Chapter 112 Volume 4, Chapter 2, Setbacks in the Desert

Rommel's retreat to Agera, lack of transport, tragic January. My correspondence with Auchinleck in Washington. Auchinleck's confidence was not shaken by his attempt to attack him in mid-February. Call Bardia on January 15. Surrendered with Halfaya and 14,000 captives to our 30th Army I went back to London to prepare my report to Congress Rommel launched a mighty reconnaissance Shocked by the bad news: Benghazi is over!Auchinleck flew to forward headquarters. His call on January 26. Rommel used his advantage to withdraw from Benghazi. Auchinleck reported us twice on January 29 and January 31. Withdrew some three hundred miles The capriciousness of fate The quantity and quality of British armored forces The event of the 1st Armored Division far-reaching defeat.

The previous volume recounted the victory of General Auchinleck after long preparations in the West African desert and the relief of Tobruk.During my visit to Washington, I felt that I could speak with confidence about his future actions.But Rommel managed to withdraw his troops neatly to positions south of Ghazala.Here he was attacked by General Godwin Austin's Thirteenth Corps, and was forced to retreat on December 16 after three days of fighting.Our mobile forces tried to wrap around the desert flanks and block Rommel's retreat along the coastal road to Benghazi.The bad weather, the roughness of the road, and above all the difficulty of supplies, all made this attempt a failure.The enemy detachment, pursued by the 4th British Indian Division, reached Benghazi in spite of the difficult situation.The enemy's armored forces retreated along desert roads through Mekili, with my 7th Armored Division in pursuit.Soon, the Guards Brigade also came to support the pursuit of the 7th Armored Division.

At this time we hoped to repeat a victory similar to that of the previous year, when the Italian army retreated south from Benghazi and our army advanced rapidly towards Antrat, thus cutting them off.Captured a large number of enemies.But it was impossible to provide a very strong force in time; the enemy was fully aware that they were in danger of being surrounded again.Therefore, when our advance troops reached Antrath, they found that the place was well guarded and could not advance.Behind this line of defence, Rommel withdrew all his troops to Ajdabbia, where he held his ground against our army; at the same time he built a strong position at Aghera.He retired there peacefully on January 7th.

At this time, the Thirteenth Army was at the end of its rope in terms of logistics.Unfortunately, due to the bad weather and the intrusion of enemy planes, the finishing work of Benghazi Port was delayed.Supplies for the vanguard therefore had to be transported overland from Tobruk, and little was accumulated.As a result, the 4th British Indian Division could not be transferred from Banghasan, and we had only the Guards Brigade and the 7th Armored Division to deal with the enemy's forces at Aguila.The 7th Armored Division was replaced by the 1st Armored Division newly transferred from China in mid-January.At one time, these troops were not strong enough to attack, nor to start repairing fortifications in case of counterattack.

In this same unfortunate corner, a year later, a military disaster destroyed the whole British campaign in the desert in 1942; , needs to be described in detail. General Auchinleck telegraphed to me at Washington, January 9, and, after describing his disposition, reported as follows: The predictions about the possible actions of the enemy forces are as follows.Stick to the Aguila｜Malada front.The Italian Tenth Army, together with the Brescia and Pavia divisions, guarded the Agella area, and was reinforced by the German 90th Light Division.The Italian Mobile Army, together with the divisions of Trento and Trieste and the German 90th Light Division, was stationed at Marada to prevent our army from encircling Agera from the south.The German 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, possibly with the Ariet Panzer Division in reserve, prepared to counterattack.

Call the next day: The position of the Guards Brigade (two battalions) 12 miles southwest of Ajdabiya was still pinned down yesterday. I was working in the map room of the White House at the time, and it wasn't hard to see what these uninspiring telegrams meant. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck January 11, 1942 I am afraid that when this telegram was received, most of the enemy's seven and a half divisions had taken the opportunity to escape, and they were still retreating along the lines of communication.I have also noticed that nine merchant ships of 10,000 tons have reportedly arrived safely in Tripoli.Everyone understands that you thought you would be able to cut off Rommel's Italian infantry by going straight to Abd's route, but now it seems that they slipped through the net.How will this affect the Acrobat project (the long drive to Tripoli)?I'm sure you and your troops are exhausted, but we must face up to the fact that they will greatly affect sportsman and supersportsmen programs.

Here again it is necessary to note the great influence of the sea war on the future of the Eighth Army. The sinking of Fleet K (the Maltese fleet), followed by the loss of the cruiser Neptune in a minefield near Tripoli on 19 December, enabled the enemy convoy to pass through the sea with vital supplies to replenish Rommel at the critical moment. army. Remember, Sportsman is our plan to assist General Weygand in French North Africa, if he is happy to accept it.For this purpose we have one armored division and three field divisions ready to depart from England at short notice; we also have a considerable air detachment ready also.Neither Weygand nor Vichy responded well to our proposal, but we had been hoping that Rommel would be defeated and that we would be stationed in Tripoli in order to drive straight into Tunisia, which would encourage either or both of them to change course.The Hypersportsman is the larger plan of Anglo-American intervention in French North Africa; I have long felt that President Roosevelt strongly endorsed it, although I proposed it in a paper of December 16 as part of the campaign of 1942. The major amphibious operations of the Anglo-Americans in the West.The determined resistance of the enemy at Ajdabiya and their methodical withdrawal to Al Qayla, therefore, are of greater importance to me and to all my thoughts than the mere hindrance of our westward progress in the desert. significance.In fact, in the whole plan that I discussed with the president, this is a disadvantage.However, according to the telegrams sent by General Auchinleck later, it seemed that everything was going well and that decisive action was imminent.

General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 12, 1942 1. I don't think it can be said that most of the enemy divisions have avoided us.Yes, they still use the name of teacher when they talk about it, but these masters and apprentices have empty names.For example, we know that the German 90th Light Division originally had 9,000 men, but now there are only 3,500 men left, and the division has only one field gun left. 2. According to my estimation, no more than one-third of the original German and Italian teams took the opportunity to escape, a total of 17,000 Germans and 18,000 Italians.These people are disorganized, lacking both senior commanders and supplies, and because of our continued pressure, they are exhausted, and they will certainly not have a force as large as 35,000 men.

3. I have reason to believe that six ships (an average of 7,200 tons each) have recently arrived in Tripoli. 4. I am convinced that we should promote the Acrobat Project for many reasons, one of which is quite important to keep Germany under attack on both fronts, Russia and Libya.I assure you, I will not be forced to act rashly by the situation, and neither will General Li Qi.But hearing the encouraging news on the Russian front, I think we should do everything we can to keep the pressure on Libya.I am convinced that the enemy's predicament is worse than we dare to imagine. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister

January 12, 1942 1. The enemy seems to have completely retreated to the region of Mersey | Bregaburg | Matex | Dioffen | Aghera, where our troops are in contact with the enemy on the eastern and southern fronts.From what we know of the enemy's dispositions, it appears that their organization and units are weak in numbers, and that they are using what little German material is available to reinforce the remnants of the Italian divisions. 2. As a land base, Benghazi has expanded very well, but the weather has been bad and has not improved. Sometimes there are severe sandstorms, covering the sky and the sun, and the visibility is almost equal to zero, which greatly hinders loading and unloading.

3. General Leech is carrying out his plan, and I hope we will soon have stronger forces concentrated on the front.The weakness and disintegration of the enemy army became more and more obvious. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck January 13, 1942 Thank you for your call on the 12th.I showed it to the President today.I am sure that you are right to prepare to press aggressively and to fight for a decisive battle on the Agera-Marada front.Regardless of the outcome, I would like to support you. From January 12th to January 21st, Rommel's troops remained silent on the Agella position, while maintaining a gap of about fifty miles from the Mediterranean Sea to the south of what was known as the Libyan Sand Sea.The salt pans, sand dunes, and small cliffs on this front were all good for defense, and the enemy was cautious, reinforcing them with mines and barbed wire.General Auchinleck felt that this position could not be attacked until mid-February.During this period, he sent the two main battalions of the Guards Brigade and the support team of the 1st Armored Division to deal with Rommel's army.Behind this, at Antrath, some ninety miles away, was stationed the remainder of the British 1st Armored Division under General Meserve.These forces, together with the 4th British and Indian Division at Benghazi and beyond, formed XIII Corps, commanded by General Godwin Austin.This army was widely dispersed, and due to logistical difficulties, the front line was weak and reinforcements were far away.As for the use of mines or other obstacles to defend the front line of the British army, no arrangements have been made.According to the plan, if Rommel launches a counterattack, our forward troops are ready to retreat.However, General Auchinleck did not believe that Rommel had the ability to attack. He thought he had plenty of time to strengthen his forces and prepare supplies. Auchinleck to the Chief of the Reich General Staff January 15, 1942 1. The enemy forces are now clearly consolidating their positions around Aguila.The total strength of the enemy at the front is estimated at: 17,000 Germans, 50 field guns, 70 anti-tank guns, 12 medium tanks, 20 light tanks; 18,000 Italians , 130 field guns, 60 anti-tank guns, 50 M‧13 tanks, about one-third of the original force. 2. Our forward units, including the Guards Brigade, the support units of the 1st and 7th Armored Divisions[1], the four armored car regiments, and the 2nd Armored Brigade, are in contact with the entire enemy line, and the patrols have arrived Agera｜Malada area. [1] On January 19, two days before the enemy's attack, the support team of the 7th Armored Division was ordered to withdraw and reorganize. 3. The enemy forces were not active except in the air; their air activity had recently increased, presumably due to the improvement of the fuel problem after the arrival of the ships at Tripoli.Our air force continued to be very active, attacking the enemy and covering our ports and forward forces.The enemy planes continued to attack our port and the road traffic east of Benghazi, but did not cause serious damage. 4. The port of Benghazi is developing smoothly. Although it has been delayed due to bad weather and rough seas, supplies are still being unloaded. Soon the news came that Bardia, Salum, and Halfaya, together with 14,000 prisoners and countless war supplies, surrendered to our 30th Army, with less than 500 casualties in our army.At the same time, 1,100 soldiers of our army were also liberated. I did not get any more important news until I flew home from Bermuda; When I said goodbye to the President, I did have a feeling that our ideas about the big adventure in North Africa were gradually converging, a feeling that turned out to be completely correct.After my arrival in London, the news was still good, although there was obviously a lull before a new campaign, but it took longer than we had originally imagined. I had just returned to China, and amidst the busy schedule of PepsiCo, I had to prepare for a formal parliamentary debate.Since I last spoke at length in the House of Commons, many world events have taken place which should now be reported to the nation.From the news I could read in the newspapers to the materials I spent at least an hour a day reading, there was a growing sense of dissatisfaction and uneasiness, thinking that we were clearly incapable of dealing with the Japanese raids in the East and Far East. Get ready.In the eyes of the public, the campaign in the desert is going well; and I am glad to be able to present the truth to Parliament.I ask my colleagues to give me considerable time. Unfortunately, General Auchinleck underestimated the strength of the enemy's regrouping.The Royal Air Force on the island of Malta, under the resolute leadership of Air Major General Lloyd, had launched an autumn offensive against Italian ports and ships, which contributed to the victory of the land battle.But in December it was attacked by a concentrated and powerful squadron of Luftwaffe squadrons on Sicily, which broke it.Our recent defeats at sea have so weakened Admiral Cunningham's fleet that for a time it was incapable of effectively interdicting the route to Tripoli.Supplies were now freely delivered to Rommel.On January 21 he sent three columns, each of about 1,000 motorized infantry supported by tanks, to launch mighty reconnaissance.These columns quickly broke through the gap in the junction of our troops, which were not covered by tanks.Godwin-General Austin then ordered a retreat, first to Ajdabiya, and then to block the enemy's way from Antrat to Musus. Bad news came on the 23rd. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 23, 1942 1. Obviously, Rommel moved eastward on January 21 because he was expected to be attacked by our army.He found himself confronted only by brisk troops ahead, apparently making a decision to advance in an attempt to disrupt our main line of communication, which he seemed to think was based at Benghazi.When retreating in the rugged sand dunes southeast of Ajdabiya on January 21, several columns of the support team of the 1st Armored Division reportedly lost seven cannons and 100 motor vehicles; Details are unknown. 2. If Rommel insists on advancing, especially around Benghazi, the transportation hub, he seems to be subjecting his eastward flank to our armored forces, where we have about 150 patrol tanks, as well as American tanks .The small enemy column, presumably a shock force, had almost penetrated into Antrat last night. 3. I feel that the domestic public may be disturbed by the enemy's reoccupation of Ajdabiya, but this is precisely the reason why Long Chongmeier was lured into it and took advantage of it.Rommel's actions prevented our reconnaissance and other preparations for the planned attack on Aguila, but you also know that the main factor in the delay was and still is the need to establish sufficient reserves in Benghazi and in front of it.I am convinced that General Leech was on the lookout for an encounter where conditions were more favorable to us than at Agera, which had swampy ground and poor roads. I accepted this view at the time, knowing nothing of what had happened on the 21st, or of the rapid general retreat of all the advancing troops.Until now, I have had no reason to think that disaster is coming.On the contrary, what I have learned is that the British army is about to attack.Our transfer to Tripolitania may have been delayed, but Auchinleck seemed certain of the future.But on the 24th, news with a different meaning came. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 24, 1942 at three o'clock in the afternoon The enemy is evidently capable of advancing with surprising strength, and their initial advances do seem to have temporarily set back our forward forces. These troops, which you know are weak, have been driven off the road.Once again Rommel struck a bold blow.His unexpected initial success may, as it did last year, make him get carried away and make progress.But this time his supply situation was far from what it was last year, and he still had a new force at that time.The situation is not going as it should, but I hope it will be brought back in our favor in the end. Yet the news was shocking.On the evening of the twenty-fourth came a military telegram. Eighth Army Naval Liaison Officer to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean January 24, 1942 Preparations are being made to evacuate Benghazi only as a precautionary measure. No sabotage work has yet been ordered.In this context, non-combatants are moving at night, as far east as possible.Once Benghazi falls, Derna will not be guaranteed. On hearing this, I sent the following telegram to Auchinleck, from whom I have not yet had a report like this. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck January 25, 1942 Deeply disturbed by reports of Eighth Army's withdrawal from Benghazi and Derna.Indeed, no one has ever pointed it out to me to make me think of the possibility of such a situation happening.The non-combatants have moved east, and the sabotage in Benghazi has not yet been ordered, all of which will make the campaign different from what we have contemplated.Did you really have a major setback in the Antrat area?Can't our new armored forces take on the rebuilt German tanks?I see this as a serious crisis, one that was unexpected to me.Why did they evacuate so quickly?Why didn't the 4th (British) Indian Division hold on to Benghazi like the Germans held on to Halfaya?The retreat now evidently faced by the deployment meant the failure of the crusader's plan and the bankruptcy of the acrobat's plan. 【１】 【1】Our army's plan to attack Libya and advance to Tripoli. Auchinleck immediately rushed to General Li Qi's forward headquarters. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 26, 1942 1. I flew here from Cairo yesterday.The situation is not good. Although the 1st Armored Division and the Guards Brigade have fought hard, they obviously cannot stabilize the situation.The enemy drove our army back to Musus yesterday, and has crossed it, but the columns still moving to the east of it apparently engaged the enemy last night. 4. As a precautionary measure, heavy equipment and base facilities have been withdrawn from Benghazi with my approval.General Leech had taken direct command of the 4th Indian Division and ordered it to attack as far south of Benghazi as possible, and to send mixed columns to cut off the enemy's communications and flanks around Antrat.The 1st Armored Division was doing everything in its power to pin down the enemy forces south of Charuba and west of Mekili and protect the flanks of the 4th Indian Division. 5. The formation of the enemy army was judged after the battle as the 15th and 21st Armored Divisions, the Ariet Division and the 90th Light Division. After Rommel deployed the main force at Msus, he could attack Benghazi to the northwest or Mekili to the east as he wished.He is attacking on two fronts.His attempt was to take Benghazi, but he also sent a force northeast to feint against our lines of communication.This feint was very successful.Our plan to send part of the 4th Indian Division drawn from Benghazi, the Armored Division, and the Guards Brigade drawn from Charuba to counterattack south was quickly cancelled, withdrew from Benghazi, and the entire Thirteenth Army retreated to Gachai Pull | Bill Hakeem on the front. The fall of Benghazi immediately became a prominent event. General Auchinleck (at forward headquarters) to Prime Minister January 27, 1942 I am also very disturbed by reports of premature action in Benghazi.I have inquired, and there was apparently some misunderstanding, probably due to the rashness of the subordinate commander, who ordered the entire navy to withdraw, and damaged several barges and the bollards on the docks before doing so.The main sabotage of the port, under the Army's responsibility, was not carried out, and no sabotage of any kind was carried out except for a few enemy storehouses.The RAF apparently sabotaged some petrol, also by mistake.These avoidable mistakes are regrettable, but not costly.I'm being held accountable. After describing the military developments in detail, General Auchinleck summarized the situation as follows: I am concerned that our armored forces have indeed not been able to take on the enemy properly; They suffered heavy losses, and had no strength to inflict equal losses on the enemy.The reason is not yet clear, but it was probably because our troops were too dispersed to be able to concentrate and take concerted action against the dense formation of the enemy.This may be just one of the reasons.The 1st Armored Division, or the remnants of that division, is now concentrated and covered by armored convoys, and I expect it to be ready for attack at once, but I await the report of the division commander.Actions on other fronts require investigation, which is forthcoming.At the same time, the aim was to restore the initiative, to press the enemy forces, and to destroy them if possible, or to force them to retreat.I am sure General Leech is determined to accomplish this goal.Ted and I live here now. Call the next day: Enemy forces have separated their forces in an apparent attempt to take both Mekili and Benghazi.This is a bold technique that Rommel used to use, and it can also show that he underestimated the strength of our army to resist the invasion.Likely, most of his tanks were used for the eastward assault.His movement, except possibly toward Benghazi, did not disrupt General Leech's planned counterattack Here it seems to me perfectly clear that General Auchinleck has never understood what has happened in the desert.He didn't have a single telegram saying what happened to the 2nd Armored Division, which was actually the 13th Army.I hope that now that he is at General Reach's headquarters, he will be able to find out the truth.At the time, I didn't know anything either. Prime Minister to General Auchinleck January 28, 1942 1. I have complete trust in you, and I am happy that you can persevere. 2. You must have seen the information about Rommel's intentions. He wanted to clear the triangle of Benghazi |This seems to increase the need for our army to stick to the end. 3. I am very anxious to hear further information from you concerning the defeat of our armored forces by the inferior forces of the enemy.The blow was hard enough. Regarding the disaster that happened this time, he only complained about the poor quality of our army's tanks, but he did not give any explanation, and even worse news came again. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 29, 1942 The situation has deteriorated and I am afraid we will have to evacuate Benghazi temporarily.Early this morning, the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade was forced back by two mixed columns of the enemy with superior strength.Each column of the enemy has at least twenty-five tanks. Meanwhile, a strong column of at least 1,500 mechanized vehicles was advancing towards Abiar from the south.Due to the threat of encirclement, the commander of the 4th Indian Division decided to stop operations southwest of Banga if possible.As it stands, I think he's doing the right thing.The sabotage in Benghazi has been ordered to be carried out.We have nothing precious there anymore. It must be admitted that the enemy's victory was not theirs nor ours.Their tactics are clever and bold.It now needed to see how far they had to disperse the armored forces around Musus in order to maintain the enormous force needed to attack Benghazi.Rommel took a big risk, and so do we.So far he has been proven right, but General Leech and I are now doing everything we can to turn the situation around.The 1st Armored Division suffered heavy losses in tanks and artillery, and the combat capability of this main force may have been temporarily weakened, let's hope it wasn't. As far as I can see, there is no looseness or confusion, nor is morale lost. General Auchinleck to Prime Minister January 31, 1942 1. Telegram on January 28, received yesterday afternoon, thank you.Unfortunately, we had to give up Benghazi, but the loss was only temporary. 2. Concerning the operations of the 1st Armored Division: I don't know how much fewer tanks on the enemy's side than we actually have on standby each day, although it is likely that our tank strength in the combat area turned out to be superior to theirs .I have given you some of the reasons for the defeat of our armored forces, and I think there is some truth to them.Other presently insoluble difficulties, which I have already mentioned, are the short range and poor performance of our two-pounder guns compared with the German guns, and the mechanical unreliability of our patrol tanks compared with the German tanks.Moreover, I am also dissatisfied with the statement that the tactical leadership of our armored forces is so high that it can offset the material superiority of the German army.Things have unfortunately reached this point, but it won't improve overnight. 3. I have no choice but to come to the conclusion that if we want to deal with the German armored forces and have the belief that we will win, then our armored forces must have at least a two-to-one advantage based on the current equipment, organization, and leadership .Even so, if they want to succeed, they must achieve the closest cooperation between infantry and artillery units, because infantry and artillery are fully capable of dealing with the corresponding German troops except for the anti-tank guns.These principles are being applied here as closely as circumstances permit, but I am also concerned that there are indications that the Royal Armored Forces are, in some cases, losing confidence in their equipment.Everything possible must be done to correct this. 4. General Leech and I watched closely for Rommel's possible intentions, but whatever they were, he would certainly succeed with the smallest columns until he was met with resistance.Plans are in place to counter such an operation. Rommel proved once again that he is a master of desert tactics, better than our commander, he has regained most of Cyrenaica, and this time retreated almost 300 miles, dashed our hopes and made us abandon Benghazi .Lost all the reserves General Auchinleck had gathered for the long-awaited mid-February attack.Rommel must have been amazed at how he started his attack with only three small columns, supported by as many troops as he could muster, and was able to win an overwhelming victory.General Li Qi reorganized the incomplete Thirteenth Army and other troops transferred from Gazaila and Tobruk.Here the pursuers and the pursued, breathless, faced each other until the end of May, when Rommel was able to renew his attack. The fundamental reason for the volatility of the situation and the serious military disaster was this: the enemy had practically free navigation in the Mediterranean to reinforce and resupply their armored forces, and they were able to bring back most of their air force from the Russian front.But the tactical changes on the scene have never been explained.The decisive day was January 25, when the enemy broke through the front and reached Musus.Since then, the chaos of the situation and the repeated changes in the plan have given Rommel the opportunity to take the initiative. The Guards Brigade did not understand why they were not allowed to resist once, but the order to retreat was issued again and again, and they had to obey. The 4th British Indian Division did not get a chance to play a role. It was only recently revealed from the enemy's documents that the enemy's tanks turned out to be superior to ours.Their Afrika Korps had 120 tanks, the Italians 80 or more, against the 150 tanks of our 1st Armored Division.However, why this division was not put to good use remains unexplained.Auchinleck reported in a telegram that the division had just arrived from the United Kingdom and had no experience in fighting in the desert; this telegram also made a general comment that not only were all the tanks of our army no match for the German tanks, but our patrol tanks were mechanically weak in combat. Also inferior.The equipment is poor, and our army is mechanically unreliable, not to mention that compared with the German army, there is a great shortage of anti-tank weapons, so the situation is even more serious. All these arguments need to be carefully analyzed.The 1st Armored Division is the best unit our army has.Most of the soldiers in this army have received more than two years of training, and compared with our regular army, their efficiency has reached the same high level.They landed in Egypt in November.Before they left England, every effort was made, on the basis of all recent information and experience, to make their vehicles fit for the conditions of the desert.After another routine inspection at the factory in Cairo, the division moved across the desert to Antrat, arriving on 6 January.In order to protect the tracks, the tank was mounted on a special transport vehicle through the entire desert area, and it arrived at Antrat intact.However, this elite division has lost more than a hundred tanks before it has engaged in much battle.During the hasty retreat, the large quantities of gasoline that had been transported were all abandoned; many tanks were abandoned behind because they ran out of fuel. When the guard brigade was ordered to retreat, it also found a large amount of gasoline, which had to be destroyed due to the approach of the enemy.But they saw many tanks abandoned in the desert, so they tried their best to bring in a lot of gasoline and drove these tanks themselves.Colestream's company alone gathered six and drove them to safety; other units collected more.In fact, some companies combined the few tanks they acquired with motorized infantry, as the Germans did, so that they were actually stronger than when they went out.What cost and labor would it take to build a unit like an armored division, with specialists and trained soldiers; what effort would it take to transport it around the Cape of Good Hope; It pains us to think of all this and see the consequences of such mishandling.In retrospect it is all the more embarrassing when the Germans managed to succeed, although they were more than 400 miles from their base in Tripoli.The British nationals, in pursuing these matters, must not be deceived into thinking that the technical ineptitude of our tanks was the sole cause of this costly and far-reaching defeat.