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Chapter 122 Volume 4, Chapter 12, India: The Cripps Mission

Memoirs of the Second World War 邱吉爾 11577Words 2023-02-05
The sincerity of Britain to India To defend the Indian people, the British debt is high. The Indian Army is loyal and brave. 2.5 million Indian volunteers. The influence of Japan's westward march. Dominion of India My own thoughts on Constituent Assembly A committee of ministers on India interested in America I send President Roosevelt a report all from India Views of the Governor of Punjab President Roosevelt's personal view Draft British Declaration Stafford Kerry Puth's Inquiry Mission Congress Rejects Our Advice My Letter to Sir Stafford April 11 Frustration Frustrating the President A Coalition Cabinet Reply to the President April 12 Sir Stafford return home.

In this world war, nowhere in the world have so many people been effectively protected from the disasters of war as in India.They passed the war years under the burden of our little island.British officials in India put India's interests above their own whenever they disagreed.They have always believed that this is a matter of British reputation.When the war was expected to end in Europe, we made an agreement with India.The agreement stipulates that all supplies and money required for the defense of India shall be charged to our account.Contracts in India were signed at an astonishingly high exchange rate, and our debts were converted from devalued rupees at the pre-war exchange rate into so-called sterling balances.Consequently, the so-called sterling balance, in other words, Britain's debts to India, piled up.In order to save India from the sufferings of aggression like many other countries, we have neither scrutinized nor calculated that the daily defense costs of India amounted to about one million pounds.In this war we suffered all the hardships, but the Indians were spared, and at the end of the war we owed them as much as we owed the United States after the First World War.I therefore declare that these matters are subject to correction, and that we reserve the right to counter-claim our alleged debts incurred in covering India's defense costs.

I also informed the Governor of this opinion. The above is just background.Against this background, the glorious heroism and combat prowess of the Indian Army played a major role in the battles in the Middle East, in the defense of Egypt, the liberation of Abyssinia and in Italy.They fought side by side with the British and drove the Japanese out of Burma with particularly brilliant results.The devotion of the Indian Army to His Majesty the King, the fidelity of the Indian Maharajas to the treaties they made with us, and the incomparable valor of the Hindu and Muslim officers and soldiers will be remembered forever.The British government in India spared no effort to build a large Indian army. However, the two major political parties in India, the Congress Party and the Muslim League, either actively opposed it or stood by.Nevertheless, some 2.5 million Indians volunteered; by 1942 a million-strong Indian Army had been formed, and 50,000 volunteered every month There are so many people.Although this huge Indian Army plan was wrong as far as the world war was concerned at the time, the response of the Indian people to it, as well as the performance of the Indian soldiers, left a glorious last page in the history of our Indian Empire .

As Japan pushed westward in Asia, the situation in India deteriorated to alarming proportions.The news of Pearl Harbor has thrown us into a panic.The loss of Hong Kong has reduced our prestige.The security of the Indian subcontinent is now directly threatened.The Japanese navy appeared to have free and unfettered access to the Bay of Bengal.For the first time, India under British rule was threatened with a massive invasion by an Asian power.Thus, latent tensions in Indian politics began to surface.But a handful of extremists led by Subhas Bose were directly involved in overthrowing the government and expected Axis victory.However, the group of strong and clear-minded people who enthusiastically supported Gandhi believed that India should remain passive and neutral in this world war.These pessimistic tones spread as the Japanese army advanced.It has been suggested that if India had shed its ties to Britain, Japan might have no incentive to invade.India's danger may be due only to its relationship with Great Britain.If this relationship can be broken cleanly, India will have a status like Ireland.Thus, these not unconvincing arguments spread.

The attitude of the Congress party got worse because of the Japanese threat.This situation became very clear when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife visited India in February 1942.The purpose of their visit was to arouse anti-Japanese sentiment among Indians and to emphasize the importance of defeating Japan to all of Asia, especially China and India.Indian party leaders took advantage of this opportunity to put pressure on Britain through the Generalissimo, hoping that Britain would bow to the demands of the Congress Party. The war cabinet could not agree that a foreign head of state should intervene as an impartial arbitrator between the British royal representative and Mr. Gandhi and Nehru of India.Therefore, I write to the Generalissimo:

February 12, 1942 Those of us in the cabinet feel that your proposed visit to Mr. Gandhi in Varda may interfere with our desire to unite all India against Japan.This might have had the unintended effect of emphasizing tribal divisions at a time when unity was paramount.I therefore venture to hope, Your Excellency, that the question will not be forced against the will of the Governor-General and the Emperor. I look forward with hope to the growing cooperation between the British, Indian and other British Empire armies, and the heroic Chinese forces who have long borne the brunt of Japanese aggression.

The Grand Marshal at last complied with our wishes, and, thanks to the tactful assistance of the Governor, this untimely visit passed without adverse effect. Singapore surrendered on February 15.Indian politics and the press reflect unabated disputes between Hindus and Muslims.Hoping to create some kind of united front, some Congress leaders called for the recognition of India's sovereign status and for an all-India national government.These matters were carefully considered by the Cabinet, and there was, as a rule, a great deal of correspondence between the Indian Office and the Governor.

I have sent a private message to the Governor, stating my views on the Self-Government of India.I am naturally related to this matter.Almost all my colleagues felt that Dominion status must be granted to the people of India after the war with great pomp and ceremony. Prime Minister to Governor General of India February 16, 1942 It is my own opinion that Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Dalits, etc. from all walks of life in India should be required to provide their best leaders to the above institutions.But the best electoral ground-truth proposal anyone here can think of could end up putting the entire parliament in the hands of Congress policymakers.This is very different from my desire.

It is the method that I should follow no matter at that time or in the future that the first-rate leaders of various large public groups and races themselves should be introduced into the parliament, because it can avoid dealing only with politicians of the party. On February 25th I sent some ministers to study the day-to-day conditions in India and to advise the War Cabinet.Every minister present had knowledge acquired directly in India, and both Mr Attlee and Lord Simon Lord Chancellor, who presided over the meeting, had been members of the 1930 Simon Inquiry.Lord Stafford Cripps is well versed in Indian politics and has a deep friendship with Gandhi and Mr. Nehru.Lord John Anderson, President of the Privy Council, was Governor of Bengal for five years.Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for Defence, was a member of the Governor General's House Executive Committee for Economics.Mr Amory, the Indian affairs secretary, is the only Conservative member on the committee.The rest are Labor, Liberal or independent.I reserve the right to participate if necessary.The committee's views generally agree with mine, so I've never had to attend their meetings.The War Cabinet had complete confidence in the Commission and largely adopted its recommendations.We are in such a smooth situation to make difficult decisions.Nevertheless, I consulted with non-cabinet ministers outside the war cabinet.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges February 28, 1942 The war cabinet will discuss India at noon on Tuesday.Thereafter, because of the seriousness of the decision taken, it must be consulted with all non-Cabinet ministers and possibly with the participation of all ministers.Furthermore, as the rights of the empire were clearly affected, the King's assent had to be obtained as soon as possible.You should immediately notify the Indian Commission of this matter. I have a good impression of the draft, however, we must not risk a split.I had to understand the reaction of the majority, not just the current minority.

As the Japanese offensive in Asia expanded westward, the United States showed a direct and growing interest in Indian affairs.American concern for world war strategy brought them into contact with political problems in which, despite their strong claims, they had no experience.Before Pearl Harbor, India was seen as a sad model for the British Empire, but a uniquely British burden.Now that Japan was advancing on her frontiers, the American government began to express its opinion on the Indian question and to offer advice.In countries where there is only one race, there has always been magnanimity and nobility in regard to the question of colour.In the same way, a country which has no overseas colonies or dependencies has an extremely noble and detached sentiment towards the affairs of the country which owns them. In November 1941, when I visited Washington, the President discussed the Indian question with me for the first time, as is typical in the United States.I reacted so strongly that he never mentioned it verbally again.Later, at the end of February 1942, he ordered Al Harriman to sound me out as to the possibility of a reconciliation between the British Government and the Indian political leaders.I told Harriman I was going to call the President.The telegram was sent out on March 4. former navy personnel to president roosevelt March 4, 1942 We are seriously considering whether, at this critical juncture, we should declare the status of Dominions after the war, including, if so, the right to secede from the Commonwealth.We must not, under any circumstances, break with the Muslims, who represent 100 million people and are the main source of the Army on which we must rely in the present battle.At the same time we have to take into account our responsibilities to the 30 to 40 million untouchables, and our treaties with the princes and states, whose number is about 80 million.Of course we don't want to push India into the abyss of chaos on the eve of the invasion. The attitude of the United States towards Hindus is extremely familiar.I think they should be informed about the situation on the Muslim side.So, on the same day, I sent all the reports from India on the situation in India to the President.The gist can be seen from the excerpt below.The first one belonged to Mr. Jinnah, Chairman of the Muslim League. The Sapuru Conference [1], convened by a small number of people, has no followers at all, and it acts as a spy and patrol for the Congress Party.The meeting made some dubious, ingenious, and therefore gullible suggestions.If Britain fell into the trap set for her, Muslim India would be sacrificed, with the most unfortunate results to follow, especially in the war effort.Sapuru's proposal, in effect, transfers all power to a Hindu All-India Government, and in doing so essentially takes immediate decisions on far-reaching constitutional issues, contrary to the British Government's 1940 the pledges given to Muslims and other minorities in the declaration of 8 August 2009.The declaration guaranteed that no temporary or decisive changes to the constitution would be made without the consent of Muslims, and that Muslims would not be forced to submit to an unacceptable government.Sapuru's proposals would propose important changes based on India as a unitary state, thus undermining Muslim insistence on Pakistan.The mood of the Muslims was extremely jittery, and a tense situation developed.They asked the British Government to announce its acceptance of the Pakistani project if it wished to have free and equal Muslim partners in its contemplation of any major constitutional change. [1] Sir Tej Bahadur Sapuru proposed the formation of an Interim Government for the benefit of a body called the Independent Conference.Those speakers completely ignored the claims of the two ethnic groups, Hindus and Muslims, and were immediately rejected by the Muslim League. Pakistan meant separate territories and governments for the Muslims and the result was the partition of India, a colossal evolution now finally complete at the cost of nearly half a million lives and the displacement of tens of millions.Such a change would never have been possible in a time of war when the danger of invasion was imminent. The second report is from Sir Firoz Khan Noon.He is a Muslim member of the Governor's Executive Committee.He has repeatedly used convincing terms against the Hindu solution that Mr Jinnah urges.He concluded: I consider it my duty to remind His Majesty's Government of the great danger which India faces if they give in to the intimidation of anti-British elements in India, and thus violate their earlier assurances.The British Empire has repeatedly claimed that it has confidence in the people of all India, not just the Congress Party; I hope that Your Majesty's Government will uphold its duty to protect the interests of all the people of India, and will not be swayed by external pressure to dissent from the Commonwealth. The third report, from the Military Adviser to the Secretary of State for India, contained the following information on the Indian Army: The various classes recruited by the Indian Army cannot be geographically divided by provincial boundaries.A large number of Muslims come from Northwest Frontier Province and Punjab, but Rajputana, Central Province, United Provinces, Bihar, Madras and other places also have their own contributions.Apart from the Sikhs, most of the martial Indians (Dogras, Chats) came from Punjab.The Gurkhas, who come from abroad in Nepal, are a large independent group.The peculiar reaction of each class cannot be estimated without knowing the general popularity of the manifesto since its publication, but the general effect on the Army at present can be anticipated. Indian soldiers are all voluntary mercenaries (they can also be called volunteers).They fought for salaries and support, but also expected rewards, gratitude, pensions, and the possible grant of land, but above all some members had a martial tradition and pride in their profession, among them The leading cadre of British officers was personally loyal to the British officers and generally loyal to the Emperor.The sign of any fundamental change in the conditions or authority of their service, whether affecting their material interests or their convictions as soldiers of the British Empire, was bound to have immediate and disturbing effects. On March 7th I called President Roosevelt again: former navy personnel to president roosevelt March 7, 1942 In keeping with my promise to keep you abreast of our policy towards India, I now send you a telegram from the Governor of Punjab.This is certainly not the only opinion on the subject.However, this was all the more important at a time when the enemy was approaching and the Punjabis provided half of all the fighting forces in the defense of India.We still insist on finding some middle ground but inspiring ways.However, I must tread carefully so as not to cause confusion in British politics at this increasingly tense time. The governor wrote: Immediately declaring India's right to secede from the British Empire some day in the future. As far as the effect on Punjab is concerned, my opinion is as follows: The responsible Muslims, who belong to the majority, insist that until a constitution for Muslim India is drawn up, British We must continue to support the overall situation.They have already suspected the pro-Japanese tendencies of the Hindus, and the constitution formulated according to the predetermined guidelines will hand over power to the Hindus, which will inevitably make them feel uneasy.They will therefore be less interested in defending India as a whole and will look for allies elsewhere. The relationship between Muslims and Sikhs is already bad, and the above reasons will turn this discord into an unprecedented situation.Nations will wish to retain their youth to defend their own interests, and this will severely impact recruiting.Unrest will be impossible to avoid, and the currently reduced security force may not be enough. The President also sent me his personal views on India at this time. President Roosevelt's Message to Former Navy Personnel March 11, 1942 I care deeply about the Indian question.I appreciate that you keep me in constant contact with it.As you can see, I'm not confident in making any suggestions, because you smart people know a lot more about the subject than I do.I have tried to approach this question from a historical point of view, and I hope you will find some new ideas that I have suggested that can be applied in India.That's why I go back to the beginning of the US government.During the revolutions of 1775-1783, the British colonies consisted of thirteen states, all of which had separate sovereignties, but with different forms of government.During the continuation of the war there was great confusion among these separate sovereign states, and only two ties could bind them together: the Continental Congress (an institution of low effectiveness and unclear powers); Tri-State poorly maintained Continental Army.At the close of the war in 1783, it was evident that the thirteen sovereign states, with their new duties, could not yet be united into one, as the new system was being experimented with, and that any attempt at a final one would inevitably fail. a federation.Thirteen sovereign states were thus united under the Articles of Confederation, and this apparently provisional government continued to exercise power until experience, trial, and error could form a permanent union.From 1783 to 1789, the experience of the states proved that without a central federal power, they would go their separate ways and form separate states. In 1787 a constitutional assembly was held, only Twenty or thirty people attended, representing all thirteen states.Their rallies are not Congress, but a handful of sincere patriots bent on creating a federal government.Events discussed were recorded, but no bystanders were present at the meeting.The current U.S. Constitution was born out of this, and was soon approved by two-thirds of the states. This is nothing but an idea of ​​mine, suggesting that a so-called provisional government be established in India also, headed by a small number of representatives, including different classes, professions, religions and regions. This leading group will be recognized as a provisional self-government government.It will of course represent the existing British provincial governments and the council of princes, but my main point is to charge this body with a more permanent government for the country. The period of consideration can be extended to five or six years, or at least after the war year.I think that this central provisional governing body, which will replace the new dominions, should have executive and management powers in the public institutions, such as finance, railways, telegraphs, etc., and other institutions which we call public utilities. Perhaps from the problems and laborious efforts of the United States between 1783 and 1789 there may be a method by which India can be brought into a new perspective and the people there will forget their resentment and become dissatisfied with the changes of the British Empire. Be more loyal, emphasizing the dangers of Japanese domination while emphasizing the benefits of peaceful change over chaotic revolution. This kind of initiative is completely in line with the changing conditions of the world in the past half century and the democratic procedures of all countries fighting Nazism.I hope you, whatever your intention, the motion will be made in London, and be sure that there will be no unwilling or forced complaints in India.Although I am very willing to help, but for the sake of heaven, please don't bring me in.Strictly speaking, this matter has nothing to do with me, simply because it is an important part of the successful battle you and I are fighting. The document is interesting because it illustrates the difficulty of making comparisons in different eras and against almost entirely different backgrounds, and the dangers of trying to apply any superficial similarities to the conduct of war. On March 8, the Japanese Army entered Rangoon.Most of my colleagues agree that it is important to find ways to break the political deadlock if India's defense is to be organized effectively.India was often discussed in the War Cabinet.The British Government's response to the Anglo-Indian Government's proposal was embodied in a draft manifesto and it was decided to send Sir Cripps to India, where he would hold direct discussions with the Indian leaders. Prime Minister to Governor General of India March 10, 1942 1. I agree with your observation that if we recklessly throw out our manifesto without clarifying the similarities and differences between us and the Indian political parties, we will, as you rightly said, invite failure, and at this most critical moment Moment sparks a heated debate involving everyone.Before I saw your call yesterday, we had decided not to make any manifesto now, but to send a war minister there to see if it would be accepted, or else the effort should be wasted.Stafford Cripps volunteered his selfless spirit for this thankless and dangerous task.He will set off immediately.Despite our differences in approach, I have total confidence in his determination to defeat Hitler's gang at any cost.Announcing his dispatch would calm the feverish excitement and give sufficient time for the calm solution of the problem, which would otherwise prove temporarily insoluble. 2. The approved document will represent our unified policy.It was formulated in accordance with the interests of India. If the various parties in India refuse to accept it, then our sincerity will be made known to the world. If necessary, we will continue to fight together on this issue. 3. Therefore I would like you to wait for the arrival of the Keeper of the Seal before discussing the whole matter with him.Of course he would be bound by the draft declaration.The draft declaration is our highest standard.In addition, he will attach great importance to the current military and administrative situation in India. 4. Due to unfortunate rumours, propaganda, and general perception in the United States, it is bound to be impossible to take a purely negative position.Cripps' visit was necessary to let the world know our sincerity, and to buy time for the necessary agreements. V. My opinion is that nothing else matters except that Indian defense as an integral part of total victory must be successful and unshakable.Sir Stafford Cripps felt the same way. The next day, I published these resolutions. Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in Derry on March 22nd.Under his presidency, a lengthy discussion took place on the basis of a draft declaration approved by the British Cabinet.The point of the British proposal was that, should the Constituent Assembly demand it after the war, the British government would solemnly pledge to grant complete independence to India.Due to limited space, the entire negotiation process cannot be published here.Some calls from Sir Stafford Cripps will give a good indication of the outcome of the negotiations. Keeper of the Seal (in Delhi) to the Prime Minister April 11, 1942 1. Tonight I received a long letter from the chairman of the Congress Party, stating that the Congress Party cannot accept our proposal.The scope of the refusal is very wide, not only for the defense policy, although the Congress Party agrees that the commander-in-chief should have the freedom to control the command of the war, as well as the freedom to deal with related activities as the commander-in-chief and the military commissioner, but the proposed However, the plan has imposed too many restrictions on the duties of the National Defense Commissioner.However, the main reason for the refusal is that, according to the Congress Party, a national government must be established immediately, and without changing the principle of the constitution, it is clearly guaranteed and pointed out in the agreement that the new government will perform its duties as a free government. Its members will serve as cabinet ministers in a constitutional government.The letter also pointed out that the prospects for the currently proposed agreement are not very different from the old situation.When they see this old situation re-emerged, it is the object we conceive to produce a new influence on the psyche of the people, to make them feel that their national liberty has come, and that they are defending the newly won liberty. It will completely become a picture cake. The Congress Party cannot participate in such a thing. 2. Obviously there is no hope of reaching an agreement. I will leave for my country on Sunday. Another telegram on the same day was as follows: You will hear an almost new grounds for refusal from the Congress Party, but the difficult circumstances cannot be explained in the cables. Despite the situation here, we have done our best.I don't think you have to worry about my visit making things worse from a morale or public opinion point of view.I think the public mood has improved a little bit in recent days. As far as I can see, despite the failure, the surrounding situation has indeed improved somewhat. Nehru finally came out and made a beautifully written statement in favor of a total war against Japan.Jinnah assures me of the unwavering support of the Muslims; the Sikhs and other minorities in general will also moderate, and I hope there is some further assurance.The real difficulty lies in the internal mood of the Congress Party itself; thus, they exhibit lengthy discussions and indecision in decision-making. If we manage the situation wisely and don't point fingers at each other, the AIC committee on April 21 might change.This committee is far more representative than the working committee. Although the results are sad, we are not discouraged.We must now proceed to the defense of India.I will interview you on this point when I return.good luck.goodbye. In the intense day-to-day struggle for existence, with forty million helpless people to defend from the catastrophe of Japanese conquest, I could bear the news; Just think of this kind of thing from a philosophical reasoning.I knew that Stafford Cripps would be devastated by the loss of his mission, so I tried to comfort him. Prime Minister to Keeper of the Seal April 11, 1942 You have done everything in your power.The tenacity and tact you have shown is a testament to how strong the UK's desire to get a deal is!You must not be discouraged and disappointed by the ending.The effects produced throughout England and the United States have been extremely favorable.In fact, it is also advantageous for the rupture to occur on the broadest issues, rather than on unclear defenses.I am glad that you are returning home immediately, and a grand welcome awaits you.While you have not achieved all of your wishes, you have made a vital contribution to the common cause and laid the foundations for the future progress of the people of India. I immediately forwarded Cripps' first telegram of April 11 and my reply to President Roosevelt.He was frustrated by the collapse of the talks.He asked me to postpone Cripps' trip, hoping to make a last-ditch effort. President Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins (in London) April 12, 1942 Please forward the following message immediately to the ex-Navy personnel.We must do everything we can to avoid rupture. It is my most earnest hope that you will be able to postpone the date of Cripps' departure from India until a further effort can at last avert a breakdown in the negotiations. I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view you expressed in your telegram, which is that American public opinion believes that the negotiations have broken down on the most extensive issues.The general impression in America is exactly the opposite of what you said.There was an almost universal feeling here that, while the Indians were willing to delegate the prerogative of control of army and naval defenses to the British authorities in power, the British government was unwilling to confer autonomy to the Indians, and the resulting stalemate had arisen.It is impossible for American public opinion to understand why, if the British Government was willing to allow certain parts of India to withdraw from the British Empire after the war, why it could not grant the Indians an equal right of self-government during the war. I feel compelled to put this question to you very frankly, and you will presumably understand my reasons for doing so.If the present negotiations are allowed to break down on the basis of problems as the Americans see them, and if thereafter a successful Japanese invasion of India and the ensuing serious defeat of our army and navy, then the injustice of American public opinion The reaction will be difficult to estimate.Is it possible for you to put Cripps on hold and give him instructions yourself in a last-ditch effort to find a basis for mutual understanding?In my judgment, an agreement was likely to be reached last Thursday night.If you can allow him to claim that you personally authorized the reopening of negotiations with him on that issue, on the condition that both parties can make some small concessions, I think an agreement is still possible. As I told you in my earlier cable, I still believe that if the various constituent parts of India were now given the opportunity to form a national Same, and agreeing that at the end of a trial period the Indians may decide for themselves the form of their constitutional government and, as you promised earlier, their future relations with the British Empire, then perhaps a solution may be found.If you have done all you can, and Cripps still fails to come to an agreement, then, on this point at least, you will have the sympathy of American public opinion that the British Government has offered a fair and sincere proposal to the Indian people, so that, The responsibility for the failure obviously does not lie with the British government, but with the Indians. I am grateful for events that have prevented this frenzied approach from being realized.Humanity cannot progress without idealism; but such idealism cannot be considered noblest at the expense of others, and regardless of the consequences that will bring ruin and massacre to millions of innocent families.The President's mind went back to the days of the American Revolutionary War and saw the events in India as if the thirteen colonies were fighting George III at the end of the eighteenth century.Instead, I have peace and security responsibilities for the Indian continent, which protects almost one-fifth of the world's population.Our resources are limited and very stretched.Our army units retreated or surrendered to the ferocious Japanese attack.Our Navy has been driven out of the Bay of Bengal, and indeed most of the Indian Ocean.We were in the air and clearly at a disadvantage.But the chance and the hope of recovery still exist, so we cannot be irresponsible and allow the vast and ancient India which we have ruled for nearly two hundred years to be destroyed with terrible barbarism.Without a complete military regime and the power to control theaters, hope and opportunity will vanish.There was no time for a constitutional experiment, a trial period to determine the future relationship between Britain and India.The question which satisfies American public opinion is not the main determining factor.We cannot abdicate our responsibility to betray the people of India and allow them to go down the path of anarchy or subjugation.While this is also a policy, it is a disgraceful policy.In that we shall turn our backs not only on the Indian people but on our own soldiers, and let their bases of operations, along with the heroic Indian Army which they fought together, crumble in a chaos of garrulous politics and bloody demise.It is our duty to send all possible assistance to India's defense. Fortunately, after studying the problems concerning India, my main colleagues all agree with me.If it were not so, I would not hesitate to resign from my personal responsibilities, which sometimes cannot be borne by a single person.On such an occasion, the greatest consolation is no hesitation.My beliefs, and those of the War Cabinet, were self-evident, as will be seen in what follows. I sent the following call back to the President: Former Navy Personnel (at Checkers) to President Roosevelt April 12, 1942 Against your instructions (for Hopkins' health,) this morning (12th) about three o'clock, Harry and I were still talking about your call to settle the Indian question.I cannot take a decision on such a matter without a cabinet meeting, which in fact will not take place until next Monday.By this time Cripps had left India, and the full explanation had been made public by both parties.In this case, Harry promised to explain the situation to you over the phone, but was unable to do so due to the atmosphere.He will call you this afternoon and have a report by wire to you. You know, I always value everything you say to me.However, if all things were to be dealt with again at this critical juncture, I feel that I cannot take on the responsibility of defending India.我確信這也是內閣及議會的觀點。你的來電稱呼是給前海軍人員的,因此我把它當作純粹私人信件保存著,同時我不打算將它在內閣正式公開,除非你告訴我,你願意這麼做。像你我之間有嚴重分歧的那些事,將使我心碎,在這可怕的鬥爭高潮中,必然會深深地傷害我們兩個國家。 四月十二日,斯塔福德‧克里普斯爵士乘飛機離開德里返英。兩星期後,全印國大黨委員會召開會議,堅持工作委員會在與掌璽大臣商談時所採取的方針。他們堅持國大黨不可能考慮讓英國保留即使是部分地對印度控制的任何計劃與建議。英國必須放棄它在印度的勢力。 正如斯塔福德‧克里普斯所預言的那樣,博學的尼赫魯主張決心要抵抗日本。在克里普斯調查團離開的翌日,他說: 我們不會去向入侵者投降。不管已經發生的情況怎樣,我們不會妨礙英國在印度的戰爭努力。我們的問題乃是如何將自己組織起來。他幾乎是完全孤立的。絕大多數國大黨領袖歸屬甘地的絕對和平主義。甘地五月十日在他的報紙上寫道:英國之存在於印度乃是日本向印度進攻的一張請帖。他們的撤離將使這個餌子消失。不過,假定餌子未能消除,自由的印度將會更有能力地去應付進攻。真正的不合作主義則將充分發揮力量。
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