly accumulated rather than expended. 18. I haven't mentioned the threat from Japan, which seems to have gotten extra serious in the past few days.I also didn't mention the great help you gave us in the Atlantic, because we discussed these important issues in such detail when we met, and now things have turned out just as we expected.I still think, however, that the more forceful the actions of the United States against Japan, the better the hope of keeping the peace.But if the peace is broken and America is at war with Japan, you can be sure that Britain will then declare war on Japan within an hour.We hope to be able to send a sizable fleet of battle to the Indian and Pacific Oceans before Christmas. 19. Finally, Mr. President, let me tell you how envious I am that the Keeper of the Seal can fly to the United States to have a long talk with you.Unable to leave, I had no choice but to take advantage of this opportunity to write you such a long letter.May I demand that all that is said about the military operations that are about to be carried out be kept in absolute secrecy except from your own knowledge?For this purpose I have separated the first part of this letter (containing the exact date of our offensive) from the rest, and I hope you will burn it promptly after reading it. With best regards and all best wishes Mr President your sincere friend Winston S. Churchill I have also, through the Secretary of State, revealed these plans in detail to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East, so that they may understand that the campaign which they are about to undertake can open a way for us to proceed, and this is also to emphasize their The urgency of the offensive, this one document is addressed to a different side, and it expresses another side of the same ideas as my letter which Mr. Attlee carried to the President with his full consent. Prime Minister to Secretary of State October 25, 1941 No one can assume that Germany will continue to fight in Russia through the winter without getting out.It is much more probable that within a month or so the Russian front, except in the south, will be at rest.Due to the loss of arms reserves, even if Moscow and Leningrad were held, Russia would have to (temporarily) be reduced to a second-class military power.Hitler could at any moment leave say a third of his army to attack Russia and still have enough troops to threaten Britain, put pressure on Spain, and send reinforcements to rectify Italy, and advance in the East. 2. Therefore, people must not guess that our situation will be better next year or in the coming spring.Conversely, in the case of the Whiplash (Operation Plan for Sicily), it may be a case of the past, the time of day.In my opinion, by the end of December such hopes will be dead for an indefinite period. 3. Hitler's weakness was in the air force.The British air force was already stronger than his air force and, with American aid, was growing even more rapidly.The Russian air force is perhaps two-thirds the size of the Luftwaffe, is deployed at suitable depths, and is in very good condition.Even counting the worthwhile portion of Italy's air force, Hitler didn't have enough air force to simultaneously support what his land forces could do.But the main part of the British air force had to stay at home to defend against invasion, so most of it was not used. 4. It is therefore important for us to seek situations which enable us to engage the enemy's air forces simultaneously and under favorable conditions in each theater of operations.Operation Whipline is very likely to provide such an opportunity. 5. If we can achieve the union of the airfields of Tripoli, Malta, Sicily and Sardinia before January and establish a foothold on these airfields, then, from the country, the aircraft in the above system Bombers based in the United States could carry out a violent and possibly decisive attack on Italy, the weak partner of the Axis powers.Italy's lack of airfields north of Sicily would make this possible.All air warfare in this new theater would directly curtail the enemy's actions against Great Britain, against the Nile Valley, and with the normal air force supporting his advance on the South-East. 6. British air superiority in the central Mediterranean will give us other advantages as well.Subject to the conditions stated in Section IX, the sea routes from the Mediterranean Sea will be sailed by transport fleets with strong escorts, resulting in all savings in ships and increased support for the war in the East. 7. The reaction of France and French North Africa following these achievements (including the arrival of British troops on the Tunisian border) may have prompted Weygand to act with all the benefits that arose from it. 8. The above is of course based on the success of the crusaders' actions.You should welcome the enemy's forces, especially the air force, to be subject to a very strong containment that would result from the Whipline Operations Plan if it were combined with the Acrobats Operations Plan (US Occupation of Tripolitania) Simultaneous words.Nothing can give us greater security, or frustrate the enemy, than the sudden simultaneous presence of many objects.This applies especially to those few weeks when the enemy is freeing surplus air forces from the Russian theater of operations and re-equipping them to fight elsewhere.As I'm sure you understand, a slow and steady move in Libya after ample preparation and calm elsewhere must invite maximum confrontation and must allow time for that confrontation to concentrate.Such an approach must have given the Germans time to intensify their reinforcements to Sicily and give German forces further control over Italy.I hope you feel, as I do, the fleeting nature of the present opportunity, and the breathing space left for Germany to rearrange its forces in other theaters after it has consolidated its front in Russia. How fleeting.As you're right, it's a matter of timing. 9. How will the enemy react to our attempt to gain an area of ​​air superiority in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea and thereby open a sea route?Given the state of the airfields still available to him in Italy, it will take him some time to bring his superior air forces into play.Therefore, he is bound to put pressure on Spain to close the Strait of Gibraltar.We tend to believe that the Spaniards would be outraged and resist any invasion of their country by the Germans, because these sullen and hungry Spaniards loathed the Germans.A British victory in the Crusader operation would have a major impact on the mood of the Spanish government.There is no doubt that Hitler could force his way through Spain, just as he could control Italy.His obstacle is in the political sphere.His purpose was to establish a United States of Europe with Germany as its leader and subject to the new order.This depends not only on the subjugation of peoples, but even more on their cooperation.Nothing will destroy such hopes more effectively than the constant occurrence of murder and revenge, hostage killings, etc., which are now going on in many countries.It would have been a very serious step for him to add Spain and Italy to the already vast conquered and uncontrollable territories over which his armies spread. 10. For all the above reasons, it seems very appropriate that the crusader and the whip should be simultaneously and closely related.On the other hand, it must be recognized that we will not be able to continue to do nothing but advance in Libya.I am running into a request from Russia to send a British army to the front of the Russian left as soon as possible.It will be impossible to resist such demands indefinitely, amid the growing anger of the British people at what they perceive as our inaction.Therefore, should a decision be made to abandon the whiplash plan or another operation in French North Africa at the invitation of France (as stated in the report of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services), it will be necessary to prepare early to mobilize a substantial force into Russia . 11. Your further comments should be sent to us before the National Defense Committee meeting on Monday evening. The commanders-in-chief in Cairo took a different view.They regarded the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal, Basra and the Caucasus, and the defense of the Taurus Mountain Fort[1] as their primary plans.They did not believe that taking Sicily was feasible or necessary.Their minds are on the right and eastward, and if it is decided to move westward and our efforts succeed, they would rather take Bizerte than make any attempt at Sicily.I am well aware of their theory, which was strongly supported by General Wavell in India.They stated their conclusions in a telegram of October 27 embodying the arguments I had advanced.As a result, I gave up the idea of ​​attacking Sicily (the whipline plan). [1] The Taurus Mountains are located in the southeastern part of Asia Minor, in Turkey.translator PM sends General Ismay to Chiefs of Staff Committee October 28, 1941 In view of the recent calls from the Middle East and your own categorical abandonment of the whip-rope plan which you advocated and which I endorse, I now consider that plan to be closed. 2. But an army equal to two divisions and one armored division should be ready to take advantage of Operation Crusader and Operation Acrobat, if they are successful.There was no reason to hope that General Weygand would invite us into Bizerte or Casablanca because of our imminent action, except as a reason to hope.If he does, we must be ready to take advantage of this great opportunity.The Commander-in-Chief and others should immediately study this matter and consult with Middle East Headquarters, especially Admiral Cunningham, on the matter. 3. It may happen that the hearts of France would be affected by a British victory, or that Germany would ask Petain to grant them the use of the theater because of the actual or possible loss of Tripoli (this cannot be ruled out). 4. The name of this action shall be Sportsman. 5. It is important to know at once which orders should be issued to change the whipline plan into a sportsman's plan so that the ship is subject to the least possible violation, and next to know the needs for the ship and the full effect of those needs . 6. I have received reports from the United States that friends there are said to be attracted by the idea of ​​American intervention in Morocco, and Colonel Knox once talked to Lord Halifax about sending 150,000 American troops Things that land there. We must be ready, if possible, to make the same proposal to General Weygand, or at any rate a British proposal, at any moment after the success of the Crusader operation seems appropriate.This could turn the tide in our favor.Therefore, the recommendation should be expressed in the most effective terms.I will not address the matter personally to the President until the outcome of Operation Crusader is known. 7. I once received a letter from Lord Louis Mountbatten, in which he expressed his strong interest in Tangier.This also needs to be studied, but it will obviously cause a lot of trouble with the Spaniards and the French, and it would be wrong to sacrifice the chance of French cooperation with us for this matter. Leaving aside the abandonment of the plan to attack Sicily, we all stuck to our estimates of values ​​and chances, and I had no difficulty in obtaining a united decision. Prime Minister to General Ismay to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Imperial General Staff November 2, 1941 While fully aware of General Wavell's views, we have definitely decided to pursue such a procedure, namely Crusader, Acrobat, Sportsman.This procedure cannot be reversed. Therefore, if all goes well, our plan is: to defeat Rommel's army and clear Cyrenaica from the enemy; to march to Tripoli; and to enter French Northwest Africa with the assistance and invitation of France.The plan to attack Sicily is premised on the successful completion of the previous two plans and can replace the third plan.But all of this is largely speculative, and I do not wish to continue the strategic debate with Middle East Command. Prime Minister to Secretary of State November 11, 1941 I have no answer but silence to your and Auchinleck's telegrams concerning the crusader's operations.No outlook can be taken on the future until we know how this operation is progressing.The campaign is a veil through which it is unwise to stare. Then it may be appropriate to see what is going on in the enemy's mind. In July 1941, the German Army Operations Planning Department had studied a future military operation called Operation East to overthrow Britain in the Middle East.Their main assumption was that the war against Russia would end victoriously in the autumn.Assuming such a big assumption, an armored regiment dispatched from the Caucasus would drive south through Persia in the winter of late 1941-early 1942.An army of ten divisions, half of them armored and motorized, would cross Anatolia from Bulgaria into Syria and Iraq, subject to Turkish obedience.If Turkey resisted, twice that force would be needed, so the plan had to be postponed until 1942.The German and Italian troops in Africa only rank third.Their tasks in the summer and autumn of 1941, apart from the capture of Tobruk, were purely defensive.By winter their losses in men and equipment will be replaced, and then, while our attention and troops are distracted by a general attack on Persia and Iraq, Axis forces on the Libyan side will attack Cairo. The German High Command has never been in favor of adventures in Africa.Germany sent troops to Africa, but to prevent the defeat of the Italian army.When the Italian rout was prevented and we were driven back, this achievement did not cause any change in German intentions.越過地中海的海上航程有被從馬耳他出動的潛艇與飛機襲擊的危險，因而是不合他們的意的。由於軸心國在增援方面與同盟國相比會遭遇到更大的困難，北非將始終不過是一個不重要的戰區。同意大利人在陸海空方面合作，在德國人的心目中也不是特別具有吸引力的。德軍司令部只是勉強地同意補充隆美爾部隊的不足。設若敵人有意的話，他們是能夠在付出可以接受的代價的條件下把足以使我們的地位不能維持的必要數量的軍隊撥出和運來的。不久將要看到，他們的主要障礙馬耳他島怎樣從來沒有遭到襲擊。無疑地，他們在克里特島的慘重損失是制止他們這樣做的一個因素。 德國陸軍部於一九四一年八月初發至指揮西、北、南各路集團軍群的將領們的一封信，概述了在打敗俄國後接著去謀取的目標： （1）加強在北非的武裝部隊，目的在使奪取托卜魯克成為可能。為了使必要的運輸艦隻得以通過，德國空軍應恢復對馬耳他的襲擊。 在氣候狀況不致引起耽延和運輸艦隻的服務得以確保按照計劃進行的條件下，可以假定進攻托卜魯克的戰役將在九月中旬開始。 （2）菲力克斯計劃（即是在西班牙的積極參加下攻取直布羅陀港）必須在一九四一年實行。 （3）設若東方戰役結束而土耳其加入我們這一邊，打算在經過最少八十五天的時期的準備後對在埃及方向的敘利亞和巴勒斯坦進攻。 因此，秋季和冬季裡的各個月分是我們的好時機。德國空軍已經撤離西西里島。俄國前線耗盡了為意大利海軍所需要的燃料。在八月分，給隆美爾的供應物資和援軍的百分之三十三損失了。在十月，這項重要數字上升到百分之六十三。 意大利人被迫而組織了用以代替的一條空運補給錢。在九月底，墨索里尼著手以每月運送一萬五千人的規模由空運輸送援軍至的黎波里，但是到了十月底，只有九千人到達。同時，到的黎波里的海上運輸則處於停頓狀態，只有少數運輸船隊溜過我們的封鎖線而駛抵班加西。但是十月分的損失終於迫使德國最高司令部輸送汽油給意大利海軍。他們也採取了一個更重要得多的步驟。鄧尼茨海軍上將勉強同意從大西洋的戰鬥中撤出二十五艘潛艇進入地中海。這是一個真正的打擊，其後果不用很久就會顯現出來。 在這期間，我們以馬耳他島為根據地而施行的控制是具有決定性的，而且由海軍部按照我所願望的在那裡建立起來的K艦隊的活動取得了豐富的戰果。在十一月八日的晚間，根據飛機報告，它們襲擊了自從恢復航行以來的第一批意大利運輸船隊，這批運輸船隊包括七艘商船，有六艘驅逐艦、兩艘巡洋艦護衛，還另有四艘驅逐艦支援。所有商船很快就被消滅。有一艘驅逐艦被我們的巡洋艦擊沉，另一艘受傷。意大利的巡洋艦並沒有參與戰事。我把這個好消息電告總統。 former navy personnel to president roosevelt 一九四一年十一月九日 駛往班加西的軸心國運輸船隊在意大利與希臘之間被殲滅一事，就其本身及其後果而言，都是非常重要的。也值得注意的是，那兩艘意大利的重巡洋艦竟不敢對抗我們的兩艘裝有六吋口徑炮的輕巡洋艦，而他們的六艘（實際上是四艘）驅逐艦也不敢對抗我們的兩艘軍艦。 我對於莫斯科前線也具有愈來愈好的印象。 軸心國的運輸船隊再次被迫停航，因而隆美爾有充分的理由去向德國最高司令部訴苦。 隆美爾將軍致德國陸軍最高司令部 一九四一年十一月九日 一‧對北非軍隊和供應物資輸送的速度已經更加減低了。 到一九四一年十月底，在意大利答應的六萬噸供應物資中，運抵班加西的只有八千零九十三噸。在原定用於進攻托卜魯克的那些軍隊中，約有三分之一的炮隊和各種重要的交通隊甚至到十一月二十日都不能從歐洲運到。再者，那二十門在突尼斯向法國買來的十五點五厘米口徑的大炮何時可以運到，還不能確定。在我們請求派來用於在十一月間進攻托卜魯克的三個意大利師當中，只有一師可供使用，而且這個師的兵額不足。 但是這時，我們無災難和有利的期間結束了。德國潛艇來到了這個戰場。皇家方舟號在使更多的飛機起飛到馬耳他以後，正當駛回直布羅陀的時候，於十一月十二日被一艘德國潛艇發射的魚雷擊中。一切挽救這艘船的企圖都失敗了，於是在我們的許多戰事中戰績顯赫的這艘有名的老資格的軍艦就在離開直布羅陀只有二十五哩航程的時候沉沒了。這是我們在地中海上的艦隊所受到的一系列的慘重損失的開端，也是我們在那裡的在以前從來不為我們所知悉的一個弱點。但是這時，為發動我們的耽延已久的攻勢所需要的一切都準備好了，因而我們現在必須轉到西部沙漠方面了。 十一月十五日，我以國王的訓示電達奧金萊克將軍，以備他在認為適當的條件、時機和情況下應用。 Prime Minister to General Auchinleck 一九四一年十一月十五日 我奉國王之命對西部沙漠的陸軍和皇家空軍的所有官兵，並對地中海艦隊，傳達陛下對於他們將在面臨的十分重要的戰役中以足資矜式的忠誠盡其職守一事所具有的信念。 不列顛和英帝國的軍隊將第一次以充足的各種現代武器的裝備與德軍周旋。這個戰役本身將影響到戰爭的整個進程。現在是為最後勝利、祖國和自由而進行最猛烈的一擊的時候了。 駐在沙漠地帶的軍隊也許會為歷史增添同布萊寧戰役和滑鐵盧戰役【１】並列的一頁。各國人民都在看著你們。我們所有的心都與你們在一起。願上帝支持正義的一方！ 【１】一七○四年八月，馬爾巴羅公爵率領英軍與奧軍聯合打敗法軍與巴伐利亞軍於布萊寧；一八一五年六月，韋林頓公爵擊敗拿破侖於滑鐵盧。translator