Chapter 113 Volume 4, Chapter 3, Malaya’s Punishment

Fierce battles in the Malay Peninsula Japanese advance to Segamat｜Battle of Muar Our retreat to Singapore A debatable strategic issue Dispersion of the Singapore Garrison General Bonnard's memorandum My dissatisfaction with the defense of the West Coast Navy Reply from Secretary of the Navy Wei General Weir's doubts about the long-term defense of Singapore My telegram of January 15th January 16th Wavell's reply No permanent land forts No field defenses January 19th Memorandum from me to the Chiefs of Staff Instructions from the Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell on the 20th Telegram to General Wavell on January 20 Emphasizing Wavell's Pessimistic Report on Keeping the Burma Road Open The Chiefs of Staff's Dilemma Sir Earl Page's Intervention Mr. Ting's January 23rd Call Unforgivable Treachery We are in Singapore carrying out the policy of fighting to the end.

The situation in Malaya before the end of December 1941 has been described in the previous volume.At the beginning of the new year, the Third Army of our army, composed of the 9th and 11th British and Indian Divisions and commanded by Lieutenant General Heath, was severely attacked on the east and west coasts.The enemy has moved south from Kota Bharu along the coastal road and is now in close contact with a brigade of our Ninth Division in Kuantan.To the west, the 11th Indian Division held a strong hilltop position at Kampar, with a brigade defending the Perak River on its left.Two brigades of the 8th Australian Division were left in the state of Johor, one of which was stationed on the beach at Mersing; here sooner or later the enemy might come to land, which would come in behind our vanguard.Up to now, the Japanese army has dispatched at least three full divisions to deal with us, and the ships are gathering in Songkhla, indicating that another division may come.On the part of our army, the eagerly awaited reinforcements are also arriving.By mid-January, the 45th Indian Brigade, the main brigade of the British 18th Division, and fifty Tornado fighters had arrived safely.By the end of the month, the entire division of the 18th Division and another brigade sent by India can arrive as scheduled.

The protection of these convoys in the narrow seas south of Singapore required the use of all our existing naval strength, except small craft, and almost all of our remaining fighter jets.Therefore, the Japanese Air Force was free to attack our troops and lines of communication.The Dutch, in faithful execution of their agreement with us, have sent four squadrons to defend Singapore, but these squadrons, like ours, are a wasted asset. There are only a few bombers left, lacking the cover of fighters, they can't make a difference.The task of our combat troops is to buy time and wait for reinforcements. The method is to keep the enemy troops in the north as much as possible in continuous positions, and not to fight too much, so as not to affect the future of the defense of Singapore's main island.

Towards the end of December, an attempt was made to form a small amphibious force to engage the enemy's rear along the west coast.On the 27th of December we made an attack which was quite successful, but the almost complete command of the air by the enemy was able to quickly keep our weak navy out of Ruitienham.On January 1, a small fleet of six fast landing craft, which had just arrived from the United States, was destroyed.Since then, the only feasible way is to avoid the Japanese assault on the sea. During the four days of ferocious invasion, Campbell's position was defended by the 11th Indian Division, but then, on January 2, Japanese troops were reported to have landed near the mouth of the Perak River, thus cutting off the division's rear danger.General Heath, anticipating a sea attack a few miles to the rear near Kuala Selangor, ordered a squad of Royal Marines to launch a land and sea counterattack from Swettianham, but got nowhere.On the second night, that is, the night between the 3rd and 4th of January, it seems that an army landed near Kuala Selangor, but the strength of the army is unknown.

Information about the enemy's movements was scant and confused, and in any case there were not enough troops to stop it.Our army withdrew, formed another line on the Slim, and sent a brigade to the southwest to guard against a possible attack from the rear. Awaiting the next inevitable invasion were only a few exhausted troops; most of them had continued to fight incessantly for the past three weeks and were therefore vulnerable to the onslaught that fell upon them on January 7th.The Japanese sent out tanks to attack straight along the road under the moonlight and broke through the defense line.Both brigades were in a state of confusion, suffered heavy losses, and were able to break out with difficulty.This serious defeat disrupted our plans to delay the enemy while awaiting reinforcements.And the Ninth Division on the east coast was also seriously affected.A brigade of the division in Kuantan had withdrawn after inflicting 2,000 Japanese casualties, and the whole division was concentrated near Raub.Further retreat on the west coast would expose its flank.

At this time, General Wavell had arrived in Singapore and visited the front on his way to the American, British, Dutch, and Australian commands.He ordered a massive retreat, completely free of the Japanese, to give our tired soldiers a respite behind whatever fresh or relatively new troops could muster.The site chosen was about 150 miles to the rear along the Muar River, on the right near Segamat.Major General Gordon Bennett of the Australian Division was in command, including a brigade of his own (the 27th Brigade), the 9th British Indian Division retreating from the east coast, and the newly arrived 45th Indian Infantry trip.The 11th British Indian Division, which has always been the first to bear the brunt, is going to be transferred to the rear to rest.The retreat began on January 10.After some fierce rearguard battles, the enemy was shaken off, and four days later a new line of defense was formed.At the same time, the sea base at Shwe Tien Ham Port has been abandoned, and the remaining light ships of our army have retreated to Ben Kalam Port.On January 16, a small group of Japanese troops landed from the sea here.Only two warships were able to intercept it, and these two warships failed to find the enemy.

The most important transport convoy, carrying the main brigade of the 18th Division (53rd Brigade) and a group of fifty Tornado fighters, is now unloading in Singapore.They were safely escorted by naval and air forces.They experienced the risks of the sea route, and were within range of enemy air superiority and were vulnerable to attack. But these reinforcements were not as important as their numbers would suggest.The 45th Indian Brigade was a recruit with only partial training, not yet trained for jungle warfare.The British Eighteenth Division, after a three-month voyage, took some time to regain combat strength, but as soon as they landed they were engaged in a losing battle.

Everyone has great hopes for the Whirlwind fighter.Finally, there are aircraft of high quality that can compete with the Japanese army.They assembled with the greatest speed and flew into the sky.In the first few days they indeed caused considerable losses to the enemy, but everything was unfamiliar to the new pilots. Within a few days, the Japanese aircraft had an advantage in numbers, and our losses became increasingly heavy.These whirlwind planes were quickly reduced. The Battle of Segamat|Muar was fought fiercely for a week.General Gordon Bennett deployed the bulk of his force to block the approach to Segamat, with the 45th Indian Brigade and an Australian battalion, joined later by another battalion, to defend the Muar River downstream.Their ambush in front of Segamat was very successful, and the Japanese army paid hundreds of lives. Although the fighting was fierce, the enemy was intercepted.However, in Muar, the four garrison battalions were attacked by the entire Japanese Imperial Guard on January 15. There were both frontal attacks and side attacks from the sea one after another.For several days, they took the road south, but were still surrounded by the enemy.As a result, they were forced to abandon their means of transport and rush out in small groups.Of the 4,000 men in this army, only 800 returned. The brigade commander Duncan, the battalion commanders, and the deputy commanders of the 45th Brigade died together.This small team stubbornly resisted the overwhelmingly outnumbered enemy forces that controlled the sky, so that the defenders of Segamat were not threatened on the side and rear, and could retreat in time.In order to protect this retreat, two British battalions of the 53rd Brigade were transferred to join the battle, and part of the 11th British-Indian Division, which was being reorganized behind the front line, was deployed to deal with the enemy's forces at Benkalam Port and the coast to the south. Threat of shore landing.

Our forces are now spread across the ninety-mile front across the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula from Mersing to Benkalam.The enemy army followed closely.There were fierce encounters at Mersing and Kluang, but again the decisive attack took place on the west coast; There two British battalions held five days at the port of Benkalam.By then all direct exits were blocked, the troops retreated twenty miles along the coast, and two thousand men were evacuated by the navy overnight. At the same time, the Japanese army received strong reinforcements.On January 15th, a large convoy transported the freshmen of the two divisions to Songkhla, and from there they went south to march towards Kluang, the center of our army's front.At this time, the enemy had five divisions in Malaya.On January 26, according to the report of our army's brave but weak aerial reconnaissance team, there were two cruisers, eleven destroyers, two transport ships, and many small ships in Xinglouyang.All the twenty-three planes that our army could gather to participate in the air battle were dispatched to attack them twice.The Japanese transport teams were under the protection of fighter jets, and our aircraft, especially the old wildebeest fighters, suffered heavy losses.But our attack was critical, the two transport ships were hit, and at least thirteen enemy planes were destroyed.This brave attack is the reflection of our air force combat unit.

The next night two destroyers sailing from Singapore attempted to sortie but were intercepted and one of them was sunk.The Japanese troops that had landed quickly moved south along the coast from Hing Lau to attack the 22nd Australian Brigade stationed in Mersing.Thus, on January 27, there were intensive battles on the right side of our front in Mersing, in the center of the front in Kluang, and on our exposed left flank.General Percival decided to retreat to the island of Singapore.Every person, every car, at the end of the day, had to cross the Causeway to get there.At the beginning a brigade was mostly lost, but by the morning of January 21 the rest of the army had passed and blew up the causeway behind it.

At least it can be debated whether it would have been more beneficial to concentrate all our forces to defend the entire island of Singapore and only use brisk mobile forces to contain the Japanese troops from going south to the Malay Peninsula.The local commander's decision, approved by me, was to fight in Johor to defend Singapore, but to delay the enemy's advance on Singapore as long as possible.The defensive battle of the Malay Peninsula was nothing more than one retreat after another, with fierce rearguard battles and tenacious support.The battle gave great honor to the troops and commanders who fought.But when the reinforcements arrived, almost all of them were attracted by the enemy group by group.The enemy has all kinds of conveniences.They had conducted detailed studies of the terrain and conditions before the war.They had already drawn up a careful and large-scale plan to infiltrate secret agents and hide bicycle vehicles for use by the Japanese army bicycle team.Superior forces and large reserves have already been assembled there; some reserves are not yet necessary.All divisions of the Japanese army are experts in jungle warfare. As mentioned above, the Japanese army's air supremacy was caused by the urgent needs of our army to take care of other areas. The local commander was completely not responsible for this, but it was a fatal injury.As a result, the main fighting force of such an army as we sent to defend Singapore, and almost all the reinforcements sent after the Japanese declaration of war, were spent fighting heroically on the peninsula.By the time they crossed the causeway to the most important battlefield they had planned, their energy was gone.Here they joined the local garrison and many detachments of the base; these added to our numbers, though not our strength.There were also two new brigades of the British 18th Division, newly landed from ships after a long voyage in unfamiliar and unimagined surroundings.The army which had to fight the decisive battle for Singapore, and which had been prepared to accomplish this lofty purpose in this field, was worn out before the Japanese attack began.Although it can be said that there are still 100,000 people, it is no longer an army. The reader may find in the appendix a memorandum written by General Bonnard in 1949; this amply illustrates the approach taken with regard to the Singapore fort in the pre-war years.It involved decisions made in August 1940 and later when the Japanese occupied Indochina.These decisions provided for a substantial increase in garrison numbers, especially air reinforcements.The resources to supply these needs, as I have said above, are spent elsewhere, and large-scale supplies can only be implemented after Japan declares war and the United States enters the war.By then it was too late.The local commanders demanded more than even the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces had imagined.It is impossible to satisfy the needs of either party.General Bonnard's memorandum does justice to it.In these few pages I can only talk about what happened at that time. The tragedy in Singapore was followed by the most serious debate in the country, and a tense exchange of telegrams between me, General Wavell, and Mr Curtin. Prime Minister (in Washington) to General Wavell January 9, 1942 As you have learned from previous telegrams, I have been anxiously awaiting the preservation of as many British forces as possible in the Malay Peninsula for the defense of the fortress of Singapore and its hinterland of Johor.I am therefore very much in favor of the manner in which rear-guard warfare is now being waged, inflicting great losses on the enemy, holding them back, and destroying everything that can be of use to them.However, I do not understand why our position has been shifted one after another by the enemy's shipping activities.The enemy troops were transported down the west coast of the peninsula in unarmed steamers, wooden boats or fishing boats, and came up from the various river ports, forcing us to retreat.It only takes one or two submarines to sink these unarmed troop transports with four-inch guns or torpedoes, and that will do the trick, blocking up these exploitable estuaries.When the enemy planes came, the submarine could always dive to the bottom of the water; in this way, it could protect the western flank of our army on the peninsula, so that every inch of land could be given up at the highest price possible, without putting its own army in danger.I would be very glad if you could tell me how the situation is and what else can be done about it so that I can explain it to the President with whom I regularly discuss all aspects of the war. General Wavell responded to my critical questions concerning Japanese land and sea operations on the west coast of Malaya as follows: General Wavell to Prime Minister January 10, 1942 I have seen the telegram to the Chiefs of Staff reporting the general situation in Malaya.As soon as the threat to the west wing arose, I considered naval operations against it.Initially, patrol boats were tried out, but they were hit by air raids during the day.In the last three nights, the destroyer Reconnaissance was dispatched from the base in Sumatra.Only three Dutch submarines are now operating in Malaya; arrangements have been made to operate on the west coast between Penang and Selangor as soon as any submarines are brought back from other military operations from January 12. I was not satisfied with this telegram, nor with the more detailed explanations I received later. Prime Minister to First Sea Lord January 22, 1942 This is really not good.On the west coast of Malaya we were absolutely overwhelmed and apparently defeated by an enemy force with no ships around.Our units have thus been forced to withdraw from one position after another, precious time has been won by the enemy, and general uneasiness has arisen among our fighting forces.The disadvantages are obvious.Why should the enemy be allowed to acquire all these ships? We evidently have few ships, or only two or three, though these seas were until recently under our control.Secondly, mentioning that the heavy machine-gun fire came from the shore, how could the enemy have captured these shores?These barges must have come down the coast, they couldn't possibly have machine guns at every point controlling every part of the coast. You must collect more accurate information.Was it not one of the most horrific British defeats in the history of naval warfare that the Japanese, without a single battleship, managed to control the west coast of Malaya?Sorry for my bad temper, but I would like a further report with a more thorough investigation. Admiral Pound gave a detailed reply. First Sea Lord to Prime Minister January 24, 1942 1. Your instruction of January 22 is purely from the naval point of view of military operations on the west coast of Malaya, but we have learned from bitter experience that in offshore waters where the enemy has air superiority, small boats No matter where you can move, this is not only a naval problem, but also an air force problem. 2. If this infiltration along the coast had occurred in 1941, I think it can be said that the Navy has not fulfilled its responsibility.In 1942, the situation was completely different. 3. Based on what we know now, it looks like this is what happened: (1) According to a telegram from the Governor to the Secretary of the Colonial Affairs, arrangements had been made before the war to move all boats up the river, so that even small boats would be out of reach of the enemy; This has clearly been done.This operation on our side was partially defeated, because the enemy penetrated through the jungle path and reached the place upstream where our boats were hidden.But we know that most of all motor boats and other craft are destroyed. (2) The failure seems to have begun in Penang, where the measures to implement the scorched-earth policy seem to have all failed.In this way, the enemy acquired a considerable number of small boats, and began to move south along the coast.In that area we are defenseless.Because of the superiority of the enemy's air force, we can't keep anything. (3) In order to counter the enemy's attack from Penang Island, which is 340 miles away from Singapore, we have a few small boats in Singapore equipped with light artillery, which were improvised when the war broke out.Due to the enemy's command of the air, it was practically impossible for these small boats to move during daylight hours, and those who attempted to move were sunk. (4) The enemy has landed motorcycle landing craft from Songkhla and is using them. 4. The present situation is that the Rear Admiral of Malaya is exhausting his strength to replenish the patrol boats; General Wavell has been asked if the Dutch army can help, and the Indian government has been asked if the Royal Indian Navy can help.The Air Force also cooperates in its limited capacity. It must be admitted that our warships capable of participating in the war could barely defend the reinforcement convoy and keep the sea route to Singapore unimpeded.As for coastal fortifications, there was nothing but a few poorly armed boats and a few refitted merchant ships with inferior weapons.Our weak ships have persevered in the face of an extremely powerful air force.They have courage, they just don't have the means to succeed. Before long it became clear that General Wavell had doubts about our long-term ability to defend Singapore.The reader will understand how much I expected the island and the fortress to hold up, as the heavy artillery had to be landed, carried, and mounted in proper places before they could lay siege to the fortress.I had hoped for at least two months of resistance before I left Washington.I watched with apprehension the attrition of our troops as they retreated from the Malay Peninsula, but did not intervene effectively. On the other hand, it has won precious time. General Wavell to the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services January 14, 1942 Yesterday, January 13th, I flew to Singapore, took a car to Segamat, and met with Heath and Gordon Bennett.The plan is being carried out, but due to the fighting north of Kuala Lumpur, the 9th and 11th Divisions have been hit again in numbers and morale, and the enemy's advance is faster than I imagined.The battle to defend Singapore will be a tough one, and we need good luck in order to hope that the transport fleet will arrive safely as scheduled.Heavy rains all day yesterday had shielded the final approach of important convoys and might have delayed the enemy's progress.Gordon Bennett and the Australians are in high spirits and I'm sure they'll hit the enemy hard. In order to understand the near-land defense and its preparations against encirclement, which I have always regarded as unquestionable, I sent the following telegram: Prime Minister (in Washington) to General Wavell January 15, 1942 1. If you are forced to retreat to the island, what will happen, please tell me your opinion. 2. How many troops are needed to defend this area?Is there any way to prevent landings like in Hong Kong?What defensive works and obstacles are there near the land?Are you sure you can suppress any attempt to deploy a siege battery with the fort artillery?Is everything ready?What arrangements have been made for the useless population?I have always thought that what was most urgently needed was to hold on to the last minute in the defense of the island, but I hoped it would not be so. 3. Everyone here is pleased with your telegram, which makes everyone feel how vigorously you are grasping your difficult task.All Americans have the same confidence in you as your English friends. I didn't get a reply from Wavell until after I got back to London. General Wavell to Prime Minister January 16, 1942 During my recent stay in Singapore, I discussed the island's defense and asked for detailed plans.Until recently, all plans were based on repelling the invasion of the island by sea and containing the invasion by land in Johor or the area north; In order to prevent the enemy from crossing the Johor Strait, no measures have been taken.The heaviest fortress guns were capable of swiveling in all directions, but the flat trajectory of the guns made them unsuitable for artillery warfare, and could not really warrant their use against a besieging battery.The supply situation is still satisfactory.The relocation of certain Air Force installations and stores to Sumatra and Java has been authorized to avoid overcrowding.Once the detailed plan is received, I will call again.Much depends on the Air Force situation. I read this telegram on the morning of the nineteenth with astonishment and pain.It turns out that the land side of the naval base and the city has not been protected by permanent fortifications.And, what is even more shocking, since the beginning of the war, and especially since the Japanese had established themselves in Indochina, no commander had taken anything worth mentioning to build up field defenses.As for the emptiness of the field defense, they did not even mention it. From all that I have seen of war, I believe, with modern firepower, that a strong field defense can be accomplished in a few weeks, and that mines and other obstacles can be used to limit and cut off the enemy's line of attack.And it never occurred to me that there would not be a permanent ring of separate batteries to guard the rear of this famous fortress.I can't understand how I didn't know about this.But neither local officials, nor domestic professional advisers, ever recognized this desperately necessary measure.In any case no one, not even anyone who had seen my telegram, pointed it out to me; my telegram was based on the false assumption that a regular siege was necessary.I read in books about the Battle of Plevin in 1877, before the age of machine guns, the Turks built temporary fortifications in Pleven in the midst of Russian attacks; Visited Verdun in 1917, where, a year earlier, a field army had made such a splendid battle in and between separate forts.I believe that the enemy, in order to smash the strong points of Singapore, will be compelled to employ artillery on a large scale, and that this will hinder the concentration of artillery and the concentration of armaments along the lines of communication in Malaya. stand up.And now all this suddenly vanished, and I saw before me a terrible sight: the island was almost naked, and the army, exhausted, if not exhausted, had retreated to the island. I write these situations not to excuse myself.This is something I should have known.My advisors should have known too; someone should have told me, I should have asked them.I asked thousands of questions, but I didn't ask this matter, because in my mind, it was impossible for Singapore to be without land defenses, just as it is impossible for a battleship to be launched without a bottom.I am aware of the various reasons that have been put forward to explain this blunder: one is that the army is busy training and building fortifications in northern Malaya; The role is to protect the naval base on the north coast of the island, so their task is to fight in front of the north shore, not along the coast.I don't think these reasons are necessarily valid.Fortifications should have been built long ago. My immediate reaction at the time was to hurry up and make up for it.I immediately dictated the following memo: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee January 19, 1942 1. I must admit that General Wavell's telegram of the 16th and other telegrams on the same subject have greatly surprised me.It never occurred to me that Singapore's fortress, with a ravine half a mile to a mile wide, was not fully fortified against attack from the north; I spoke of this matter with Sir John Deere when I sailed, and he too Never thought of it.What is the use of an island as a fortress if not as a castle?Building an independent fortification line, combining searchlights and cross-shooting with the wire netting and obstacles everywhere in the low-lying area, and preparing a considerable amount of ammunition at the same time, so that the cannons of the fortress can control the enemy's forts in Johor. Minimal equipment; it is unbelievable that a fortress has not had such equipment if it has been built for twenty years.If this is the case, wouldn't it be more appropriate to build the necessary field fortifications during the two and a half years of this war?How is it that none of you have pointed this out to me at any time during these discussions?This is long overdue, since in various memorandums issued during the last two years I have stated time and again that I rely on such defenses as Singapore Island against a formal siege, never on the Kra Strait plan.In England at this moment we have found it necessary to protect the rear of all batteries against attacks from landing in the rear; the Pottsdown Hill Battery at Portsmouth has long pointed out these long-established principles. 2. Several sea-facing forts and a naval base are not considered a fortress, but a fortress is a strong position with four weeks, complete ‧ complete ‧ fortification.Mere sea-facing batteries without fortified batteries or fixed fortifications to protect the rear cannot be excused for any reason.By this omission the whole fate of the fortress was in the hands of ten thousand soldiers who forced their way across the strait in small boats.I warn you, this will be one of the biggest scandals that will ever come out. 3. When the battle of Jizi Johor is in progress, a plan should be made immediately and the work should be done as best as possible. The plan should include: (1) Try to use fortress artillery on the northern front by using weak explosives or, if weak explosives are not available, charged with a certain amount of high explosives. (2) Plant landmines and build roadblocks at landing sites where considerable troops can be assembled. (3) Set up barbed wire and set up traps in swamps and other places overgrown with castanopsis. (4) Build field fortifications and solid strongholds, capable of cross-firing field artillery and machine guns. (5) As soon as small boats are found in the Straits of Johor or anywhere else within range of fire, they are recruited and brought under our control. (6) Field guns at each end of the strait, carefully concealed, and searchlights installed, to destroy any enemy ships attempting to enter the strait. (7) Establish a core of three or four mobile counter-offensive reserve columns upon which the army can be built when driven out of Johor. (8) All male residents shall be employed in the construction of fortifications.Take the most severe coercive method to make the best use of hoes and shovels. (9) Not only must Singapore use all means to maintain its defense work, but the whole island must also fight to the end until every army and every stronghold is destroyed separately. (10) Finally, the city of Singapore must be transformed into a castle and defended to the end.Surrender cannot be considered. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces therefore issued the following instructions: Chief of Staff of the Armed Services to General Wavell January 20, 1942 The possibility that the Battle of Johor may be against you should be considered and all preparations should be made for the greatest possible defense of the island.A few key points are as follows: 1. Adequate preparations shall be made to enable the fort artillery to be used against an invasion on land, and effective firing maneuvers shall be organized.When examining the possibility of stockpiling, Chi informed the most urgent quantity of high-explosives required. 2. The approach from the strait to the land, the landing site on the island and its exit, shall be blocked by barbed wire, mines, traps or other possible means. 3. Part of the artillery and machine guns used to defend the beach will be transferred from the south to the north and west of the island. 4. All ships or boats within or outside the strait within range of fire of the island are to be concentrated under our control or destroyed. 5. The defense must be based on a territorial system, so that all ground defenses are well positioned to control the most dangerous avenues of attack.In view of the difficulty of deploying beach defenses in swampy areas, a good system of mobile reserves should be established, ready for a swift counter-offensive.It is also necessary to develop a traffic trench network in the hinterland to prevent the expansion of the position after the successful landing.For this, and generally for various fortifications, all possible civilian and military labor must be used. 6. All possible measures are to be taken against attempts to land at night by surprise.At this point, given the strategy and mobility of the Japanese forces, reconnaissance was to be done where no landing seemed likely to take place. 7. Appropriate measures should be taken to protect the Johor and Singapore airfields and other possible landing places from intrusion by Japanese airlift units which are reported to be preparing in Indochina.RAF personnel must be fully utilized. 8. To take effective measures to evacuate and control civilians, and suppress the activities of the fifth column. 9. Personnel participating in fixed security work must be armed and assigned tasks in the local defense plan. Shiquan Island needs to thoroughly improve signal communication, and also needs to get in touch with Sumatra Airport, which can be used as a base for close support aircraft. 11. (We) believe that many of the above points are already in progress, and hope to inform you as soon as possible.The remaining points should be acted upon without delay; and all possible steps should be taken to prepare for a lasting defense. At the same time, I also telegraphed to General Wavell: January 20, 1942 Now that you are the Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific of the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and Australia, of course I cannot issue instructions to you directly.All your operational orders, as few as possible, I hope, will be transmitted from the President in Washington through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Even so, when I have suggestions or questions, I advocate continuing our correspondence.This is especially true when it comes to the local defense of a fortress like Singapore.It must be in this spirit that you read the cable sent to you by the Chiefs of Staff today concerning the land defense of Singapore Island.I am greatly disturbed by your many telegrams, and I want to state this very clearly: I hope that every inch of ground will be defended, and that every material or every defensive facility will be blown to pieces, so as not to be captured by the enemy, unless it is in the city of Singapore. After a protracted battle in the ruins, there must be no question of surrender. I also sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces: Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee January 20, 1942 The matter (Burma reinforcements) is indeed in the hands of the Supreme Commander, but the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces should express their opinion.Obviously nothing should distract us from the Singapore campaign, but if Singapore falls a quick transfer of troops to Burma is possible.As a strategic goal, I think keeping the Burma Road open is more important than keeping Singapore. Chief of Staff of the Armed Services to General Percival (in Singapore) January 21, 1942 1. The wartime cabinet discussed the recent situation in Malaya. 2. The cabinet was very disturbed by the report that the Japanese army continued to land after our front in the west bank of Malaya.It had been hoped that local naval forces would be improvised and effective against an invasion of presumably unarmed enemy ships.Please provide details of the actions that have been taken and what you would like to see done on this matter. 3. Another issue discussed was the issue of water supply in Singapore Island.回想到香港不得不因缺水而投降，你能保證新加坡即使同馬來半島斷絕，也可以維持下去嗎？ 四‧一個月以前，總督奉令盡量將無用的人口從新加坡疏散。請電告已經疏散的人數和將來的計劃。 二十一日早晨當我醒來的時候，我的公文匣子上面放著韋維爾將軍的下列電報，報告守衛新加坡的前景悲觀之極。 General Wavell to Prime Minister January 19, 1942 我派到新加坡去研究該島防衛計劃的官員現已回來。防衛該島北部的計劃正在準備擬訂中。守住該島所需要的部隊人數，大致同防衛柔佛所需要的人數一樣多，或者還要多一些。【１】我已命令珀西瓦爾在柔佛戰鬥到底，但要訂出計劃，萬一柔佛戰役失敗，就要盡可能地延長島上的抵抗。可是我必須報告你，柔佛一旦失陷，該島還能守多久，我是懷疑的。要塞大炮的設置是用來打船隻的，彈藥大部分也僅供此用；有許多大炮只能向海面射擊。【２】守備隊一部分已調到柔佛，留下來的許多部隊不知道能起什麼作用。我給你看黯淡的前景，很是抱歉，但我不願你對島上要塞存著錯誤的印象。新加坡防禦工事的建築，是完全用於向海面攻擊的。我仍然盼望柔佛可以守到下一次護航隊來到的時候。 【１】是我用的斜體。作者（這裡改為下加黑點。譯者） 【２】這點並不準確，大多數的大炮也可以向陸地射擊。 後來又接到了下面的電報： 波納爾將軍致首相 一九四二年一月二十日 由於情勢擬趨惡化，韋維爾已匆匆飛往新加坡。 麻坡一線，情勢混亂，但四十五旅和第二澳大利亞營正在撤離巴克里地區，期與五十三步兵旅會合，步兵旅要奪取本加欖港以北八哩的巴榮山。右翼現撤到昔加末河背後，今晚撤回拉比斯。 韋維爾回來時將有電告。 韋維爾將軍致三軍參謀長 一九四二年一月二十日 一‧今天飛到新加坡，會見珀西瓦爾、希思和西蒙斯。 馬來亞形勢十分惡化。第四十五印度步兵旅全旅和兩個澳大利亞營被隔斷在麻坡以東的巴克里，顯然未能撤退。五十三旅在巴克里以東二十哩的巴榮，也正受到嚴重打擊。 二‧按照南部情況，昔加末｜拉比斯地區的軍隊有撤退必要，可能有向柔佛、巴魯總撤退又最後撤回島上的必要。 三‧保衛本島的準備工作正在用僅有的資源積極進行。保衛能否成功，取決於柔佛撤回的軍隊的人數和情況，增援的到達以及空軍在島上維持戰鬥機的能力。如果諸事順利，保衛時期可望延長。 四‧新加坡今晨被轟炸兩次，每次有敵機約五十架。軍事損失目前未詳。 韋維爾將軍也答覆了我二十日的電報，但是在晚上才到我手裡。 General Wavell to Prime Minister 一九四二年一月二十一日 一‧你願繼續讓我知道你的意見，高興得很。 二‧我渴望你對於新加坡的防禦不要有錯誤的印象。直到近來，我自己才認識到，防禦的規劃完全是僅僅針對海面攻擊的。三軍參謀長來電所舉各點，已全部經過研究，已盡可能加以執行。 三‧我希望將印度旅以及十八師的剩餘部隊調到新加坡，減除傷亡數以後，保衛本島應該有相當於三師左右的軍力，如果我們被迫而出此策的話。後來的援軍大概要用於防守爪哇和蘇門答臘，這兩地力量薄弱。為此，我們正和荷蘭方面編製計劃。 我對於韋維爾十九日的電報沉思了好久。我一向只是想到激勵他們，並盡可能地強迫他們死守該島、要塞和市區；除非政策有了決定性的改變，無論如何，這個態度是應當堅持下去的。但是現在我開始更多地考慮到緬甸，考慮到開赴新加坡的援軍。這些援軍可能遭劫，也可能挽回。扭轉他們的航向北向仰光，還有充足的時間。因此我起草了如下的給三軍參謀長的備忘錄，並及時送到伊斯梅將軍手中，以供他們在二十一日十一時三十分開會之用。但我要坦白承認，我並沒有下決心。我依靠我的朋友們和顧問們。這時候我們大家都十分難受。 Prime Minister to General Ismay, Transfer to the Chiefs of Staff Committee 一九四二年一月二十一日 一‧鑒於韋維爾將軍這封帶來極壞消息的電報，我們在今晚的國防委員會開會時，必須對整個局勢重新加以考慮。 我們正好犯了我在啟程的船上拍發留神一電時所擔心的錯誤。本來可以在柔佛、或無論如何可以沿新加坡海岸形成一條扎扎實實的防線的部隊，已被各個擊破了。在接陸方面沒有建立起防禦線。海軍對於敵軍在半島西海岸的包抄沒有採取防禦行動。韋維爾將軍已經表示意見，認為保衛新加坡島要比在柔佛打勝仗需要更多的軍隊，而柔佛的戰役幾乎可以肯定是失敗了。 他的電報對於持久的防禦不抱什麼希望。明顯得很，這種防禦只是要使目前正在途中的全部援軍來作犧牲。如果韋維爾將軍仍然懷疑能否拖到幾個星期以上，那麼，隨之而起的問題是：我們要不要立刻炸毀各碼頭、炮台和工廠，集中一切力量去保衛緬甸，並使滇緬公路暢通無阻呢？ 二‧據我看這個問題現在就應當加以正視，並率直地向韋維爾將軍提出來。如果海軍和陸軍的全部破壞工作做得徹底，新加坡（對於敵人）還有什麼超過西南太平洋上許多港口的價值？在另一方面，緬甸如果喪失，那就慘了。這樣會使我們同中國人隔絕，在同日本人交戰的軍隊當中，中國軍隊算是最成功的。我們很可能由於辦事糊塗，對作出無可奈何的決定有所顧慮，就會使新加坡與滇緬公路二者都丟失。這一決定，顯然要看新加坡島能守多久而定。如果只能守幾個星期，那麼犧牲我們的全部援軍和飛機，當然是不值得的了。 三‧而且，誰也不能不考慮到，新加坡一旦淪陷，科里幾多爾必將相繼淪陷，這將使印度大大震驚；只有強大的部隊的來到和緬甸方面戰事的成功才能把印度支持下來。 請將以上一切在今晨加以考慮。 三軍參謀長沒有作出明確的結論，我們在當晚開國防委員會時，要我們採取這樣重大的步驟，也是同樣躊躇不決的。 韋維爾將軍作為盟軍最高統帥，要負起直接的、初步的責任。 我自己感到問題十分棘手，不能堅持我的新看法，如果當時我已下了決定，也就會堅持下去了。我們中間誰也沒有預見到防禦戰竟會在三個星期多一點的時間之內崩潰，否則至少能花一兩天工夫來作進一步考慮的。 澳大利亞代表厄爾‧佩奇爵士，當然是不出席參謀長委員會的，我也沒有請他參加國防委員會。不知怎樣，他看到了我給三軍參謀長的一份備忘錄，他立刻打電報給他的政府。 一月十四日我們接到柯廷先生的電報，電報中有一番嚴厲的責備。 柯廷先生致首相 January 23, 1942 由於今天戰時內閣召開緊急會議，討論關於馬來亞形勢的報告，我發出下列的電報： 據佩奇報告，國防委員會已經考慮撤出馬來亞和新加坡的問題。由於我們得到過一切保證，撤出新加坡將被各處認為不可饒恕的背叛。在帝國和地方的防務體系中，新加坡是一個中心要塞。正如我的電報所指出的，我們都明白，該地建設得牢不可破，無論如何，它能作長期的堅持，直到主力艦隊來到的時候。 甚至在緊急的時候，援軍應當轉移到荷屬東印度，而不是到緬甸去。其他任何別種作法將引起極大反感，而且可能促使荷蘭進行單獨媾和。 根據援軍源源而來的保證，我們已經切實執行了協定中我方擔負的責任。我們盼望你不要因撤退而破壞整個的目的。 馬來亞的形勢和對拉包爾的進犯，引起了公眾惴惴不安，以為盟軍軟弱無能，不能制止日軍的前進。我政府既認識到自己應負責使公眾作好準備，以便有抵抗侵略者的可能，對於為什麼還不能阻止敵人到達我們的海岸，也有加以解釋的責任和義務。因此，徹底探討形勢中的一切可能性，亦屬責無旁貸，何況澳大利亞人民以眾多的人數，志願參軍，服役海外，但當他們的抵抗力、帝國的威信以及盟國事業的鞏固可能已受到無法彌補損失的時候，他們卻不得不為局勢的改進等待很久。這一點是很難理解的。 柯遷先生的電報，又嚴厲，又不尋常。不可饒恕的背叛這一說法，同真理或軍事事實並不相符。大禍即將臨頭。 我們能夠躲避嗎？得失怎樣相抵呢？在這時候，這些重要軍隊的目的地還在我們的控制之下。用現實的眼光來審查這些問題，就無所謂背叛。況且，澳大利亞戰事委員會並不能衡量全局。要不然，他們就不會要求完全忽視緬甸，事實證明緬甸是我們唯一有辦法拯救的地方。 說柯廷先生的電報起了決定性作用，這是不正確的。如果我們在方針上早已得出一致意見的話，我們當然要如我所建議的那樣，率直地把事情向韋維爾將軍提出來。可是我在會上感覺到，反對放棄遠東這個有名的重要據點的意見是很堅決的。正當美國人在科里幾多爾方面頑強作戰的時候，英國要是來個臨難而退，這在全世界、特別在美國所產生的影響，是不堪設想的。至於一個純粹軍事性的決定應該是怎樣，那是無可懷疑的。 但是經過大家的同意或默許，盡了一切的努力來增援新加坡，支持它的防務。第十八師繼續前行，其一部分早已登陸了。